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Resumen 
Los tres rasgos principales que caracterizan al período de la Primera Globalización –desde 
mediados del siglo XIX hasta, al menos, la Primera Guerra Mundial (PGM)– son la expansión de la 
economía atlántica, desde la Europa industrial (the core) hacia la periferia occidental de reciente 
colonización europea; la incorporación de regiones “nuevas” en la economía global; y la creciente 
integración de los mercados de bienes y factores a escala mundial. La presente investigación se 
focaliza, precisamente, en las regiones de reciente asentamiento europeo (settler economies)  
–Argentina, Australia, Canadá, Chile, Nueva Zelanda y Uruguay– durante ese período, al constituir 
sociedades cuyos desarrollos recorrieron sendas similares que las transforman en un grupo de 
economías comparable. Se trata de un club con abundancia de recursos naturales, sujeto a dinámicas 
semejantes en términos de olas de inmigración, marginalización de poblaciones nativas, flujos de 
capital europeo, trabajo libre (al menos, desde la segunda mitad del siglo), instituciones social y 
políticamente funcionales a la expansión económica y con la constitución de una suerte de culturas 
“neo-europeas” que caracterizarían sus pautas de desarrollo de largo plazo. Los resultados fueron 
variados. Canadá y Australia se transformaron en economías exitosas y Nueva Zelanda, pese a su 
pequeño mercado interno y la elevada participación de commodities en su pauta exportadora, 
también logró posicionarse en el grupo de países de alto bienestar. Por su parte, las economías del 
Cono Sur Sudamericano fueron menos afortunadas, comportaron trayectorias irregulares y 
quedaron rezagadas frente a los líderes mundiales. En estos términos, ellas constituyen el “fracaso” 
de aquel club que, hacia finales del siglo XIX, mostraba promisorias expectativas de desarrollo 
dentro de un patrón de desenvolvimiento aparentemente común. De todos modos, y sin discutir la 
veracidad de esto último, al interior del club se evidenciaban discrepancias que no resultaban 
ajenas, incluso, para los contemporáneos. Las economías de ascendencia anglosajona eran más ricas 
–en cuanto a producto per cápita–, tenían una mayor presencia de las manufacturas en la estructura 
productiva y estaban sujetas a un proceso de deterioro en la distribución del ingreso menos intenso 
en comparación con los settlers asociados a la tradición española.  
Es usual en la literatura recurrir a las diferencias institucionales entre un grupo de economías y el 
otro para explicar el dispar comportamiento. Se contrasta el set de organizaciones, derechos y 
privilegios, la estabilidad económica y política, así como el enforcement de los derechos de 
propiedad de las excolonias españolas y británicas. Repetidamente aparece el disorder de las 
primeras contra el order de las segundas (en los trabajos de Douglas North) o los desarrollos a la 
“South American way” de las primeras (como señalara David Landes). La motivación inicial de esta 
investigación es, precisamente, avanzar en el conocimiento de estas diferencias al interior de un 
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club cuyos miembros parecen similares en cuanto a trayectorias históricas y perfiles productivos, 
pero que han mostrado desenvolvimientos tan dispares en el largo plazo. 
Muchas regiones de Sudamérica, Oceanía y África se beneficiaron de las consecuencias de la 
Segunda Revolución Industrial –la extensión del ferrocarril, mejoras técnicas referidas a la 
refrigeración y la caída en el coste de los transportes interoceánicos–  y, gracias a sus tierras fértiles 
y clima templado, se posicionaron como ricas proveedoras de producción agropecuaria para los 
centros industriales del mundo. La abundancia de recursos naturales les permitió ingresar en una 
senda de crecimiento sostenido en las décadas previas a la PGM hasta alcanzar niveles de ingreso 
per cápita similares a los de las economías del core. La “bendición” de los recursos naturales 
aparece, en estos términos, como un argumento casi inapelable y, como tal, constituyó una 
explicación clave del desempeño de estas economías durante largo tiempo. Sin embargo, desde los 
años noventa (del siglo XX), se ha desarrollado una nueva literatura dentro de la Teoría del 
Desarrollo que se identifica con la que se denomina la hipótesis de la “maldición de los recursos 
naturales”, una suerte de compleja paradoja en la cual los países ricos en capital natural presentarían 
tasas de crecimiento menores a la de países pobres en ese tipo de recursos. La discusión se ha ido 
trasladando hacia un campo en el cual se admiten influencias mixtas y donde se ha trascendido la 
sola consideración del crecimiento económico para incorporar tópicos más próximos a la noción de 
desarrollo como pobreza, educación y distribución del ingreso. Dentro de este renovado enfoque, 
varios procesos son considerados como condicionales a la estructura institucional, dentro de un 
contexto en el cual la “maldición” ha dejado de ser un efecto inevitable, sino propio de 
determinadas circunstancias. En este sentido, las settler economies, caracterizadas por su 
abundancia de recursos naturales y dominadas por la ocurrencia de procesos que la literatura 
identifica con los hechos estilizados del período –fuerte expansión económica liderada por las 
exportaciones, primarización de la estructura productiva y deterioro en la distribución del ingreso– 
constituyen una suerte de “experimento natural” donde utilizar el debate “maldición-bendición” 
como línea argumental. 
La literatura reciente sobre la expansión de la economía atlántica durante la Primera 
Globalización utiliza el teorema de Stolper-Samuelson, dentro la teoría de comercio de Heckscher-
Ohlin, para explicar la performance de las economías del “Nuevo Mundo” (particularmente, los 
trabajos de Jeffrey Williamson y sus seguidores). Esta estructura conceptual resulta útil para 
explicar aquellos tres hechos estilizados, aunque poco permite argumentar respecto a la dispar 
evolución al interior de los países miembros del club. Dentro de un patrón similar durante el 
período, pone el énfasis en las relaciones económicas internacionales y la formación de precios, 
pero sin prestar mayor atención a las condiciones domésticas. Por esa razón, en esta investigación 
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se utiliza un enfoque analítico alternativo, en la tradición de la staple thesis para complementar 
aquella visión y articularla con la denominada appropriability hypothesis que se deriva de la 
literatura de la curse of the natural resources en su enfoque institucional. 
Esta aproximación propone un enfoque diferente al estándar en la literatura y permite discutir 
aspectos claves de la Primera Globalización en términos de la expansión endógena de la frontera de 
tierra, diferenciales de productividad intersectoriales y distintas evoluciones en la distribución 
(funcional) del ingreso. La “contribución doméstica” al crecimiento económico fue, precisamente, 
la incorporación de tierra (de calidad variable) a la producción y ello tuvo consecuencias 
determinantes en el cambio estructural, la evolución de las tasas de retribución a los factores 
productivos y en la cantidad e intensidad de su utilización. Sin embargo, las dotaciones de recursos 
naturales y su efectiva explotación no representan la historia completamente. La expansión de la 
frontera estuvo estrechamente relacionada con la constitución y distribución de los derechos de 
propiedad sobre la tierra y, en consecuencia, con la conformación de las reglas de juego y los 
mecanismos de incentivos que regularían la actividad agropecuaria. Por lo tanto, la calidad de la 
tierra y la calidad de las instituciones (ligadas con ésta) constituyen ejes centrales de la 
argumentación. En este sentido, la idea fuerza es que la mera existencia de abundantes recursos 
naturales no explica el éxito o la prosperidad de los miembros del club. En efecto, no fue solamente 
el descubrimiento de recursos naturales o de oportunidades comerciales para su utilización sino 
también la intensidad de su explotación y la distribución de las rentas asociadas a ello las que 
crearon (o no) un escenario apropiado para el desarrollo. En este sentido, la argumentación procura 
indagar en las condiciones que convierten a los recursos naturales en un proceso endógeno al 
desenvolvimiento económico. 
De acuerdo a esta estructura conceptual y a la revisión bibliográfica realizada, y prestando 
especial atención a los hechos estilizados de la Primera Globalización para las economías de 
reciente asentamiento europeo de clima templado, se propone focalizar la investigación en tres 
cuestiones principales: (i) la expansión endógena de la frontera; (ii) la influencia de la calidad de la 
tierra en el desempeño económico; y (iii) la interacción entre la abundancia de recursos naturales y 
la calidad institucional. Para avanzar sobre estos tópicos, se plantea trabajar en tres direcciones: (i) 
diseñar un modelo analítico apropiado para abordar las preguntas e hipótesis; (ii) operacionalizar 
dos de los principales conceptos y variables de interés: la expansión de la frontera y la distribución 
funcional del ingreso; (iii) proponer ejercicios empíricos y descripciones detalladas para entender 
las relaciones entre recursos naturales y calidad institucional (hipótesis de apropiabilidad). 
El Capítulo 2 está dedicado a la presentación del marco conceptual y el modelo de análisis. 
Trabajando dentro de la tradición de los modelos de factores específicos y tomando una propuesta 
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de Ronald Findlay y Mats Lundahl de 1994, se la extiende para incorporar la calidad de la tierra 
como elemento adicional en la argumentación, dentro de una lógica de expansión endógena de la 
frontera (esto es, de incorporación de abundantes recursos naturales a la producción) y reglas de 
decisión pautadas por el coste de oportunidad de esa expansión. Se asumen formulaciones 
específicas de las ecuaciones del modelo y se propone un análisis numérico para representar los 
cambios en el producto (total y sectorial), la especialización productiva y la distribución funcional 
del ingreso ante modificaciones en los precios relativos de los productos o en las dotaciones de 
factores productivos (trabajo y capital). Bajo estas condiciones, es posible explicar desempeños 
dispares entre economías similares que se diferencian en la intensidad de incorporación de tierra de 
diferente calidad y que, por lo tanto, rinde diferenciales de retribución a sus propietarios. La 
ampliación de la brecha entre rentas de la tierra y salarios que caracterizó al período –y que tan bien 
ha sido reportada en la literatura reciente– depende, precisamente, de la efectiva existencia de 
tierras capaces de generar esos retornos para ser apropiados y cuyo volumen resultaría mayor 
cuanto mejores (de más alta calidad) fueran éstas. Sin embargo, la captura de rentas por parte de los 
agentes está sujeta al sistema de propiedad de la tierra imperante y, para su análisis, se propone 
utilizar la appropriability hypothesis. Se entiende este concepto en cuanto al contexto que ambienta 
la capacidad que tiene un agente innovador de apropiarse de las rentas de una innovación y que, en 
nuestros términos, significa interpretar al sistema de propiedad de la tierra como el marco de 
actuación de los agentes que incorporan tierra “nueva” y se hacen de las rentas –antes inexistentes– 
que ella genera. En otras palabras, además de la existencia de tierra capaz de generar rentas 
diferenciales respecto a la retribución de otros factores productivos, se requiere de una estructura 
institucional que legitime esa apropiación, la que tendrá, por razones técnicas e institucionales, 
consecuencias particulares en los miembros del club. 
De la discusión propuesta en el Capítulo 2, dos cuestiones son claves para el análisis: la 
expansión de la frontera y la evolución en la distribución del ingreso, y se dedican los próximos dos 
capítulos para la operacionalización de ambos conceptos.  
En el Capítulo 3, se presentan distintas nociones y medidas de la expansión de la frontera durante 
el período para identificar “patrones de asentamiento” en el territorio. La medición del proceso se 
realiza a través de sistemas de información georeferenciada (GIS, por su sigla en inglés) y la 
elaboración de índices de expansión denominados “extensivos”, “intensivos” y “de contribución”. 
Estos indicadores recogen la disponibilidad de activos potencialmente utilizables (ofrecen una 
medida de riqueza) en la producción agropecuaria, considerando diferentes aptitudes (“alta”, 
“media” y “baja”) para la producción de pasturas (grassland) y distancia (únicamente evaluado para 
el caso de Argentina). Se identifica dos patrones de asentamiento. En el Cono Sur Sudamericano, 
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las tierras que realizaron las mayores contribuciones a la expansión fueron las de alta calidad y, por 
lo menos en el Río de la Plata, se trataron de procesos sostenidos en el tiempo. Esta dinámica 
contrastó con la de Australia y Canadá. En el primer caso, la expansión fue previa al boom de 
precios (de la última década del siglo) y transcurrió, fundamentalmente, por tierras de baja calidad. 
En el segundo, recién fue notorio hacia el cambio de siglo y abarcó, con similar intensidad, a todos 
los tipos de tierra. Por su parte, Nueva Zelanda comportó rasgos de ambos patrones. Al igual que en 
Australia, el proceso fue más intenso antes de la mejora sistemática de los términos de intercambio 
y, como en Canadá, los tres tipos de tierra estuvieron involucrados en la expansión. Por lo tanto, y 
atendiendo a nuestro marco conceptual, los efectos más notorios de la Primera Globalización en 
términos de deterioro en la distribución del ingreso debieron haberse constado en el Cono Sur. La 
discrepancia entre la tasa de renta y la tasa de salario habría tenido mayor espacio para expresarse y 
ello se habría reforzado con una incorporación sostenida de tierra a la producción (en Argentina y 
Uruguay). Para testear la presunción derivada del marco teórico, es necesario contar con 
estimaciones de la evolución de la distribución del ingreso, lo que es materia del próximo capítulo. 
En el Capítulo 4, se trabaja sobre dos dimensiones de la desigualdad en el sector agropecuario. 
Por un lado, se calculan indicadores de desigualdad en la tenencia del principal activo de la 
actividad, la tierra, en vísperas de la PGM y se encuentra un panorama complejo, donde la 
identificación de patrones no es inmediata y toma relevancia considerar diferenciales regionales. 
Uruguay y la zona pampeana argentina parecen presentar un patrón similar, de alta desigualdad, 
aunque menor a la del norte argentino, la zona de Cuyo y Chile donde, probablemente, la larga 
herencia colonial impuso una estructura de la propiedad altamente concentrada. En forma 
consistente con este último punto, se presentan discrepancias entre las zonas inicialmente 
colonizadas de Australasia (Victoria, New South Wales, Queesland y Nueva Zelanda) con las de 
asentamiento más reciente (South Australia y Western Australia) y políticas explícitas de 
intensificación y desconcentración de la propiedad. Este último patrón es el seguido por Canadá en 
su expansión de la frontera hacia el oeste, donde las provincias de Manitoba, Saskatchewan y 
Alberta presentan los menores indicadores de desigualdad del club. Por otro lado, se estima la 
distribución funcional del ingreso (rentas, salarios y beneficios) en el sector agropecuario de cada 
uno de los settlers  y su evolución decadarial entre 1870 y la PGM. Dentro de un patrón general de 
deterioro de la distribución que se hizo notorio desde la Primera Globalización –bajo el entendido 
de que los asalariados constituían la mayor parte de la población–, se observa un incremento 
relativo de las rentas de la tierra en la estructura distributiva (“rental drifts”) que fue 
significativamente más notorio en el Cono Sur Sudamericano y donde, además, se consolidó un 
patrón “rentista” de la producción. En contraste, en los otros miembros del club se evidenció una 
participación mucho mayor de los beneficios en Canadá y de los salarios en Australasia, lo que 
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señala un funcionamiento mucho más fluido de los mercados de factores, la posibilidad de crear 
mercados de bienes más amplios y reducir los efectos tipo crowding-out que suelen “maldecir” a las 
economías ricas en recursos naturales.  
Finalmente, considerando el marco teórico y el modelo de análisis presentados en el Capítulo 2 y 
la operacionalización de variables claves propuesta en los Capítulos 3 y 4, el Capítulo 5 está 
dedicado al testeo de algunas de las principales hipótesis. Se discute el efecto de la abundancia de 
recursos naturales sobre el desarrollo económico a través de la interacción entre el tipo de tierra y la 
calidad de sus instituciones. Como proxy del primer punto, se utiliza la contribución de la tierra de 
alta, media y baja calidad a la expansión de la frontera concepto de riqueza potencial). En el 
segundo caso, se utilizan dos aproximaciones. Una de ellas es básicamente cuantitativa, donde se 
utilizan indicadores estándar en la literatura sobre calidad institucional (“constraints on the 
executive” del programa Polity IV y contract-intensive money como proxy al enforcement de los 
contratos y el cumplimiento de los derechos de propiedad). La otra es de corte más cualitativo y 
refiere a la descripción histórica de la conformación y distribución de los derechos de propiedad 
sobre la tierra, desde comienzos del siglo XIX hasta la PGM, en cuatro miembros del club: 
Argentina y Uruguay (representantes de la tradición española) y Australia y Nueva Zelanda 
(asociados al patrón anglosajón). Estas dos aproximaciones determinan, a su vez, dos enfoques 
metodológicos. Por un lado, en lo que se denomina enfoque macro, se proponen ejercicios 
econométricos con datos de panel para contrastar las hipótesis de la maldición y de la 
apropiabilidad en la actividad agropecuaria y, por otro, bajo un enfoque más próximo a la conducta 
de los agentes, se propone un relato histórico guiado por la appropriability hypothesis para 
identificar diferentes patrones de asentamiento en ambas regiones (Río de la Plata y Australasia).  
El primer ejercicio permite no rechazar la hipótesis de la maldición de los recursos naturales en 
cuanto a la producción agrícola, aunque sí se refuta cuando se la evalúa en términos de la 
distribución del ingreso. En otras palabras, fronteras abiertas –grandes riqueza de tierra sin 
explotar– estarían asociadas con reducidas capacidades de producción, pero con sociedades de 
menor desigualdad. La calidad institucional, interactuando con los recursos naturales o sin hacerlo, 
contribuirían positivamente, moderando la maldición o potenciando la bendición. Asimismo, se 
encuentra evidencia a favor de la appropriability hypothesis en su dimensión técnica cuando se 
considera como variable dependiente la inequidad, pero se la rechaza en el caso de explicar la 
producción. Esto es, expandir la frontera más intensivamente por las mejores tierras (las que ofrecen 
las posibilidades de apropiar mayores rentas) contribuye con la producción agropecuaria, pero 
deteriora más significativamente la distribución. ¿Cuáles son las consecuencias en el largo plazo de 
estos hallazgos? En la medida que la riqueza natural tiende a agotarse –en forma irregular y a 
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diferente ritmo aunque, evidentemente, es un recurso finito–, de algún modo, nuestras economías 
“escaparían de la maldición” de la baja producción en el agro pero, simultáneamente, dejarían atrás 
la bendición de la frontera abierta para evolucionar por una trayectoria de persistente inequidad. 
Cuanto más intensivo fue el avance de la frontera por las mejores tierras –como el caso del Río de 
la Plata y el Chile– más agudo resultó el deterioro en la distribución del ingreso agropecuario.  
De acuerdo al segundo enfoque, se confirma que la cuestión de la tenencia de la tierra fue 
extremadamente importante en la economía política de los settlers, y nuestro énfasis es puesto en 
identificar la propiedad de la tierra como una función, antes que como un derecho. Las instituciones 
formales que gobernaron la distribución de la propiedad y la conducta de los agentes involucrados 
(efectiva o potencialmente) no fueron extremadamente diferentes entre el Río de la Plata y 
Australasia. Las regulaciones fueron escritas con el mismo tipo de preocupaciones, siguiendo el 
modelo norteamericano, y los agentes se comportaron de acuerdo a sus propios intereses, creando 
mecanismos para obtener la mayor cantidad posible de tierra al menor coste y tomar ventaja frente a 
otros cuando las circunstancias así lo permitían. Las mayores diferencias entre ambos sistemas 
derivaron de la debilidad de los gobiernos del Río de Plata para lograr el cumplimiento de las 
regulaciones en un contexto en el cual las elites sustentaban su poder en la propiedad de la tierra. En 
cambio, los gobiernos en Australasia crearon contextos de colonización más favorables y 
dispusieron acciones más próximas a una noción de desarrollo. Éstas fueron empapando la 
conciencia colectiva dentro de un ambiente política y financieramente más estable y una 
homogeneidad social bien sustentada en los valores de una idiosincrasia común. Las diferencias 
entre ambas regiones no se situaron tan claramente en la propiedad de activos como en la 
distribución del ingreso, lo que señala el predominio de mercados de factores mejor integrados y 
donde salarios y beneficios contribuyeron con la creación de una clase media más amplia y 
temprana. Las condiciones negativas de la apropiabilidad presentaron su carácter más adverso en el 
Río de la Plata, aunque ellas no impidieron la expansión productiva, sino que determinaron una 
concentración más aguda del ingreso y con un claro perfil rentista. Las consecuencias adversas 
sobre la producción llegarán en las décadas venideras, cuando estas economías afronten el cambio 
estructural sobre estructuras distributivas dispares y donde la amplitud de los mercados internos  
dirá mucho de la performance en los procesos de industrialización. 
En definitiva, nuestras contribuciones se resumen en seis puntos: (i) Se plantea la extensión de un 
modelo analítico en la tradición de la staple thesis para incorporar, conceptualmente, la influencia 
de las distintas calidades de tierra en el desempeño económico. Asumiendo formas funcionales 
específicas, se propone un análisis numérico del modelo y se realizan ejercicios de calibración y 
simulación para interpretar la incidencia de los movimientos de distintas variables del sistema; (ii) 
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Se realiza una aplicación de la curse hypothesis en perspectiva histórica y, de acuerdo a la 
appropriability hypothesis, se relaciona la expansión de la frontera con la formación de arreglos 
institucionales en términos de un gradiente de apropiabilidad de rentas asociadas con diferente 
calidad de las tierras; (iii) Se discute y mide el concepto de land frontier expansion mediante el uso 
de herramientas relativamente novedosas en la disciplina (GIS); (iv) Se realizan estimaciones 
originales de la distribución funcional del ingreso en la actividad agropecuaria, por décadas, desde 
1870 hasta la PGM. (v) Se proponen ejercicios econométricos de carácter indicativo para testear las 
hipótesis que, sin llegar a ser concluyentes, arrojan evidencia que permite avanzar en la 
interpretación; (vi) Se ofrece una panorámica histórica del desarrollo de los derechos de la 
propiedad de la tierra en el Río de la Plata y en Australasia desde comienzos del siglo XIX hasta la 
PGM. Se presta especial atención a la formación de los sistemas de propiedad y a la conducta de los 
agentes, con especial énfasis en el rol del estado y de los grupos sociales involucrados. 
Como disciplina, la Historia Económica tiene una virtud incuestionable, que es la de permitir 
colocar al análisis económico en perspectiva histórica para comprender las especificidades de los 
sucesos y captar aquellos fenómenos que forman parte de expresiones más profundas e insertas en 
la estructura socio-económica. En este sentido, esta Tesis se presenta en un momento que resulta 
conveniente por sus puntos de contacto con ciertos procesos que experimenta la economía 
internacional. En los últimos seis años, ésta ha mostrado una fortaleza de los precios de los 
commodities que no se evidenciaba desde, al menos, mediados del siglo XX. Ello ha significado 
mejoras muy importantes en los términos de intercambio de un grupo amplio de economías en 
desarrollo, algunas de las cuales son, precisamente, las mismas que protagonizaron la edad de oro 
de la Primera Globalización. En particular, las economías del Cono Sur han sostenido procesos de 
expansión muy significativos, basados en exportaciones de productos de base primaria que mucho 
recuerda a procesos que sucedieron hace más de un siglo atrás. Como entonces, se trata de 
economías cuyas instituciones contribuyen con la expansión productiva –pues la definición de los 
derechos de propiedad y su enforcement podían considerarse casi tan aceptables para ese propósito 
hacia finales del siglo XIX como hoy día–, pero cuya calidad institucional poco logra incidir en el 
patrón distributivo. El perfil rentista de sus sociedades, modalidades de crecimiento aún 
concentradoras y la desatención a un manejo prudente de las rentas de los recursos naturales –que 
evite efectos crowding out como los discutidos en este trabajo– son preocupaciones que hoy 
parecen tan vigentes como antes. Obviamente que la expansión de la frontera ha perdido su carácter 
extensivo y el desafío está cifrado en avanzar en la intensificación de su uso –algunos autores 
hablan de la expansión “vertical” de la frontera– sin comprometer, en ese proceso, la sostenibilidad 
medioambiental del desarrollo. En definitiva, se trata de una articulación entre calidad institucional 
y progreso tecnológico que permita endogenizar la propia abundancia de recursos naturales. 
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Chapter 1 
Presentation and introduction 
1. Motivation and initial questions 
1.1 Motivation: the unequal evolution between “equals” 
We can identify three main features of the First Globalization: the expansion of the Atlantic 
economy from the mid-19th century onwards, the incorporation of new regions into the global 
economy and the formation of markets for goods and productive factors in a world scale. We focus 
our analysis on regions of recent European settlement (as the League of Nations would call them, or 
briefly “settler economies”) in that period. The so-called “settler economies” of the 19th and 20th 
century seem to have some common characteristics that make comparisons between them possible. 
Their economic and social development followed parallel paths because they had similar dynamic 
relations between waves of immigration, the marginalization of native people, European capital 
inflows, land abundance, free labour (at least after the mid-19th century), socially-useful political 
institutions and neo-European cultures (Lloyd & Metzer, 2006). By the late 19th century they were 
well integrated into the global economy and, in fact, the main settler areas in North America, 
southern South America, Australasia and the southern and northern regions of Africa became 
essential to the development of the global economy associated with the Second Industrial 
Revolution.  
The settler economies that we consider in this research coincide with the group of countries that 
Lewis (1983:209) identifies as “template economies” that includes Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
Chile, New Zealand, South Africa, the US and Uruguay. According to Foreman-Peck (1995:105), 
these economies are “the group of non-European countries which at the [beginning of the] twentieth 
century can be classified as developed”. However, for the main part of this study we exclude two of 
these countries because they present some distinct characteristics that can make the comparison 
difficult. US can be considered the leader of the group as it is sometimes studied as a settler 
economy but had an earlier industrial trajectory that marks it off from the others. South Africa was 
different from the group as regards levels of activity and economic growth and showed important 
lags with regard the other economies. For these reasons these two economies fall outside our 
sample, and we will consider the other six countries as the “club” of settler economies.1 
The “golden age” of the settler societies was the First Globalization era (1870-1913), a process 
characterized by the integration of the world markets for goods and productive factors, 
                                                 
1 Willebald (2006) presents an analysis of the evolution of settler economies in the long run (1870-2000) that includes 
both economies. 
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convergence, free trade and peace. At the beginning of the 20th century these societies seemed to 
have a promising future, but as became evident after World War II (WWII), the results fell short of 
the first expectations in several cases (Willebald, 2007, and Willebald & Bértola, 2011). 
In the 20th century the main problem for these economies was how to deal with the transition 
from a settler society to some form of post-settler configuration and they took different paths and 
adapted to the new context with different degrees of success. They began to adapt after World War I 
(WWI), which was a catastrophic shock to the world economic system and disrupted trade, capital 
and labour flows. Efforts after the war to re-establish financial stability coincided with a boom in 
commodity prices and the recovery in capital flows, so those profound changes were hidden for a 
few years. However, world trade collapsed again in the 1930s, even higher trade barriers were 
established and preferential blocs came into being, and this pushed the settler economies into the 
Great Depression. And then, before international trade had recovered the dynamism it lost in the 
crisis, WWII broke out, and this was another heavy blow to the settler societies. Later, the Bretton 
Woods arrangements favoured areas that could industrialize enough to escape to some extent the 
settler trap of commodity-dependence. Outcomes varied; Canada did this successfully, Australia 
was relatively successful and in New Zealand, with its very small internal market and greater 
reliance on agricultural exports, success was more limited. However, the Southern South American 
area was less fortunate and struggled to make the transition (Lloyd & Metzer, 2006). Therefore, “in 
this characterization, the South American Southern Cone countries were the ‘failure’ in the settler 
club, with slower development paths and lower living standards” (Willebald, 2007:295; our 
translation). 
In recent literature, the discrepancies in terms of development within the club have been 
explained by the institutional matrix that produces a set of organizations, rights and privileges; the 
stability of the structure of exchange relationships in political and economic markets; and a state 
that provides (or not) a set of political rules and promote the enforcement of rights. In general, 
studies contrast the experience of Latin America vs. North America and they propose concepts as 
disorder vs. order in the economic change (North et al., 2000), the “South American way” (Landes, 
1998:Ch. 20), cultural heritage (North, 2003) and different ways of organizing a society (a social 
order) identified with a “limited access order” (North et al., 2010). The application of these 
concepts to contrast the South American Southern Cone countries with the ex-English colonies is 
straightforward. However, this comparison is not new and many contemporary people were aware 
of important differences between these regions.  
In 1831, the British Secretary of State wrote to the Governor of New South Wales that, 
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“[n]othing could be more unfortunate than the formation of a race of men, wandering with 
their cattle over an extensive region of the interior, and losing like the descendants of the 
Spaniards in the Pampas of South America, almost all traces of their original civilization” 
(quoted in Williams, 1975:67).  
In 1852, Juan María Alberdi ask for himself,  
“Do we want to implant and acclimatize in America the English liberty, the French culture, 
and the diligence of people from Europe and United States?  Bring alive pieces of them in 
the customary of the inhabitants and settle here. Do we want that habits of order, discipline 
and industry prevail in our America? Fill up with people in possession of these habits. They 
are communicative ones; beside the European manufacturer the American industrial soon is 
formed” (Alberdi, 1852:90; own translation). 
The main motivation of our research is to gain an insight into these differences within this group 
of countries that seem quite similar as regards their histories and productive profiles, but present so 
different long-run developments. Based on these discrepancies of their long-run trajectories we 
contrast two models of development that, although we identify with the colonial origin, we go 
further and propose an analytical framework where the quality of natural endowments and 
institutional arrangements interact. How did this resemblance operate historically? Many parts of 
South America, Oceania and Africa benefited from the consequences of the Second Industrial 
Revolution (the spread of railways, the introduction of refrigeration, a big fall in inter-ocean 
transport costs) as their temperate climate and fertile soils were especially suitable for the 
production of meat, wheat, wool and various other commodities. Their natural resource 
endowments enabled them to take a fast track to expansion and, in the eve of WWI, they reached 
levels of income per capita on a par with the richest economies in the world. Their abundance of 
natural resources was understood as a “blessing” –in the sense of the “staples thesis” or the “vent 
for surplus theory”– as these countries were able to participate in external trade with resources that 
were hitherto almost unexploited and for which international demand, mainly from European 
countries, was dynamic and strong. Positive relationship between natural capital and economic 
performance was clear and this idea formed an extended consensus among scholars. However, in 
recent years, and particularly since the 1990s, perceptions of the connection between abundant 
natural resources and economic development have changed. 
A new literature has developed, inspired by the work of Sachs & Warner (1995, 1999a, b), which 
focuses on the so-called “resource curse hypothesis”, a puzzling paradox whereby resource-rich 
countries tend to grow more slowly than resource-poor ones. Why is an abundance of natural 
resources so often related to deficient economic performance in the last decades? Is an abundance 
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of natural resources a curse on economic development? Is this negative association a general pattern 
or does it depend on the technological and institutional structure of the economies? Is it a general 
pattern or does it depend on the conditions of supply and demand in a given historical situation? 
Evidently, in the context of the settler economies in the First Globalization, it is difficult to think 
about the topic in terms of one-way relationships. The First Globalization was a period in which the 
settler economies developed primary productive specialization and this fostered not only growth but 
also increasing inequality. Therefore we cannot label an abundance of natural capital as a complete 
blessing or a complete curse. When the settler economies were exposed to the effects of the First 
Globalization they took advantage of their abundant natural resources and received the blessing of 
their natural capital. These economies grew quickly in the closing decades of the 19th century up to 
WWI thanks to favourable international conditions, represented by a dynamic external demand and 
plentiful productive factors flows (labour and capital). However, and taking an old expression of 
Barran & Nahum (1978):189 (own translation), “the blessing was diabolical” because these 
countries underwent a persistent process of worsening income distribution. In the current theoretical 
and empirical literature about the “curse hypothesis” the possibility of mixed influences is discussed 
and there are wider perspectives that introduce considerations other than economic growth, such as 
poverty, education and inequality. These new issues –where institutional arrangements play a 
central role– constitute a useful framework to understand settler development.  
The recent literature on the evolution of the Atlantic economy during the First Globalization uses 
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem from the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory (H-O-S) to explain the 
performance of the New World economies (Lindert & Williamson, 2001; O’Rourke, Taylor & 
Williamson, 1996; O’Rourke & Williamson, 1994, 1999; Taylor & Williamson, 1997; Williamson, 
1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2002). This framework can be used to explain the three stylized facts of 
the period –economic growth, primary specialization, worsening income distribution– and it 
emphasizes international economic relationships and the formation of prices, but it does not pay 
enough attention to domestic conditions. For this reason we are interested in an alternative 
analytical approach based on the so-called “staple thesis” and the “vent for surplus theory” 
supplemented with topics derived from the appropriability hypothesis as a way to gain new insights 
into the phenomenon. 
Our approach has a different focus of recent standard analyses that enables us to discuss key 
aspects of the First Globalization in terms of the endogenous expansion of the land frontier, 
differentials in sector productivities and different evolutions in functional income distribution. The 
“domestic contribution” to economic growth was the incorporation of “new” land (of variable 
quality) into production, and this had consequences for structural change, the evolution of income 
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rates and the quantity and intensity of the use of productive factors. However, natural endowments 
are not the whole story. The expansion of the land frontier was related to the constitution of land 
ownership rights and, consequently, to the establishment of different land ownership systems and 
different incentive mechanisms associated with them.2 These differences in land frontier expansion 
and the corresponding formation of the institutional arrangements governing it are one of the main 
factors that in explaining why the income and distributive pattern in the different settler economies 
evolved in different ways. Land quality and institutional quality are central elements in our 
analytical and empirical approach. Our guiding concept in this Thesis is that the mere existence of 
abundant natural resources can not explain the success or prosperity of the settler economies. 
Indeed, it was not only the discovery of natural resources or of commercial opportunities to utilize 
them but also the rate of exploitation and the distribution of rents that acted together to create the 
conditions for economic development (McLean, 2004). Therefore we will focus on the 
transformation of natural resources as an endogenous process (David and Wright, 1997) that 
explains the evolution of these economies and their structures in productive and distributive terms.  
1.2 Initial questions and hypotheses 
The settler economies based their production on primary activities but in spite of this, around the 
time of WWI, they achieved levels of development close to the (industrialized) “core” of the world 
economy, and thus their abundance of natural resources could represent a blessing. But this blessing 
was accompanied by a persistent worsening in income distribution and the persistence of the 
primary specialization. Moreover, evolution in the countries of the “club” was heterogeneous and 
results differed. Income per capita was higher (they were “richer” economies) and inequality 
worsened less in the ex-British colonies (Australia, New Zealand and Canada) than in the ex-
Spanish colonies (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay), and manufactures developed more in the former 
than in the latter. In some sense, the blessing was greater and the curse less damning in the British 
colonies than in the Spanish ones. Therefore our initial question is as follows: Is an abundance of 
natural resources a curse or a blessing for economic performance? The general strategy in our 
research is to apply this question to the settler economies during the First Globalization (and note 
that we understand “economic performance” in terms of economic growth, specialization, and 
income distribution) and to pay special attention to differences within the “club”. More specifically, 
our main question is: Why did product, the productive structure and income distribution evolve 
                                                 
2  An understanding of the dynamic of frontiers would have to include considerations of frontier peoples and 
institutions at specific times and places. Our study of Latin American countries in the colonial era would have to 
consider institutions introduced by the Spanish and Portuguese to extend their empires in the New World, such as the 
religious mission, the encomienda, the military, the town and the family (Weber & Rausch, 1994). However, these 
institutions are characteristic of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries and have less effect after the independence period, so we 
concentrate our analysis on tenure mechanisms that are more like capitalist institutions.  
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differently in countries endowed with similar natural capital and exposed to the same international 
conditions? 
Our hypothesis is that the process of land frontier expansion created different opportunities, 
depending on the quality of the natural resources (land aptitude for allocating grassland and distance 
to the markets) for members of the club and this determined how productive and distributive 
patterns were established. That economy that moves its frontier by the best lands experienced the 
blessing of the abundance of natural resources in terms of economic growth, but faces the curse of a 
more intense worsening in the income distribution. The appropriability conditions of the natural 
resources (depending on their quality) and the quality of the institutions (in terms of their capacity 
to reduce crowding-out effects in the resource allocation) conditioned the economic performance of 
the period. Availability of land resources was the main comparative advantage of these economies 
to participate in the international markets of food and raw materials, and it was the basis for their 
export-led growth strategy. But, simultaneously, the First Globalization created pressure to increase 
inequality. One of the main expressions of this evolution was a wider gap between land rentals and 
other income modalities (especially wages, but profits as well) in a process that combined rising 
rental rates and the expansion of the productive factor more intensively used to produce 
commodities, i.e. an abundant land endowment. However, the natural endowments of the settler 
economies in the “club” were not homogenous, and they led to different results. In our theoretical 
framework, moving the land frontier by better land would encourage the adverse effects on 
inequality because it would enable a small segment of the population (the owners of the land) to 
capture increasing rents. A deeper worsening in the income distribution in the agriculture in the 
River Plate would be associated with the different timing of land frontier expansion into land that 
was better as regards agricultural aptitude and distance. The prevailing conditions contributed to the 
creation of a “rentist” pattern in Spanish ex-colonies because land ownership ensured the elite 
received incomes without having to make large investments, and because land concentration was 
high due to the colonial heritage and the scarce effectiveness of the redistributive land policies. 
Land frontier expansion occurred at the same time that the institutional arrangements that created a 
new land ownership rights system were set up.  In the ex-British colonies, the distribution of land 
ownership rights created a land ownership system that fostered economic growth and a more 
income egalitarian pattern than in South American Southern Cone. In the British territories, in 
relative terms, the conditions stimulated capital accumulation (physical and human) and moderated 
the crowding-out effects of natural resources, and therefore paved the way for better economic 
performance than that of the Spain’s ex-colonies. 
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After this introduction there are three sections in this chapter in which we outline the debate that 
guides our research and explain the structure of this Thesis. In Section 2 we present the three main 
“stylized facts” of the settler economies during the First Globalization (primary export-led growth 
and worsening income distribution) and we focus our analysis on the differences between the 
countries in the “club”. In Section 3 we review the “curse” and the “blessing” in the literature on 
natural resources to find suitable lines of argument to support our hypotheses. These are presented 
in Section 4, together with an outline of this Thesis that explains the main thread of our argument 
and the connections among the four main Chapters. 
2. Some “stylized facts” of the settler economies during the First Globalization 
The period 1870-1913 was a real golden age for the settler economies. Their expansion can be 
traced ultimately to the Industrial Revolution, a profound process of technological progress that 
changed social and economic relationships on a world scale. Industrial Revolution started in the 
second half of the 18th century in Great Britain and spread slowly to the continent over the next 
hundred years, in a process that meant technological growth impulses from the core to peripheral 
areas.3 The result was the formation of world commodity and factor markets during the first 
globalization boom, which was one of the most important processes in the world economy in the 
last two centuries. Trade liberalism was paramount, mercantilist barriers were dismantled and there 
was a transport revolution, all of which helped to generate global markets during the 19th century. 
Transport costs fell thanks to the railways and improved shipping, and this was a permanent change, 
and although anti-globalization policies started to emerge after the 1870s they were not powerful 
enough to bring about a return to the 1820s levels of economic isolation. There was unrestricted 
mass migration until the end of the century (although subsidies for immigrants progressively 
disappeared) and global capital markets became steadily more integrated as European investors 
pursued good prospects for growth overseas. Recent studies on globalization, growth and inequality 
by Lindert, O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson have opened up a prolific line of research and have 
generated a debate that has been determinant to better understand the expansion of the Atlantic 
economy during the period. Template regions with scant populations that were exposed to the 
effects of the First Globalization took advantage of their abundance of natural resources and their 
economies grew quickly from the closing decades of the 19th century to WWI, encouraged by 
dynamic demand for raw materials and by factors of production (labour and capital) flows. 
However, this blessing was associated with persistently worsening income distribution. A process 
with economic growth and increasing inequality has points in common with a “Kuznetsian view” of 
                                                 
3 The process was persistent and new regions were progressively incorporated into the “revolution”, but the pace was 
slow and the influences were not lineal or continual. By the middle of the 19th century only France and Belgium had 
adopted some of the main features of modern manufacturing.  
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economic development (Kuznets, 1955), although the dynamic in the long-run was different.  
According to Bértola (2005),  
“It seems that in Australasia and the River Plate countries the underlying dynamic in the 
phase of increasing inequality was different to that described in Kuznets’ view for the 
northern economies. In particular, manufacturing did not have higher productivity levels 
than agriculture, and it is debatable, especially in the River Plate, whether inequality in the 
agriculture sector was less than in manufacturing. To sum up, it can be argued that the phase 
of increasing inequality in the South was not related to industrialization but preceded it.” 
(Our translation). 
2.1 Economic growth  
As a group, the “club” of settler economies had two phases of economic growth that showed 
different rates of expansion or movement through the cycle (Figure 1.1).  From 1870 to the crisis of 
1890 these economies grew (1.5% per annum in 1870-1891) and the rate of growth accelerated 
from the mid-1890s to WWI (2.2% in 1893-1912), when they suffered a sudden drop.4  
The economic evolution 
of the settler economies 
meant there were different 
periods of catching-up with 
the “core” of the world 
economy. Settler economies 
started the period with high 
levels of income per capita 
(between 90 and 100 per 
cent of the “core”) but in the 
crisis of the 1890s they fell 
behind for the first time 
(Figure 1.2).5 After that they 
grew strongly and moved closer to the core but this process came to an end in 1910, before WWI. 
During the war their evolution consisted of a first period in which the gap widened and then a brief  
                                                 
4 Growth rates calculated between the bottom and the top of each cycle. Argentina (1875-1939), Australia (1870-1939), 
Canada (1900-1939), New Zealand (1875-1939) and Uruguay (1870-1939). 5-year average, Index 1911=100. 
5 We consider two indicators for the “core” of the world economy: one is the simple (unweighted) average of GDP per 
capita in the three main industrialized European countries –France, Germany and the United Kingdom– and the other 
incorporates the US into the calculations. In this chapter, the “core” economies referred to are the former group.  
Figure 1.1
GDP PER CAPITA: SETTLER ECONOMIES
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recovery that lasted until 1919. 
However, and independently on 
this post-war instability, our 
club still had income levels on 
a par with the richest countries 
in the world.   
2.2 Primary productive 
specialization 
The Industrial Revolution in 
the “core” economies brought 
about a profound change in 
their productive structure, 
which was that manufacturing 
accounted for an increasing share in the internal generation of value while the contribution of 
agricultural activities to total GDP shrank. This process was evident in the United Kingdom from 
the beginning of the 19th century, and it became apparent in France and Germany in the second half 
of the century as industry became the biggest sector of their economies since the 1880s. In the years 
prior to WWI, industry accounted for nearly 40 percent of their GDP.6  
In the settler economies 
primary production was 
clearly predominant during the 
period, and on the eve of 
WWI agriculture accounted 
for almost 25 per cent of GDP 
as against only 15 per cent for 
manufacturing (Figure 1.3).7 
The permanent pattern was for 
agriculture’s share to decrease 
and for manufacturing’s share 
to increase, but the gap was 
huge and it persisted.  In this 
                                                 
6  UK 36.4% (1907) (Feinstein, 1972); France 35.3% (1913) (Lévy-Leboyer & Bourguignon, 1985); Germany 41.9% 
(1905) (quoted in Wolf, 2010:7, Table 3.a, from Hoffman et al., 1965). 
7  New Zealand is excluded because manufacturing value-added is not available.   
Figure 1.3
MANUFACTURING AND AGRICULTURE: SETTLER ECONOMIES
GDP shares in percentage (constant prices)/5-year period (1870-1924)
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sense, the main difference between the “core” and the “settlers” was not in the importance of the 
agriculture but in the scarce participation of manufacturing. Settler economies were capable to 
achieve high per capita income levels with a productive structure based on primary activities.  
2.3 Evolution of income distribution 
Initially we use the wage/rental ratio as a proxy for income distribution evolution, which is how 
this is handled in the literature on inequality during the First Globalization.8 Figure 1.4 shows the 
evolution of the wage/rental ratio for five settler economies from 1870 to the 1920s.9 
The fact that the ratio is falling indicates worsening income distribution in the settler economies. 
However, we can identify two periods. According to Williamson (2002), there was one regime prior 
to WWI when the 
wage/rental ratio seriously 
declined, and then a second 
regime in the interwar 
years when this trend 
slowed down considerably 
or even reversed. The two 
regimes would reflect 
different policy attitudes 
towards globalization. 
Before WWI, trade was 
relatively free, capital 
flowed in abundance and 
mass migration was 
encouraged or tolerated. But these conditions changed after the war; trade policy became autarkic, 
mass migration was restricted and world capital markets disintegrated due to government 
intervention and the Great Depression. In places where “land was held by the favoured few and 
where industrialization had not yet taken hold, the pre-World War I commodity price convergence 
meant greater inequality in resource-abundant economies like those in Southeast Asia, the Southern 
Cone of South America, Egypt and the Punjab” (Williamson, 2000:14). On the other hand, it meant 
less inequality in resource-scarce economies like those of Western Europe and East Asia. Places 
where the family farm predominated and where land distribution was more equal, a decrease in the 
                                                 
8 Arroyo Abad, 2008; Bértola & Porcile, 2002; Bértola & Williamson, 2003; Greasley & Oxley, 2001a,b, 2004, 2005; 
O’Rourke, Taylor & Williamson, 1996; O’Rourke & Williamson, 1994, 1999; Williamson, 1996, 2002. 
9  Argentina (1875-1939), Australia (1870-1939), Canada (1900-1939), New Zealand (1875-1939) and Uruguay (1870-
1939). 5-year simple average, Index 1911=100. 
Figure 1.4
WAGE/RENTAL RATIO: SETTLER ECONOMIES
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wage/rental ratio did not make for a similarly sharp rise in inequality. Unlike in the Kuznetsian 
view, worsening income distribution was not associated with structural change (the transformation 
from an agrarian to a manufacturing economy) but with an intensification of primary activities. 
2.4 What happened within the “club”?   
As we state in Section 1, our motivation is to understand how economies that are so similar can 
have such different economic performance in the long run. In fact, considering a common pattern, 
the intensity and the consequences of the First Globalization were different within the “club”. 
Levels of product per capita were higher and the deterioration of income distribution less intense in 
the ex-British colonies (Australia, New Zealand and Canada) than in ex-Spanish ones (Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay), and manufacturing came to the fore much more in the English-speaking 
countries. In the main body of this Thesis we will describe and explain these differences and 
highlight some general trends that explain why some economic development paths were successful 
and others not. Settler economies were members of the “club” of rich countries around the time of 
WWI (or they were very close to the “core”), and in this sense an abundance of natural resources 
was a blessing for these recently-settled regions. However, this blessing was accompanied by 
primary activities becoming predominant and income distribution persistently worsening. Did the 
settler economies differ from each other as regards economic growth, specialization (productive 
structure) and the evolution 
of inequality? 
2.4.1 Economic 
growth and 
convergence 
The common pattern was 
that the position of all the 
settler economies improved 
in the period before WWI, 
but their evolution was 
different (according to 
levels and paces). Initially, 
we can identify “rich” and 
“poor” countries in the club 
(see Figure 1.510). On the one hand, from the mid-19th century Australia and New Zealand had 
higher levels of income per capita than the other settler countries (these two economies head the 
                                                 
10 “Settler” series is the simple average of members of the “club” and with the same information of Figure 1.1. We 
prefer original values instead of values expressed in logarithms because they show more clearly the differences.  
Figure 1.5
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GDP per capita world ranking during the period). At the turn of the century, Canada joined the 
group of rich economies after a long period of sustained growth. On the other hand, the countries of 
the South America Southern Cone were the “poor” economies of the group, only Argentina 
managed to rise into the top category but it did not consolidate this progress. After the 1890s, the 
economies of the River Plate accelerated their economic growth and progressed in a way similar to 
Canada, but Chile was unable to repeat its previous performance (see Table 1.1; simple average for 
Settler).  In a similar way, New Zealand expanded again after the 1890s but it did not exceed the 
rate of Australia’s growth. 
 
Argentina Australia Canada Chile New Zealand Uruguay Settler
1870 1,311 3,273 1,695 1,290 3,100 2,181 2,142
1891 1,970 4,666 2,409 2,099 3,731 2,290 2,861
Growth 2.0% 1.7% 1.7% 2.3% 0.9% 0.2% 1.4%
1893 2,335 3,708 2,334 2,103 3,788 2,437 2,784
1912 3,904 5,098 4,377 2,968 5,209 3,508 4,177
Growth 2.7% 1.7% 3.4% 1.8% 1.7% 1.9% 2.2%
Expansion phases of settler "club". Rates of growth between the minimum and maximum figure of simple average.
Source:Maddison (2001).
Table 1.1
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SETTLER ECONOMIES
GDP per capita (1990 international Geary-Khamis  dollars) 
and growth rates during expansion phases 
 
This examination by periods enhances our understanding of the short-run dynamics involved, but 
an analysis of the whole period as an analytical unity confirms the impression of classical authors in 
the comparative approach that “rich countries and their impoverished cousins” (Bértola & Porcile, 
2002) took “parallel paths” (Duncan & Fogarty, 1984). This would mean that initial differences 
between these economies did not lessen after expansion, and that there was no catching up process 
in the club although these economies were similar in terms of natural endowments and international 
competitiveness. When we compare GDP per capita in each settler economy with the leaders of the 
large economies (Figure 1.6, considering Australia as the reference) and the small economies 
(Figure 1.7, considering New Zealand as the leader) we find this non-convergent evolution. It is 
clear that the 1890s was a period of crucial changes:  a group of countries with similar rate of 
expansion and subject to comparable external influences became consolidated but there were no 
clear signs of convergence within the “club”.11 When we compare the GDP per capita of each 
settler economy with the “core” of the world economy (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) 
we can appreciate the extent of these changes. The indicators for the “rich” economies in the club 
are shown in Figure 1.8 and the “poor” ones in Figure 1.9. Argentina and Canada converged in the 
                                                 
11 Sanz-Villaroya (2005) presents evidence for this for the large economies. Argentina started to fall behind Australia in 
1899 and behind Canada in 1896. The behaviour of different countries was heterogeneous and the growth of some 
economies is compensated for by the decline of others.  
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“traditional” version of the concept; they both started a catching-up process from the 1870s-1880s 
onwards (with some backward movements) and overtook the level of the “core” before WWI. 
Canada was relatively richer than Argentina and the impact of the war was less severe. In the 1920s, 
Canada’s average GDP per capita overtook the “core” level but this was something Argentina did 
not achieve. 
Figure  1.6
CATCHING-UP PROCESS WITHIN THE "CLUB": LARGE ECONOMIES
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Figure  1.7
CATCHING-UP  PROCESS WITHIN THE "CLUB": SMALL ECONOMIES
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Figure  1.8
CATCHING-UP  PROCESS: AUSTRALIA, CANADA AND NEW ZEALAND
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Figure  1.9
CATCHING-UP  PROCESS: ARGENTINA, CHILE AND URUGUAY
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Australia and New Zealand converged from higher levels of income per capita than the “core” 
and maintained their indicators over the unity throughout the period (convergence as a “come down 
process”). Nevertheless, from the first half of the 1890s to the eve of WWI these two economies 
improved in a way similar to the other settler economies. Uruguay developed in an irregular and 
divergent way: it had high levels of income towards the end of the 19th century, it started to improve 
relatively fast up to WWI, it suffered adverse effects from the war but its economy then recovered 
dynamism and maintained levels of GDP per capita at around 80 per cent of the “core” economies. 
Chile began the period with low income per capita and at the end of the 19th century its levels were 
less than 70 percent of the “core” economies, but like in the other countries considered the years 
before WWI were a time of catching-up, and after the war the economy attained income per capita 
levels of around 70 percent of the leading world economies. 
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As the more extended literature on international comparison of income levels, we have 
concentrated on quantity effects by utilizing a fixed PPP-converted benchmark for GDP levels 
projected backwards with national indices of real product (in the line of Bairoch, 1976; Maddison, 
1995).  However, the relative positions depend upon both prices and quantities and the comparisons 
can change when we incorporate these considerations (see Prados de la Escosura, 2000, for a 
discussion). This may be especially important for the settler economies, as open economies, at the 
heyday of the gold standard. It is possible that other convertors –as the exchange rates– would 
provide better comparisons in terms of income and welfare. In current research, we follow the more 
extended literature on international comparison of real product and we will deal with these 
considerations in next steps in the research. 
2.4.2 Productive structure 
The settler economies all shared the same productive pattern with primary production 
predominant and a manufacturing having a small share, and although this differed from the 
productive structure in the “core” countries it yielded comparable levels on income per capita.  
In Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and Uruguay agriculture still predominated even after 
WWI (Figures 1.10, 1.11, 1.14 and 1.15). However, Australia was different because in the 19th 
century manufacturing had a greater and stable share than in the other three countries of the group.  
In Canada, manufactures were more dynamic too but even so they did not account for 25 percent of 
the GDP in the 20th century (Figure 1.12). In Chile, the focus of primary production was mining 
activities, and industry and agricultural production sank to a secondary role after the start of the 20th 
century (Figure 1.13).  
Figure 1.10
ARGENTINA: MANUFACTURING AND AGRICULTURE
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Figure 1.11
AUSTRALIA: MANUFACTURING, AGRICULTURE AND MINING
GDP shares in percentage - Consant prices 1891 (1870-1911) and 1938-39 (1912-
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Another important aspect is that in Australia, Canada and Chile the share of manufactures 
decreased during the period that prices for primary products boomed (from 1890 to WWI), which 
suggests that these countries showed signs of reacting to the changes in relative prices. However, 
this did not happen in Argentina or Uruguay, where early industrialization retained certain 
dynamism even though it started from very low levels. 
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Figure 1.12
CANADA: MANUFACTURING, AGRICULTURE AND MINING
GDP shares in percentage - Consant prices 1900 (1871-1925)
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Figure 1.13
CHILE: MANUFACTURING, AGRICULTURE AND MINING
GDP shares in percentage - Consant prices 1995 (1870-1919)
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Figure 1.15
URUGUAY: MANUFACTURING AND AGRICULTURE
GDP shares in percentage - Constant prices 1961 (1870-1919)
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
1870-1874 1880-1884 1890-1894 1900-1904 1910-1914
Source: Bertino & Tajam (1999); Bértola (1998); Instituto de Economía (1969).
Manufacturing Agriculture
Figure 1.14
NEW ZEALAND:AGRICULTURE
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Persistent predominance of agriculture in the River Plate (Argentina and Uruguay) and 
Australasia (Australia and New Zealand) is clear when we compare growth rates (Table 1.2). In the 
19th century, they showed paces of expansion over the settler average and slowed down during the 
first two decades of the 20th century. On the contrary, Canada accelerated the rise of agriculture in 
the 1900s and 1910s, and Chile experienced, in spite of constituting the weakest of the “club”, 
important improvements.  
Argentina Australia Canada Chile New Zealand Uruguay Settler 1/
1870s 0.95 0.63 0.29 0.25 1.78 0.56 0.49
1880s 2.66 0.48 0.29 0.10 0.84 0.41 0.39
1890s 3.01 0.42 0.17 0.16 0.51 0.50 0.44
1900s 1.05 0.26 0.41 0.15 0.23 0.08 0.28
1910s 0.35 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.37 0.10 0.32
1/ Simple average.
Source: Altman (1992); Bertino & Tajam (1999); Bértola (1998); Braun, Braun, Briones & Díaz (2000);  Cortes Conde (1994);
 Haig(2001); Instituto de Economía (1969). 
Table 1.2
AGRICULTURE IN SETTLER ECONOMIES
Annual economic growth rates by decade in percentage
 
2.4.3 Worsening income distribution 
There is evidence that confirms that “within labour-scarce countries, opening up to international 
trade and to international factor movements raised inequality, a powerful effect before 1914 where 
immigration was massive.”  (Lindert & Williamson, 2001:1-2). However, different countries in the 
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settler “club” behaved differently. Figure 1.16 shows the evolution of wage-rental ratios in each 
settler economy compared with the average for the group. It is motivating to note that the 
economies whose ratios decreased more up to the 1920s (i.e. where income distribution worsened 
sharply) were precisely those whose relative performance in the long run was worse (the “poor” 
countries of the club). At the start of the period the ratio in Argentina was around 600 and at the end 
its values were around 50. The pattern in Uruguay was similar; the country started with a ratio of 
1,100 and finished the period at around 150. On the other hand, in the same period the changes in 
Australia and New Zealand were, respectively, from 400 to 120 and from 270 to 130.  Canada was 
different again; the trend was 
an increasing wage-rental ratio 
(the data begins in 1900). 
Recent studies have 
considered the evidence in a 
manner that is sensitive to 
regional diversity. The First 
Globalization was a period in 
which new land was 
constantly being put into 
production; this was a process 
of frontier expansion and it 
included specific geographic 
movements of population. 
Therefore the consideration of regional evolutions within large economies is a very interesting 
aspect of the economic performance of the settler countries. 
Shanahan & Wilson (2007) disaggregate the Australian findings and present separate land and 
wage data (Figure 1.17) for four colonies (New South Wales, South Australia, Queensland, and 
Victoria) in the second half of the 19th century and up to WWI.  
“In broad terms, our results also show that the more general global pressures that impacted 
on Australia in aggregate were felt in each colony (and later State) to varying degrees; but 
the effect was in the same general direction. From the 1860s to the years just prior to World 
War I the wage-rental ratio in each individual colony appears to have ultimately trended 
down, although the paths of this convergence did differ.”  (Shanahan & Wilson, 2007:18).  
Figure 1.16
WAGE/RENTAL RATIO: SETTLER ECONOMIES
Index 1911=100, 5-year averages (1870-1924)
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The authors seem 
committed to finding the 
H-O-S results instead of 
the meaning of different 
regional evolutions. One of 
the arguments that guides 
our research is the 
incorporation of “new” 
land into the production 
and the different trajectory 
of the income distribution 
may be understood in 
terms of the land frontier 
expansion. Notions as open frontier –as it was the case of South Australia during decades– where 
the price of the land is practically null, and the possible existence of wage-premium in the frontier 
are simple concepts, absent in the standard framework, that can explain dissimilar evolutions.  
Emery, Inwood & 
Thille (2007) present the 
first Canadian estimates of 
region-specific wages and 
land prices. “Our evidence 
indicates that while 
Canada as a nation looks 
like an anomaly in the era 
of convergence, this is 
largely an artefact of 
aggregating the experience 
of the labour-abundant 
eastern provinces with the 
late-settling and land-
abundant western provinces.”  (Emery, Inwood & Thille, 2007: 22). Figure 1.18 shows the 
evolution of the wage-rental ratio for Eastern regions (Augusta–Elizabethtown, Medonte and 
Wellington) and Western regions (Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta), and the differences are 
very clear.  In the west of the country we find the “typical” settler pattern of worsening income 
distribution up to WWI, while in the east there was a “European process” like in a labour-abundant 
Figure 1.18
WAGE/RENTAL RATIOS: LARGE REGIONS OF CANADA
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Figure 1.17
WAGE/RENTAL RATIOS: COLONIES OF AUSTRALIA
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country.  Huge differences in levels in the beginning of the period are not surprising when we think 
about the process in terms of land frontier expansion. Large extensions of “empty” lands in the 
West opened the gap between wages and land rents and only when the frontier closed –and 
ownership rights were set up– both indicators showed the same trend.  
For Chile, regional estimates of the wage-rental ratio are not available. However, the evidence 
shows that inequality was high and the trend during the First Globalization was for it to worsen 
(Prados de la Escosura, 2005, 2007; Bértola & Rodríguez, 2009; Bértola, et al., 2010). Prados de la 
Escosura (2005: 39) reports a Gini Index of 0.41 for 1870 and 0.65 for 1913,12 and Bértola & 
Rodriguez (2009:16) report a Gini Coefficient of 0.52 for 1875 and 0.66 for 1930. However, this 
evolution was not homogenous because the rate at which inequality increased slowed down from 
the beginning of the 1890s to the first five years of the 20th century (Rodriguez Weber, 2009:66), 
which was a period of land frontier expansion and different evolutions of the relative rewards 
(several indicators would show an increase of the relative wage as consequence of the expansion to 
the north). 
2.4.4 Synthesis and new questions 
While the intensity of the First Globalization and its consequences for the settler economies 
followed a broad common pattern, the countries reacted in different ways, and this probably 
determined their economic performance in the subsequent decades. These economies based their 
production on primary activities but in spite of this, at around the time of WWI, they achieved 
levels of development close to the “core”.  However, income per capita was higher and inequality 
was worsening less in ex-British possessions (Australia, New Zealand, Canada) than in the South 
American Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay), and in the former group economic 
specialization was relatively less concentrated on primary activities.13 In terms of the curse/blessing 
of natural resources, the ex-British colonies were more blessed and less damned by their abundance 
of resources than the other ex-colonies. 
Why were the results so different in the two groups of countries? From an analytical and 
empirical perspective, a possible strategy to answer this question would be to evaluate the different 
conditions these economies faced when they integrated to the world economy. In the literature, and 
especially in the framework of the H-O-S trade theory, there has been an emphasis on the role of 
relative prices and the movement of productive factors. In particular, the mainstream in recent 
literature about the expansion of the Atlantic economy has focused on analyzing the evolution of 
the terms of trade, relative earners (rental and wage incomes), and immigration and capital inflows. 
                                                 
12 The author proposes “pseudo-Gini” indices because they are backwards projections of Gini with Inequality Indices. 
13 This statement is confirmed by data in Australia and Canada and is deduced from indirect indicators in the case of 
New Zealand.  
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However, endogenous land frontier expansion (or the moving frontier) has not been convincingly 
argued in this analysis, the empirical approach has been too simplistic, and except from the model 
we revisited in this Thesis,14 the theoretical framework lacks formality.15 The incorporation of 
abundant natural resources into production and the impact of this on a country’s economic 
performance is a line of research that has received little attention in the recent literature on 
Economic History. However, the relationship between an abundance of natural resources and 
economic growth is an area of Development Theory that has been analyzed and researched 
empirically very much in recent years. Our aim is to apply these recent contributions to the settler 
economies during the First Globalization from an historical and comparative perspective. In the 
next section we review the literature to find arguments that are useful for our objective (we propose 
a classification of literature according to topic and analytical methodology), and in Section 4 we set 
out the hypotheses that guide our research. 
3. Abundance of natural resources and economic development 
3.1 The notion of natural capital 
Since the end of the 20th century economic development is no longer considered to be dependent 
only on the accumulation of physical and human capital. Academics now point that there is a third 
form of “capital” or “economic asset” that is important to the performance of the economic system 
of production, consumption, investment, saving and welfare. This distinct type of capital is the 
natural and environmental resource endowment available to an economy, and it is commonly 
referred to as “natural capital”. The production of goods and services in an economy is achieved by 
a combination of produced and natural capital. Capital refers to any stock that yields a flow of 
valuable goods or services now and in the future. Standard growth models emphasize the role of 
capital produced by humans and three types can be identified: manufactured capital (factories, 
buildings, tools and other physical objects identified with means of production), human capital (the 
stock of education, skills, culture and knowledge stored in human beings themselves) and social 
capital (connections within and between social networks). However, there is an increasing 
consensus that natural capital is important for economic growth. Natural capital consists of the 
various ways that the environment encourages production and supports most aspects of human 
existence. From a conceptual and practical point of view two kinds of natural capital may be 
differentiated. First, there is non-renewable natural capital like fossil fuels and mineral deposits that 
do not recover on a time scale close to the rate at which people use them. For all practical purposes, 
fossil fuels are literally consumed by use. This type of natural capital generally yields no services 
                                                 
14 Findlay & Lundahl (1995). 
15 Di Tella (1982) is, probably, one of the most important exceptions. 
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until it is extracted. The second type is renewable natural capital, which is active and self-
maintaining and uses energy from the sun and the Earth’s core. Ecosystems are renewable natural 
capital. A forest or marine ecosystem provides a flow or annual yield of timber or seafood, and this 
flow can be sustained in the long run if the ecosystem is not deteriorating. The generation of natural 
resources is just one function of natural capital that yields a flow of ecosystem services when the 
system is left in place (Ayres et al., 1996). Since the flow of services from ecosystems requires that 
these systems function as a whole, the structure and diversity of the system is an important 
component in the constitution of natural capital (Barbier et al., 1995). Natural capital is important 
for sustainable economic development but increasing economic dependence on natural resource 
exploitation appears to be an obstacle to growth and development in most low- and middle-income 
economies in the world. The recent literature shows there is a negative relation between economic 
growth per capita and some measures of natural capital, and this is seen as the “curse” of natural 
resources (Auty, 2001a; Gylfason, 2006, 2007; Sachs & Warner, 1995, 2001).16 Why should an 
abundance of natural resources often be connected to poorer economic performance? Is an 
abundance of natural resources a “curse” for economic growth? Are we faced with a general pattern 
or does it depend on specific conditions (as regards technology or institutions) in an economy, the 
characteristics of demand and supply and the effect of different historical circumstances? In this 
section we review the literature about the analytical and empirical relations between natural 
resource endowments and economic growth from a long run perspective. First, we introduce some 
concepts and a general overview of the debate (item 3.2). Second, we present two theses that 
represent the “natural resources blessing hypothesis”, which was a commonly accepted idea about 
economic growth in the mid-20th century (item 3.3). Then our review presents three perspectives 
from the so-called “natural resources curse hypothesis”: the “productive structure approach” (item 
3.4), the “crowding out approach” (item 3.5) and the “factor endowment and institutional change 
hypothesis” (item 3.6), and we consider the different channels of cause and effect that may be 
identified.  
3.2 The debate: “curse” or “blessing”? 
“Natural resources” is a more restricted category of analysis than “natural capital” because they 
are generated by the latter and, consequently, they do not incorporate its systemic character. 
However, they lend precision to the historical analysis of settler economies where the constitution 
of markets and others institutions were historically determined at the same time that natural 
resources were first being exploited. 
                                                 
16 In general, the studies cover the period from the 1960s to the end of the 20th century.  
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To discuss the impact of natural resources on economic development it is useful to distinguish 
among resource abundance (a stock measure of resource wealth), resource rents (the ‘windfall’ flow 
of earnings derived from natural resources at some point in time) and resource dependence (the 
degree to which economies have access to alternative sources of income other than resource 
extraction; usually related to export specialization). Obviously these concepts may be correlated 
because economies with abundant natural capital may get high incomes from extraction, they may 
specialize in primary exports and they may become dependent on resources. But some resource-rich 
countries are not dependent on resources and some relatively resource-poor economies are. 
Therefore, there is much confusion about the exact meaning of the concept “resource abundance”. 
This term may be used differently in different sciences and even in different areas of economics. In 
the natural sciences or environmental economics, resource abundance usually means the amount of 
potentially exploitable natural resources. But in studies of the Dutch disease, resource abundance 
means the amount of natural resources and reserves that have already been exploited. The share of 
potential resources that, in the end, becomes economically exploitable depends on many factors 
such as economic and political conditions and technological progress and, in consequence, is 
endogenous to the economic system. 
Initially in the literature the “curse” was regarded as an almost unquestionable empirical fact. 
This idea was based on an index –primary exports shares in GDP– but this is more a measure of 
dependence on natural resources than their abundance. In these terms, the analysis concentrated on 
the channels that connect the two processes –dependence of natural resources and economic 
growth– in accordance with the typical factors that affect economic performance as the 
accumulation of productive factors and technological progress. However, when we consider that (i) 
institutions have increasingly come into the mainstream of recent economic thought; (ii) a central 
aspect of the matter of natural resources is ownership –of the assets themselves and of the rents 
derived from their exploitation for production–; and (iii) interest groups and the state are key agents 
in the formation of the property system; then the literature has advanced systematically in bringing 
institutional arrangements into the analysis. The results have been mixed, but there is a general 
consensus in the literature that some kind of conditionality is involved. The idea is that the quality 
of institutions plays a central role in the curse or the blessing of natural resources, and even when 
there are abundant natural resources in an economy it can perform well if its institutions are “good” 
(this would involve some kind of curse-reversal). Finally, the latest contributions in the literature 
have reacted to this consensus. Several authors distinguish between natural resource dependence 
and natural resource endowment or abundance, and take into account alternative indicators such as 
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the stock of natural capital or total natural resource assets.17 Empirical studies in this analytical line 
challenge the traditional view in that they invert the relationship  
–resource abundance positively affects growth and institutional quality– and identify “this apparent 
paradox [with] a red herring” (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2006). Does this assertion mean we are 
faced with a meaningless debate? On the contrary, the debate constitutes a real “research 
programme” and is especially useful to enhance our understanding of the economic performance of 
economies that are based on the successful exploitation of natural resources.  
Our aim in this section is to review the recent literature about the relationships between abundant 
natural resources and economic performance so as to find hypotheses to guide our research. In 
recent years the debate has moved to less extreme positions; mixed results are now accepted and 
aspects of institutions are actively considered. The discussion has also broadened the notion of 
economic performance to incorporate concepts other than economic growth such as poverty, 
inequality and various welfare indicators. However, the debate has largely concentrated on analyses 
of the second half of the 20th century, and new light can be shed on the discussion by applying these 
concepts in the long run and with an historical perspective. 
3.3 Natural resource abundance as a blessing 
In the last quarter of the 19th century and up to WWI many countries grew rapidly. This economic 
boom was closely associated with export-led industrial expansion in Western Europe and the US, 
and temperate regions –North and South America, South Africa and Australasia– benefited from it. 
Industrializing European countries needed cheap natural resources from the “New World” and the 
settler countries needed to import capital and labour to expand their capacity to provide resource-
based exports. A key factor in this world development was the transport revolution at the end of the 
19th century (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1994; O’Rourke, Taylor and Williamson, 1996), which 
made it possible for the settler countries to meet these needs and thus join the world economy. 
Myint (1958) argues that trade was the channel whereby idle resources –in particular natural 
resources– in new economies were brought into productive use and fuelled economic growth. 
According to the “staples thesis”, development in many countries has been built around the 
expansion of export sectors in general and natural resource exports in particular. The “vent for 
surplus theory” –a Smithian concept– suggests that trade was the means by which unexploited 
resources started generating wealth and economic growth (Altman, 2003; Bertram, 1963; Chambers 
and Gordon, 1966; Innis, 1930, 1940; Smith, 1976; Southey, 1978; Watkins, 1963; Wellstead, 
2007). Both frameworks consider the presence of excess resources –“land” and “natural resources”– 
                                                 
17 The World Bank (2006) includes agricultural land, pasture land, forests, protected areas, metals and materials, coal, 
oil and natural gas as components of the natural wealth of economies. 
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that are not being fully exploited in a closed economy, and international trade allows these new 
natural resources to be exploited to increase exports and foster growth (Barbier, 2005). 
In the vent-for-surplus theory, Adam Smith analyzed trade for a country which had been isolated 
but then entered into international trade. Trade provided new effective demand for the output of the 
surplus resources which would have remained unused had there been no external trade. According 
to this argument, exports can be increased without reducing production for the domestic market. In 
his arguments, Smith implied that internal demand was inelastic because there was zero growth in 
the demand for resources to enable society to benefit from the new market economy. Harold Innis, 
referring to Canada but in a way that is applicable to other settler economies, says that the economic 
history of countries with abundant natural resources had dominated by the discrepancy between the 
centre and the margin of western civilization.  
“The raw material supplied to the mother country stimulated manufacturers of the finished 
product and also of the product which were in demand in the colony. Large-scale production 
of raw materials was encouraged by improvement of technique of production, of marketing, 
and of transport as well as by improvement in the manufacture of the finished product 
(Innis, 1956: 385). 
In these terms, agriculture, industry, transportation, trade, finance, and even governmental 
activities tended to be subordinate to the production of the staple for a highly specialized 
manufacturing society. Therefore, the staple theory is a subset of the export-led growth hypothesis 
and it is designed to explain the growth and economic development of resource-rich economies. 
Since the 1950s it has come in for heavy criticism (Altman, 2003) but it remains an important 
contemporary framework for economic analysis and it can help answer some of the questions about 
the curse and the blessing of an abundance of natural resources. 
In other direction, there is a wide range of literature about the US that emphasizes the positive 
impact that resource endowments had on welfare levels in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
(Czelusta & Wright, 2004, 2007; David & Wright, 1997; Mitchener & McLean, 2003; Wright, 
1990). In particular, Wright (1990) connects the fact that the US has a leading role in manufacturing 
to technological progress and learning potential in the American mining sector. Similarly, David 
&Wright (1997), Wright (2001) and Czelusta & Wright (2004) claim that mining encouraged the 
establishment of prestigious educational institutions and diffused knowledge to other sectors. 
Recently, several authors have proposed models to represent formally the way in which the 
opening up of a previously closed economic region to staples-led trade can lead to economic 
development (Lundahl, 1998). Some of them employ the concept of the “endogenous” or “moving” 
frontier (Di Tella, 1982; Findlay, 1995; Findlay & Lundahl, 1994; Hansen, 1979) and others extend 
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the framework of the staple approach to include the nature of export staples, regional characteristics 
and institutional structure (Schedvin, 1990). These models also offer an explanation as to why 
resource-based development may be initially successful but may not be sustainable in the long run. 
There were economies specialized in primary exports with a small manufacturing sector (an activity 
that does not usually expand in this type of economy), and the dynamic demand for raw materials 
during the golden age (1870-1913) made it possible for them to continue to grow. However, these 
economies remained vulnerable to falls in the international prices for primary products relative to 
prices for manufactures. Once a country specializes in resource-based exports it may find it difficult 
to move away from its main primary specialization and take the path of modern manufacturing. 
Frontier-based development is symptomatic of a pattern of economy-wide resource exploitation that 
generates little additional economic rent, and the rents that are produced are not reinvested in more 
productive and dynamics sectors (such as manufacturing) (Barbier, 2003, 2007). This form of 
economic life, which is typical of “new” countries, was able to offer high standards of living to 
society in exporting countries but only as long as domestic resource supplies and world demand 
remained dynamic. Declines in demand or increases in supply would have severe consequences for 
the internal political economy of a country and leave it weakly positioned to react to the challenge 
of finding a new basic product to produce and trade. As Watkins (1963) says, these economies face 
the risks of the “staple trap”. In this sense, the small “domestic market, and the factor proportion  
–an abundance of land relative to labour and capital– create a comparative advantage in resource 
intensive exports (staples). “Economic development will be a process of diversification around an 
export base. The central concept of a staple theory, therefore, is the spread effects of the export 
sector, that is the impact of export activity on domestic economy and society.”  (Watkins, 1963: 53-
54). In this situation the creation of “linkages” in the export of particular staples –backward, 
forward and final demand linkages– would be a key element in the success or failure of the 
country’s long-run economic performance. To sum up, these kinds of models involve notions where  
the export orientation of some economies presents lock-in effects whereby the main primary 
specialization blocks structural change and consequently impedes economic growth. 
3.4 The productive structure approach: the curse and primary specialization 
One of the approaches to the “natural resource curse” that we present in this section focuses on 
the productive structure of the economy. First, a perspective that considers the allocation of 
resources among productive sectors with different spillover effects on aggregate growth emphasizes 
the role of specialization in economic development. Economies whose production is based on 
natural resource abundance and where manufacturing and services have a small share in the 
productive structure will grow more slowly. Manufacturing and services lead to a more complex 
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division of labour and have more potential to incorporate knowledge into production and thus 
develop a sustainable growth trajectory. Second, the so-called Dutch disease is an important 
concept in the literature about the natural resource curse hypothesis. Economies with abundant 
natural resources are subject to periodic increases and falls in their performance because commodity 
prices on world markets are variable and from time to time new exploitable natural resources are 
discovered. This process generates volatility in export earnings, a real appreciation in the value of 
the country’s currency, and it damages other export industries. These two visions both pertain to 
productive structure but they emphasize different aspects when it comes to identifying the origin 
and the evolution of the curse. The former highlights the predominance of primary activities as a 
long run process with cumulative changes, while the latter offers an explanation of a sudden change 
in which the movement of relative prices is a key issue. 
3.4.1 Natural resources, structural change and economic development 
In the contributions to Development Theory during the 1950s, ideas about growth and structural 
change were closely related. The argument was that development involved the reallocation of 
productive factors from sectors with low productivity to activities with high productivity, which are 
characterized by increasing returns and complementarities (Hirschman, 1958; Lewis, 1954, 1955; 
Myrdal, 1957; Nurkse, 1953, 1962; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961; Rostow, 1953). As the industrial 
sector would constitute the main activity to obtain higher levels of productivity, the process would 
involve changes in the economic structure of the economy, and manufacturing would have a greater 
share in GDP and employment. Manufacturing generates productive spillovers, forward and 
backward linkages and economic and technological externalities that maintain the increasing returns 
in the long run. When countries have an economic structure with a high share of primary activities 
then economic growth is hampered and the abundance of natural resources is a curse that impedes 
economic development. 
In the 1960s the theoretical and empirical centre of attention changed and the focus shifted to 
modeling economic growth in accordance with an aggregated production function (Solow, 1956; 
Swan, 1956). With this new approach productive activities and structural change, by definition, 
played a secondary role, and with the assumption of exogenous technical progress less attention was 
paid matters of sector performance. However, the subject became important again in the 
mainstream of economic development in the 1980s with the New Theory of Economic Growth 
(NTEG) and the endogeneity of technical progress. The models have two or three sectors, there are 
increasing returns to intensive research and development (R+D) and there is greater productive 
diversification to obtain positive rates of growth in the long run. Clear examples of recent 
theoretical and empirical contributions to the subject (Cimoli et al, 2005) are new theories in the 
fields of international trade and the geographic location of productive activities (Grossman & 
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Helpman, 1994; Krugman, 1991), the new theory of economic growth (Aghion & Howitt, 1992) 
and the new theory of development (Ray, 2000; Ros, 2000). In view of the fact that primary 
activities by their very nature do not form endogenous cores of innovation and technical progress, 
economic dependence on natural resources has led to low productive dynamism. 
There are two alternative visions to the mainstream literature that identify primary specialization 
with low economic dynamism. One of them is related with the Marxist and structuralist tradition 
and, the other, proposes a framework derived from the Schumpeterian analysis of the economic 
growth and innovation.  
First, we consider the unequal development view, whose proponents include the Marxist and 
Dependencia authors (Amin, 1974; Baran, 1957; Emmanuel, 1972; Frank, 1967, 1978; Furtado, 
1966, 1969; Wallerstein, 1974) as well as scholars identified with the Latin American Structuralism 
(Dixon & Thirwall, 1975; Myrdal, 1957; Prebisch, 1950, 1959; Seers, 1962; Singer, 1950). This 
literature includes various models and theories and many of the key elements feature in the North-
South trade model (Krugman, 1981). The idea is that if trade reinforces the economic supremacy of 
the leading region this is because “a small ‘head start’ for one region will cumulate over time, with 
exports of manufactures from the leading region crowding out the industrial sector of the lagging 
region” (Krugman, 1981: 149). One of the main theories about the unequal development of the 
centre –the industrial core– and the periphery –with its specialization in primary production– is the 
Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis (Prebisch, 1950, 1959; Singer, 1950). According to this idea, there is an 
inherent long-run trend for (non-oil) primary product prices to fall relative to manufacturing prices. 
This may not be a problem if it is the result of increased technical progress and the country is able 
to export more and improve its position in world markets. However, the worsening terms of trade 
will affect the economic growth of a developing country because the income elasticity of demand 
for manufactured goods is much greater than the income elasticity for primary commodities. As the 
result of this combination of relatively low income elasticity and worsening terms of trade, 
countries that rely on the primary goods sector will grow more slowly than economies that rely on 
manufacturing industries. Recent post-Keynesian and post-Kaldorian theories have dealt with this 
subject and present formalizations about these limitations on the balance of payments and on 
economic growth (McCombie & Roberts, 2002; McCombie & Thirlwall, 1994) in terms of different 
income elasticities of demand for exports and imports and the dynamics of the current account. 
Second, in the 1960s, the concept of a gap and technological capacity emerged from the 
contributions of authors concerned with technological dynamics and its influence on international 
trade and economic growth (Freeman, 1963; Hirsch, 1965; Posner, 1961; Vernon, 1966). In this 
view, technological asymmetries are the key to explaining international movements of goods and 
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services among countries and national patterns of specialization. Innovation is not diffused 
immediately and technologically advanced countries enjoy an initial advantage and can expand their 
share in the world market. Economic growth in the long run depends on a country’s capacity of 
narrow the technological gap. Modern models have improved the formalization of technological 
dynamics in the Neo-Schumpeterian tradition and have included the notion of heterogeneity among 
agents (Dosi, 1988) and the analysis of aggregated economy (Dosi et al. 1990; Fagerberg, 1994). 
Industrialization is a process of “accumulation of capabilities” that led from traditional, especially 
rural, economies to others driven by industrial activities (nowadays also advanced services), “able 
to systematically learn how to implement and eventually how to generate new ways of producing 
and new products under conditions of dynamic increasing returns” (Cimoli, et al, 2008:2). In the 
same way, the Evolutionary School takes the “industrialist” ideas and emphasizes that technological 
change is the motor of structural change and the source of international specialization (Dosi et al., 
1990). In economies that can internalize the new paradigms and technological trajectories there are 
changes in sector composition and technical progress diffuses to the whole economy. This process 
needs the existence of connections among codified knowledge, tacit knowledge and various 
capacities to transform information into innovation and development (Nelson & Winter, 1982). The 
notion of technical change and industrial dynamics as evolutionary processes (Dosi & Nelson, 
2009) has led authors to consider the systemic relations among enterprises, organizations and the 
institutional structure. “National Systems of Innovation” have become a central concept in the 
models (Cimoli & Dosi, 1995; Freeman, 1987; Nelson, 1994) and there is a privileged level of 
analysis of the interactions and co-evolutionary dynamics among five sub-domains (and their 
related institutions) that govern (i) the generation of scientific knowledge, (ii) the development, 
improvement, and adoption of new techniques, (iii) the “economic machine” which organizes the 
production and distribution of products and incomes, (iv) the political and legal structure, and lastly 
(v) cultural domain-shaping values, norms and customs (Dosi, 2007:2).  
Therefore, like in the mainstream, heterodox views focus on why economies that base their 
productive expansion on the exploitation of natural resources find it difficulty to obtain high rates of 
growth. The “curse” is expressed as a permanent process of economic divergence. 
3.4.2 The Dutch disease 
Countries with abundant natural resources undergo booms and busts at irregular intervals because 
of commodity price volatility and the discovery of new resources. This evolution makes for 
intermittent changes in export earnings and periodic real appreciation of the national currency, and 
it works to the detriment of other export industries and foreign capital inflows in a process that has 
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come to be called the Dutch disease (Corden, 1984; Drelichman, 2005; Krugman, 1987; Neary & 
van Wijnbergen, 1986; Torvick, 2001; van Wijnbergen, 1984; Wahba, 1998).  
A resource price boom or windfall may lead initially to higher rates of growth, but this will only 
be a transitory gain. As a consequence of the boom, the natural resource sector will expand and 
attract economic resources away from more dynamic sectors such as manufacturing. As a result, in 
the long run the economy will become specialized in production and exports based on natural 
resources, and consequently economic growth will be slow and intermittent. Thus the Dutch disease 
tends to decrease the level of total exports or bias their composition away from high-tech or high-
value-added manufacturing and service sectors that may be particularly beneficial for economic 
growth. The fact that exchange rates are unstable causes uncertainty, and this may damage exports, 
investment (Sachs & Warner, 1999a; Herbertsson et al., 1999) and other trade activities including 
foreign investment. Foreign direct investment may suffer because, apart from natural resource 
exploitation activities, the possibilities for investment are scarce. That is to say, natural capital tends 
to crowd out foreign capital (Auty, 1997, 2001b; Gylfason, 2006, 2007). Besides this, industries 
based on natural resources can pay higher wages (Sachs & Warner, 2001) and also higher interest 
rates than other export and import activities, and this makes it difficult for the latter to remain 
competitive in the world market. 
Matsuyama (1992) provides a formal model that captures the “natural resource curse” effect and 
suggests that resource-abundant economies will specialize in the production and export of primary 
goods. Even if relative world prices do not change, rising productivity in the agricultural sector will 
attract labour away from manufacturing and thus impede industrialization and economic growth in 
the long run. If local agents invest their resource revenues in the economy –and not in international 
capital markets– this will generate a temporary consumption and production boom. Thus, a 
resource-rich economy will adjust to its steady state in the long term “from above” not “from 
below”, and during the transition its average growth rates will be negative (Rodriguez & Sachs, 
1999). The dynamic of the adjustment provides interesting arguments about growth and GDP levels 
even without considering effects in the Dutch Disease framework. 
Boyce & Emery (2006) show that the basic model of a competitive well-functioning exhaustible 
resource industry can explain not only the negative correlation between resource abundance and 
growth but also the positive correlation between resource abundance and income levels. The 
economic rents earned in the exhaustible resource sector can explain the differences in levels, while 
the intertemporal tradeoffs dynamic faced by exhaustible resource owners explains the growth 
effects. This is a very interesting argument for settler economies, which were at the top of the GDP 
per capita world ranking at the end of the 19th century and gradually lost ground after WWI. The 
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decline in resource rents occurs endogenously, and the rate of decline is affected by the rate of 
change in technology and by resource prices. Interestingly, as the model assumes that natural 
resource markets function well, market and institutional failures are not needed to explain the 
resource curse. Bravo-Ortega & De Gregorio (2005) advance similar ideas about differences in 
terms of the curse. Natural resources have a positive effect on levels of income and a negative effect 
on growth rate. But the curse does not inevitably occur. If we accept the interaction term between 
human capital and natural resources, we can show that high levels of human capital may outweigh 
the negative effects that natural resource abundance has on growth. In other words, the adverse 
effects of the Dutch disease can be offset by specific measures (Frenkel, 2010) and even managed 
in such a way as to be part of an optimal growth path (Matsen & Torvik, 2005). 
3.5 The crowding out approach: natural capital displaces other capital modalities  
In the structure of recent models an abundance of natural resources or heavy dependence on them 
influences some variable “x” which hampers economic growth (Sachs & Warner, 2001). So the 
task of theorists and empirical researchers has been to identify the mechanisms that connect these 
two processes. These channels can be seen in terms of crowding out: an abundance of natural 
capital tends to displace other modalities of capital and hinder the expansion of production 
(Gylfason, 2004, 2007). In our presentation we focus on rent-seeking activities, the influence of 
“bad” institutions, the effects on the generation of human capital, and the expenditure and saving 
patterns associated with natural resources abundance. 
3.5.1  Rent seeking, weak institutions and appropriability 
In many developing countries, large natural resource rents, especially in combination with badly-
defined property rights, imperfect markets (or the absence of markets) and permissive legal 
structures, may lead producers to engage in uncontrolled rent-seeking. This diverts resources away 
from economic activities that are more fruitful in social terms, and it may hamper economic growth 
(Ascher, 1999; Auty, 2001b; Baland & Francois, 2000; Gelb, 1988; Gylfason, 2001; Tornell & 
Lane, 1998, 1999; Torvik, 2002).  
Huge resource rents may lead to economic and political power being concentrated in the hands of 
elites that, once in control, use their rents to tilt income and wealth distribution in their favour and 
thus secure their hold on power. The consequences of this are persistent high inequality, weakened 
democracy and political instability that slow growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2005; Collier & 
Hoeffler, 1998, 2002, 2005; Dalgaard & Olsson, 2008; Karl, 1997). Governments may be tempted 
to spoil markets by granting enterprises or individuals privileged access to common-property 
natural resources, or they may offer producers tariff protection or other favours at the public 
expense, and this creates competition among the rent seekers to obtain such favours. Extensive rent 
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seeking may generate corruption in business and government (Baland & Francois, 2000; Gray & 
Kaufmann, 1998; Krueger, 1974; Leite & Weidmann, 1999; Torvick, 2002), distort the allocation of 
resources, weaken fixed investment (by crowding out physical capital), lead to increased public 
spending (Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003; Ross, 1999), reduce economic efficiency and work against 
social equity. Moreover, abundant natural resources may induce a false sense of security among the 
people and governments and cause the State to miss opportunities to impose good economic 
management (including free trade and an efficient bureaucracy) and establish good quality 
institutions (Auty, 2001a,b; Bulte et al, 2005; Sachs & Warner, 1999b; Sala-i-Martin & 
Subramanian, 2003). In other words, abundant natural capital may crowd out social capital –the 
infrastructure and institutions of a society in a broad sense: culture, cohesion, law, the legal system, 
rules and customs and so on– and affect economic growth (Auty, 2006; Gylfason, 2004). Therefore 
we can identify three main channels: rent seeking may corrode social capital through corruption 
(Auty, 2001b; Karl, 1997; Leite & Weidmann, 1999; Ross, 1999; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 
2003), through inequality (Gylfason & Zoega, 2003) and through the absence of political liberties, 
which are all factors that hinder economic growth and perpetuate poverty. However, this effect is 
not independent of the political regime, and the evidence indicates that the curse is more likely to 
occur in presidential regimes (and other non-democracies) than in parliamentary systems (Andersen 
& Aslaksen, 2006). 
Auty (2001b) says that different kinds of natural resource endowments may have different effects 
on economic performance. It is especially interesting to distinguish between “point resources” (e.g. 
mineral and energy resources, activities where the use of capital is intensive) and “diffuse 
resources” (e.g. cropland and livestock). The former generate greater opportunities for rent-seeking 
and corruption than the latter, and the negative consequences for economic growth are more serious. 
Isham et al. (2005) say that export concentration in point resources is strongly associated with weak 
public institutions, and these in turn are strongly linked to slower economic growth. Woolcock et al. 
(2001) show that natural resources-rich economies in general, and different types of resources in 
particular, put different types of pressure on community structures, institutional capacity and state-
society relations. Economic growth is more likely to be undermined when natural resources are 
more easily captured and controlled by a narrow elite. Bulte et al. (2005) propose similar exercises 
but evaluate the curse in terms of several indicators of human welfare. They show that resource-
intensive countries tend to have lower levels of human development. This implies that the resource 
curse is a phenomenon that does not just affect economic growth but has wider impacts, and 
countries that rely on point resources tend to perform worse. 
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Boschini et al. (2005) show that the effect of natural resources on economic development is not 
determined by resource endowments alone but by the interaction between a country’s type of 
resources and its quality of institutions. This combination of factors represents the so-called 
“appropriability” of a resource. This concept captures the probability that an abundance of natural 
resources leads to rent-seeking, corruption or conflicts, and these in turn damage economic 
development. In economies where resources are highly appropriable, the abundance of resources 
may hamper economic growth, while in countries where resources are less appropriable their 
abundance may contribute to economic expansion in the long run. Moreover, in these analytical 
lines the curse is seen as a process conditioned by the impact of other factors, and in this scenario 
institutional arrangements play a central role. However, recently other academics have questioned 
this view and cast doubt on the intensity of the effect and the causality of the relationship. 
Stijns (2001) suggests that natural resources may affect economic growth either favourably or 
negatively and Domenech (2008) proves that, in the case of Spain (1860-2000), mineral resources 
had a positive effect on industrialization by 1920. Ding & Field (2004) use more suitable indicators 
of natural resource abundance –natural capital (according to the World Bank, 2006, instead of the 
GDP shares of primary exports) – and demonstrate that the impacts of natural resources on growth 
disappear. Finally, Brunnschweiler & Bulte (2006) and Brunnschweiler (2008) present evidence 
that overturns the causality hypothesis and propose that resource abundance has positive effects on 
growth and institutional quality. 
3.5.2 Human capital and skill intensity 
Natural resource abundance may reduce private and public incentives to accumulate human 
capital because there is a high level of non-wage income –e.g., dividends, social spending, low 
taxes– and because the predominant tendency in resource-rich economies is to underestimate the 
long-run value of education (Birdsall et al., 2000; Bravo-Ortega & De Gregorio, 2005; Gylfason, 
2001; Wood & Mayer, 2001). In others words, abundant natural capital may crowd out human 
capital. In terms of the productive structure approach, activities based on natural resources –e.g 
agriculture, fishing, forestry or mining– are less high-skill labour-intensive and probably also less 
high-quality capital-intensive than other industries. Thus they confer relatively few external benefits 
on other industries (Wood & Berge, 1997) and tend to impede learning by doing, innovation 
(Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2004; Sachs & Warner, 2001, Stijns, 2001), technological progress and 
consequently economic growth. 
3.5.3 Expenditure patterns: incentives to saving and investment 
Natural resource abundance may prevent private and public incentives from promoting saving 
and investing (Papyrakisa & Gerlagh, 2006). As the owners of the natural resources accumulate 
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more we expect that the demand for capital falls, and this leads to lower real interest rates and 
slower growth (Gylfason & Zoega, 2001).  
Manufacturing often enjoys increasing returns to scale and creates positive externalities. A 
decrease in scale in manufacturing further decreases the productivity and profitability of physical 
capital and accelerates the decrease in investment (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 1999a; Gillis et al., 
1996). In others words, abundant natural capital may crowd out physical capital. Natural resource 
wealth decreases the need for savings and investment as the abundance of natural resources 
provides a continuous stream of future windfalls, and welfare seems less dependent on the transfer 
of man-made capital to future periods (Corden, 1984; Gylfason & Zoega, 2001, 2006). This process 
may be related to the retarded development of financial institutions, a state of affairs that 
discourages saving, investment and economic growth. Besides this, not only is the volume of 
investment important but also the quality of the expenditure, and individuals or governments 
frequently invest windfall rents in unproductive projects. 
In economies in which a large proportion of the total wealth is in the form of land, total savings 
can be used either to accumulate capital and attend to market demand or to invest in land (Kurz & 
Salvadori, 1995; Foley & Michl, 1999). When land is still relatively abundant, the aim of investing 
in land is to reap the benefits that will come from future price rises. As land prices increase, 
capitalists invest a larger part of their wealth in it and this slows down capital accumulation. On the 
other hand, when land is not abundant and the frontier has already been occupied, increases in land 
rents depress profits and boost capitalist expenditure up to a point at which capital accumulation 
virtually stops. In both cases resources are diverted from an alternative destination –capital 
accumulation– in a sense very close to the idea of crowding out, as described above. To the extent 
that capital accumulation is the main source of growth and technical change, economies in which 
land rents and/or opportunities for land speculation are higher will grow less.  
3.6 Factor endowment and the institutional change hypothesis: natural resources, path 
dependence and institutional legacy 
A last and very influential approach in recent economic history analysis about why some 
resource-dependent economies have developed more successfully than others, is the assertion that 
the basic explanation of economic development is to be found in the interaction of critical 
exogenous factors such as geography, climate and institutional legacy. These factors may explain 
why certain recently-settled regions in temperate areas, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the US, entered the 20th century as “more developed” countries than the resource-dependent 
tropical plantation and peasant-based economies of Africa, Asia and Latin America.  
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Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) suggest that different European colonization strategies created 
different sets of institutions. “Neo-European” states were set up where colonial settlers tried to 
replicate European institutions, and the emphasis was on private property and controls against 
government power. But, at the other extreme, there were also “extractive” states in which these two 
aspects were not considered. Colonization strategy and settlement by Europeans was influenced by 
geography, climate, disease and environmental factors. In places less suitable for settlement and 
with high mortality among settlers (malaria, yellow fever) it was more likely that extractive States 
would be formed. But on the other hand if European colonists could safely settle in an area they 
created better institutions. Long after European colonies became independent the colonial legacy of 
the institutional matrix persisted and it has been a key factor in determining whether economic 
performance would be good or bad (the notion of path-dependence). 
Engerman & Sokolof (1997, 2002) consider that the relevant factor endowment was not just 
relative abundance of land and natural resources to labour in the New World but also the soil, the 
climate and the size and density of native populations. Their view highlight the fundamental 
importance of the extreme differences across the New World societies in the extent of inequality in 
the distributions of wealth, human capital, and political influence that were present from the early 
histories of the colonies and due primarily to their respective factor endowments (or initial 
conditions more generally) The causal relationship is between factor endowments, social and 
economic inequality and the generation of institutional arrangements that create the conditions for 
economic development. They emphasize the role of factor endowments, arguing that the colonies 
that came to make up the US and Canada were quite unusual in the New World, because their factor 
endowments predisposed them toward paths of development with relatively equal distributions of 
wealth, human capital and greater population homogeneity as compared with the great majority of 
other regions of Latin America.  
Other authors have studied the connection between specific environmental conditions –climate 
and tropical locations– and economic performance, and present evidence that the former directly 
influenced the latter (Bloom & Sachs, 1998; Kamarck, 1976). However the predominant current 
view is that factor endowment explains economic growth but only through the indirect impact of 
institutional factors (Easterly & Levine, 2003; Hall & Jones, 1999), and does not put forward 
arguments for direct causality. 
3.7 Remarks and summary 
We have identified four analytical approaches to understanding the relationship between natural 
resource endowment and economic development. Three of them are associated with the “resource 
curse hypothesis”, a dominant concept in the literature since the publication of Sachs and Warner’s 
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paper in 1995. The fourth approach is related to the “blessing” that natural resources confer on 
economic growth, a notion that held sway in the mainstream until the middle of the 20th century. 
One approach focuses on the productive structure and considers the allocation of resources 
among activities with different spillovers and scale economies, and the influence these have on 
economic growth. Some activities would provide better opportunities for expansion than others, and 
therefore economic specialization becomes a key issue. Economies based on primary activities 
(natural resources-intensive economies) and where manufacturing and services have a small share 
in the internal generation of value would grow more slowly than other economies where labour 
division is more complex and innovative capacity is strengthened by systemic relationships. This 
approach includes the contributions of the Latin American Structuralism and the Developmentalist 
Theories of the 1950s-1960s and also of the recent analyses from the Neo-Schumpeterian and 
Evolutionist Schools. “Dutch disease hypothesis” occupies a key position in the approach that 
emphasizes changes in productive structure. Countries with abundant natural resources undergo 
booms and busts at irregular intervals because of price variations and because new resources are 
discovered. This evolution would create sudden changes in export earnings and in real currency 
exchange rates, and would affect the performance of foreign direct investment and productive 
activities, especially in tradable industries. The framework of the Dutch Disease hypothesis is 
useful to discuss the dynamic of the adjustment even though it is not essential to understand it. In 
other models it is possible, as well, to find different effects of the abundance of natural resources on 
income growth and income level. Economies with huge natural resources can achieve high incomes 
per capita although the transition into a new equilibrium may imply negative growth rates. 
A second approach is based on the recent literature about the “resource curse hypothesis”. In this 
model the idea is that an abundance of, or heavy dependence on, natural resources influences some 
variable “x” which affects economic growth. The channels of transmission of this effect can be 
understood in terms of crowding out: an abundance of natural capital tends to displace other 
modalities of capital such as social, human, physical and financial assets, and tends to damage 
foreign direct investment. In general, failures in economic policy and weaknesses in institutions 
generate conditions adverse to economic growth, and resources are allocated to activities with low 
contributions to social welfare. This analysis is usually based on rent-seeking behaviour, which 
includes the government granting privileges to private agents, corruption, inequality and restrictions 
on political freedom. An abundance of natural resources may reduce incentives to accumulate 
human capital and depress public and private expenditure on high quality education. It may also be 
accompanied by low incentives to save and invest in a context of weak demand for machinery and 
equipment and low real interest rates. When capital accumulation is the main source of resources 
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for growth and technical change, economies in which land rents and/or opportunities for land 
speculation are higher will grow less. In this context, the possibilities to connect financial capital 
with production are reduced and credit markets are imperfect and segmented. These considerations 
may be extended to foreign direct investment, which will find few attractive alternatives apart from 
the main natural resource exploitation activities.  
The third approach is the so-called “factor endowment and institutional change hypothesis”. In 
accordance with this view, the core of economic development is the interaction of critical 
exogenous factors such as geography, climate and institutional legacy. We can identify two 
perspectives here. First, the endowment of natural resources may directly affect economic 
development because geographic and environmental factors would determine land quality, potential 
production and the available technology. Second, the environment, geography and natural 
endowments may have indirect effects on economic development through the institutional structure 
and changes in institutional arrangements. 
Finally, a fourth approach considers that natural resources are a blessing for growth. According to 
the “staple theory”, several countries have developed integrated economies by exporting primary 
products (typically some settler economies). The existence of backward and forward linkages 
supports this view because some activities have more potential than others to induce dynamism in 
the economy. The “vent for surplus theory” suggests that external trade was the way in which idle 
natural resources started to generate value, and this opened the way for quick expansion.  
4. Hypotheses and structure of the Thesis  
The starting point of our argument (see 
Figure 1.19) is that when the settler 
economies, with their abundance of natural 
resources, were exposed to the effects of the 
First Globalization they reacted differently in 
terms of economic performance. There was a 
common pattern of primary export-led 
economic growth and worsening inequality, 
and in different places the incorporation of 
“new” land into production would have 
different consequences in terms of income –
levels per capita and distribution– with 
differing intensity in long-run performance.   
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4.1 Line of argument and hypotheses 
Massive migrations and inflows of capital were accompanied by the expansion of the frontier, 
the settlement of “new” regions and movements into inhabited areas. The concept of frontier 
expansion has two dimensions. On the one hand there is the traditional idea of the exploitation of 
“new resources” that led to increasing economic growth, and on the other hand the idea of “land 
conversion” whereby new and relatively large scale productive activities were introduced into 
regions where there already was economic activity (Barbier, 2003:16). In our Thesis we concentrate 
on the former notion because it is more appropriate to refer to the “frontiers of settlement”.18 
The most famous study of the importance of frontier expansion for economic development was 
that of Frederick Jackson Turner in 1893. Turner (1920) advanced what is known as the “Turner 
thesis”. His argument is that the frontier attracted a particular type of person, and this was crucial 
for determining the path of US society. This study was the first in a fruitful field of research that 
applied these notions to North America, Latin America, and Australasia. 
The “domestic contribution” to economic growth in settler economies was precisely the 
incorporation of “new” land into production. The literature about the economic development of 
settler economies has traditionally discussed the timing of frontier expansion. “In the Argentine 
pampas, and in the south-eastern and south-western regions of Australia, the fertility of the soil and 
mean rainfall declined as the farming frontier moved inland from the coasts –though more rapidly 
in the case of Australia” (McLean, 2005: 20).19 “If the 1890s saw beginning of large-scale 
settlement on the prairies [Canada] and the pampas [Argentina], the era of the open frontier of 
settlement was over by 1914” (Adelman, 1994:5). In Argentina, and in contrast to other settler 
economies like Australia and Canada, “[t]he economic problem was how to pass from horizontal 
expansion –onto new land– to expansion that we may call vertical expansion, which would include 
intensive agriculture and industrial development” (Di Tella & Zymelman, 1967: 141-142; our 
translation).20 Another aspect of land frontier expansion is the types of natural resources involved. 
“Australia, and to a lesser degree New Zealand, had a significant mining sector, and this meant 
more diversified exports and also a supply of raw materials and energy for the country’s own 
industry. Mining explains why GDP per capita in Australia was initially so much higher than in 
Argentina (around 1880).” (own translation) (Álvarez, Bértola & Porcile, 2007: 12). Denoon 
(1983), Dieguez (1969), Duncan & Fogarty (1984) and Platt & Di Tella (1985) all consider 
different land frontier expansion patterns in their analyses of comparative development. The 
                                                 
18  “Frontiers of settlement” is a concept corresponding to the North American notion of land frontier expansion, and 
this contrasts to the European notion whereby the “political frontier” is the central idea (Power, 1999).  
19 Similar concepts are proposed in Rock (1986) and Díaz Alejandro (1975) (Argentina and the US).  
20 In other words, the problem of Argentina –as other settler economies– was how to deal with the structural change. 
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expansion of the land frontier was clearly related to the way in which land property rights were set 
up and consequently to the establishment of different land ownership systems. One of the main 
factors behind differences in economic performance may be differences in land frontier expansion 
and in the creation of the institutional arrangements related to it. The incentive mechanisms and the 
capacity that institutions had to appropriate rents and channel them into productive activities are 
determinant in explaining differences within the “club”. 
We focus our analysis on the settler economies during the First Globalization (from the mid-19th 
century to WWI) and we consider that an abundance of natural resources was one of the main 
factors behind economic performance in the period. In the recent literature, the stylized facts 
associated with the First Globalization –economic growth, primary specialization and increasing 
inequality– have been analyzed in terms of changes in relative prices and factor endowments –in the 
H-O-S tradition– although little attention has been paid to the incorporation of new land. Our 
approach is to emphasize this process and to consider endogenous land frontier expansion as the 
main expression of the abundance of natural resources in settler economies. The incorporation of 
“new” land was a process that went on at the same time that specific institutions dealing with land 
ownership were being set up. Therefore a second central aspect is to examine the connection 
between the dynamics of land incorporation and the quality of the institutions involved. Because 
worsening income distribution is a key subject, we employ a theoretical framework in which the 
different rental appropriability capacities of the natural resources is a key factor, and we evaluate 
the formation of the land ownership system in accordance with it. In line with our objectives, we 
put special emphasis on the agriculture performance because of two reasons. First, this sector was a 
central protagonist in the land frontier expansion and, in consequence, it was the activity that 
received more directly the effects of the First Globalization. Second, a sector approach allows us a 
more detailed analysis of the evolution of income and inequality in settler economies.  
Our hypothesis is that the land frontier expansion shaped different opportunities, depending on 
the land aptitude, for members of the settler club and this determined how productive and 
distributive patterns were established. That economy that expands its frontier by the best lands 
“received” the blessing of the abundance of natural resources in terms of growth, but faced the 
curse of a deeper worsening in the income distribution in the agriculture. Land quality determines, 
technically, the appropriability conditions of the natural resources, and the quality of the institutions 
(in terms of their capacity to moderate concentrated rent appropriation) conditioned the long-run 
performance of the period. In this sense, our view has points of contact with the “factor endowment 
and the institutional change hypothesis” because endowments play a central role and interact with 
institutions to determine the economic performance in a logic of path dependence. 
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Availability of natural resources (especially land) was the main comparative advantage of settler 
economies to participate in the international commodity markets, and it determined their export-led 
growth strategy in a way according to the hypothesis of the blessing of the natural resources (in the 
tradition of the Staple Theory). But, at the same time, the First Globalization created pressures to 
increase income inequality. These pressures were expressed in a broader gap between rents and 
other income modalities (wages and profits) in a process that combined higher rental rates with the 
expansion of the productive factor more intensively used to produce food and raw materials (land as 
the abundant factor). Nevertheless, the natural endowments within the “club” were not homogenous 
along the territory, and the consequences rendered different results. In accordance with our 
theoretical framework, moving the land frontier by better lands would foster the negative effects on 
income distribution because it would enable a reduced segment of the population (landowners) to 
capture increasing rents. A more intense worsening in the inequality of the River Plate would be 
associated with the different timing of land frontier expansion into lands that were better as regards 
agricultural aptitude (in terms of the suitability to allocate grassland) and distance (to strategic 
territorial points that we call “centres of gravity”). Considering different land quality as diverse 
types of natural resources that imply different conditions to capture the rents generated by the 
incorporation of “new” land is represented by the “appropriability hypothesis” and its two 
components, i.e. the technical and the institutional dimensions.  
The historical conditions in Spanish ex-colonies contributed to the creation of a “rentist” pattern 
in which land ownership made possible the elite appropriate incomes without having to make 
substantial investments, in a social environment where the land concentration was the norm in a 
society with deep roots in the colonial era. Simultaneously with the land frontier expansion, it was 
occurred the configuration of a system of institutional arrangements that created a new land 
ownership structure. In the ex-British colonies, the distribution of land ownership rights configured 
a land ownership system that encouraged economic growth and an income pattern more egalitarian 
than in South American Southern Cone. In the British territories, and in comparative terms, the 
conditions fostered investment (in physical and human capital) and moderated the crowding-out 
effects of natural resources.  
4.2  Structure of the Thesis 
In accordance with our hypotheses, the discussion of the literature about the curse and the 
blessing of the natural resources, and paying attention to the foremost stylized facts of our “club” of 
economies, we focus on three main questions: (i) endogenous land frontier expansion; (ii) the 
influence of land quality in the economic performance; (iii) the interaction between the abundance 
 57
of natural resources and institutional quality. To deal with these questions we work in four 
supplementary directions. 
4.2.1 Theoretical framework: land frontier expansion, land quality and institutional 
quality 
We present an analytical model that describes the three stylized facts mentioned in Section 2 to 
represent some aspects of the blessing and the curse of the natural resources and that supplements 
the view derived from the H-O-S theory. In the tradition of “specific factor” models, we study two 
aspects of domestic conditions: endogenous land frontier expansion and the use of a decision rule to 
understand this movement in terms of incomes and costs related to this expansion. We propose 
modifications to the theoretical formulation derived from Findaly & Lundahl (1994) and Findlay 
(1995) to introduce the effect of different land qualities in the results of the model. Our objective is 
to emphasize the role of endogenous advance on the land during the First Globalization and how it 
reacted to movements in the relative prices of the commodities, the changes in the relative 
endowments of productive factors and modifications in parameters. Our contribution is to extend 
the model to make it more flexible and adapt it to the different results within the settler “club”. Our 
discussion focuses on particular on the influence of different patterns of land frontier expansion (or 
settlement) –which depends on land quality– on the constitution of particular distribution structures.  
Land frontier expansion occurred simultaneously with the creation of specific institutional 
arrangements and, therefore, the institutional explanation of the natural resource curse (and 
blessing) constitutes a useful tool to guide our analysis. The effect of natural resources on economic 
development is not determined by resource endowments alone, but rather by the interaction between 
the type of resources and the quality of institutions. This combination represents the so-called 
“appropriability” of a resource. In general, this concept alludes to the environmental factors that 
control the innovator’s ability to get returns generated by an innovation. In the case of natural 
resources, the concept captures the probability that they may lead to rent-seeking, anti-competitive 
actions and corruption or conflicts which, in turn, damage economic development. In economies 
where resources are highly appropriable, the abundance of resources may hamper economic 
development, while in countries where resources are less appropriable their abundance may 
contribute to it. These aspects are dealt with in Chapter 2. From this discussion, two questions are 
central for our analysis of the economic performance of settler countries: land frontier expansion 
and income distribution, and in the next two chapters we made these concepts operational. 
4.2.2 Land frontier expansion: concept, measures and evidence 
From the discussion in Chapter 2 we present different notions and measures of land frontier 
expansion. In order to identify the “settlement patterns”, we present the concept of land frontier 
expansion and review its recent theoretical and empirical development so as to discuss ways to 
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measure the process. We base our quantification proposal on the use of geo-referenced information 
systems (GIS) and the elaboration of land frontier indexes (“extensive”, “intensive”, and 
“contribution”). With this strategy we can circumvent the limitations of previous approaches in the 
matter because we consider different land aptitudes (in agricultural terms) and distances (from 
“centres of gravity) considering potential vegetation. We dealt with these aspects in Chapter 3. 
4.2.3 Inequality patterns: concept, measures and evidence 
In accordance with the discussion in Chapter 2, we present different notions and measures of two 
dimensions of inequality in settler economies. We consider assets and incomes distribution, in order 
to identify different “distributive patterns”. Agricultural production was the most important 
productive activity in the settler economies and one of the main factors in land frontier expansion, 
so a study of the inequality in the sector can yield interesting insights. 
We review the distribution of the land ownership in the eve of the WWI. We present percentile 
indicators, Gini coefficients and sizes of the establishments by country in the “club” and by regions 
(the latter for large economies, Argentina, Australia and Canada). Inequality indexes hide certain 
“shapes” in land distribution that make some comparisons relative and drive us to put the emphasis 
on different regional realities that improve our approach to the question. We also estimate 
functional income distribution in the agrarian sector. We present the concept and discuss the 
existence of two distributive patterns. In one of them capitalist relations predominated, and this was 
typical of the British ex-colonies, and in the other economic relations were based on agrarian rental 
incomes, and this was the pattern in the economies of the South America Southern Cone. In the 
Australasian economies and Canada income distribution worsened less severely than in the Spanish 
ex-colonies in the “club”, and this coincided with different dynamics of advancing into the territory. 
In accordance with our measure of land frontier expansion in agrarian aptitude terms, and supported 
by our theoretical framework, we argue that the different exploitation of natural resources explain, 
at least partially, these differences. These aspects are discussed in Chapter 4. 
4.2.4 The role of institutional arrangements: appropriability and land ownership 
systems 
Specific institutional arrangements –especially property rights– came into being at the same time 
that the land frontier was expanding (although in some periods one process preceded the other), so 
the influence of these two factors on economic performance should not be studied separately, and 
we pay attention on the simultaneous effects. 
We discuss the effect of natural resources on economic development through the interaction 
between the type of natural resources that a country possesses and the quality of its institutions. We 
consider types of natural resources in terms of land aptitude. We approach institutional quality by 
considering governance, contract enforcement and property rights (at the macro level), and in terms 
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of the evolution of the configuration of the land ownership system (at the level of the agents’ 
behaviour). Our argument is guided by the appropriability hypothesis and we propose two 
approaches. One is based estimating the statistical relation between economic development (growth 
and income distribution in the agrarian activity), natural resources and institutions, and involves the 
concepts of constraints on the executive and contract-intensive money. The other is a historical 
description of the distribution of land rights and the institutional arrangements related to the land 
property in four countries: Argentina and Uruguay (that represent the Spanish ex-colonies) and 
Australia and New Zealand (the English ex-colonies). Our main findings are that, in the long run, 
the curse of natural resources on development in terms of inequality arises when the new land that 
is brought into use is more suitable for agrarian activity (high aptitude). However, at the same time 
the abundance of land bestows the blessing of significant economic growth in the agriculture when 
economies “escape from the (initial) curse” of natural resources. 
4.2.5 Other contributions 
In Chapter 6 we present our main conclusions, final remarks and contributions. In addition, 
several chapters have a very detailed appendix. Chapter 2 has an appendix with the formal 
representation of the analytical model, which is commented on and illustrated in the core of the 
chapter, and the results of the corresponding calibration and numerical analysis. It constitutes an 
interesting improvement on the original model and a conceptual contribution to the analysis of the 
period. Chapter 3 has a description of the application of GIS tools in historical perspective and 
examines some methodological questions. Chapter 4 includes an appendix about the 
methodological construction of the functional income distribution series for the agrarian sector. 
This appendix provides new statistical series and describes the methodological decisions that, 
besides making our results plausible, may be useful for subsequent working research. Finally, in the 
appendix to Chapter 5 there is a description of the institutional quality indicators used in our 
econometric exercises. 
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Chapter 2 
Land abundance, frontier expansion and income distribution 
in settler economies during the First Globalization (1870-
1913): analytical framework 
The effects of the First Globalization on economic growth and income distribution in the New 
World figure prominently in the recent literature about the economic history of the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Initially in this chapter we discuss an analytical model –in the “specific factors” 
model tradition– to improve our understanding of the evolution of economic performance in natural 
resource-abundant regions. This approach supplements the H-O-S approach and has endogenous 
land frontier expansion as a main concept. In this framework it is possible to introduce different 
qualities of land in order to represent the historical process of the settler economies. 
First, we consider economic growth and the evolution of inequality in the settler economies as a 
“club” and present the well-known H-O-S framework as the “mainstream” view that explains the 
effects of the First Globalization (Section 1). We discuss some of the main limitations of this 
framework (theoretical and empirical questions) and outline recent efforts to overcome them. Then 
we introduce an analytical approach that changes the emphasis of the analysis. In the tradition of 
“specific factor” models, we work with two aspects of domestic conditions: endogenous land 
frontier expansion and the use of a decision rule to understand this movement in terms of marginal 
incomes and costs of the expansion. We propose static comparative exercises to review some of the 
main processes associated with the First Globalization (improving terms of trade, immigration, 
capital inflows, the reduction in the cost of clearing land, technical progress) and to understand how 
the model works (Section 2). In this framework we propose a numerical analysis with specific 
functional expressions to illustrate this subject and discuss our results. As this framework cannot 
explain differences within the “club” (studied in Chapter 1), we discuss some analytical extensions 
to capture different land qualities in terms of agricultural aptitude and distance from markets 
(Section 3) and advance suggestions and hypotheses that will be tackled in subsequent steps of this 
research (Section 4). 
Natural endowments (land) are not the whole story and their incorporation into production is 
mediated by institutional arrangements, so we extend our analytical framework to consider recent 
contributions about economic development and an abundance of natural resources. One of the main 
branches of the curse of natural resources approach is the analysis of the role institutions play in 
economic relationships. We use the appropriability hypothesis to consider the idea that different 
types of natural resources interact with institutional quality and yield differing economic results. 
According to the more extended literature our settler economies would have similar natural capital, 
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but it is important to introduce the idea of “quality” to identify different “types” of natural 
resources. We consider different kinds of land –depending on its natural aptitude to be used for 
grazing– to incorporate a scale of appropriability possibilities that ranges from high quality land 
(with a greater probability of yielding differential rents) to low quality. First, we review the concept 
of the curse of natural resources and present the appropriability hypothesis (Section 5). This concept 
enables us to identify two models of distribution (in the agrarian sector) and the creation of 
institutional arrangements for land ownership. Finally, in Section 6 we draw our conclusions and 
make some final remarks about the two conceptual approaches, their role in this Thesis and the 
subsequent chapters. 
1. Stylized facts and the “canonical” model: comments and limitations 
During the First Globalization (from the mid-19th century to the 1910s), the settler economy 
development pattern was characterized by a strong primary export-led economic growth and 
increasing income inequality. In the closing decades of the 19th century economic growth was 
encouraged by the export of primary products (leather, wool, meat, wheat and, in some cases, 
mineral products),21 and the abundance of natural resources was a blessing for the productive 
expansion of the settler economies (see Figure 2.1). But this blessing also contained a curse in that 
income distribution worsened and specialization in primary production adversely affected the 
expansion of incipient artisan 
and basic manufacturing 
activities (de-industrialization, 
according to Williamson, 
2004).  
The H-O-S trade theory 
predicts that free trade will 
raise the incomes of agents that 
own the abundant-factor and 
will reduce incomes of agents 
that posses the scarce-factor. 
Given a situation where labour 
works the land and each 
economy takes commodity prices as given by world markets, movements towards globalization  
–through trade and commodity price convergence– favour workers’ incomes (as opposed to those of 
landowners) in places where labour is abundant and land is scarce, whereas in places where labour 
                                                 
21 Willebald (2006, 2007) presents the external specialization of the settler economies during the period. 
Figure 2.1
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is scarce and land is abundant the relative incomes of landowners are favoured. Considering that 
labour remuneration in labour-abundant and land-scarce economies was initially lower than labour 
remuneration in labour-scarce and land-abundant ones, and that the opposite happens in landowner 
incomes, globalization in a pre-industrial environment leads to a levelling of world income 
(O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999). Therefore, the inequality-globalization connection in the 
nineteenth century can be summarized as follows: globalization seems to have had an anti-
egalitarian effect in (initially) land-abundant regions; it was a force that increased inequality by 
rewarding landowners more than wage-earners. Globalization seems to have had an egalitarian 
effect in (initially) land-scarce countries, especially in those that adhered to free trade and resisted 
pressure for more protection. These two effects might appear at first glance to cancel each other out 
when we aggregate the Atlantic economy as a whole. However, when we note that European 
landlords at the top of the Atlantic income distribution scale lost the most while European unskilled 
workers at the bottom gained the most, we see that changes favoured an evolution of net egalitarian 
effects (Lindert & Williamson, 2001). The impact of mass migration reinforced this trend.  
In the Atlantic economy real wages and living standards converged from the mid-19th century 
until WWI. This process was driven by the narrowing of the wage gap between the New and the 
Old World. In addition, many European countries, particularly the poorer ones, were catching up 
with the economic leaders in Europe (the industrial countries). Migration affected long-run 
equilibrium output and wages through changes in aggregate labour supply; it raised wages in 
countries with high emigration rates and reduced them in countries that received migrations. Capital 
flows acted as an anti-convergence force (in the sense of the Lucas Paradox) because they moved 
towards rich countries, rather than poor ones, in pursuit of abundant natural resources, young 
populations, and the (potential) abundance of human capital (Clemens & Williamson, 2004).  
Recent studies, with very few exceptions, 22 have not applied Rybcszynski’s theorem from the 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory to explain the performance of the Atlantic economy during the 
period. This point is important because this theorem states that the maintenance of the substitution 
rates of production after an increase in one factor must lead to an absolute expansion in the 
commodity production that uses relatively more of that factor, and to an absolute reduction in the 
production of goods using relatively less of the same factor. Therefore, in the settler economies, 
land frontier expansion would increase agrarian production and at the same time reduce 
manufacturing output. This stylized fact, despite some differences, is a good representation of the 
evolution of the club (see Chapter 1, sub-section 2). In addition, the theorem proves that “the terms 
                                                 
22 Rodriguez Weber (2011) explicitly applies the Rybcszynski effect to a mining economy (Chile) in the period 1880-
1905. Williamson (2004) discusses a similar question in the context of the de-industrialization of India during the First 
Globalization. 
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of trade of the commodity using relatively much of the factor whose quantity has increased must 
deteriorate” (Rybcszynski, 1955: 339). In our context, land frontier expansion would have been 
associated with a decrease in the ratio between the price of the agrarian commodity and the price of 
the manufactured good (PA/PM). This result scarcely occurs in settler economies during the period, 
which is probably why the literature pays scant attention to Rybcszynski’s effect. In a previous 
paper we review the stylized facts of settler economies during the First Globalization and evaluate 
the evolution of two relative price ratios (Willebald, 2009:27, 29). First we present that ratio 
because it is, conceptually, the more suitable relationship. Second, we work with international terms 
of trade (TOT) as a proxy because, in the case of settler economies, export prices (PX) would 
represent agrarian prices, and import prices (PIM) the prices of industrial products. For the club, 
PA/PM tended to decrease slightly in the 1870s and 1880s, but starting in the 1890s the evolution 
changed direction and the ratio increased significantly until it reached a peak after WWI. The 
evolution of PX/PIM was similar but did not have the initial decreasing trend. In addition, if we 
consider the small country assumption the internal changes in factor endowments should not affect 
international prices. In other words, it is reasonable to think that the predominant effect of the 
evolution of commodity prices meant for an improved PA/PM ratio and therefore regressive effects 
on income distribution. Bearing this in mind it is no surprise that the land frontier occupied a 
secondary place in the recent literature and it has been practically ignored in empirical studies. 
Research into inequality trends in countries that participated in the global economy looks at two 
kinds of empirical evidence. First, it considers trends in the ratio between farm rents per unit of acre 
and the unskilled wage rate (r/w), which can be understood as a measure of how many days an 
employee has to work to pay the rent for one unit of land. This is an adequate index of inequality in 
a world with a big agricultural sector where land is a critical component of total wealth and a 
decisive factor in income generation, and where the landowning class is a minority. Second, the 
other inequality evidence from factor prices uses trends in the ratio between GDP per worker and 
the unskilled wage rate (y/w) and yields an index of how far the recipient of an average income is 
from the typical unskilled worker near the bottom of the income distribution scale. In order to make 
historical and long run comparisons of globalization and inequality, it is important to take into 
account two shortcomings of this approach. 
First, there is a serious empirical obstacle to obtaining satisfactory results, which is that 
consistent data, even for a single country, are scarce and fragile. Data have often been compiled 
from a variety of sources –which involves us in all the difficulties of working with different 
methodologies– and they have been used to create different types of series for real wage rates (for 
unskilled urban workers, usually taken from the construction sector), land prices (rural areas), trade 
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(the exchange of goods and international commodity prices), migration (distinguishing regions of 
origin and destination), and capital movements (financial and foreign direct investment). In 
particular, when we work with rental-wage ratios (or income-wage ratios) changes in the structure 
of the active population are not considered, so the ratios can be interpreted as indicators of income 
polarization rather than overall inequality. Second, from a conceptual point of view the framework 
to understand this question is based on the neoclassical approach to the theory of international trade 
and specialization. The H-O-S approach is a useful framework to help us think about and interpret 
several features of the process, but other aspects seem to be hidden behind prices and their 
comparative evolutions. In particular, productivity gains, the possibility to advance into unoccupied 
regions, the possibility to change the specialization of inhabited areas, and changes in the economic 
structure have consequences that are hard to incorporate into the neoclassical approach. 
Recent studies have addressed the first point in two ways. First, they try to improve the quality 
and quantity of the data by elaborating new series (Arroyo Abad, 2008, for Argentina, Mexico, 
Venezuela and Uruguay in the 19th century; Bértola and Colab, 2000; Bértola, et al., 1999, for 
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay; Bohlin & Larsson, 2007, for Sweden; Greasley & Oxley, 2005, for 
New Zealand) or by considering evidence so as to allow for regional diversity (Emery, et al., 2007, 
for Canada; Shanahan & Wilson, 2007, for Australia). Second, these new studies estimate 
inequality and poverty in the long run using various indices (Prados de la Escosura, 2005, 2007, for 
Latin America) or in a direct way using population and economic census data and assigning income 
to active individuals depending on their economic activity, profession, gender, and region (Álvarez 
& Nicoloni, 2010, for one region in Argentina; Bértola, et al., 2007, and Bértola, et al., 2009c, for 
Brazil; Bértola and Rodríguez Weber, 2009, and Rodríguez Weber, 2009, for Chile; Bértola, et al., 
2009a,b, and 2010, for the South American Southern Cone). 
Other authors have addressed the second shortcoming by emphasizing the relationship between 
growth and inequality in pre-industrial economies. The basic idea is that the level of possible 
inequality depends on the level of per capita income, the subsistence level of the majority of the 
population and the size of the elite that may appropriate the eventual surplus (Milanovic, et al., 
2007).  Other authors take the evolution of productivity as a central concept and treat it as a process 
that depends on the interaction between technical progress, changes in the productive structure and 
changes in the demand pattern, which have consequences for the development of international trade 
(Bértola, 2000; Porcile and Bértola, 2007; Willebald, 2006, 2007). Finally, in a 2007 article, Knick 
Harley argues the following.  
“Applying the Stopler-Samuelson paradigm from the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, 
the result is an approach that sees price convergence as pivotal in defining, identifying, 
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and measuring globalization. This focus, however, obscures the implications of frontier 
incorporation and other insights achieved by viewing nineteenth-century globalization 
as a mechanism whereby peripheral economies were incorporated into the core of 
organized economic activity. A frontier-centred perspective also reintroduces the role of 
economic institutions as a crucial element of economic growth and development.” 
(Harley, 2007:238).  
Bringing the frontier into the analysis involves the discovery of export staples, a process of 
learning how best to exploit them, and the mobilization of capital and labour for production, use 
and distribution. In a recent working paper, Camilo García-Jimeno and James Robinson show 
similar interest in the frontier. They analyze the classical F.J. Turner (1920) view, the “Frontier (or 
Turner) Thesis”, for North, Central and South America from the middle of the 19th century to 2007.  
They suggest that institutional quality, taken together with the open frontier, explain the success or 
failure of these economies in the long-run. 
“The consequences of the existence of a frontier for different countries in the 
Americas depended a lot on the nature of political institutions which formed in the early 
independence period. If these institutions featured few constraints on the executive, 
having a frontier was actually bad for economic development”. (García-Jimeno & 
Robinson, 2009: 18).  
From this viewpoint, the focus centred on frontiers –the incorporation of regions that were 
originally almost unoccupied and outside European economic influence– supplements the 
mainstream approach and helps to explain new questions. In particular, land frontier expansion may 
be a pivotal concept insofar as it enables us to connect considerations about technological progress 
and institutional formation in a different way, as based on the combination of endogenous growth in 
the use of the productive factor and regional and local perspectives. These considerations are 
particularly useful in our line of research. 
Our thesis is part of the literature that seeks to understand the effects of the First Globalization on 
economic growth and income distribution in the closing decades of the 19th century and the first 
decades of the 20th century. Initially, we present a model that incorporates the concept of 
endogenous land frontier expansion to complement the view derived from H-O-S framework, and 
includes a focus on different land quality in interaction with institutional quality. We attempt to 
incorporate some of the proposals presented in Harley (2007) related to land frontier expansion, and 
in García-Jimeno & Robinson (2009) related to institutional approach. Afterwards, we will discuss 
the land frontier expansion approach of García-Jimeno & Robinson (2009) (Chapter 3) and we will 
contribute with new evidence about income distribution from a sector perspective (Chapter 4).  
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2. A complementary view to H-O-S approach: the importance of endogenous land frontier 
expansion 
Changes in levels of economic activity, income distribution and the productive structure may be 
represented by a simple model that incorporates changes in relative prices, inter-sector differences 
in productivity, and the accumulation of productive factors. This model is based on the so-called 
Ricardo-Viner “specific factors” model, which was itself influenced by Jones [1979, (1971)] in the 
“staple theory” tradition. We initially follow Findlay & Lundahl (1994) and Findlay (1995) and 
present comparative static exercises to represent the main stylized facts of the First Globalization. 
As in Di Tella (1982) and Harley (1978), this model considers the concept of an endogenous or 
moving frontier, and permits us to introduce a perspective that supplements the insights usually 
studied in the recent literature. 
The basic idea is that the supply of land “physically” given, as in Ricardo’s notion of “the 
original and indestructible powers of the soil”, is not necessarily perfectly inelastic. Incorporating 
land into production requires an investment to clear waste land, improve transportation and create 
the conditions for people to live in distant territories. Therefore the acquisition of “new” land could 
be thought of as an investment that yields returns equal to its rents, but that also requires some 
initial expenditure which has to be recovered at a rate of return that is competitive with other 
alternatives (the typical notion of opportunity cost). In this sense, the supply of land become 
“endogenous” and its quantity and price have to be determined along with the supply and cost of all 
the other commodities and factors. As in the H-O-S theory, the way to understand the economic 
process is to solve the model for changes in factor prices and commodity outputs when commodity 
prices or factor endowments are altered. However, the interesting point is that those changes in 
relative commodity and factor prices cause changes in the supply of specific factors (capital and 
land). In sub-sections 2.1 and 2.2 we concisely present the model –with some of the main 
functions–and the static comparative exercises include a numerical resolution –by adopting specific 
functional relations– to give dimension to and illustrate more clearly some of the relationships. The 
complete formal presentation is given in the Appendix to Chapter 2.  
2.1 Main characteristics of the initial model 
Technology is represented by a constant returns to scale production function for Primary 
Products (A) and Manufactures (M): 
A=A(N, LA)       (1) 
M=min[F(KM, LM),AR/αΜ]      (2) 
Where: 
 68
N: input of natural resources specific to sector A (“land”). 
KM: input of capital to sector M. 
F: the familiar neoclassical constant returns to scale production function. 
AR: raw material input; it is connected to gross output M by the fixed coefficientαΜ. 
Li: input of labour in sector i, with i=A, M.  
L= LA + LM      (3) 
KM is assumed as a perfectly elastic supply in the long run at interest rate ρ, which is determined 
by domestic time preferences. KM consists of an accumulated stock of M (a good that can be either 
consumed or invested). N is determined by an endogenous frontier and may be increased by 
incurring in a rising marginal cost in terms of capital: 
KA = φ (Ν)        (4) 
With φ’(N) > 0 and φ’’(N) > 0; where φ’(N) is the marginal cost of “clearing” a unit of land. 
φ (Ν)  is a convex function of the amount of land cleared.  
If we adopt M as the numeraire good we have: 
p= PA / PM: the relative price of A. 
w= W / PM: the real wage. 
We can write the production function for M in an intensive form: 
m=min[m(k),aR/αΜ]      (2)’ 
For any given value of p, first order condition imply: (1-αΜ p) m’(k)= ρ  (5) 
Where k* that satisfied (5) also determines the equilibrium real wage: 
w* =(1-αΜ p) [m(k*) -  m’(k*) k*]       (6) 
That is, the retribution to each unit of labour in sector M is given by the difference between the 
product generated in the activity (equivalent to the income) and the capital cost (in intensive terms) 
corrected by the coefficient (adjusted) of the raw material. Capital cost given by the product of the 
price of the capital (its marginal productivity) and the amount of capital used in the production.    
Analogously, we can write the production function for A in an intensive form: 
a=a(n)       (1)’ 
Where: 
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a: output per worker in sector A. 
n: land per worker in sector A. 
a’(n): marginal productivity of land; with a’(n) > 0 and  a’’ (n) < 0. 
Assuming perfect competition and free mobility of labour between sectors: 
w* = pa - p[a’(n) .n] = p[a-a’(n) n]        (7) 
That is, the retribution to each unit of labour in sector A (the same that sector M) must be equal 
to the difference between the value of the product generated in the sector and the cost of land (in 
intensive terms). The last is given by the product of the price of land (the value of the marginal 
productivity) and the amount of land used in the activity. For each value of p there exists a unique 
value for n and therefore a unique value for the marginal productivity of land a’(n). 
How is the extension of the frontier (and the amount of land) determined? In the long run, the 
rate of return on clearing land (the relation between the marginal income and the marginal cost on 
clearing land, Λ) must be equal to the interest rate (that represents the opportunity cost): 
ρ
φ
=Λ=
′
′
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)(
N
nap
        (8) 
In accordance with (7), a rise in p leads to a fall in n to restore the level of wage w*. In addition, 
the numerator of (8) rises since the marginal productivity of a unit of land a’(n) rises in response to 
an increase in p (a’’ (n) < 0). As φ’’(N) > 0, N must increase in order for equation (8) to hold. We 
have thus proven that:  
N = N (p) and N’(p) > 0       (9) 
The extension of the frontier is an increasing function of p. Since for each p there is a unique 
n(p) and N(p), it follows that there is also a unique LA and therefore a unique A. Since N’(p)>0 and 
n’(p)<0, it follows that LA and N are increasing functions of p:  
A = A(p); A’(p) >0,        (10) 
where (10) represents the supply curve of A. 
From (3) we know that the value of LA corresponds to a unique value of LM as well.  
Since k* is determined uniquely by (5) we know KM and hence M as well. We obtain: 
M = M (1/p); M’ (1/p)>0,        (11) 
where (11) represents the supply curve of M (a positively sloped curve that depends on its own 
relative price; the reciprocal of p). Assuming that consumers have identical and homothetic 
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preferences we define demand functions:  
AD = AD (p, Y)       (12) 
δ AD / δ p < 0;  δ AD / δ Y > 0 
MD = MD (1/p, Y)       (13) 
δ MD / δ (1/p) < 0;  δ MD / δ Y > 0, 
Where Y is the national income and may be expressed as: 
Y ≡ w (LA + LM ) + ρ ΚΜ + q N       (14) 
with q ≡ p a’(n): rental rate per unit of land.       (15) 
The rental rate per unit of land (q) is equal to the value of the marginal productivity of land. 
Y is a representation of the functional (or factorial) income distribution of the economy. That is, 
how the “cake” (total income) is distributed among the owners of labour (workers), capital 
(capitalists) and land (renters or landowners). From (10) and (12) we may determine the full general 
equilibrium of the closed economy:  
EA (p) = A(p) – AD (p); E’A (p) >0        (16) 
The equilibrium corresponds to the value p* of p that satisfied:  EA = 0  (17) 
Comparing with the standard Ricardo-Viner model, with given values of specific inputs N and K, 
it represents the short-run response to changes in prices, while Findlay-Lundahl (F-L) model stands 
for the long-run expansion. As Findlay (1995):131, we can drawn the short-run excess supply 
function through p* in Figure 2.2 as the curve SS’, steeper than LL’ because the effects are 
enhanced when we consider N and K endogenous. In our analysis, both provide identical 
equilibrium p* when endowments are set equal to values K* and N* determined endogenously.  
2.2 The dynamics of the First Globalization: how does the model work? 
2.2.1 External demand and improving terms of trade 
From the middle of the 19th century Atlantic commodity markets became closely integrated as a 
consequence of the transport revolution (steam replacing sails, refrigeration ships, trans-continental 
railroads). Economies (or colonies) ceased to be autarkic and opened up to the rest of the world. 
Economies that were previously self-contained faced an excess demand for primary goods (A), and 
the relative price (p) of these goods increased (in other words the terms of trade improved). Initially 
these economies were “small” and so the price was determined by the conditions of the world 
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market. With the opening of the economy there was an excess demand function indicated by DD’ in 
Figure 2.2. What happens with the free trade equilibrium of our economy after economic opening? 
Figure 2.2 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM: AUTARKY AND OPEN ECONOMY 
 
   Source: extracted from Findlay (1995): 131. 
The initial impact (while land and capital held constant) was to raise p very sharply from p* (in 
autarky) to wp , where DD’ intersects the short-run excess supply function SS’. A rise in p increases 
LA and reduces LM and therefore A increases and M falls, and the emerging exports of A are 
equivalent to the distance OG.  According to (15) the increase in p and LA raise the rental rate per 
unit of land (q), and this leads to an increase in the numerator of (8) and thus the rate of return on 
clearing land increases. To re-establish the equilibrium, N has to expand in order to raise the 
marginal cost of a unit of land [φ’(N)] relative to the rental rate. Agrarian employment LA expands 
even faster that N and LM falls less sharply than KM, since the capital-intensity km must decline with 
a rise in p. The long-run equilibrium occurs at the intersection between DD’ and the long-run excess 
supply function LL’ and a price level
*
wp  after an “overshooting” of prices. The results are additional 
exports of GH. Capital has been diverted away from manufacturers into land expansion in a process 
that can be interpreted as a more intense primary specialization (de-industrialization, Williamson, 
2004), leaving the rate of return () in the long-run unchanged in ρ.  What happens to functional 
income distribution? Assuming the average productivity in agriculture is greater than in 
manufacturing, total income increases. Since ρ  and L remain unchanged, w in both sectors 
stagnates or fall, KM decreases and q and N increase, it is clear that a new distributive pattern has 
emerged. In this pattern landowner earnings will have a greater share of national income and 
earnings derived from labour and capital will have a smaller share. Since landowners are a small 
proportion of the population these changes in income distribution mean there is greater inequality. 
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The model adequately represents our three stylized facts. Settler economies increased their 
exports to the rest of the world (mainly to Europe) when technical progress in international 
transport made it economically efficient to move commodities over long distances. In this context, 
there was an incentive for settler economies to expand the land area devoted to agricultural 
production, to increase agrarian output and to reallocate their productive factors. However, we also 
found that worsening income distribution was an “inherent” component of the First Globalization.  
We propose a numerical analysis23 from 
a calibration of the model to simulate 
marginal changes in p,24 and we verify 
changes in all the variables in accordance 
with the theoretical relationships and 
coinciding with the stylized facts of settler 
economies. In Table 2.1 we present the 
signs of the changes of the main variables 
when p increases and classify the variables 
into four areas: productive factors; growth 
(of the whole economy, Y, and each sector, 
A and M) and productive structure; income 
distribution (some relevant ratios as the 
total land rentals as proportion of total 
wages, R/W, and profits, R/P;  and the share of each earning to productive factor in the total 
income, W/Y, R/Y and P/Y), and prices (in this case, only of the productive factors).25  
2.2.2 Immigration 
Another major result of the transport revolution was a deeper integration of labour markets 
across the Atlantic. Declining transport costs, which made the passage more affordable, and 
increasing transport speed –shorter journeys– acted together to facilitate the movement of millions 
of people from Europe to America and Oceania. In addition, several governments in the New World 
stimulated immigration from Europe as part of their plan to settle the “empty land”. How did this 
supply of new immigrants affect the long-run equilibrium presented in the previous analysis? How 
does the system react after the economy opens if we include movements in the labour factor? 
Initially, holding 
*
wp  and thus all other prices constant, the greater supply of labour would have 
                                                 
23 Initial parameters are: α=0.25; αM=0.60; β=0.80; γ=10; ρ=0.05; θ=1.70; L=1.50 (details in Appendix to Chapter 2). 
24 From our calibrated model, we repeat our exercises with marginal changes in p, considering p*0.99 and p*1.01   
25 We present the results of all our simulation exercises in Appendix to Chapter 2. 
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all been absorbed by the manufacturing sector. This happens because the frontier is fixed by the 
marginal value product of land and we assume that the supply of capital in manufacturing is 
perfectly elastic in the long run. Therefore, manufacturing (M) expands, influenced by employment 
(LM) and investment (KM). As the economy expands (Y), the domestic demand for A increases as a 
consequence of increased final consumption and the intermediate use of additional raw materials in 
manufacturing. Under these conditions, the relative price of agricultural goods increases, primary 
exports decline below the original level OH (to satisfy domestic demand) and the land frontier 
extends, absorbing some of the increase in labour.26 The rise in 
*
wp  leaves the return to capital 
unchanged –by (5)– but the fall in k that this requires must lower the real wage in terms of either 
good –by (6) and (7). The return to land raises (q) making possible the investment needed to clear 
new land. As the raw material is more expensive (a higher relative price of the primary sector’s 
output), manufacturing reduces capital intensity (k) to absorb it, and both processes cause a decline 
in the real wage (in a market where the 
labour supply increases). 
The main consequences of the impact of 
immigration on settler economies are 
adequately represented in our simulation 
exercises by assuming marginal changes in 
L (see Table 2.2). 27 With this effect, in 
spite of decreases in the land-labour 
coefficient in agrarian activity and the 
capital-labour coefficient in manufacturing, 
the economy expands led by agriculture 
and improving terms of trade. The 
combination of land frontier expansion and 
increasing land returns worsens income 
distribution and rentists obtain an increased part of the total output.  
Considering the importance of the evolution of terms of trade for the settler economies, we 
simulate the relationship between p and L (see Figure 2.3). The positive relationship is consistent 
with the historical evolution. Improving terms of trade in economies where, initially, labour markets 
offered high wages, made these countries attractive for settlers and added to the natural growth of 
                                                 
26 The subtraction of excess demand from the original excess supply shifts the long-run excess supply LL’ to the left, 
thus raising the primary (relative) price and reducing exports. The demand curve DD’ of Europe should also have 
shifted to the left because emigration reduces demand and this would mitigate the increase in 
*
wp  
27 From our calibrated model, we repeat our exercises with marginal changes in L, considering L*0.99 and L*1.01   
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the population. However, ceteris paribus, this is a process restricted by the resources of the 
economy, and in the long run there is a limit.  
Figure 2.3 
SIMULATION EXERCISE: TERMS OF TRADE AND LABOR 
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2.2.3 Capital inflow 
The opening up of the economies of the New World in the 19th century attracted considerable 
inflows of capital that would have driven down the interest rate. How can we represent this process?  
We first assume a fall in the interest rate from the level ρ∗ (in the long-run equilibrium).28 A lower 
interest rate corresponds to a higher capital-labour ratio in manufactures (k) and, from (6), it 
becomes clear that this also corresponds to a higher real wage. Since, initially, 
*
wp  remains 
unchanged, equation (7) shows that the rise in w must increase the marginal productivity of labour 
in A or equivalently the land-labour ratio in sector A must rise. What happens to our “crucial” 
condition (8)?  
If N remains constant, the left hand side of (8) will fall in proportion to pa’(n), i.e., in proportion 
to the value of marginal productivity of land in A or in accordance with the rental per unit of land q. 
If q falls less than proportionally to ρ,  an increase in N is needed to raise φ’(N) to restore 
equilibrium. That is to say, if the rental rate per unit of land falls less than proportionally to the 
interest rate, it will be optimal to extend the frontier until the rate of return on clearing land equals 
the interest rate. It is possible that the rise in the land-labour ratio (n) in sector A leads to a fall in LA 
and an increase in LM. Since KM is higher in sector M (because k is higher too) manufacturing 
                                                 
28 As Findlay & Lundahl (1994), we ignore the effects on the balance of payments on the ownership of financial assets. 
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production increases. What is the effect on primary production? It is ambiguous because even if N 
increases, LA falls and this may result in lower output. If the increase in land can compensate for the 
fall in labour we may see a rise in A and consequently a general expansion of the economy. 
Assuming that the value of the marginal productivity of land and the interest rate fall in the same 
proportion, φ’(N) will remain unchanged and so will the land supply. In this case, LA and LM remain 
unchanged and the higher KM in manufacturing will increase M. This will raise the demand for raw 
materials and there will be an excess 
demand for A that will be brought about by 
the fall in ρ (the higher consumption drives 
higher income). 
What happens to the functional income 
distribution if the economy undergoes a 
general expansion? Since w rises and L 
remains constant, workers initially 
improve their share in the national income, 
but changes in capital and rental 
components are ambiguous. In the first 
case, since ρ  falls and KM rises we have 
two opposing effects. In the second case, 
the change in the rental component 
depends on the specific characterization of the relations in the model and the relative changes. 
Therefore, the capital inflows can moderate the effects of the initial improvement in the agrarian 
relative price in terms of income distribution. It may be possible that the decline in the interest rate 
leads to a rise in M, associated to the deepening of capital, as well as an increase in A related to the 
extension of the frontier without a “necessary” worsening in income distribution.  
The main consequences of the impact of capital inflows on settler economies are adequately 
represented in our simulation exercises assuming marginal changes in the interest rate ρ 29 (see 
Table 2.3, where we propose a decrease in the variable) in the case of general expansion of the 
economy. With this effect, both the land-labour coefficient in agriculture (n) and the capital-labour 
coefficient in manufacturing (k) increase, which would stimulate growth in both sectors but with a 
bias towards industry (the share of manufacturing in total income increases). Under these 
conditions, the land frontier expands but as land rental (q) decreases, rentists lose earnings while 
                                                 
29 From our calibrated model, we repeat our exercises with marginal changes in ρ, considering ρ*0.99 and ρ*1.01. We 
present the results of the simulation in the Appendix to Chapter 2 considering an increase in the interest rate.  
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workers and capitalists relatively gain, and only the latter improve their share in total income. 
Therefore, if our conditions in the model can be applied to the club of settler economies, capital 
inflows would have favourable consequences on economic growth and there would be a trend 
towards equality. 
Figure 2.4 
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As before, we simulate the trajectory of the interest rate and prices and we obtain a positive 
relationship (Figure 2.4). The higher cost of capital in economies specialized in primary goods 
makes production relatively more expensive and leads to higher agrarian prices in relation to 
manufacturing prices. The opportunity cost of capital increases, the chances to expand agrarian 
production decrease and, in relative terms, primary output becomes more expensive. 
2.2.4 Innovations that lower the real cost of land frontier expansion  
During the period, some innovations occurred that made for improvements in the internal 
conditions of the settler economies and reduced the real costs of land frontier expansion. The 
introduction of railway systems, the construction of canals and more extensive road networks meant 
real reductions in the cost of clearing land. Inventiveness is not a prerogative of frontier societies 
but the list of inventions stimulated by the challenge of opening the land is impressive.30 To 
represent these improvements we need to assume changes in the function φ(N) that denote a 
cheapening of the land clearing process (see Figure 2.5). The function φ(N) become flatter from 
                                                 
30 The list includes the six-shooter, portable windmills, barbed wire and an enormous variety of mechanical appliances 
like the improved plough and the combine harvester (Hennessy, 1978). 
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point θ on. If pw* is held constant, the new equilibrium level of land will be in N’, where the slope of 
the shifted φ(N) function at θ’ is equal to the slope of the original function at θ.  In consequence, 
greater land supply would come about without changes in the factor price, i.e. an unchanged land-
labour ratio, and thus an increase in LA would be required. In this case, labour moves from 
manufacturing to agriculture while capital and output decline (KM and M). However, a rise in 
manufacturing productivity occurs because raw materials are cheaper. The agricultural excess 
supply increases shifting LL’ to the right and inducing a fall in p (the terms of trade worsen) and an 
expansion in exports. In the new equilibrium, as p is lower real wages are higher, while the rental 
per unit of land (q) must fall because access to the “new” territories has been facilitated by technical 
progress. Therefore, improvements in the means of access to the land make it possible to expand 
exports even though the terms of trade do not improve, and to free resources from agriculture so 
they can go to industrial investment. 
Figure 2.5 
CHANGES THAT CHEAPEN THE REAL COST OF CLEARING LAND 
 
Source: extracted from Findlay (1995): 138. 
Our representation of the wave of innovations that affected internal conditions in settler 
economies and lowered the real cost of further extension of the frontier requires modifications to 
two parameters of our model. To obtain a flatter φ(N) we marginally reduce the parameter θ and to 
get a curve intersecting the original function in KA, we deal with lower values of γ31 (see Table 2.4). 
With these changes, we obtain results equivalent to inflows of capital. Both the land-labour 
coefficient in agriculture and the capital-labour coefficient in manufacturing increase and stimulate 
the general expansion of the economy. As it is cheaper to expand the frontier, land rental decreases 
                                                 
31 In our calibrated model, we repeat our exercises with marginal changes in θ (θ*0.99 and θ*1.01) and γ (γ-1 and γ+1). 
We present the results of the simulation exercises and we consider increases in both variables in the Appendix to 
Chapter 2.   
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and rentists lose earnings with respect to total wages and profits, although only capitalists increase 
their share in the total product. If the conditions we assume are correct, the technical progress that 
improved access to new land would have positive consequences on economic growth and there 
would be a trend to moderate the worsening distribution derived from the initial increasing in p. 
Our representation of the improvement in 
the internal conditions for clearing land 
requires changes in two parameters of the 
model. As a result it is not possible to 
make a visual illustration to show the 
relationship to prices. However, it is 
evident that cheaper land clearing is 
associated with lower land rents, and our 
model adequately represents the worsening 
terms of trade that result from cheaper 
access to new territories. 
2.2.5 Innovations that directly 
affect the production 
sectors  
There was also technological progress in production sectors. Our model may represent shifts in 
the production function as Hicks-neutral for both sectors.32 An improvement in the manufacturing 
production function, and maintaining constant
*
wp , will raise k to preserve the equality of the net 
marginal product of capital with a fixed interest rate ρ (remember that m’’(k) is negative). From (6) 
and (7), these changes must raise the real wage and the land-labour ratio in agriculture. As land is 
initially maintained constant, LA must fall, LM must increase and consequently, A decreases and M 
expands. The excess demand for A at constant price 
*
wp  and the leftward shift of the excess supply 
function LL’ mean an increase in the price, which reduces exports even though the extension of 
frontier required to recompose equilibrium in equation (8). On the other hand, an improvement in 
agriculture would lead to a fall in the land-labour ratio if p, and therefore w, are held constant. From 
(8), N rises and LA must increase more that proportionally to reduce n, causing LM, KM and M all to 
fall. LL’ shifts to the right, leading to a decline in 
*
wp  and a rise in the export volume. As 
*
wp  
decreases real wages increase, and all the changes in Table 2.1 continue so a final equilibrium is 
                                                 
32 Hicks-Neutral (or Hicksian Neutrality) technological progress refers to changes in the production function 
(innovation) that do not affect labour differently from the way they affect capital. The relationship between the marginal 
productivities of the factors holds constant for a given proportion between capital and labour (Sala-i-Martin, 1994). 
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established. Sector innovations are “import biased” in the first case and “export biased” in the 
second, and the terms of trade improve when productivity improves in manufactures and worsens 
when it improves in agriculture. The consequences in terms of income inequality are ambiguous. 
Our representation of some innovations 
in agriculture that make for greater yield 
per hectare requires changes in the 
parameter β (the elasticity of the 
productive factor, which is used more 
intensively in agrarian production)33 (see 
Table 2.5). With these changes, we obtain 
consequences in productive factors, growth 
and structure equivalent to inflows of 
capital. As before, both the land-labour 
coefficient in agriculture and the capital-
labour coefficient in manufacturing 
increase, thus stimulating a general 
expansion of the economy. New land 
incorporated into production under better productive conditions frees resources (capital and labour) 
which can go to manufacturing and this sector expands. Land rental increases –the returns on the 
land is higher– and when this is taken with a greater land area we see that the income of rentists 
grows faster than total wages, and income distribution worsens.  
As before, we simulate the relationship between β and p (Figure 2.6). Improved yield of land per 
hectare should be related to lower prices, but this is true only from certain levels of β. When the 
yield of land is insufficient to produce high output per unit of productive factor, prices can increase 
with the improvement in β. 
2.3 General overview 
The model shows that the economies exposed to the effects of the First Globalization and subject 
to a process of rising relative prices for primary goods displayed three main trends that we identify 
with three main stylized facts. Settler economies, blessed by their abundance of natural resources, 
participated actively in international trade, expanded their volume of exports and had high 
economic growth rates. This process also included the loss of incipient manufacture activities 
(handicrafts) –a “curse” in the jargon of literature– and a worsening in income distribution. 
                                                 
33 Using our calibrated model, we repeat our exercises with marginal changes in β (considering β*0.99 and β*1.01). We 
present the results of the simulation in the Appendix to Chapter 2.  
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The other effects of the First Globalization –analyzed as processes “added” to the improvement 
in the terms of trade– were processes that intensified the positive consequences for economic 
growth, but they had ambiguous effects on income distribution. In accordance with our simulation 
exercises, immigration and improvements in the productive performance of land could lead to a 
more acute worsening in the income distribution. On the other hand, capital inflows and cheaper 
cost of clearing land could make for lower inequality in the settler economies.34 
Figure 2.6 
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3. Why is endogenous land frontier expansion a useful analytical concept?  
Our approach is to regard 19th century globalization in terms of the expansion of the Atlantic 
economy from north-western Europe to the frontier periphery instead a “regimen switch to 
openness”.35 This means we see globalization as the incorporation of regions that were beyond the 
frontier of organized economic activity into capitalist relationships on a world scale.36 In these 
terms, we do not have to introduce the notion of price convergence in order to understand world 
integration. Globalization may be “defined as a shift from an economy where local supply and 
                                                 
34 Another process that can be represented by the model is the introduction of tariffs on the import of manufactures (see 
Findlay, 1995: 140). A tariff on imports of manufactures reduces p and discourages the extension of the frontier and the 
output of A. On the other hand, output M  increases and so do real wages since the cost of the primary input is reduced. 
35 Identifying globalization with a change in the opening regimen is the predominant vision in the mainstream literature 
(i.e. O’Rourke & Williamson, 2005:21).  
36 This notion was familiar in the tradition of the “Great Frontier” idea, as was proposed by Walter Prescott Webb in his 
work of 1952. According to Weber & Rausch (1994), Webb extended the argument of Turner –who saw the North 
American frontier as promoting democracy– and regarded the entire Western Hemisphere (Latin America together with 
South Africa, Australia and New Zealand) as a “great frontier” that transformed Europe, breaking down feudal 
institutions, and helped in the rise the European capitalism, dynamism and democracy.  
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demand fluctuations dominated price fluctuations to one in which the economy became a price-
taker to global forces” and if this is the case, “it need not depend on price convergence” (Harley, 
2007:240-241). In the model we present in Section 2 we introduce the notion of land frontier 
expansion to explain processes that play only a secondary role in the H-O-S theoretical framework. 
Our proposal is to change the Findlay-Lundahl model to illustrate an important aspect of the 
historical evolution of settler economies. It is possible to introduce different land qualities as 
additional components in the colonizer’s decisions to inhabit certain areas and not others (for a 
complete formal presentation of the model see the Appendix to Chapter 2). 
The decision to expand the land frontier initially depends on the rate of return on clearing land, 
that is to say the relationship between the marginal income from the use of “new” land and the 
marginal cost of preparing the area for production. Is the condition of the land throughout the 
territory homogenous? Probably not; it is more reasonable to assume that land quality varies. Thus 
the expansion of the frontier will yield different incomes (depending on land fertility, for instance) 
and the cost of clearing land will differ depending on the characteristics of the land (climatic 
conditions and the ruggedness of the terrain, for instance). In others words, the returns on 
expanding the frontier are different when we consider the process in Argentina in the fertile regions 
of the Pampas on the one hand and in cold Patagonia (in the south) on the other, or in Australia the 
returns in the coastal savannah will differ from those in the central desert. How we can incorporate 
these variations in conditions of settlement? 
3.1 Our contributions to the model 
We modify our concept of “land” in the model (N) to introduce considerations about land quality 
(NQ). Land quality depends on the agricultural aptitude of the land (Naa) (its natural suitability for 
grazing or crops) and distance (d) from markets. In other words, our variable must consider that 
excellent soils located very far away are in fact bad soils in productive and economic terms. 
Producers are able to identify land quality37 and they choose the “direction” of expansion in 
accordance with the rate of return of each type of land. How can we represent land quality and the 
producers’ decision rule? For simplicity, we consider two types of land –high (NH) and low quality 
(NL)– and two corresponding functions that represent the access conditions to the “new” land.    
KAH = φΗ (ΝΗ)          (18) 
KAL = φL (ΝL)          (19) 
We assume that the land rental of high quality land (qH) is higher than that of low quality (qL) 
and, formally, this means that expanding the frontier into high quality land is not cheaper than 
                                                 
37 We assume that producers use all available information when they make decisions about expanding the frontier. 
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settling in low quality land. In other words, this difference means that the conditions to accede to 
the “new” land are not necessarily more favourable for high quality land than for low quality land. 
The point is that to start production on better land (fertile soils, with watering holes, relatively close 
to the markets) can require improvements (dwellings, roads, wire fences) that are not necessary (or 
justified in economic terms) in the case of the worse land. We demonstrate this assertion in the 
Appendix to Chapter 2. 
In addition, we consider two production functions in agriculture: 
AH=A(NH, LAH)       (20) 
AL=A(NL, LAL)       (21) 
We assume that the marginal productivity of high quality land is greater than that of low quality 
land but we identify only one agriculture product with a (relative) price p. Therefore production in 
agriculture is: A=AH+AL  
In the F-L model, the function φ (Ν) and a(n) represent (in marginal terms) the two main 
components of the “crucial” relation (8) to obtain the rate of return on clearing land (Λ). N and 
Λ relate negatively38 and the optimum occurs when Λ equalizes the rate of interest (ρ). In our 
analysis (in Appendix to Chapter 2 we give a complete formal presentation of the model) we 
propose to introduce two functions (ΛΗ and ΛL) of return. The producers will choose to expand the 
frontier into both types of land until the point where the two rates of return reach the level of the 
interest rate (see Figure 2.7).  
Figure 2.7.a Figure 2.7.b
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Producers will choose the “direction” of the expansion depending on relative yields (of the two 
kinds of land) and theoretically this is represented by a comparison between the marginal rates of 
                                                 
38 Λ is a function with negative slope and concave up. See equations (21), (31), and (34) in the Appendix to Chapter 2, 
Section 1. 
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return on clearing land. The producers’ decisions depend on the technological conditions of the 
economy and the land endowments previously incorporated, which is represented by the 
possibilities to expand the frontier and the production functions. 
Total income is represented in the following expression: 
Y ≡ w (LA + LM ) + ρ ΚΜ +  qL NL +  qH NH      (14)’ 
Where qL and qH are the rental rates for each type of land and qL < qH. 
Rents from low quality land or remote land will be lower than those in areas with high 
agricultural aptitude or close to “centres of gravity” (usually the seaports; i.e. the “external door” of 
the economies). Therefore the consequences of extending the land frontier beyond the Prairies in 
Canada, from South Australia to the North Territory or from the Pampas to Patagonia will have 
different effects on income distribution than our model initially predicted. The direction of the 
changes of the distributive pattern will react as the initial model predicts, but the intensity of the 
effects will depend on land aptitude (associated with the production functions) and on how far away 
the natural endowments are (associated with functions A(.) and φ(.)).  
Under these assumptions, the different intensity of the worsening of income distribution in the 
settler economies during the First Globalization may be explained by the fact that people occupied 
land of differing quality and thus received different rewards. The widening of the gap between land 
rentals and wages that characterized the period depended on the effective existence of returns to 
appropriation. The abundance of excellent land in the Pampas or Uruguay made it easier to capture 
rents –as against wages– than the case of Australia (where the land became more arid the farther 
from the coast the producer moved) or Canada (where the exceptional prairies were all of 2,000 km 
from the eastern coast). 39 
3.2 Numerical analysis 
We apply a numerical analysis to solve the model in accordance with our proposition and to 
propose a contra-factual exercise to compare results. First, we suppose an economy similar to that 
in the previous section but with two production functions in agriculture with different land 
elasticities. In the case of high quality land, we propose an elasticity of 0.8 and for low quality land 
an elasticity of 0.4 (βH=0.8 and βL=0.4). In addition, we consider different cost functions of 
clearing land with θH=1.4 and θL=1.2. Second, we consider an economy with absolute land 
homogeneity and therefore without differences in parameters. We calibrate the model to obtain 
                                                 
39 Other interesting issue is to introduce the idea of segmented labour markets. We can consider that the wage in frontier 
was higher (because it included a premium) and we may identify three types of labour retributions, one corresponding to 
manufacturing (wM.LM)  and the other two corresponding to agrarian sector (wAF.LAF + wA.LA) and with wAF > wA = wM. 
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similar results –in terms of structure40– as in the previous exercise and we consider β=0.62 and 
θ=1.4. The details of both calibrations are presented in the Appendix to Chapter 2. We concentrate 
on the effect of changes in relative prices for two reasons: (i) the historical evidence clearly shows 
that improving terms of trade was one of the main processes in the First Globalization; (ii) our 
model adequately captures the stylized facts of settler economies in a situation of improving terms 
of trade. In next stages of the research other effects we will be studied. In Table 2.6 we present the 
main results of our numerical analysis to compare the evolution and the levels (periods 0, 1, 2) of 
total output and income distribution with marginal changes in p in model with different types of 
land (Economy 1) and with land homogeneity (Economy 2).  
Economy 1 Economy 2 Economy 3 Economy 1 Economy 2 Economy 3
A0 0.922 0.884 0.969 RW0 0.677 0.596 0.741
A1 0.998 0.944 1.050 RW1 0.721 0.635 0.792
A2 1.080 1.007 1.136 RW2 0.768 0.675 0.846
Var. Var.
1 8.22% 6.72% 8.30% 1 6.58% 6.41% 6.92%
2 8.18% 6.71% 8.18% 2 6.48% 6.29% 6.79%
M0 0.528 0.495 0.536 RP0 7.037 6.633 7.528
M1 0.459 0.441 0.467 RP1 8.852 8.110 9.457
M2 0.385 0.383 0.393 RP2 11.542 10.153 12.278
Var. Var.
1 -13.11% -11.02% -12.88% 1 25.79% 22.28% 25.63%
2 -16.15% -13.12% -15.73% 2 30.39% 25.18% 29.84%
Y0 1.451 1.380 1.505 WY0 0.564 0.593 0.544
Y1 1.457 1.385 1.516 WY1 0.555 0.584 0.533
Y2 1.465 1.390 1.529 WY2 0.545 0.574 0.522
Var. Var.
1 0.46% 0.35% 0.76% 1 -1.67% -1.55% -1.97%
2 0.51% 0.40% 0.82% 2 -1.73% -1.61% -2.03%
AY0 0.636 0.641 0.644 RY0 0.382 0.354 0.403
AY1 0.685 0.682 0.692 RY1 0.400 0.371 0.422
AY2 0.737 0.725 0.743 RY2 0.419 0.387 0.442
Var. Var.
1 7.73% 6.35% 7.48% 1 4.82% 4.75% 4.84%
2 7.62% 6.29% 7.30% 2 4.62% 4.56% 4.62%
MY0 0.364 0.359 0.356 PY0 0.054 0.053 0.054
MY1 0.315 0.318 0.308 PY1 0.045 0.046 0.045
MY2 0.263 0.275 0.257 PY2 0.036 0.038 0.036
Var. Var.
1 -13.50% -11.33% -13.54% 1 -16.61% -14.26% -16.45%
2 -16.58% -13.46% -16.42% 2 -19.69% -16.41% -19.46%
Economy 1: βh=0.8 βl=0.4; θh=1.4, θl=1.2.  
Economy 2: βh=0.62 βl=0.62; θh=1.4, θl=1.4.  
Economy 3: βh=0.8*1.01 βl=0.4*0.99; θh=1.3*0.99, θl=1.2*0.99.  
Source: own estimates.
GROWTH AND STRUCTURE INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Table 2.6
VALUES AND VARIATIONS OF THE VARIABLES OF THE MODEL
Simulation of a marginal increasing in p=PA/PM
 
                                                 
40 We calibrate both “economies” to obtain similar results in terms of sector shares in total income and labour.   
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Economic growth in the economy where we identify different types of lands is quicker, the 
evolution occurs from higher levels and the structural change is more intensive than in the economy 
with identical land throughout. Analogously, in the former the differences between total land rents 
and total wages are huge, and the worsening in the income distribution is more severe. 
Now, we can compare economies with differences in land quality to make out concepts more 
precise. Economy 3 represents a situation similar to Economy 1 but with marginal changes. High 
quality land has greater input elasticity (0.8*1.01) and low quality land has a lower β-coefficient 
(0.4*0.99). In addition, we adjust the coefficients of the land clearing frontier to reduce the gap 
between the two types of land rentals and focus basically on the productive dimension of land 
quality. In other words, in this exercise, we reduce the differences between the two costs of clearing 
land to concentrate our attention only on differences in productivities.41  
In accordance with our expectations, the situation shows an economy that grows quicker and 
income distribution worsens more intensively. In Economy 3 the average growth rates of total 
income is 0.8 per cent and in Economy 1 it is 0.5 per cent; and the relation between total land rents 
and wages is systematically higher, and increases by an average of 6.9 per cent in Economy 3 and 
6.5 per cent in Economy 1. In addition, the share of total wages in income deceases 2 per cent in 
Economy 3 but only 1.7 per cent in Economy 1. This fall in total wages is not compensated by 
higher land rental shares but by less of a fall in total profits. Economy 3 shows the higher 
agriculture specialization of our simulation exercises although the pace of the structural change is 
slower than in Economy 1. Table 2.7 gives the details about land incorporated into production, 
labour, and the corresponding factor prices to supplement our analysis and to gain insights into this 
subject.  
In the version of F-L model, land is homogenous throughout the territory and so there is no 
question of choosing between types of land. This is why in Economy 2 the advance into the two 
types of land is the same and land rentals coincide. We make it possible to identify different land 
qualities and, considering that rents for high quality land are higher, agents decide to occupy good 
land more intensively. However, it is not possible to expand the frontier only to better land. In the 
process of settling new land, the chance to obtain better quality was often conditioned by the 
occupation of land of inferior quality. This process is well represented in our model. Nevertheless, 
land is a finite resource and it is not possible to expand the frontier at the same rate all the time. The 
model illustrates a convergence process where the decreasing rates of land expansion coincide with 
higher amount of land incorporated. Comparing Economy 1 and 3, we find that the incorporation of 
                                                 
41 In Economy 1, the difference between the parameters of clearing land is 0.2 (θH- θL=1.4-1.2). In Economy 3 the 
difference is 0.1 (1.3*0.99-1.2*0.99). 
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land of high quality is more intensive when lands are relatively more productive (a wide gap 
between βH and βL) and this happens in spite of appropriating lower rent by unity of land (q).  
This representation has an attractive interpretation in terms of the curse hypothesis. An economy 
that moves its frontier to better land enjoyed the blessing of an abundance of natural resources and 
this was reflected in economic growth, but it also encounters the curse of a more intense worsening 
in income distribution. This raise three important points: (i) different land quality can be understood 
as different types of natural resources; (ii) the impact of the abundance of natural resources is far 
from being unique and universal, it depends on historical specificities and on different dimensions 
of the economic development where positive effects can coexist with negative ones; (iii) strictly 
speaking, an abundance of natural resources is not a question of endowments but of the productive 
application of resources and, in this sense, the abundance is an endogenous process. 
Economy 1 Economy 2 Economy 3 Economy 1 Economy 2 Economy 3
Nh0 0.728 0.471 0.835 qh0 0.617 0.518 0.611
Nh1 0.748 0.488 0.864 qh1 0.623 0.525 0.617
Nh2 0.769 0.505 0.893 qh2 0.630 0.533 0.623
Var. Var.
1 2.76% 3.63% 3.44% 1 1.09% 1.43% 0.98%
2 2.71% 3.54% 3.36% 2 1.07% 1.41% 0.94%
Nl0 0.233 0.471 0.215 ql0 0.449 0.518 0.445
Nl1 0.255 0.488 0.237 ql1 0.457 0.525 0.453
Nl2 0.278 0.505 0.259 ql2 0.464 0.533 0.461
Var. Var.
1 9.38% 3.63% 10.04% 1 1.81% 1.43% 1.80%
2 8.77% 3.54% 9.29% 2 1.71% 1.41% 1.70%
Km0 1.573 1.471 1.611 w0 0.545 0.545 0.545
Km1 1.317 1.265 1.354 w1 0.539 0.539 0.539
Km2 1.062 1.061 1.100 w2 0.532 0.532 0.532
Var. Var.
1 -16.29% -14.03% -15.92% 1 -1.19% -1.19% -1.19%
2 -19.34% -16.13% -18.76% 2 -1.22% -1.22% -1.22%
Lah0 0.648 0.548 0.671
Lah1 0.669 0.574 0.692
Lah2 0.689 0.601 0.714
Var.
1 3.19% 4.78% 3.24%
2 3.08% 4.63% 3.11%
Lal0 0.419 0.548 0.386
Lal1 0.465 0.574 0.431
Lal2 0.511 0.601 0.476
Var.
1 10.82% 4.78% 11.46%
2 10.03% 4.63% 10.54%
Economy 1: βh=0.8 βl=0.4; θh=1.4, θl=1.2.  
Economy 2: βh=0.62 βl=0.62; θh=1.4, θl=1.4.  
Economy 3: βh=0.8*1.01 βl=0.4*0.99; θh=1.3*0.99, θl=1.2*0.99.  
Source: own estimates.
PRODUCTIVE FACTORS PRICES
Table 2.7
VALUES AND VARIATIONS OF THE VARIABLES OF THE MODEL
Simulation of a marginal increasing in p=PA/PM
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It is common to associate the differences in inequality within the club of settler economies 
especially with institutional arrangements and cultural questions). “Of course, in those places where 
the family farm dominated and where land was distributed more equally, a fall in w/r [Wage/Rental 
ratio] would not have translated into such a sharp rise in inequality” (Williamson, 2000:14). 
Refered to Uruguay and New Zealand, some scholars demonstrate that the divergent path “can be 
explained by the existence of different institutions governing the agricultural sectors of the [two] 
countries, which in turn generated different distributions of both land property rights and product 
shares in the agricultural sector (Álvarez et al., 2011:165). Other authors propose,  
“[t]he rise in the returns to land could lead to the emergence or consolidation of a 
wealthy land-owning elite […] while the real wages of workers in both sectors may 
have stagnated or fallen. In the case of more ‘open’ Anglo-Saxon regions, such as the 
United States, Canada, and Australia, the extension of the frontier largely meant an 
extension of the family farm, with the returns to land as well as the wage of labour 
accruing to the same individual, leading to a rise in general prosperity (Findlay, 
1995:133).  
It is beyond doubt that institutional arrangements influenced the evolution of economic growth 
and income distribution during the period, but theoretical and empirical research has paid little 
attention to the different types of natural resources. Our proposal includes an attempt to consider 
differing land quality. In the following section we supplement this vision based on endowments 
with a consideration of the effects of institutions. 
4. The curse and natural resources: institutional quality and the appropriability hypothesis 
Since the end of the 20th century economic development has no longer been considered to depend 
only on the accumulation of physical and human capital. Academics now accept that there is a third 
form of “capital” or “economic asset” that affects the performance of the economic system. This 
distinct type of capital is the natural and environmental resource endowment available to an 
economy, and it is commonly referred to as “natural capital”. Natural capital is important for 
sustainable economic development, but increasing economic dependence on natural resource 
exploitation appears to hamper growth and development in most low- and middle-income 
economies in the world. It has been shown in the recent literature that there is a negative 
relationship between economic growth per capita and some measures of natural capital, and this is 
considered the “curse” of natural resources. 
Why should an abundance of natural resources so often be related to deficient economic 
performance? Is the curse a general pattern or does it depend on other factors? Can the blessing of 
certain historical circumstances change into a curse? The literature about this subject is very 
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extensive and varied, and the results are mixed. Authors today prefer not to tackle the curse as such 
but to see the relationship as a conditional connection, where the curse is not considered to be an 
inevitable result. In Chapter 1 we propose a classification of the different analytical perspectives in 
this debate and we identify four interpretations: an abundance of natural resources as a blessing; an 
abundance of natural resources as a curse –with two approaches: the “productive structure 
approach” and the “crowding out approach”–; and finally the “factor endowment and institutional 
change hypothesis”. We will now work with the third and fourth approaches and discuss the impact 
of weak institutions on economic development in terms of the appropriability hypothesis. 
4.1 The curse of natural resource abundance: the institutional explanation 
We saw in our review of the literature in Chapter 1, Section 3, that large natural resource rents, 
especially in combination with poorly-defined property rights, imperfect markets and permissive 
legal structures may lead to uncontrolled rent seeking among producers. This would divert 
resources away from economic activities that are more fruitful in social terms and would affect 
economic growth. When big rent incomes are in the hands of elites, economic and political power 
may be concentrated, and once these groups are in the government they may use these resources to 
strengthen their position and remain in power. The usual results of this are persistent high levels of 
inequality, weak democracy and political instability. Moreover, abundant natural resources may 
induce a false sense of security in people and in governments and cause them to miss opportunities 
to develop good economic management and good quality institutions. Governments are tempted to 
spoil markets by granting some enterprises privileged access to common-property natural resources 
or by offering producers tariff protection or other favours, and this creates competition among the 
rent seekers to obtain these favours. Extensive rent seeking may generate corruption in private and 
public sectors, distort resource allocation, weaken investment, increase public spending and harm 
economic efficiency and social equity. Abundant natural capital may crowd out social capital 
through corruption, inequality and the absence of political freedoms, which are all factors that 
hinder economic growth and cause poverty to persist. 
Auty (2001b) says that different kinds of natural resource endowments may have different effects 
on economic performance. It is interesting to distinguish between “point resources” (that require the 
intensive use of capital, such as minerals and energy resources) and “diffuse resources” (that require 
less concentrated development, such as cropland and livestock). “Point resources” generate greater 
opportunities for rent-seeking and corruption and the negative effects on economic growth are more 
severe. In a similar vein, Isham et al. (2005) say that export concentration in point resources is 
strongly associated with weak public institutions, which are in turn strongly related to slower 
economic growth. Woolcock et al. (2001) show that natural resource-rich economies and different 
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types of resources put different kinds of pressure on community structures, institutional capacity 
and state-society relations. The situation most likely to undermine economic growth is when natural 
resources are easily captured and controlled by a narrow elite and, in these terms, some scholars are 
interested in the conditions of appropriability of natural resources and its rents. Recently the 
institutional explanation of the curse has focused on two related issues, (i) the intrinsic 
characteristics of the natural resources in question (the effect of abundance differs depending on the 
type of natural resource), and (ii) the quality of institutions in terms of their capacity to open 
appropriability possibilities for incomes based on the natural capital.  
4.2  The appropriability hypothesis 
Institutional explanations offer interesting predictions about why different resource-rich 
economies may be affected differently by their natural wealth. In general, countries with extensive 
plantation crops (sugar, bananas) or very valuable minerals (oil, diamonds) are more likely to have 
unfavourable results than countries with wheat, rice or livestock. But when we contrast countries 
with comparable natural resources, why do some seem to gain relatively more from their 
endowments while others have bad outcomes? 
Boschini, et al. (2005) propose a framework that provides arguments to answer this question. 
They show that the effect of natural resources on economic development is not determined by 
resource endowments alone, but rather by the interaction between the type of resource and the 
quality of institutions. This combination of factors represents the so-called “appropriability” of a 
resource. In general, this concept alludes to the environmental factors that control the innovator's 
ability to obtain returns from an innovation. In the case of natural resources, the concept captures 
the probability that abundance may lead to rent-seeking, corruption, anti-competitive strategies or 
conflicts, and these in turn damage economic development. In economies where resources are 
highly appropriable, abundance may hinder economic performance, whereas in countries where 
resources are less appropriable, abundance may contribute to long term economic development.  
The appropriability hypothesis may be seen in terms of the institutional and the technical 
dimensions. An abundance of natural resources negatively affects economic development where 
institutions are weak, and the impact of institutional quality and abundant natural resources is more 
pronounced when the natural resources are technically –in the sense of intrinsic characteristics of 
the resource– more easily captured (“appropriable”). The model that authors propose to test this 
hypothesis has the following specification for the country i:   
gi=X’iα0+ α1 NRi+ α2Inst+ α3(NRi x Insti)+εi        (22) 
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Where g is the average yearly growth rate of GDP (1975-1998), X’ is a vector of control 
variables, NR is a measure of natural resource wealth, and Inst a measure of institutional quality. NR 
x Inst represents the interaction between natural resources and institutional quality.  
Authors use four different measures of natural resources to capture a gradual increase in technical 
and institutional appropriability. The proposals, from the broadest to the narrowest measure, are as 
follows: the share of primary exports in GNP (Sachs & Warner, 1995); the share of ore and metal 
exports in GDP; the share of mineral production in GNP (Sachs & Warner, 1995); and the value of 
production of gold, silver, and diamonds as a share of GDP. To capture institutional quality, the 
authors employ the (unweighted) average of indexes for quality of the bureaucracy, corruption in 
government, rule of law, the risk of expropriation of private investment, and the repudiation of 
contracts (from Knack & Keefer, 1995, 2002). This article shows that whether natural resources are 
good or bad for a country’s development depends crucially on the interaction between the 
prevailing institutional arrangements and the type of resources the country has. For economic and 
technical reasons, some natural resources are more likely than others to cause problems such as 
rent-seeking and conflicts. However, these potential problems can be countered by good 
institutional quality. In contrast to the traditional resource curse hypothesis, these authors show that 
the impact of natural resources on economic growth is non-monotonic with regard to institutional 
quality. Countries rich in minerals are cursed only if they have low quality institutions, and the 
curse is reversed if institutions are sufficiently good. Additionally, Mehlum et al. (2006) and 
Robinson et al. (2006) also present the concept that there is a non-monotonic relationship between 
natural resources and economic development with regard to institutional quality.   
Mehlum et al. (2006) develop a model in which entrepreneurs choose between becoming 
“producers” or “grabbers”. The relative payoff from these activities depends on how “grabber 
friendly” the institutions are, which also determines the effect of natural resources on the economy. 
More natural resources will raise national income if institutions are “production friendly” but 
reduce it if they are “grabber friendly”. Robinson et al. (2006) develop a model with similar 
predictions but in which the political incentives generated by the resources are the key explicative 
factor. In countries with good institutions resources are positive because the effects of incentives 
that promote perverse political practices are mitigated, but in countries with bad institutions 
resources remain a curse. 
There are different analytical options that enable us to reach similar and compatible conclusions 
through other channels. In a recent working paper, García-Jimeno & Robinson (2009) show 
renewed interest in land frontier expansion. This concept involves the incorporation of land (a 
natural resource) into production, and this process is accompanied by the setting up of a new system 
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of property rights (institutional arrangements), so there is an immediate connection with the field 
we are interested in. These authors analyze the classical F.J. Turner view, the “Frontier (or Turner) 
Thesis”, for North, Central and South America from the middle of the 19th century to 2007. They 
suggest that “…if political institutions were bad at the time of frontier settlement, the existence of 
such frontier land might actually lead to worse development outcomes, probably because it provides 
a resource which non-democratic political elites can use to cement themselves in power” (García-
Jimeno & Robinson, 2009:18). 
These authors propose a model similar to the following:  
gi,=β0+ β1 Fi, t+ β2Ci, t+ β3(Fi, t x Ci, t )+εi         (23) 
Where gi,t is the dependent variable of interest for country i. This is, respectively, GDP per-capita 
in 2007; the Polity average democracy score in the periods 1950-2007 and 1990-2007; and the 
average Gini coefficient for income inequality over the latter period. Fi,t is the proportion of the 
country which was frontier land in period t and Ci,t is the constraints on the executive power from 
Polity IV in period t , considering t=1850 (or some year around that time).  
What is particularly interesting about this specification is that if we reinterpret the analytical 
relation and consider that the open frontier (not occupied territory) represents the natural wealth as 
unexploited natural resources of these economies, the model is equivalent to that used in Boschini, 
et al. (2005) (see equation (22)). 
5. Highlights and final remarks 
In this Chapter we propose a supplementary model to the H-O-S framework in order to explain 
the performance of settler economies during the First Globalization. The modeling of specific 
factors enables us to stress the importance of domestic conditions in countries exposed to the effects 
of the First Globalization up to WWI. Land frontier expansion becomes a key factor in explaining 
the different effects of globalization on the settler economies. The availability of land resources was 
the main comparative advantage that enabled them to participate in international markets. In order 
to better understand this process, we modify the model to incorporate differing land quality. There 
are three important contributions in our model. 
First, it constitutes an application of recent theories in the literature about the relationship 
between an abundance of natural resources and the economic performance to the Atlantic economy 
during the First Globalization. Basing our work on this literature, we show that the curse and the 
blessing of natural resources do not constitute a deterministic process, and outcomes are associated 
with the specific historical circumstances in each case. Settler economies were blessed with an 
abundance of natural resources and had strong export-led growth, but the curse was present in the 
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form of increasing income inequality. Note too that the First Globalization did not affect all 
economies with the same intensity. These differences can explain the long-run divergent economic 
performance in some members of the “club”. 
Second, we emphasize the concept of a moving frontier or endogenous land frontier expansion. 
An abundance of natural resources is not a fixed situation but a process that reacts to changes in the 
structure of commodity prices and factor endowments, and to progress it requires capital, labour, 
technical progress and suitable institutional arrangements. Therefore this abundance is not given but 
is part of the evolution of the economic system, an idea that is not new because it goes back a long 
way. “Resources are highly dynamic concepts; they are not, they become, they evolve out of the 
triune interaction of nature, man, and culture…” (quoted in Ding & Field, 2004:2 from 
Zimmerman, 1933:4). 
Lastly, we consider that differing land quality can refer to different types of natural resources. 
With this framework, we can conjecture that differences in evolutions within the “club” are 
connected to differences in endowments as regards agricultural aptitude and distance from markets. 
The hypothesis that our framework supports is that settler economies that first occupied the “best” 
land achieved higher incomes and agricultural production, but they suffered worse income 
distribution. This would be because landowners (the small rich elite) were able to obtain greater 
relative factor earnings to the detriment of workers and capitalists. Our interpretation has similar 
points to Milanovic et al. (2007).  
When average incomes are very low or barely above the subsistence minimum, the income 
surplus is small.42 Under these conditions, the members of the upper class would be few, and the 
level of inequality would be quite modest. However, as average incomes increase –with the 
incorporation of “new” land– this constraint on inequality is lifted. In a context where wages cover 
the subsistence conditions and emerge land rents –that results higher in better lands–the surplus 
increases, and the maximum possible inequality compatible with the new average income is greater. 
In other words, the maximum achievable inequality is an increasing function of average income 
and, in our model, it also reacts to the income structure of the agrarian activity. The historical 
association between land rents and elites, and the possibility of widening the gap between land rents 
and wages when land is comparatively superior, reinforces our proposition.     
The timing and intensity of frontier expansion, together with institutional change, explains the 
dynamics of the process. Different types of land (depending on its natural aptitude) can be classified 
on a scale of appropriability that ranges from high quality land (with a greater likelihood to yield 
                                                 
42 Authors suppose that each society has to distribute income in such a way as to guarantee a subsistence minimum for 
its poorer classes. The remainder of the total income is the “surplus” that is shared among the richer classes.  
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differential rentals) to low quality land. However, the impact of this situation on economic 
performance depends on the quality of the institutions. “Bad” institutions worsen the adverse effects 
of land frontier expansion when the movement is onto high quality land, and “good” institutions 
moderate that evolution. 
We reinterpret an equation as (23) (in the tradition of Turner’s approach) in the light of 
appropriability hypothesis (in the tradition of the curse of the natural resources) tested in an 
equation as (22), and we consider the appropriability gradient that offer the different land qualities 
to evaluate the two dimensions of this hypothesis. On the on hand, we consider the institutional 
dimension, which involves the quality of the institutions and, on the other hand, the technical 
dimension, which refers to the “intrinsic” conditions of the natural resource that encourage or 
moderate the capacity of the agents to capture rents. This statistical approach gives several 
interesting insights that guide our description of the formation of institutional arrangements 
specifically related to land ownership rights in settler economies. 
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Formal presentation of the model 
1. Initial version 
The model derives from Findlay & Lundahl (1994) and Findlay (1995). We include a 
specification of the generic functions to illustrate the problem and to find an analytical solution. 
With this solution, we solve the problem with a numerical analysis43 to determine the incidence on 
the endogenous variables of changes in the exogenous ones. 
1.1 Production and utility functions      
o Primary (agriculture) sector (A): 
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o Utility function:  
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Agrarian production has two destines: input of Manufactures (AR) and consumption (AC). 
AAA CR =+             (5) 
 
Manufacturing production is used to consumption (MC) and the capital re-composition. 
 MMK CM =+δ           (6) 
Where  δ is the capital amortization rate. 
 
o Normalization of production functions:  
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43 We use MatLab (Matrix Laboratory) as our numerical computing application.  
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1.2 Profit maximization and resolution of k  
o Manufactures: 
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Replacing m’(k) in accordance to (8):  
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o Primary (agriculture) sector (A): 
Cost on clearing land: 
 )(Nk A φ=            (18) 
Where: )(Nφ is the cost function; it is an increasing and concave up function and, then, 
0)( and 0)( >′′>′ NN φφ . We can express it as:  )( θγφ NNk A ==    (19) 
With >1 and γ >0. 
Therefore,  
wNnpaa −−=Π ρφ )()(           (20) 
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1.3 Resolution of w  
With constant returns to scale (and in accordance with Euler’s Theorem) the sum of factor 
earnings exhausts the total product. Considering (10) and working out w: 
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Replacing ρ in accordance with (11): 
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Perfect competition in the labour markets makes:  
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1.4 Resolution of n  
Replacing with the value of ρ from (21) in (29): 
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By differentiation and considering that N=LAn,  
 
  )(' 111 −−− == θθθ γθγθφ nLNN A         (31) 
 
From (30) and (31), 
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In accordance with (7) and considering 1)(' −= ββnna      (34) 
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Replacing with (38) in (36) we obtain n. Our procedure is the following. We start with one of the 
components of the denominator of (36): 
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We continue with the denominator of (36),  
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Therefore, the complete denominator of (36) is,  
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Therefore, we substitute the last relation in (36):  
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Then, we calculate n by Newton approximation. 
1.5 Rest of variables  
The deduction of the rest of the variables (N, A, LM, KM, M, q and Y) is immediate and we close the 
system estimating p from the following relation:  
A+M=Y=w(LA+ LB)+ρKM+qN         (40) 
2. Selection of parameters and discussion of the results for Findlay-Lundahl model 
2.1 Parameters and discussion  
Our numerical analysis takes as reference the structure and the conditions of Uruguay in the eve 
of the WWI (in general terms, we work with 1912 as benchmark). We choose Uruguay because we 
have enough information to incorporate in the model and it constitutes a small and homogenous 
economy where regional disparities are less relevant. In this section, we present and justify the 
choices of the values of the parameters (Table A2.1) and discuss, critically, our results. 
Table A2.1 
Calibration: parameters and values  
Parameter Value 
α 0.25 
αM 0.60 
β 0.80 
ρ 0.05 
γ 10 
θ 1.70 
L 1.50 
α is the output elasticity of capital in manufacturing sector; it is a constant value determined by 
the available technology. Output elasticity measures the responsiveness of output to a change in 
levels of the productive factor used in production (ceteris paribus). In these terms, the more α is 
higher, the more capital- intensive the economic activity results. They are not available historical 
statistics of α in manufacturing and we only have some assumptions to the whole economy from the 
1960s on. Carracelas et al. (2009) review different available studies that cover similar periods and 
propose different values of α: 0.3 in Bucacos (1999) (1960-1998); 0.28 in De Brum (2004) (1957-
1999); 0.35 in Fossati et al. (2005) (1956-2003); 0.38 in Thedoluz (2005) (1978-2003); 0.35 in 
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Chumacero (2006) (1961-2000). For the second half of the 20th century, it is expected a higher 
value of α in manufacturing than for the whole economy –probably upper 0.4– and a level 
significantly higher than in the first decade of the century, when industry was more labour-
intensive. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose an elasticity between 0.2 and 0.3 for 1912. We 
assume 0.25 as our value of reference. 
 αM is a fixed coefficient that connects the gross output of manufacturing (M) to raw material 
input. It represents the share of inputs on manufacture production. Information is available for 1930 
(constant prices of 1936) and, considering the characteristics of industry during the first decades of 
the 20th century, we only consider those branches that manufacture agrarian products (foodstuffs, 
drinks, tobacco, textile, clothes, forest products, paper, leather). Inputs represent 64 per cent of 
gross production and we assume 0.6 as our value of reference (Millot, et al., 1974).  
β is the output elasticity of land in the agriculture; as in the case of α, it is a constant value 
determined by the available technology and represents the responsiveness of output to a change in 
levels of the land (ceteris paribus). There are studies about Argentine case and, considering 
historical similarities with Uruguay, we consider that they are results applied to Uruguayan 
agriculture.44 Newland & Poulson (1998):341 estimate the total factor productivity in pastoral 
production in the Argentine Littoral for two periods, 1825-1865 and 1865-1908, and three 
productive factors. For the first period, they consider the following weights: land (0.35), labour 
(0.20) and capital (0.45). For the second period, as Diaz Alejandro (1975):142-144, they propose 
0.375, 0.250 and 0.375, respectively. We present a model with two productive factors in agriculture 
and then we add land and capital and assume a weight of 0.8 for land (N) and 0.2 for labour (L).  
ρ is the interest rate and it represents the price of the capital and acts as the opportunity cost of 
the investment. Data about interest rates are scarce although consistent between sources. In 1911-
1913, the average of the yield government bonds was 4.3 per cent (Obstfeld & Taylor, 2003) and 
the active interest rate 6.5 per cent (Román, 2010). Therefore, we assume ρ=0.05 to consider a 
value within this range.  
γ and θ are technological coefficients that were determined from the calibration of the model and 
the consideration of a theoretical expression of the function KA = φ (Ν) , where φ (Ν)  is a convex 
function of the amount of land cleared with φ’(N) > 0 and φ’’(N) > 0. We consider our results 
acceptable when we assume γ=10 and θ=1.7. 
L represents the quantity of labour that participates in the different productive activities of the 
                                                 
44 Moraes (2001): 61-64 proposes an estimation of the total factor productivity of the pastoral production of Uruguay 
for the period 1872-1930 (three benchmarks). However, her calculation methodology implies a share of labour that is 
absolutely marginal and is not adequate for our objective.   
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economy. We consider that our economy has only two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing, and 
we consider the estimates of economic active population available for around 1912. In accordance 
with our sources, the economy presented 48,640 agrarian (Bértola, 2005) and 22,224 manufacturing 
workers (Maubrigades, 2002). Information about days and hours of work in the South American 
Southern Cone is scarce, partial, and basically qualitative. In our estimates of functional income 
distribution in the agrarian sector (see Chapter 4) we review some evidence and our assumptions in 
this case are consistent with that estimation. We assume 230 days of work per year and 9 hours per 
day. Therefore, we estimate 146,688,480 worked hours in agrarian and manufacturing activities 
around 1912. We assume L=1.5. 
The variable n –the land-labour coefficient– is calculated applying a Newton approximation, and 
we assume as extremes of p for the bisection of the function the values 0.5 and 1.5. We look for a 
value p=PA/PM around 1 because we always can express the agriculture and manufacture product in 
such a way that the relation of prices equals the unity. 
How can we consider that our calibration of the model renders “good” results? We regard as 
“good” results obtaining some basic relationships closer to the historical data of economic structure. 
Considering only two sectors, the GDP structure of the Uruguayan economy around 1912 showed 
an agrarian participation of 65 per cent and the remaining 35 per cent to manufacturing (Bértola, 
1998). Our calibration offers a productive structure of 68 and 32 per cent, respectively. 
Analogously, the labour structure showed an agrarian participation of 69 per cent and the remaining 
31 per cent to manufacturing (Bértola, 2005; Maubrigades, 2001). Our calibration offers a labour 
structure of 76 and 24 per cent, respectively.45 Taking account the simplicity of our model and the 
quality of our data –in all cases historical estimates– we consider that it renders satisfactory results. 
2.2 Results of the simulation exercises 
We present the complete simulation results of the calibration and simulation exercises in the 
following Tables.  
All cases consider increases in variables that cause changes in factor endowments and factor 
productive prices. We present movements in terms of trade, labour (associated to migration), 
interest rate (related to capital flows), cost of clearing land and land productivity.  Variables are 
presented in four analytical categories: productive factors; economic growth and structural change; 
income distribution; and prices.  
                                                 
45 Differences are not so small but they do not surprise us. Our assumption of the same labour-days and worked hours in 
both sectors may be inducing distortions. For instance, if we consider that worked hours in the agriculture and 
manufacture are, respectively, 10 and 8 instead of 9, the “real” labour structure would be 73 and 27 per cent instead of 
68 and 32 per cent and, in consequence, very close to the results of our model.  
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N0 0.9461 A0 0.9829 RW0 1.3216 q0 0.8177
N1 0.9613 A1 0.9997 RW1 1.3846 q1 0.8268
N2 0.9764 A2 1.0165 RW2 1.4504 q2 0.8359
KM0 0.9235 M0 0.4508 RP0 16.7539 w0 0.3902
KM1 0.8429 M1 0.4176 RP1 18.8590 w1 0.3827
KM2 0.7653 M2 0.3848 RP2 21.3321 w2 0.3752
LA0 1.1450 Y0 1.4052 WY0 0.4098
LA1 1.1696 Y1 1.4110 WY1 0.4043
LA2 1.1940 Y2 1.4173 WY2 0.3985
LM0 0.3550 AY0 0.6882 RY0 0.5506
LM1 0.3304 AY1 0.7041 RY1 0.5633
LM2 0.3060 AY2 0.7199 RY2 0.5759
n0 0.8263 MY0 0.3208 PY0 0.0329
n1 0.8219 MY1 0.2959 PY1 0.0299
n2 0.8178 MY2 0.2715 PY2 0.0270
k0 2.6016
k1 2.5513
k2 2.5012
Period 1: p; Period 0: p*0.99; Period 2: p*1.01
Source: own estimates.
INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Table A2.2
VALUES OF THE VARIABLES OF THE MODEL
Simulation of a marginal increasing in p=PA/PM
PRODUCTIVE FACTORS GROWTH AND STRUCTURE PRICES
 
N0 0.9479 A0 0.9849 RW0 1.3422 q0 0.8187
N1 0.9613 A1 0.9997 RW1 1.3846 q1 0.8268
N2 0.9754 A2 1.0154 RW2 1.4317 q2 0.8353
KM0 0.8751 M0 0.4279 RP0 17.7363 w0 0.3894
KM1 0.8429 M1 0.4176 RP1 18.8590 w1 0.3827
KM2 0.8079 M2 0.4058 RP2 20.1710 w2 0.3757
LA0 1.1479 Y0 1.3980 WY0 0.4074 p0 0.9850
LA1 1.1696 Y1 1.4110 WY1 0.4043 p1 0.9938
LA2 1.1924 Y2 1.4244 WY2 0.4008 p2 1.0031
LM0 0.3371 AY0 0.6939 RY0 0.5551
LM1 0.3304 AY1 0.7041 RY1 0.5633
LM2 0.3226 AY2 0.7151 RY2 0.5721
n0 0.8258 MY0 0.3061 PY0 0.0313
n1 0.8219 MY1 0.2959 PY1 0.0299
n2 0.8180 MY2 0.2849 PY2 0.0284
k0 2.5958
k1 2.5513
k2 2.5045
Period 1: L; Period 0: L*0.99; Period 2: L*1.01
Source: own estimates.
Table A2.3
VALUES OF THE VARIABLES OF THE MODEL
Simulation of a marginal increasing in L
PRODUCTIVE FACTORS GROWTH AND STRUCTURE INCOME DISTRIBUTION PRICES
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N0 0.9694 A0 1.0061 RW0 1.3797 q0 0.8234
N1 0.9613 A1 0.9997 RW1 1.3846 q1 0.8268
N2 0.9534 A2 0.9935 RW2 1.3896 q2 0.8303
KM0 0.8627 M0 0.4217 RP0 18.6905 w0 0.3856
KM1 0.8429 M1 0.4176 RP1 18.8590 w1 0.3827
KM2 0.8236 M2 0.4134 RP2 19.0332 w2 0.3798
LA0 1.1678 Y0 1.4193 WY0 0.4041 p0 0.9916
LA1 1.1696 Y1 1.4110 WY1 0.4043 p1 0.9938
LA2 1.1715 Y2 1.4028 WY2 0.4044 p2 0.9960
LM0 0.3322 AY0 0.7029 RY0 0.5623
LM1 0.3304 AY1 0.7041 RY1 0.5633
LM2 0.3285 AY2 0.7054 RY2 0.5643
n0 0.8301 MY0 0.2971 PY0 0.0301
n1 0.8219 MY1 0.2959 PY1 0.0299
n2 0.8138 MY2 0.2947 PY2 0.0296
k0 2.5969
k1 2.5513
k2 2.5067
Period 1: ρ; Period 0: ρ*0.99; Period 2: ρ*1.01
Source: own estimates.
Table A2.4
VALUES OF THE VARIABLES OF THE MODEL
Simulation of a marginal increasing in ρ
PRODUCTIVE FACTORS GROWTH AND STRUCTURE INCOME DISTRIBUTION PRICES
 
N0 1.0495 A0 1.0682 RW0 1.3440 q0 0.7828
N1 0.9613 A1 0.9997 RW1 1.3846 q1 0.8268
N2 0.8881 A2 0.9416 RW2 1.4226 q2 0.8674
KM0 0.9602 M0 0.4538 RP0 17.1118 w0 0.4075
KM1 0.8429 M1 0.4176 RP1 18.8590 w1 0.3827
KM2 0.7463 M2 0.3862 RP2 20.6440 w2 0.3610
LA0 1.1466 Y0 1.4808 WY0 0.3968 p0 0.9613
LA1 1.1696 Y1 1.4110 WY1 0.4043 p1 0.9938
LA2 1.1899 Y2 1.3491 WY2 0.4104 p2 1.0226
LM0 0.3534 AY0 0.6935 RY0 0.5548
LM1 0.3304 AY1 0.7041 RY1 0.5633
LM2 0.3101 AY2 0.7137 RY2 0.5710
n0 0.9154 MY0 0.3064 PY0 0.0324
n1 0.8219 MY1 0.2959 PY1 0.0299
n2 0.7464 MY2 0.2863 PY2 0.0277
k0 2.7167
k1 2.5513
k2 2.4067
Period 1: θ and γ; Period 0: θ*0.99 and γ-1; Period 2: θ*1.01 and γ+1
Source: own estimates.
Table A2.5
VALUES OF THE VARIABLES OF THE MODEL
Simulation of a marginal increasing in θ and γ
PRODUCTIVE FACTORS GROWTH AND STRUCTURE INCOME DISTRIBUTION PRICES
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KM2 0.8688 M2 0.4291 RP2 18.4701 w2 0.3842
LA0 1.1782 Y0 1.4001 WY0 0.4068 p0 0.9955
LA1 1.1696 Y1 1.4110 WY1 0.4043 p1 0.9938
LA2 1.1608 Y2 1.4221 WY2 0.4019 p2 0.9918
LM0 0.3218 AY0 0.7098 RY0 0.5622
LM1 0.3304 AY1 0.7041 RY1 0.5633
LM2 0.3392 AY2 0.6983 RY2 0.5642
n0 0.8112 MY0 0.2902 PY0 0.0292
n1 0.8219 MY1 0.2959 PY1 0.0299
n2 0.8328 MY2 0.3018 PY2 0.0305
k0 2.5426
k1 2.5513
k2 2.5611
Period 1: β; Period 0: β*0.99; Period 2: β*1.01
Source: own estimates.
Table A2.6
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3. Revision of the model: our proposal 
As in the previous presentation, we include specifications of the generic functions to illustrate 
the problem and to find an analytical solution. With this solution, we solve the problem with a 
numerical analysis to determine the incidence on the variables of the model of exogenous changes 
in variables. We concentrate in the influence of changes in the relative prices (p=PA/PM) because 
terms of trade were the main factor to explain the stylized facts of the period.  
3.1 Production and utility functions 
o Primary (agriculture) sector (A) with two sub-sectors AH and AL that work, respectively, in 
high aptitude (NH) and low aptitude land (NL): 
 HH AHHAHHHH LNLNAA
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o Manufactures (M): 
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Where αα −== 1),( MMMM LKLKMM  and 10 << α  
 
M
RA
α : is an industrial input that comes from A and participates in the industrial 
production according to the coefficient αM. 
In equilibrium: 
M
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A
LKM
α
=),(  
Besides: LLLL MAHAH =++           (4) 
o Utility function:  
),( CC MAuu =           (5) 
Agrarian production has two destines: input of Manufactures (AR) and consumption (AC). 
LHCR AAAAA +==+           (6) 
 105
Manufacturing production is used to consumption (MC) and the capital re-composition. 
 MMK CM =+δ , Where  δ is the capital amortization rate    (7) 
o Normalization of production functions:  
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3.2 Profit maximization and resolution of k  
o Manufactures: 
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Replacing m’(k) in accordance to (10):  
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Applying the natural logarithm (logarithm to the base e):  
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In accordance to logarithm proprieties:  
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o Primary (agriculture) sector (A): 
Cost on clearing land: 
H
HHAH NNk
θγφ == )(          (20) 
L
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θγφ == )(           (21) 
Where: )( iNφ is the cost function; an increasing and concave up function; i.e. 
0)( and 0)( >′′>′ iii NN φφ . 
The cost on clearing land is different by type of land and we assume: θH > θL (w explain this 
assumption in the following section).  
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Therefore, the maximum profit in the Agriculture occurs when the rate of return of clearing land 
in both types of land coincides.  
3.3 Resolution of w  
With constant returns to scale (and in accordance with Euler’s Theorem) the sum of factor 
earnings exhausts the total product,  
wkmpkkm M ++= )()( αρ          (26) 
kkmpw M ρα −−= )()1(          (27) 
Replacing ρ in accordance with (13): 
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kkmpkmpw MM )()1()()1( ′−−−= αα        (28) 
)])()()[1( kkmkmpw M ′−−= α         (29) 
In accordance with (10) and considering 1)(' −= ααkkm      (30) 
)])[1( 1kkkpw M
−−−= αα αα          (31) 
)1()1( αα α −−= kpw M          (32) 
Perfect competition in the labour markets makes:  
wNnpa HH =− ρφ )()(           (33) 
wNnpa LL =− ρφ )()(           (34) 
3.4 Resolution of n 
Replacing with the value of ρ from (23) in (33): 
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By differentiation (20) and considering N=LAn,  
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From (23), considering (39) and (36),  
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Replacing with (43) in (41) we obtain n. Our procedure is the following. We start by one of the 
components of the denominator of (41), 
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We give other steps in the denominator of (41),   
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Therefore, relation (41) can be expressed as, 
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We work analogously with nL to obtain the following result: 
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We calculate nH and nL by Newton approximation. 
3.5 Rest of variables  
The deduction of the rest of the variables (N, A, LM, KM, M, qH and qL and Y) is immediate and 
we close the system estimating p from the following relation:  
AH+ AL+M=Y=w(LAH+ LAH+ LM)+ρKM+qH NH + qL NL      (46) 
4. Selection of parameters and discussion of the results in our model 
4.1 Parameters and discussion 
We apply a numerical analysis to solve the model and to propose contrafactual exercises to 
contrast results. On the one hand, we suppose an economy similar to the Section 3 considering two 
production functions in the agriculture with different land elasticities: βH=0.8 and βL=0.4. The first 
elasticity coincides with the formulation used in our F-L Model and, the second one, is assumed 
inferior and equivalent to a half of the former. However, the elasticity of the low quality land results 
higher than the elasticity of the capital in manufacturing to denote the primary specialization of the 
economy. In addition, we consider different cost functions of clearing land with θH=1.4 and θL=1.2 
because they assure us that land rentals of the better lands are higher than those of the worst lands. 
From equations (23) and (25) of Section 3 we know:  
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We assume qH>qL and NH>NL and, as N=NL+NH, we can express N=λNH+NH  with 0<λ<1. 
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Applying logarithms, ln θH - ln θL >(θL-1) ln(λ NH)-(θH-1) ln(NH) 
As we consider θH > θL >1 then,   
 ln θH - ln θL >0 and  (θL-1) ln(λ NH)-(θH-1) ln(NH)<0 
Therefore, we are sure that we obtain qH>qL. 
On the other hand, we consider an economy with land homogeneity (types of land are identical) 
and we calibrate the model to obtain similar results –in terms of productive and labour structure–
that our framework. For this, we consider βH= βL=0.62 and θH= θL =1.4.  
Finally, we propose a third exercise to represents an economy with different types of lands, 
similar to former but with marginal changes. High quality land presents a higher input elasticity 
(0.808=0.8*1.01) and low quality land a lower β-coefficient (0.396=0.4*0.99). In addition, we 
adjust the coefficients of the clearing land frontier to reduce the gap between both types of land 
rentals and to put higher requirements to differences in land quality issue. We assume 
θH=1.287=1.3*0.99 and  
θL=1.188=1.2*0.99. 46 
 As in Section 2, we 
compare the economic 
structures we calibrated 
with the historical 
estimates of GDP by 
sector (Bértola, 1998) 
and labour by activity 
(Bértola, 2005, and 
Maubrigades, 2001) (see 
Table A2.7). Our 
                                                 
46 The gap between θ-parameters is 0.2 for Economy 1 and 0.1 for Economy 3. 
Economy 1 Economy 2 Economy 3
(a) (b)
GDP
Agriculture 65% 63% 63% 64%
Manufacturing 35% 37% 37% 36%
Labour
Agriculture 69% 73% 76% 77% 75%
Manufacturing 31% 27% 24% 23% 25%
(a) Worked hours per day: 9 in both sectors. 
(b) Worked hours per day: 10 in agriculture; 8 in manufacturing.
Economy 1: βh=0.8 βl=0.4; θh=1.4, θl=1.2.  
Economy 2: βh=0.62 βl=0.62; θh=1.4, θl=1.4.  
Economy 3: βh=0.8*1.01 βl=0.4*0.99; θh=1.3*0.99, θl=1.2*0.99.  
Source: Bértola (1998, 2005); Maubrigades(2001); own estimates.
Table A2.7
SOME ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS
Percentage in the total
Observation
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calibrations show a participation of 63-64 per cent and 36-37 per cent for Agriculture and 
Manufacturing, respectively. In all cases, the approximation to the observed values is even better 
than the F-L Model. Analogously, in the labour structures that was obtained the participations of the 
agrarian and manufacturing are around 76 and 24 per cent, respectively (values close to those 
obtained for F-L Model). As in that case, considering the simplicity of our model and the type of 
the data, we believe that the results are satisfactory. 
4.2 Results of the simulation exercises 
Economies (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Nh0 = 0.728 0.471 0.835 Ah0= 0.629 0.442 0.701 RW0 = 0.677 0.596 0.741 qh0 = 0.617 0.518 0.611
Nh1 = 0.748 0.488 0.864 Ah1= 0.665 0.472 0.744 RW1 = 0.721 0.635 0.792 qh1 = 0.623 0.525 0.617
Nh2 = 0.769 0.505 0.893 Ah2= 0.704 0.504 0.790 RW2 = 0.768 0.675 0.846 qh2 = 0.630 0.533 0.623
Nl0 = 0.233 0.471 0.215 Al0= 0.293 0.442 0.268 RP0 = 7.037 6.633 7.528 ql0 = 0.449 0.518 0.445
Nl1 = 0.255 0.488 0.237 Al1= 0.333 0.472 0.305 RP1 = 8.852 8.110 9.457 ql1 = 0.457 0.525 0.453
Nl2 = 0.278 0.505 0.259 Al2= 0.375 0.504 0.346 RP2 = 11.542 10.153 12.278 ql2 = 0.464 0.533 0.461
Km0 = 1.573 1.471 1.611 M0 = 0.528 0.495 0.536 WY0 = 0.564 0.593 0.544 w0 = 0.545 0.545 0.545
Km1 = 1.317 1.265 1.354 M1 = 0.459 0.441 0.467 WY1 = 0.555 0.584 0.533 w1 = 0.539 0.539 0.539
Km2 = 1.062 1.061 1.100 M2 = 0.385 0.383 0.393 WY2 = 0.545 0.574 0.522 w2 = 0.532 0.532 0.532
Lah0 = 0.648 0.548 0.671 Y0 = 1.451 1.380 1.505 RY0 = 0.382 0.354 0.403
Lah1 = 0.669 0.574 0.692 Y1 = 1.457 1.385 1.516 RY1 = 0.400 0.371 0.422
Lah2 = 0.689 0.601 0.714 Y2 = 1.465 1.390 1.529 RY2 = 0.419 0.387 0.442
Lal0 = 0.419 0.548 0.386 AhY0 0.434 0.321 0.466 PY0 = 0.054 0.053 0.054
Lal1 = 0.465 0.574 0.431 AhY1 0.457 0.341 0.491 PY1 = 0.045 0.046 0.045
Lal2 = 0.511 0.601 0.476 AhY2 0.481 0.362 0.517 PY2 = 0.036 0.038 0.036
Lm0 = 0.433 0.405 0.443 AlY0 0.202 0.321 0.178
Lm1 = 0.367 0.352 0.377 AlY1 0.228 0.341 0.201
Lm2 = 0.299 0.299 0.310 AlY2 0.256 0.362 0.226
nh0 = 1.124 0.860 1.246 MY0 0.364 0.359 0.356
nh1 = 1.119 0.850 1.248 MY1 0.315 0.318 0.308
nh2 = 1.115 0.842 1.251 MY2 0.263 0.275 0.257
nl0 = 0.557 0.860 0.557
nl1 = 0.549 0.850 0.550
nl2 = 0.543 0.842 0.543
k0 = 3.636 3.636 3.637
k1 = 3.593 3.592 3.592
k2 = 3.548 3.548 3.548
Economy 1: βh=0.8 βl=0.4; θh=1.4, θl=1.2.  
Economy 2: βh=0.62 βl=0.62; θh=1.4, θl=1.4.  
Economy 3: βh=0.8*1.01 βl=0.4*0.99; θh=1.3*0.99, θl=1.2*0.99.  
Source: own estimates.
Table A2.8
VALUES OF THE VARIABLES OF THE MODEL
Simulation of a marginal increasing in p=PA/PM
GROWTH AND STRUCTUREPRODUCTIVE FACTORS INCOME DISTRIBUTION PRICES
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Chapter 3 
Land frontier expansion: concepts and measures applied to 
settler economies in historical perspective (1850-1920)  
In Chapter 2 we proposed a supplementary model to the Heckscher-Ohlin framework in order to 
explain the performance of recent settlement economies during the First Globalization. We 
constructed a model of specific factors to stress the importance of domestic conditions in countries 
exposed to the effects of the First Globalization up to WWI. In this context, the role of land frontier 
expansion becomes a central aspect in explaining how that globalization affected the economic 
performance of the Atlantic economy. The availability of land resources was the main comparative 
advantage that enabled these economies to participate in international markets. In order to better 
understand this process, we made modifications to the model to incorporate differing land quality. 
Our main contributions were in three important areas. First, an abundance of natural resources in 
countries exposed to the dynamics of the First Globalization was a mix of blessing and curse and its 
consequences differed in intensity depending on the quality of the natural endowments and the 
interaction with the institutional quality. Second, endogenous land frontier expansion shaped the 
dynamics of the process as it combined the effects of specific historical circumstances with the 
consequences of the formation of world markets. Third, our hypothesis is that in settler countries 
where the high quality land was occupied more intensively, the worsening in income distribution 
was exacerbated but with increased levels of income and agrarian production. This would be the 
result of greater differences in relative factor remuneration in favour of landowners (rentists) and to 
the detriment of workers and capitalists. However, this process interacted with the formation of 
institutions related to land –specific land ownership rights and the role of the national authorities– 
that, depending on their quality, they moderated or strengthened the curse and the blessing.  
In our approach the expansion of the land frontier is one of the central themes. We need to make 
this notion operational if we are to test our hypothesis empirically. Therefore the first stage of our 
empirical strategy –and the aim of this chapter– is to identify different settlement patterns in the 
settler economies to evaluate the likelihood of our proposition. Initially, in Section 1, we present the 
concept of land frontier expansion and review the recent theoretical and empirical studies. In 
Section 2, we discuss the ways land frontier expansion can be measured, we consider recent efforts 
at quantification, and we examine the main shortcomings of these approaches. In Section 3, we 
present our quantification proposal based on the use of Georeferenced Information Systems (GIS). 
In this section, we explain how we can avoid the limitations of the previous approaches by 
considering different land aptitudes of potential vegetation and distances from “centres of gravity”. 
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We present our results for land frontier expansion in terms of land aptitude and an illustration –as a 
first approach to the question– of the consequences of the introduction of distances into the 
estimates (in the case of Argentina) in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5, we draw conclusions. 
The trajectories of the different countries in our club were not homogenous and, when these 
countries faced the effects of the First Globalization, we can identify two patterns based on their 
dynamics of settlement. In the River Plate (Argentina and Uruguay) land frontier expansion was 
dominated throughout the period by land of high and medium aptitude, and this was also the pattern 
in Chile starting in the 1880s.  On the other hand, land expansion in Australia and Canada moved to 
a different rhythm and characteristics. In Australia land expansion came before the First 
Globalization boom (1850s and 1860s) and it was dominated by low quality lands.  In Canada, the 
expansion only became intensive at the end of the century and, in addition, the three types of land 
were equally important; medium and low quality land also made significant contributions. New 
Zealand showed features of both patterns. Like in Australia, land frontier expansion became more 
dynamic before the price boom, but the effect of high quality land was very important to explain. 
However, like in Canada, all three land types made their contribution to expansion. 
1. Is land frontier expansion a classical concept that has come back? 
The most famous study of the importance of frontier expansion for economic development was 
that of Frederick Jackson Turner, in the Annual Report of the American Historical Association of 
1893, where he postulated what is known as the “Turner thesis”. This is the notion that the frontier 
attracted a particular type of person, and this was crucial in determining the development path of 
US society and in explaining why that country was and is so exceptional. The frontier promoted 
individualism, social mobility, economic equality and freedom, and it was decisive to the 
development of democratic institutions in a process of “perennial rebirth”.  
Turner’s frontier thesis enjoyed considerable popularity in the early 20th century. The “notion of 
an aggressive pioneering national spirit nurtured by repeated exposure to primitive conditions 
became a means to national self-glorification” (Hofstadter, 1970:23; quoted in Furniss, 2006:26) 
and to a large extent this idea explains why, in a lot of the literature, the concept is given the 
adjective “myth”. Beginning in the 1920s, this thesis came in for a wide range of remarkable 
empirical and theoretical criticisms like the fact that its overemphasis on a single determinant 
influence in the frontier environment meant ignoring other forces such as the class struggle, 
urbanization, religion, gender, ethnic heterogeneity, slavery and the growth of international 
capitalism (Furniss, 2006). However, and probably due to the connection between the “Frontier 
Thesis” and American nationalism, Turner’s ideas remained influential in economic, political and 
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social thought for decades.47 It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that academic interest in the 
frontier revived and in the 1980s a new approach emerged to definitively challenge Turner's 
framework: this took the form of “New Western History”. In this new perspective the environment 
was seen not as a barrier to expansion but a factor that changed with human interaction. Many 
participants in the debate have even rejected the use of the term “frontier” because of its nationalist, 
racist and ethnocentric connotations. However, not all reactions were so extreme and some 
academics re-introduced the term into the analysis and defined the frontier as an area of cultural 
interaction. Similarly, Slotkin (1985, 1992) turned around the idea of the frontier myth as a 
narrative marked by the boundaries and the encounter of opposites (civilization and savagery, man 
and nature, good and evil). These encounters were described in terms of conflict and violence, and 
eventually resolved through domination and conquest (the supposed subordination of indigenous 
peoples, nature and evil by the forces of progress, civilization and God). These ideas have 
constituted a fruitful line of research and have been applied in other regions in North America and 
in Australasia, South Africa, and Latin America (Hartz, 1964; Winks, 1971). This evolution in 
thinking about this subject reflects some of the changes and paths the history of the American West 
has undergone.   
According to Burt (1965), if Turner had looked north when he wrote about the mass movement to 
the West, he might have discovered surprising evidence for his thesis in New France as “the 
westward movement was North American, not just American in the narrow sense of the word” 
(Mikesell, 1960:68). In any case, Turner’s thesis remained of great interest throughout the first half 
of the 20th century. In the 1920s and 1930s, the “Frontier Thesis” was popular in Canadian 
historiography as an explanation of the country’s development and to find parallels between the two 
North American “Wests”. However, historians studying the Canadian West began to see more 
differences than similarities. Much of the credit for long-lasting interpretations of Canadian 
development belongs to Harold Innis, who suggested that the economic development of Canada 
should be approached from the standpoint of trade and staple production. This analytical line was 
identified with the “Laurentian School”: it was a framework that emphasized the history of 
transport and the importance of urban development in Canadian history (“Metropolitan School”). In 
the second half of the 20th century academics have acknowledged the power of the mythic West and 
its imagery. Some embrace it and others attack it, but the thesis has remained part of the 
interpretation of national development. In the literature some authors take note of the interlocking 
nature of American and Canadian westward expansion (Burt, 1965) while others play down the 
similarities (Sharp, 1955) and identify “several wests” in the overall expansion (Winks, 1971). The 
                                                 
47 The slogan that defined the themes of the political campaign of the American Democratic Party presidential candidate 
at the beginning of 1960, John F. Kennedy, was precisely “the New Frontier” (Slotkin, 1992). 
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historiography has been extensive and varied (Cross, 1970), and in recent years subjects related to 
the imaginary (Francis, 1992) and cultural issues have emerged (for a recent discussion, see Higham 
&Thacker, 2006). The long tradition of frontier studies in North America has comparable 
developments in other parts of the world. 
The frontier is one of the most pervasive and evocative image underlying the creation of a 
national identity in Australia. Probably, the most influential interpretation of the Turner view in the 
Australian context was that in Russel Ward’s 1958 study, The Australian Legend, although previous 
contributions (Alexander, 194748; Sharp, 1955) of a Turner type had employed similar concepts and 
reached pessimistic conclusions about the supposed imperial utopia (Davis, 2006). Contemporary 
studies of the frontier follow one of two lines. On the one hand, there are interpretations of Turner’s 
ideas, including considerations of several frontiers (Winks, 1971, 1981), in which New Zealand 
appears as a part of the process with particular characteristics (Coleman, 1958) and they recognize a 
lasting impact on national identity in remote regions such as the Northern Territory (Loveday, 
1991). On the other hand, a variety of approaches have been introduced in the literature in which 
the frontier is considered as a discursive trope that settler society produces to reinforce the 
formation of civil society and cultural hegemony. In this conceptualization, a central point is the 
extent to which the nation-state “Australia” was founded on the violence and depredations of 
encounters in colonial times (Reynolds, 1987, 2003).  
Like North America, many parts of Latin America were conquered and settled by Europeans in a 
process that seems, at least on the surface, to be similar to what happened on the Anglo-American 
frontier. However, except for Brazil and Argentina, Latin American academics have seldom seen 
the frontiers as important factors in the formation of national institutions and identities (Weber & 
Rausch, 1994). Various authors in the early 20th century argued that the shortage of “free land”  
–which causes the rigidity of social systems in Hispanic America (Belaúnde, 1923)– and the use of 
different institutions to deal with labour (such as missions and encomiendas) (Bolton, 1917) make it 
difficult to apply the thesis. Apart from some exceptions –like Aiton (1940), and Clementi (1986-
1988)49 – most Latin American historians consider their frontiers are unsuitable for a Turner-type 
analysis and seldom refer to Turner when they write about the frontier.  
“Few influential Latin Americans regarded their frontiers as places of regeneration 
that went through a temporary ‘return to primitive conditions’ as they gave birth to 
individual liberty. Instead, most nineteenth century Latin American urbanites and 
                                                 
48 It is quoted in Davis (2006).  
49 It is quoted in Weber & Rausch (1994): xvii, xxxv. 
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intellectuals saw their frontiers as violent, brutal places that engendered despotism 
rather than democracy”  (Weber & Rausch, 1994: xviii).  
Like in the literature about British Empire frontiers, notions in Latin America have changed 
progressively and the view emerged that it was not simply the physical environment that 
determined the impact of the frontiers on people, but the values that people brought to the physical 
environment. Hispanic colonizers wanted to incorporate those indigenous cultures into their own 
society, which is another reason why Latin American frontiers differed from those in North 
America (Zavala, 1965). One of the more obvious consequences of this different “attitude” was 
“mestizaje” (racial mixture), a trans-culturation process that introduced distinctive characteristics 
not present in North America. According to Mikesell (1960), the Latin American “frontier of 
inclusion” contrasted sharply with the Anglo-American “frontier of exclusion”. This pattern 
changed in the 19th century when the Latin American countries achieved political independence and 
needed to define political boundaries with active settlement that legitimated the new states. 
Transatlantic migrants were arriving in search of a new livelihood, and the as yet unused land could 
be exploited economically to feed the industrial populations of Europe.  
The most important of these movements,  
“… was the wave of settlement which spread from the estuary of La Plata northward 
across Uruguay and westward across Argentina. This occupation of arable and grazing 
lands, previously the habitat of hunting Indians, by immigrants from Southern Europe; 
the construction of a railway network … and the growth of the great cities of Buenos 
Aires, Rosario and Montevideo, are all in the classical tradition of the North America 
frontier”. Besides, “other neglected lands ranging from the arid pampa of Atacama to 
the rain-drenched forest south of Chile's Bío-Bío river attracted attention” (Butland, 
1966: 94).  
In the Atacama, the focus was a long-established form of mining, and in the forest there was a 
central European pattern of farming “cut-over” land that was slowly won from the Araucanians. At 
the same time, profits to be made from sub-Antarctic pastoralism stimulated European penetration 
of the cold lands of Tierra del Fuego, and similarly, irrigation in agriculture brought about a more 
intensive settlement pattern from the Río Negro through the Andean oases of Mendoza and 
Tucumán (Butland, 1966: 94).  
In the 1970s the notion of the frontier became less dominant (at least in its classical sense) and 
this opened the way for other conceptual frameworks to provide analytical support for the study of 
settler economies. In the recent literature about the expansion of the Atlantic economy during the 
19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem from the 
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Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory is used to explain the performance of the New World (for a review 
see Chapter 1). 
The 1870-1913 period was a real “golden age” for the settler economies. This expansion can be 
traced to the Industrial Revolution, a process that started in Britain in the second half of the 18th 
century and in subsequent decades spread to other European countries, transmitting technological 
growth impulses from the core to peripheral regions. The formation of world commodity markets, 
mass migration and capital flows combined to make up one of the most important processes in the 
world economy in the last two centuries. Recent studies by Lindert, O’Rourke, Taylor and 
Williamson on globalization, growth, and inequality have opened up a fruitful line of research and 
generated a debate about subjects that are very important to a better understanding of the expansion 
of the Atlantic economy during the period (see Chapter 2).  
In every case the stimulus to development came from expanding markets in the world economy  
–usually expressed as rising prices– that led to an extension of the internal land frontier 
accompanied by considerable inflows of capital and immigrant labour (not only from outside the 
country but also from other regions within its political borders). The new sectors or activities that 
came into being were related to the production of primary exports, this generated additional demand 
for capital, labour and raw materials, and this demand was met partly from foreign sources. 
Therefore the international and inter-regional mobility of factors were part of the story. The 
expansion of the frontier has played a secondary role in the modern historical analysis of settler 
economies, in spite of the fact that the main “domestic contribution” to economic growth was 
precisely the incorporation of “new” land into production. Only recently have academics seriously 
returned to the notion of frontier expansion. 
Arroyo Abad (2008) gives us a comparative view of some Latin American economies (Argentina, 
Mexico, Venezuela and Uruguay) during the 19th century and presents a theoretical framework that 
connects up the effects on inequality of factor endowments and trade. This article includes an 
analysis of the effect on income distribution of labour movement, changing terms of trade and land 
expansion. Inequality depends critically on the relative scarcity of productive factors and the 
distribution of their ownership. Land was not a fixed factor in these economies; at that time, large 
areas were incorporated into production and this enabled the settler economies to actively 
participate in international primary commodity markets. However, as populations grew, land 
became relatively less abundant and inequality increased. Findlay & Lundahl (1994, 2001) and 
Findlay (1995) present a model that captures the structural pattern of the process with a 
combination of the “vent-for-surplus” and “staples” theories, and regard the endogenous land 
frontier as a main factor. In this conceptual framework, land frontier expansion is taken as the 
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pivotal concept in an analysis of changes in relative prices, inflows of labour and capital, structural 
change and movements in income distribution. Neither of these analytical approaches is critical of 
the “mainstream” framework and they can be considered supplementary visions to the general view 
(in the tradition of the H-O-S model) of the First Globalization and the development of the Atlantic 
economy. However, there have been other approaches that are more critical. 
In a recent article, Knick Harley argues that applying the H-O-S approach means we should 
consider price convergence as a pivotal concept in the definition, identification and measurement of 
globalization. But, as globalization can be “defined as a shift from an economy where local supply 
and demand fluctuations dominated price fluctuations to one in which the economy became a price-
taker to global forces […] it need not depend on price convergence” (Harley, 2007:240-241). When 
we see 19th century globalization as a process in which peripheral economies were incorporated into 
the core of organized economic activity, we can consider their learning how to best exploit their 
natural resources, their mobilization of capital and labour for production, their use and distribution, 
and the setting up of new institutional arrangements in other terms. Bértola et al. (2010) propose a 
framework compatible with this vision to explain the evolution of inequality in the South American 
Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Uruguay) during the First Globalization. According to 
this analysis, the effect of globalization on inequality depended on the expansion of the frontier and 
on institutions persisting from colonial times, and this changed in old and new areas.50 Lastly, in a 
recent working paper, Camilo García-Jimeno and James Robinson show renewed interest in the 
frontier. They analyze the classical “Frontier (or Turner) Thesis” for North, Central and South 
America from the mid-19th century to 2007. In this approach, the consequences of the existence of a 
frontier depend on the nature of the political institutions which came into being in the early 
independence period. When institutions placed few constraints on the executive, having a frontier 
was bad for development in terms of economic growth, income distribution and democracy. 
From these perspectives, the focus on frontiers –that is, the incorporation of regions that 
originally were scarcely occupied and outside European economic influence– adds another 
viewpoint to the mainstream approach and helps to explain new questions in this field. Land 
frontier expansion is a pivotal concept that makes it possible to connect considerations about 
technological progress and institutional configuration in a different way. This concept is based on 
endogenous growth in the use of the productive factors, and it can include regional (and local) 
perspectives. Our application of land frontier expansion is only instrumental (it has to do with the 
expansion of natural resource exploitation) and it does not attempt to explain or conceptualize the 
process in terms of Turner’s conceptual framework. According to Furniss (2006), the frontier is a 
                                                 
50 Rodríguez Weber (2009) proposes an argument in the same conceptual line.  
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concept that has been used in two quite distinct senses. On the one hand, it is used as a 
descriptive/analytical term to describe a presumably empirical reality. On the other hand, it 
represents a social construction and it is confined to cultural ideas in colonial societies or, to put it 
another way, it is an ethnographic construct. The option we choose is closer to the first position in 
which the notion of a frontier has an instrumental character, considering analytical questions in 
specific theoretical frameworks related to the blessing and the curse of natural resources. 
2. Measuring land frontier expansion 
The literature about the frontier has been rather imprecise as to how the concept can be defined. 
It is hard to think of the frontier as a dichotomous condition because usually the boundaries are not 
clear-cut. In historical analysis, the “obvious” conditions to define a frontier are the presence of 
native communities not subject to state control, the absence of significant numbers of settlers and 
the inexistence of state institutions. However, in much of the literature the conceptualization of the 
frontier does not go beyond interesting (and intuitive) discourse, and there have been very few 
efforts to quantify the process. 51 In this section we comment on some of these efforts and propose a 
new approach to represent the concept and apply it for the purposes of analysis. 
2.1 Recent quantification efforts 
In the H-O-S framework approach, land frontier expansion is a concept introduced to consider 
changes in factor endowments, and the expansion itself is represented by the land/labour ratio. 
“The land-labour ratio may decline in the long run as positive Malthusian forces 
associated with labour scarcity encourage early marriage, high fertility in marriage, and 
high child survival rates. Labour scarcity may also encourage across-border migration 
and thus an even greater and quicker decline in the land/labour ratio. Alternatively, high 
and rising wage-rental ratios may foster land settlement, a frontier experience that has 
received considerable theoretical and empirical attention in the literature.” (Williamson, 
2002:77). 
Probably, this “considerable theoretical and empirical attention” that Williamson mentions refers 
to the literature that we previously reviewed but we consider –as do other scholars– that the 
“frontier experience” is a concept that offers new insights into the issue. Various studies in this line 
of thought have included, where possible, both arable and pasture land so as to measure the process 
of the expansion of occupied land against labour.  
                                                 
51 Even Turner was never very precise in his statistical or demographic definitions of the frontier. At one time the 
concept meant quite literally the region which lay beyond a continuous line which might be drawn down the map of 
America from north to south. At other times it is represented by the same line but it is accepted that there are pockets of 
settlement beyond that fringe. And at other times the notion of a line is abandoned, and cultural, economic or social 
criteria are introduced (Winks, 1971).  
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Arroyo Abad (2008) takes this working line and introduces additional questions. She provides a 
brief analysis of land frontier expansion considering the institutional and political conditions that 
characterized the incorporation of new land into production. In general, she refers to the percentage 
of arable land transferred to private ownership when she considers land indicators. Empirically, her 
paper concentrates on simulation exercises, and to evaluate the impact of a fixed supply of land she 
assumes that no land expansion occurred after 1850. Therefore, land became progressively scarcer 
over the century, which made for unfavourable conditions for labour and a worsening in income 
distribution. Her evidence for Argentina and Uruguay is given in Figure 3.1.  
Figure 3.1 (a: Argentina; b: Uruguay) 
LABOUR/LAND RATIOS: ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY (1820-1900)
 
Source: extracted from Arroyo Abad (2008): v-vi. 
 
 
In both cases the evolution of the labour/land ratio goes up in the long run although with 
different trajectories. In Uruguay there was a rising trend, which would be consistent with a small 
territory and easy access to the different regions (Figure 3.1.b). In Argentina the trend was a 
decrease until the 1840s –according to this analysis, land frontier expansion only occurred up to the 
mid-19th century– and afterwards there were two periods with different intensity: from the 1840s to 
the 1870s the indicator shows moderate growth, and this accelerates until the end of the century (in 
the period of high immigration) (Figure 3.1.a). 
García-Jimeno & Robinson (2009) study the effects of the frontier on economic development but 
choose a different strategy. They estimate the proportion of land which was frontier (non-occupied 
territory) in each independent country in the Americas in 1850. In their empirical work they use 
historical data about income per capita, democracy and inequality. They classify land with less than 
2 people per square mile (0.7722 people per square kilometre) as frontier land (open frontier). They 
work with various historical atlases of the regions and use Georeferenced Information Systems 
(GIS) to measure the area occupied. The threshold of “2 people per square mile” was employed by 
the US Census Bureau and was the criterion used by the US office that declared the country had a 
 122
closed frontier in 1890. Therefore, the authors use the following index for the frontier: 
Fi 1850=1 - [OA i 1850 /TA i current]      (1) 
Where: 
OA i, 1850: is the occupied area (in some surface measure such as square kilometres or square 
miles) of country i in 1850 (or any year around that time). Land is considered occupied when the 
population density is greater than 2 people per square mile.  
TA i current: is the total area of country i, current data.  
Figure 3.2 
THE FRONTIER IN NORTH AMERICA AND SOUTH AMERICA CIRCA 1850 
 
Source: García-Jimeno & Robinson (2009): 28-29.  
The estimates are mapped on a continental scale (we reproduce the North and South America 
maps in Figure 3.2) and the results are 72.5 per cent for the US and 85.3 per cent for Canada. Three 
calculations are proposed for the South and Central American countries: a narrow criterion, a wide 
criterion and a third source. In the wide criterion, the estimate is 74.2 per cent for Argentina, 52.7 
per cent for Chile and 100 per cent for Uruguay. 
2.2 Some observations and shortcomings 
The two types of indicator are different proxies to the evolution of relative endowments. 
Williamson’s indicators emphasize the flow dimension of the process and García Jimeno-
Robinson’s approach concentrates on the stock dimension. The former type is more appropriate to 
dynamic analyses but hide differences in the relative factor levels. The latter type are more useful 
for comparing endowment levels but have the disadvantage of being a static approach, which 
undermines the analytical power of the argument. In the neoclassical vision, the expansion of the 
frontier is important when it comes to conceptualizing movements in factor endowments, but 
beyond these considerations it is of only secondary interest. García Jimeno-Robinson’s approach 
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focuses on the concept, and they propose a specific measurement using a new tool to study land 
frontier from a historical perspective. The connection between the expansion of the land frontier 
and settlement by colonizers is conceptually (and intuitively) correct and we follow the same 
strategy, but we have four observations to make about this. 
First, and independently on the specific question we are dealing with, the choice of a threshold is 
always arbitrary and can always be disputed. This objection is not against the value adopted (2 
persons per square mile) but against the rigidity that this involves. We might consider several 
different thresholds to present land frontier expansion “levels”, and thus to open subsequently the 
possibility of incorporating the creation of markets and the economies of agglomeration more 
actively into the analysis. Second, the focus on just one period means we lose the dynamics of the 
process. The expansion of the land frontier is a concept in which movement is a fundamental 
dimension. By comparing different points in time we will be able to consider different “shapes” of 
how occupied land expanded, and capture the possibility that non-frontier land might revert to being 
frontier again. Third, the use of today’s administrative divisions (national borders and internal 
boundaries) means not incorporating the formation of institutional arrangements at different times 
in history and therefore reduces the notion of “economic space” to “administrative space”. Finally, 
the strategy of taking all of a country’s national territory as a reference for “maximum frontier” is 
questionable.52 On the theoretical level we might assume that all the land in a country can be 
occupied and exploited, but on the historical level it is arguable that for institutional and technical 
reasons there were regions of the country that were not accessible. We discuss these arguments and 
present alternatives to suggest ways to circumvent these limitations.   
3. A proposal for approaching land frontier expansion  
The starting point is to know how many inhabitants were settled in an area, because we are 
interested in the incorporation of land into market production and the consequent growing 
participation of settlers in international markets. We assume that the presence of a relatively high 
level of population is the best proxy for land incorporated into economic activity. Another approach 
would be to consider the setting up of institutions that establish property rights and state control 
over these regions.53 In this Chapter our emphasis is on the first notion to stress the productive 
conditions of expansion of land for production. We focus on the institutional question in Chapter 5. 
3.1 How can we solve the shortcomings of the previous approach? 
Initially, we pay attention to three first shortcomings. First, it is possible to work with several 
levels of frontier expansion using different thresholds and accepting that the concentration of people 
                                                 
52 It is even controversial to argue about the idea of a “national” territory in the Latin American countries in 1850.  
53 However, this would mean assuming that the native people’s rights would not be valid.  
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can “shape” land frontier expansion. It is clear from demographic studies that expansion was not 
always a continuous outward movement from established nuclei. What is more, difficult land such 
as marshes, mountains, forests and deserts meant there were gaps and “population islands” were 
formed in the settlement process. We work with four levels; we start our analysis with the standard 
threshold of 0.7722 inhabitants per km2 (“medium”), then we divide this value by two (“lower”), 
double this value (“upper”), and finally we do not use any threshold and we consider only land 
“without” people as frontier.  Thus we propose as thresholds progressively more rigorous criteria to 
identify regions in transition. Second, we construct our indicator for 10-year periods between 1850 
and 1920 to overcome the static perspective of the previous approach. Third, primary sources of the 
data consider today’s local administrative divisions as a reference framework, but the use of 
different measures of population density makes it possible to “paint the map” (to identify different 
regions in the territory) independently on local jurisdictions. 
We illustrate our approach with a series of maps (Figure 3.3) showing the evolution of 
population counts in three large regions (Oceania, North America and the Southern Cone of South 
America) for six benchmark years (every 20 years from 1830 to 1930) and with ten ratings, from 0-
10 inhabitants to more than 25,000 per cell (Figure 3.3.a). Georeferenced information represents 
data referred to spatial localization of the values of variables in cells of 69.4 km2. 54  
The aim of this exercise is to identify periods in which the process of land frontier expansion was 
more intense and to capture the dynamic in different regions. In general, the evidence shows that the 
location of new economic activities and the movement and settlement of population was an intense 
process in the settler countries at the turn of the century, but it became exhausted before the 1930s 
and the evolution within the club was not homogenous.  
Figure 3.3: POPULATION COUNT  
Figure 3.3.a. References 
 
 
                                                 
54 See an explanation of the Georeferenced Information Systems and the application to our issue in Appendix to 
Chapter 3. 
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Figure 3.3.b.  Oceania: Australia and New Zealand 
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Figure 3.3.c.  North America: Canada and US 
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Figure 3.3.d.  Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.  
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Initially Australia’s population was located in coastal areas with rural settlements around the wet 
periphery of the continent, and this was the forerunner of the type of occupation that subsequently 
occurred in the semi-arid interior (a similar characterization can be found in Williams, 1975: 65-
66). The south-eastern (Victoria and Tasmania) and north-eastern (New South Wales and 
Queensland) regions were the first to be occupied and population density was increasing, and it was 
not until the end of the century that people began moving into the south-west of the country 
(Western Australia, around Perth). Historically South Australia and the Northern Territory have the 
characteristics of an open frontier and the advance of the settlers on territory was disperse and less 
intense. In New Zealand in the period 1840 to 1860, settlers firmly established themselves in a 
number of areas scattered across both islands. The main initial colonization took place in the areas 
of Auckland, Bay of Islands, Plymouth, Wanaque and Wellington in North Island, and Nelson, 
Christchurch and Dunedin in South Island (McKinnon, 1997). The area around Auckland, where 
the colony’s seat of the government was located, was the biggest centre of settlement, and most of 
the population was in North Island (75 per cent). The settlement of South Island, with its rugged 
terrain and extreme climate, was somewhat delayed (Figure 3.3.b). However, the form that 
expansion took changed quickly –particularly with the gold rushes of the 1850s-1860s–, and in 
1874 more than half the population (55 per cent)55 was in South Island.  
Canada was an immense territory and the early colonizers settled in the east. It was not until the 
last decade of the 19th century that the fertile central prairies were occupied, a process that was 
made possible by the coming of the transcontinental railways (Figure 3.3.c). 
In the Southern Cone of South America the expansion of the frontier around the River Plate 
followed more or less the same pattern in Uruguay, the Argentinean provinces of Buenos Aires 
(around the port), La Pampa and Córdoba (in the west-centre), Santa Fe and Entre Ríos (on the 
Littoral) and even in the south of Brazil (in the state of Rio Grande do Sul). In Chile the most 
intensive settlement was in the Núcleo Central. During the last two decades of the century, Chile 
progressively expanded to the north after the Guerra del Pacífico (1879-1883) and took over land 
with rich nitrate deposits. During the first decades of the 20th century, the settlement of the South 
was associated with agricultural expansion after the defeat of the Araucanian (Figure 3.3.d). 
Our mapping offers another interesting subject, the early development of large cities, because 
land frontier expansion was accompanied by a quick urbanization process. Clear examples of this 
are Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth in Australia, Auckland and Wellington in New 
Zealand, Ottawa and Quebec in Canada, Santiago in Chile, Buenos Aires, Rosario, Tucumán and La 
Plata in Argentina and Montevideo in Uruguay.  
                                                 
55 In 1858 the total population was 115,462 and in 1874 it was 344,984 (NZOYB, 1990). 
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3.1.1 Settlement and potential vegetation 
We can describe the movement of population into a territory, but how was the area effectively 
achievable? Bearing in mind the fourth limitation mentioned above, we do not take the total surface 
area of a country as a reference for the “maximum frontier” because this option is not consistent 
with the historical development of the settler economies in terms of production. Is all the territory 
suitable for the creation of the means to sustain the population (food, clothes)? Are colonizers 
willing to settle anywhere? Are all places safe enough? The answers to all these questions are no.  
Colonizers will initially settle in places suitable for human habitation. Early settlers in large parts 
of the planet (especially settler economies like North America in the 18th century and the South 
American Southern Cone and Australasia in the 19th century56) were quite restricted in their options 
as to where people could settle and develop agriculture. Geography (swamps, mountains, dense 
forests, and poor soils), climate (extreme temperatures, wetness) and hostile indigenous populations 
limited access to many regions. Besides this, large areas of the world could not be reached because 
infrastructure was lacking. The early spread of people (and agriculture) was considerably restricted. 
What exactly was the “wildness” that 18th and 19th century settlers had to face in our regions? 
Can we replicate those historical conditions to understand the settlers’ decisions and possibilities? 
Some concepts from environment and climate change literature can be useful to help us answer 
these questions. Data representative of the world’s “potential vegetation” are a proxy for the natural 
environment that people in settlement times had to confront. The world’s potential vegetation is the 
vegetation that would most likely exist now in the absence of human activities.57 It has been 
estimated in accordance with georeferenced information about today’s ecosystem frameworks, 
various other information sources, and some hard work on classification and analysis (Ramankutty 
and Foley, 1999). We are interested in identifying land able to “support” settlers and potentially 
able to produce goods for international commodity markets. In the case of the settler economies, a 
basic condition is to consider land that can be used to raise livestock. An alternative criterion would 
be to consider arable land or land suitable for crops (typically wheat, in our “club”), but this would 
be an excessively rigorous criterion.58 Settler economies had extensive areas where it was (almost) 
impossible to cultivate the land but where cattle or sheep could be reared successfully. Therefore we 
consider that the “maximum frontier” will include regions of the country that could be used to raise 
livestock, which in general means the territory’s allocation of grassland. Figure 3.4 shows the 
                                                 
56 South and North Africa had similar patterns. 
57 These data do not necessarily represent the real pre-agricultural vegetation because vegetation types have changed 
with changes in environmental conditions such as climate and CO2 concentrations (Ramankutty and Foley, 1999:1001) 
although they represent a good proxy.  
58 In general, the land conditions (fertility, roughness, temperature) to raise livestock are less strict than those to raise 
crops (especially cereals, one of the main products of the settler economies).  
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distribution of biome types according to the potential vegetation for our regions. Biomes are 
climatically and geographically defined regions with similar ecological climate conditions such as 
communities of plants, animals and soil organisms, and they are often referred to as ecosystems 
(University of California, Museum of Paleontology, 2009). Biome types are defined by plant 
structures (trees, shrubs, grasses), leaf types (broadleaf and needleleaf), plant spacing (forest, 
woodland, savanna) and climate (Figure 3.4.a). The biome types that can be classed as grassland are 
shown in Table 3.1. Klein Goldewijk & Van Drecht (2006) assign ordinal values and construct a 
ranking of grasslands including grassland and steppe, open shrubland, savanna, dense shrubland, 
tundra and several varieties of woodland.  
 
Figure 3.4 
POTENTIAL VEGETATION: BIOME TYPES 
Figure 3.4.a. References 
 
Figure 3.4.b. Oceania: Australia and New Zealand 
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Figure 3.4.c.  North America: Canada and the US 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4.d.  Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile and Uruguay
 
 
 
 Source: CSGE-Atlas of the Biosphere. 
It is clear that settlers faced different “wildness” depending on each country and the land in that 
country that was occupied. Starting with Oceania (Figure 3.4.b), in Australia shrubland and savanna 
predominated and only a very small part of the total was grassland/steppe. In New Zealand, on the 
other hand, grassland/steppe was the main vegetation biome (although with big differences between 
the two islands). In Canada (Figure 3.4.c) there was grassland and open shrubland on the prairies 
but there were large swathes of tundra and boreal forest between this central region and the Atlantic 
and Pacific coasts. Finally, in the Southern Cone (Figure 3.4.d), grassland predominated in 
 134
Argentina and Uruguay, and the wide range of variation in Chile from hot desert in the north to 
polar desert in the south is obviously represented by the succession of colours. 
Therefore, following García Jimeno-Robinson’s methodology, we can calculate the index: 
Fi t=1 - [OA i t /PVGi ]       (2) 
Where: 
OA i t: is the occupied area (in km2) of country i in period t, with t=1850, 1860, …and 1920. 
PVG i: is the “potential vegetation grassland” area (in km2) of country i which represents that 
part of the national territory suitable to graze livestock.   
3.1.2 Frontier expansion and agricultural aptitude 
Soils are not homogenous throughout a territory, climate changes and terrain slopes differ 
significantly, and this imposes 
a specific set of constraints and 
creates different conditions for 
the development of agricultural 
activities. The ranking shown 
in Table 3.1 enables us to 
distinguish three land types as 
“high”, “medium” and “low” 
aptitude (HA, MA, and LA) for 
grassland. We group categories 
6 and 5 together, 4 and 3 
together and 2 and 1 together 
(the sum represents our PVG). Based on this we can construct two sets of indicators. 
First, the following indicators show the “extensive” character of land frontier expansion 
considering the shares of each type of land occupied in the total grassland area. 
OAHA i t /PVGi      (3) 
OAMA i t /PVGi      (4) 
OALA i t /PVGi      (5) 
Second, the following indicators show the “intensive” character of the process considering the 
shares of each land type occupied in each land aptitude category. IHA, IMA and ILA represent the 
intensity in the use of land of high, medium and low intensity in each period t. 
OAHA i t /PVGHAi=IHA i t      (6) 
R ank
G rassland / steppe 6
O pen shrubland 5
S avannah 4
Dense shrubland 3
T undra 2
E vergreen / deciduous mixed forest / woodland 1
T emperate broadleaved evergreen forest / woodland 1
T emperate deciduous forest / woodland 1
T emperate needle leaf evergreen forest / woodland 1
T ropical deciduous forest / woodland 1
P olar desert / rock / ice 0
B oreal deciduous forest / woodland 0
B oreal evergreen forest / woodland 0
T ropical evergreen forest / woodland 0
Hot desert 0
Source: Klein Goldewijk & Van Drecht (2006):105.
T able 3.1
B IO ME  T Y P E S  AND T HE  AL L O C AT ION OF  G R AS S L AND
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OAMA i t /PVGMAi=IMA i t      (7) 
OALA i t /PVGLAi =ILA i t      (8) 
Besides, considering that: 
OA i t /PVG i = OAHA i t /PVGi + OAMA i t /PVGi + OALA i t /PVGi 
= OAHA i t /PVGi * PVG
HA
i / PVG
HA
i + OA
MA
 i t /PVGi * PVG
MA
i / PVG
MA
i + OA
LA
 i t /PVGi *  PVG
LA
i /PVG
LA
i 
= PVGHAi / PVGi  * IHA i t +  PVGMAi / PVGi  * IMA i t + PVGLAi /PVGi * ILA i t = 
= β1. IHA.+ β2. IHA.+ β3. ILA       (9) 
Where βi are fixed, known and represent the share of each type of land on the total PVG, and IHA, 
IMA and ILA change along the time and tend to 1 in the long run. Therefore, evaluating the evolution 
of the intensity in the use of land we can identify patterns of land frontier expansion.  
Suppose that land frontier expansion followed the “Ricardian Model”, in which the more fertile 
land is cultivated first and then, when population and the need to raise food production come into 
play, the less fertile land came into production. The evolution of our indicators would follow a 
pattern similar to that shown in Figure 3.5. The indicators show the different phases of expansion 
depending on the fertility and 
amount of land used for the 
agricultural production. We hope 
that each economy presents a 
specific path depending on its 
particular circumstances –historical, 
institutional and geographical– and 
that each has different outcomes in 
terms of economic growth and 
income distribution. 
The determination of PVG is an 
adequate criterion when land is used 
to produce consumption goods. Was 
this always the case? Sometimes the decision to move from a location to an uninhabited place was 
related to economic activities other than biological production. A typical example of this would be 
mining.59 This is an important question because Australia and Chile, and to certain extent Canada 
and New Zealand, developed mining considerably in the period, and population movement –and the 
                                                 
59 The economic history of many countries includes “gold rushes”, and the 19th century was a prolific period for stories 
of this kind. 
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frontier– could be related to factors other than those associated with the PVG. Therefore we should 
include frontier land that is unsuitable for grazing but can be mined. Strictly speaking, these 
considerations deserve specific research with a different approach. Instead of working with settler 
economies as the central category –which gives a bias towards the study of agricultural activities– 
we would need an approach that captures the development of mineral extraction in these areas. On 
this point, Denoon (1983) argue that Chile is a limit case of settler economies,60 and we make 
changes in our conceptualization to capture this special case.  
In Chile the First Globalization coincided with the expansion of nitrate production as a 
consequence of the acquisition of large regions with rich mineral deposits after the Pacific War 
(Guerra del Pacífico, 1879-1883).  Antofagasta (a province of Bolivia) and Tarapacá (a province of 
Peru) were annexed to Chile at the beginning of the 1880s, and mineral production became the main 
determinant of economic growth in the country until the Great Depression of the 1930s (Cariola & 
Sunkel, 1982). According to our distribution of biome types, both provinces are desert regions and 
would not be considered as potentially colonisable land. We include both provinces as part of 
Chile’s “PVG” to calculate our indicators, and since the nitrate deposits were very rich, we consider 
them as “high aptitude” land. The decision is not fanciful because Chile showed a high 
specialization in agricultural production from the mid-19th century to the 1880s and a production 
profile perfectly comparable with the rest of the “club”. The point is less important for the other 
members of the “club” because the agrarian specialization was clearly dominant during the period 
3.1.3 Frontier expansion and distance 
Is it enough to know agricultural aptitude to be able to categorise occupied land? In settler 
economies land quality depended not only on agricultural aptitude but also on the distance from the 
production regions to the markets and the ports. The effective exploitation of natural wealth 
depended on participation in international commodity markets. Therefore our indicator must 
consider that excellent soils that are very far away are in fact bad soils in productive and economic 
terms, or alternatively that distant land –with similar agricultural aptitude– is low-value land, in a 
comparative sense. How can we introduce this idea of distance?  
In the recent literature several concepts that emerged from economic geography are applied to 
economic history analysis (Crafts, 2005; Martínez-Galarraga, 2009; Rosés, 2003; Schulze, 2007; 
Tirado, et al., 2006). In particular, the concept of “market potential” incorporates distance as a main 
factor and therefore may be useful for our purpose. The Harris market potential equation (Harris, 
1954) can be defined as:  
                                                 
60 Denoon (1983) argues the same idea about South Africa.  
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Where Mj is a measure of the size of region j (state, province or other division), usually GDP, 
and dij is the distance, usually represented as the bilateral transport costs between i and j.  
We can estimate an indicator of “land quality” in accordance with agriculture aptitude “adjusted” 
by the distance to specific places that were in some sense “centres of gravity” because of their 
economic, political or historical condition. We consider geographical points that spread population 
in different directions as centres of gravity. When did interior distance become important? During 
the first decades of the settlement, distance did not matter. Expansion into the territory was 
undertaken by people looking for adventure and wealth, but it did not respond significantly to 
productive objectives. Although each economy had its own characteristics we can choose 1850 as 
the time when land frontier extension was considered from an economic perspective and distances 
became an important matter. We illustrate our issue with the diagrams in Figure 3.6.  
Georeferenced information presents data in terms of grid cells, and our database represents the 
distribution of population with a global 5x5 minute resolution. Therefore we have grid cells that are 
approximately 8.3 km in length, 11.8 km in diagonal and have a surface area of 69.4 km2. We can 
assume that Figure 3.6.a represents the situation for a country in 1850. The occupied surface area 
contains 89 cells, which gives a total area of 6,177 km2 (CG is the centre of gravity).  In 1910, the 
total occupied surface is represented by 140 cells which means an increase of 3,539 km2 (the 
difference between 9,716 km2 and 6,177 km2). Land frontier expansion was the result of successive 
extensions, and these are represented by areas of different colours. However, from an economics 
perspective, incorporating the first 89 cells was not the same as incorporating the following 51 cells. 
In accordance with our analytical framework (see Chapter 2) the cost of clearing land is an 
increasing function on the quantity of land incorporated into production.61 We can apply this idea 
here and consider that each cell incorporated into production has a different area that depends on its 
distance from the centre of gravity. As a result, 69.4 km2 would be an “average” of the closer cells 
(that have low values) and the distant cells (that have high values). Therefore we need a coefficient 
that “penalizes” the former group of cells and “rewards” the latter, and we use a measure of distance 
between each cell and the centre of gravity. We multiply 69.4 by a potential function of the distance 
(of each cell) s1 and then we re-scale the total surface of each type of land to maintain the true cell 
average (69.4 km2) (note that we have as values of distance as number of cells). Potential function 
allows us to apply a higher value to the distant cells (the land that is more expensive to incorporate) 
                                                 
61 KA=φ(Ν) . With φ’(N)>0 and φ’’(N)>0. φ’(N) is the cost of “clearing” a unit of land. φ (Ν)  is a convex function of 
the amount of land cleared. 
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than closer ones, and at the same time we can test our theoretical assumption with the numerical 
exercises proposed in Chapter 2. It is important to re-scale the series so we keep the total surface of 
endowments (in terms of agricultural aptitude and quality) and hence we can make comparisons.  
CG CG
A
Figure 3.6: MEASURING DISTANCE
Figure 3.6.a: 1850 Figure 3.6.b: 1910
Distance
 
How can we make our definitions operative? Distance is an important factor in the large 
economies of the group –Argentina, Australia and Canada– but less so in the small economies  
–Chile, New Zealand and Uruguay. However, even in the latter, certain geographical conditions 
would make it necessary to consider distance. Settler economies based their expansion on external 
conditions associated with the First Globalization, so ports are natural candidates to be considered 
“centres of gravity” or an expansion axis. However, in some cases we need to take into account 
other possibilities. Initially, we choose some important ports as fixed reference points for measuring 
distances. We assume that the producers decide to direct their products to the closest port in the 
province, state or large region. It is impossible to know the real destination of the production but we 
consider that our assumption is reasonable. In cases in which there is another type of “centre of 
gravity”, we can argue about the feasibility of our assumption. We discuss this question for all the 
economies in our club but we only present empirical evidence for Argentina (in sub-section 4.3). 
We choose this country to illustrate the analytical effects of incorporating distance for two reasons. 
First, Argentina is a large economy and distance was important in its economic history, and second, 
Argentina had the most intensive land frontier expansion during the period. In the next stages of our 
research we will extend the analysis to other settler economies and we will improve the results by 
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including real distance instead of air distance (to consider geographical accidents, infrastructure and 
transport costs).   
The 1910 Official Yearbook of 
Australia includes a description of 
the main ports of the 
Commonwealth classified by 
states and ranked by importance 
in the region (including data like 
width of entrance, depth, 
facilities, security and cargo 
capacity). We choose one port per 
state as a reference. In New South 
Wales we consider Port Jackson, 
which is the harbour of Sydney 
city. In Victoria, we consider Port 
Phillip in the Hobson’s Bay at the mouth of Yarra River, which is the harbour of Melbourne city. In 
Queensland, the most important port is Brisbane, which is at the mouth of the Brisbane River close 
to Moreton Bay. In South Australia, we consider Port Adelaide in the city with the same name. In 
Western Australia, since the beginning of the 20th century the most important port has been 
Fremantle, at the mouth of Swan River and 19 km southwest of Perth. North Australia only had one 
main harbour, Port Darwin, in the city with the same name. Finally, Tasmania had several ports and 
the most important was Hobart, at the mouth of Derwent River. Figure 3.7 shows the locations of 
the ports we could use as reference points to calculate distances.62 
In Argentina (see Figure 3.8) the most important port was Buenos Aires, while the other 
harbours in the Republic were fundamentally specialized in coasting ship. The national census of 
1914 reported that 56 per cent of all cargo went to Buenos Aires (including sailing and steam ships) 
and that almost 180 of the 610 vessels were large ships (deep draught). We use Buenos Aires as one 
of our reference markers for distance. However, we also need to consider a second reference 
because land expansion in Argentina developed along two axes. The coastal (litoral) and Pampas 
(pampeana) regions developed from the beginning of 19th century with a strong foreign stimulus 
and Buenos Aires was their port. But there was also the inland Andean (andino) region, which had 
its roots deep in the colonial past of Spanish South America, which had always been centred on Alto 
                                                 
62 Coghlan (1904):222-223 notices that some figures –such as statistics from Melbourne– are inflated because the great 
ocean steamers were counted twice (entering the port and leaving). However, this limitation is not important for our 
purposes because the adjustment does not change the ranking within each state.   
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Perú (Bolivia) and the rich zone of Potosí, and this area influenced the north of Argentina (Cao & 
Rubins, 1996). Tucumán city was one of the most important economic and political centres. It had 
strong demographic development and was located in a region 
with a productive structure based on plantations (sugar), which 
contrasted with the pastoral activity of the south and east of the 
country. We take it as our second reference point for distances. 
We had defined five regions in Argentina (Willebald, 2009) and 
we propose the same regional classification here: the North-
West (Jujuy, Salta, La Rioja, Tucumán, Catamarca and Santiago 
del Estero); the North-East (Formosa, Chaco, Misiones and 
Corrientes); Cuyo (San Juan, San Luis and Mendoza); La 
Pampa (Córdoba, Santa Fé, Buenos Aires, the Federal Capital, 
La Pampa and Entre Ríos); and Patagonia (Neuquén, Río Negro, 
Chubut, Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego). Buenos Aires is the 
“centre of gravity” for La Pampa and Patagonia, and Tucumán 
is our reference point for distances in the North West, North 
East and Cuyo. 
Canada is a very large country with Atlantic and Pacific coasts and initially it would be suitable 
to consider both these “exit doors” to international markets (Figure 3.9). In 1913-1914, the four 
most important ports in the 
country in terms of cargo 
shifted were Halifax and 
Montreal on the east coast (in 
Nova Scotia and Quebec 
provinces, respectively) and 
Vancouver and Victoria on 
the west coast (both in British 
Columbia). Both ports in the 
east handled approximately 
the same amounts of cargo in 
tonnage63 but average cargo 
per vessel was significantly 
greater in Montreal, so we 
                                                 
63 Annual averages 1913-1914: Halifax 3.5 million tons, Montreal 3.9 million tons.  
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take this as our eastern reference point. In the west, there are only minor differences between 
Vancouver and Victoria and they are located very near each other (Statistics Canada, 1914:474, and 
1915:501-502). However, an examination of the dynamics of settlement raised doubts about the 
importance of these two ports as “centres of gravity”. The demographic development of the middle 
areas of the country was more related to expansion from the east than from the west, so we need an 
alternative distance reference point (see Figure 3.3.c). Winnipeg, the capital of Manitoba, is near the 
longitudinal centre of North America, in south central Canada, close to the eastern border of the 
Canadian Prairies, at the confluence of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers. Historically, this area 
played an important regional role as a fur trading post (18th century) and as an important post for the 
Hudson’s Bay Company (during the first half of the 19th century), and it enjoyed rapid progress 
after the coming of the Canadian Pacific Railway in 1881. Like for Argentina, in a previous paper 
(Willebald, 2009) we identified a classification of regions in Canada that facilitated the analysis. 
These regions are as follows: Atlantic Canada (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward 
Island, Newfoundland and Labrador); Quebec; Ontario; the West (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and 
Alberta); British Columbia and the North (Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut). We 
consider the three first regions as the “East”, where Montreal constitutes the “centre of gravity” and  
the three last as the “West”, with Winnipeg as the distance reference point.  
When we come to the small economies in our “club” it may be 
interesting to consider some geographical conditions. 
Chile is 4,270 km long and an average of 175 km wide, and it has a 
particular shape that gives it almost all kinds of climates and very varied 
topography (Hurtado, 1966). We can consider three ports as distance 
reference points, corresponding to the North, South and Central regions (see 
Figure 3.10). In Willebald (2009), we propose the following regional 
classification: the North: Tarapacá, Antofagasta, Atacama, Coquimbo and 
Arica y Parinacota; the Núcleo Central: Valparaíso, Santiago (Metropolitan 
Region), Libertador General Bernardo O'Higgins, Maule, Northern Biobío 
(Ñuble); and the South: Southern Biobío (Arauco, Bío Bío, Concepción), 
Araucanía, Los Ríos, Los Lagos, Aisén del General Carlos Ibáñez del 
Campo and Magallanes and Chilean Antarctica. In the North the main port 
was Iquique, in Tarapacá, followed by Tocopilla and Antofagasta in Antofagasta province. In 1910, 
the former exported a volume of nitrates that exceeded the total for both the other ports together 
(Cariola  & Sunkel, 1982: 133).64 In the South, the most important port –especially for the trade in 
                                                 
64 About the ports of the northern region see Badía-Miró (2008).  
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cereals such as wheat– was Talcahuano, which at the end of 19th century and the first decades of 
20th century exceeded the movement of other ports such as Constitución or Tomé. Finally, the main 
port in the Núcleo Central, the region with the highest population concentration and with a long 
history of agricultural development, was Valparaiso, which dates from the colonial times. Therefore 
we could use three ports as distance reference points: Iquique, 
Talcahuano and Valparaiso.  
New Zealand is made up of two main islands. At the beginning 
of 20th century, the two ports with the greatest total tonnage entered 
and cleared were Auckland in North Island (followed closely by 
Wellington) and Bluff Harbour in the South Island (Coghlan, 
1904:223). (See Figure 3.11). 
However, in South Island there is 
another interesting geographical 
case for our exercise: 
Christchurch. The urban 
development of this city would 
have justified choosing it as our distance reference point. This 
will be tackled in a later stage of our research. 
Finally, in Uruguay, since colonial times Montevideo has been 
the main port and the economy’s international “exit door” (see 
Figure 3.12).  
3.2 Data  
Recent literature about the negative effects of economic growth on environment and global 
climatic change includes historical approximations to the evolution and geographical location of 
people, consumption and production on a world scale that is very useful for our purpose. The 
“Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)” includes two programmes: the History 
Database of the Global Environment (HYDE 3.1) and the Integrated Modelling of Global 
Environmental Change (IMAGE). Information about population is available on the website.65 Data 
corresponding to biome types is from the Atlas of the Biosphere, a product of the Center for 
Sustainability and the Global Environment (SAGE), part of the Nelson Institute for Environmental 
Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.66 We work with Georeferenced Information 
Systems (GIS) and the data are presented in terms of grid cells that represent the distribution of 
                                                 
65 http://www.pbl.nl/en/themasites/hyde/index.html 
66 http://www.sage.wisc.edu/atlas/ 
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population with a global 5x5 minute resolution and 15 biome types (like those presented in Table 
3.1). In the Appendix to Chapter 3 we give a critical discussion of the data and propose some 
adjustments to overcome their main limitations.  
Current land areas by administrative units are from GeoHive Populations Statiscs 
(http://www.geohive.com/). 
4. Land frontier expansion in terms of “quality”: our results 
We propose several measures of land frontier expansion from the mid-19th century to 1920. 
Initially we present the simpler approach to this question following the García Jimeno-Robinson 
method, although we introduce some changes because we consider different times and inhabitant 
benchmarks in the indicators to improve the analysis (subsection 4.1; they are absent aspects in that 
approach). Then we review the series in accordance with our proposal. First, we consider land 
aptitude in term of its suitability to support grassland vegetation (low, medium and high aptitude) 
(subsection 4.2). Second, we illustrate the application of distance in our measures in the case of one 
of the large economies of the club: Argentina (subsection 4.3).  
4.1 In accordance with the country’s current surface area 
Following an equation similar to (1), we calculate the ratio between the area of occupied land 
and the area of the country’s current territory, and this result is subtracted from the value one, for 
each decade from 1850 to 1920.  We consider two modalities of occupied areas: (i) a benchmark of 
0.7722 inhabitant/km2 like García Jimeno-Robinson; (ii) without considering any benchmark; that 
is, territory is considered occupied regardless of the number of people there. Table 3.2 shows the 
indicators for all the settler economies. 
The indexes fall systematically, which indicates the open frontier was decreasing (or the 
occupied area was expanding). The results show clearly the differences between the large and the 
small economies. Argentina, Australia and Canada began the period with large parts of their 
territory as open frontier and show a gradual population advance into these areas up to WWI. In 
general our numbers are consistent with García Jimeno-Robinson’s records. Their calculations 
(with the wide criterion that they define and our equivalent definition) are 74.2% for Argentina, 
52.7% for Chile and 85.3% for Canada (around 1850). In the case of Uruguay the difference is 
greater because García Jimeno-Robinson propose a ratio of 100%, which means that Uruguay 
would have had a completely open frontier in the mid-19th century, a result that contradicts the 
historical evidence. However, it is important to take into account that these similar results emerge 
when we do not consider any benchmark (the lower part of Table 3.2), while García Jimeno-
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Robinson’s numbers have a benchmark of 0.7722 inhabitants per km2. With this more rigorous 
benchmark the results differ more significantly. We are not able to replicate their estimates but, 
evidently, we work with different databases. In the Figures 3.13 and 3.14, we show the evolution of 
the indicators without benchmarks, to be consistent with the comparison and show a whole 
illustration of the advance of the population across the territory regardless of the settlement density.  
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
Argentina 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.81 0.78
Australia 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Canada 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.92
Chile 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.71
New Zealand 0.95 0.93 0.85 0.76 0.73 0.69 0.66 0.62
Uruguay 0.91 0.87 0.81 0.76 0.66 0.58 0.54 0.49
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
Argentina 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.73 0.71 0.68 0.63 0.59
Australia 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
Canada 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.82
Chile 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.54
New Zealand 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.37
Uruguay 0.72 0.56 0.46 0.38 0.28 0.22 0.20 0.18
Source: own elaboration from Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, HYDE 3.1 and IMAGE Programmes, http://www.geohive.com/
Table 3.2
LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with the current national territories and a benchamark of 0.77 inhab/km2
In accordance with the current national territories and without benchamark
 
Figure 3.13
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Figure 3.14
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First, as regards the large economies (Figure 3.13), the indicators for Australia and Canada fall 
slightly during the period while the index for Argentina shows a steady decline. Second, the small 
economies began with relatively low indexes, these fell rapidly towards the end of the period, but 
the rate of the processes was different in different places (Figure 3.14). In the mid-19th century, 
Uruguay had the more extensive open frontier, although its territory was occupied quicker than in 
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New Zealand and Chile. In 1850, almost the 60 per cent of Chile’s current territory was frontier, 
and the indicator for this country declined more slowly than those for the other small economies.67 
4.2 In accordance with grassland: our proposal 
The literature on the economic development of the settler economies has traditionally discussed 
the timing of frontier expansion, and the comparison between these regions has attracted many 
scholars (see Chapter 1). What do our indicators tell us about this question? As a first dimension, 
our estimates consider four levels of density settlement: one without a benchmark (like in the 
second part of Table 3.2), a medium level of 0.7722 inhabitants per km2, an upper level of 1.545 per 
km2 and finally a lower level of 0.3863 per km2. We compare the results considering, firstly, all the 
current territory (like García Jimeno-Robinson) and, then, the land suitable to allocate grassland as a 
second dimension. 68 
Considering the first dimension, the evolutions are similar in all the cases, but the indicators 
present differences in levels depending on the strictness of the benchmark. Higher benchmarks are 
associated with higher indicators that show larger open frontiers. The introduction of the second 
dimension does not significantly alter the results. In general, the indicators follow the same trend 
with lower levels, which denote quicker advances on the open frontier. Our countries are abundant-
land economies and the differences in terms of surface area between total territory and grassland are 
not huge.69 The pattern of settlement in grassland was similar to the rest of the territory in terms of 
dynamics, but the intensity was greater.70 
Figures 3.15 and 3.16 show the indicators for Argentina. Levels differ but trajectories are 
similar. The evolution in Argentina contrasts with that in Australia (Figures 3.17 and 3.18), where 
the trend to decrease was slight and there are backward movements. In Australia the decrease is 
similar among the indicators but this is not so for Argentina, where the changes differ significantly. 
In Australia, the decrease from 1850 to 1920 in the “lower”, “medium” and “upper” indicators are 
0.6, 0.7 and 0.7 per cent, respectively, and in Argentina they were 24.3, 18.4 and 11.5 per cent, 
respectively (we refer to grassland indicators). As the results change when we use different 
benchmarks we may think that land frontier expansion in Argentina was a process of gradual 
dispersion of the population (because less strict indicators “incorporate” occupied land more 
quickly), but this was (almost) absent in the case of Australia. 
                                                 
67 Chile’s national boundaries changed significantly during the period. The interpretation of the index is limited. 
68 “Bm” signifies “benchmark”. 
69 Grassland in total territory is as follows: Australia (98%), Argentina (81%), Canada (66%), Chile (77%; with the 
adjustment proposed in sub-section 3.1.2), New Zealand (88%) and Uruguay (100%). 
70 By their construction, our indicators leave people out the calculation. People that settled in territories non-suitable to 
allocate as grassland are excluded. In the average of the period, the proportions of population excluded are the 
following: Argentina (14%), Australia (15%), Canada (11%), Chile (6%), New Zealand (12%) and Uruguay (0%). 
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Figure 3.15
ARGENTINA: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with total current territory
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Figure 3.16
ARGENTINA: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with grassland
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Figure 3.17
AUSTRALIA: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with total current territory
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Figure 3.18
AUSTRALIA: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with grassland
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Canada (Figure 3.19 and 3.20) shows evolutions similar to Australia until the last decade of the 
19th century. However, after the price boom of the 1890s the frontier expanded significantly with a 
decreasing movement between 1890 and 1920 (around 4 per cent), although the process was less 
intense than in Argentina. 
Figure 3.19
CANADA: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with total current territory
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Figure 3.20
CANADA: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with grassland
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Chile (Graphs 3.21 and 3.22) showed an intense process of frontier expansion up to 1890, 
consistent with the extension of the territory to the north. Afterwards, the process followed a 
moderated decreasing trend that seemed exhausted by the 1910s. 
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Figure 3.21
CHILE: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with total current territory
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Figure 3.22
CHILE: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with grassland
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Finally, considering that New Zealand (Figures 3.23 and 3.24) and Uruguay (Figures 3.25 and 
3.26) are similar economies in terms of population, demographic dynamics and size (see Álvarez, 
2008), we could suppose similar evolutions. The movements of the corresponding land frontier 
expansion indicators would confirm our expectations for the long run.       
Figure 3.23
NEW ZEALAND: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with total current territory
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Figure 3.24
NEW ZEALAND: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with grassland
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
Source: own elaboration from Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, HYDE 3.1 and IMAGE Programmes. 
Bm_0 Bm_0.39
Bm_0.77 Bm_1.54
 
Figure 3.25
URUGUAY: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with total current territory
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Figure 3.26
URUGUAY: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS
In accordance with grassland
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Both economies began the 19th century with their territory practically uninhabited and a frontier 
almost 100 per cent. The rate of the processes was similar, they advanced without ruptures, but in 
New Zealand this slowed down in the end of the century (with the exception of the Bm_0). An 
interesting point is that the indicator without a benchmark for New Zealand at the beginning of the 
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period is very different to the other indexes. This is evidence of a more dispersed population across 
the territory, which was probably a consequence of the fact that New Zealand had many access 
points from the sea, which facilitated the settlement in both islands. 
Considering the limitations of the previous analyses (see sub-section 2.2), we contrast different 
land frontier expansion indicators that take as a reference the aptitude of the land suitable for 
agricultural activity (in terms of grassland). First, we propose exercises with our “extensive 
indicators”. They measure the proportion of each type of land “incorporated” into the economy  
–high, medium and low aptitude– on total grassland (we consider the medium benchmark, 0.7722 
inhabitants/km2; equations (3), (4) and (5)), discounted from the unity. A decreasing trend 
represents the expansion of the frontier or alternatively a decline in the amount of open frontier (the 
decrease in natural wealth in relative terms). 
Argentina moved its frontier across medium and high land aptitude (Figure 3.27). This evolution 
contrasts with Australia (Figure 3.28) –where land of medium attitude was occupied but without an 
intense advance on the frontier– and Canada (Figure 3.29) –where at the turn of the century the 
expansion advanced on the three types of land. 
 
Figure 3.27
ARGENTINA: EXTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
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Figure 3.28
AUSTRALIA: EXTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
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Figure 3.29
CANADA: EXTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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Figure 3.30
CHILE: EXTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
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Source: own elaboration from Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, HYDE 3.1 and IMAGE Programmes. 
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In the case of the small economies, we have different rates and dissimilar changes in the 
structures. The expansion of the frontier in Chile in the period 1860-1890 included a first stage of 
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movement onto low aptitude land (1850-1880) and a second stage to high aptitude land (1880-
1890) (Figure 3.30). New Zealand (Figure 3.31) showed –in a similar way to Canada, but with 
higher intensity– an evolution through the three types of land although the biggest movement was 
onto high aptitude land. This contrasts with Uruguay, where frontier expansion occurred 
fundamentally onto high aptitude land (Figure 3.32).  
Figure 3.31
NEW ZEALAND: EXTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
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Figure 3.32
URUGUAY: EXTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
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Consideration of our “intensive indicators” of occupied land offers additional insights into the 
question. They measure the proportion of each type of land “incorporated” into the economy –high, 
medium and low aptitude– of each respective land aptitude endowment. We represent the pattern of 
the expansion as in the case of Figure 3.5 with the assumed Ricardian Model, where each indicator 
trends to 1 in the long run and we apply equations (6), (7) and (8). Argentina (Figure 3.33) and 
Uruguay (Figure 3.38) advanced on their high and medium aptitude land. This pattern coincided 
with the evolution in New Zealand except that a significant amount of low aptitude land was also 
occupied (Figure 3.37). Australia (Figure 3.34) mainly occupied low aptitude land. This was also 
the pattern in Canada (Figure 3.35) until the 1880s, when the country reacted to the price boom and 
expanded its frontier with a pattern similar to that of Argentina. At the beginning of the period, 
Chile (Figure 3.36) had almost completely occupied the medium aptitude land and afterwards it 
advanced into low (first stage) and high aptitude land (from the 1880s). 
Figure 3.33
ARGENTINA: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Occupied land -- Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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Source: own elaboration from Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, HYDE 3.1 and IMAGE Programmes. 
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Figure 3.34
AUSTRALIA: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Occupied land -- Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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Figure 3.35
CANADA: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Occupied land -- Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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Source: own elaboration from Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, HYDE 3.1 and IMAGE Programmes. 
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Figure 3.36
CHILE: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Occupied land --  Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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Figure 3.37
NEW ZEALAND: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Occupied land --  Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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Figure 3.38
URUGUAY: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Occupied land --  Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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The last important subject is to characterize the dynamics of the process. For this we use the 
“intensive indicators” of the previous analysis but to explain land frontier expansion instead of 
occupation of land. In other words, we measure the proportion of each type of land “incorporated” 
into the economy –high, medium and low aptitude– on each respective endowment, discounted 
from the unity. Therefore decreasing trajectories mean expansion of the frontier (a decrease of the 
“open” frontier). With scarce data it is not possible to use sophisticated techniques to find 
breakpoints so we calculate and compare growth rates by grassland and the different land aptitudes.  
A shortcoming of our previous analysis is that the evolution of the indicators depends critically 
on the magnitude of the endowments. Clearly, it is more likely to run out a type of land when it is 
scarce in the economy. In Figure 3.39 we present our classification of grassland into land types for 
each country in the “club”. We use these shares to weight the different variations and calculate the 
contribution of each type of land to total expansion (the way the indicators are constructed means 
negative variations indicate land frontier expansion). The share of each contribution to total 
variation is given in Table 3.3 (in percentages). 
Argentina had a clear pattern of land frontier expansion (Figure 3.40) that accelerated during the 
period and was encouraged by high aptitude land (Figure 3.41). Over the whole period this land 
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contributed with the 56 per cent of the total variation (Table 3.3). Initially we could expect that the 
process was similar to that in Canada (Figure 3.44), but there are important differences. 
Canada had periods of reversion of the process, which can be explained by low aptitude land 
(Figure 3.45), and the acceleration was just apparent from the beginning of the 20th century. In this 
last extension of the frontier, the contribution of low aptitude land exceeded the 25 per cent of the 
total variation and the leader was the medium quality land (Table 3.3). The third large economy in 
the “club” showed a completely different pattern. 
        Source: own elaboration from CSGE-Atlas of the Biosphere.
Figure 3.39
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In percentage by type of land suitable to allocate grassland
Argentina
66%
30%
5%
Australia
40%
56%
4%
Canada
5% 3%
92%
Chile
47%
12%
40%
New Zealand
58%
18%
24%
Uruguay
98%
2% 0%
 
Figure 3.40
ARGENTINA: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Variations / Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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Figure 3.41
ARGENTINA: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
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1850s 1860s 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 1910s
Argentina
High 59.2% 50.8% 57.3% 55.6% 55.0% 55.9% 58.4%
Medium 40.3% 49.3% 42.9% 44.4% 45.4% 44.5% 41.4%
Low 0.8% 0.5% 0.2% 0.8% 0.5% 0.8% 1.3%
Australia
High 7.1% 3.4% -229.7% 28.2% -13.9% 23.5% 2.5%
Medium 56.6% 86.3% 343.6% 54.4% 47.2% 135.3% 74.1%
Low 36.6% 10.3% -14.2% 17.5% 66.7% -58.8% 23.4%
Canada
High 25.0% -3.1% -181.4% 63.3% -234.1% 35.8% 36.5%
Medium 67.9% -5.7% -490.6% 128.1% -394.8% 38.1% 37.7%
Low 7.1% 108.9% 772.8% -91.5% 730.0% 26.6% 26.2%
Chile
High 32.2% -18.3% -6.5% 84.3% 111.1% 84.6% 69.7%
Medium 0.8% 8.3% 16.3% 8.4% -22.2% 38.5% 4.1%
Low 69.1% 109.9% 90.5% 7.7% 11.1% -23.1% 25.9%
New Zealand
High 65.6% 64.8% 70.5% 59.2% 69.0% 62.3% 58.1%
Medium 18.9% 17.9% 21.1% 26.1% 23.3% 23.5% 29.5%
Low 16.0% 19.7% 10.9% 16.1% 9.0% 15.3% 13.9%
Uruguay
High 99.1% 105.1% 98.5% 97.0% 95.8% 95.6% 98.6%
Medium 1.0% -5.5% 1.6% 3.4% 4.8% 4.7% 1.5%
Low 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Source: own elaboration from Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, HYDE 3.1 and IMAGE Programmes. 
Table 3.3
INTENSIVE LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION INDICATORS: CONTRIBUTIONS ON TOTAL VARIATION
In percentage / By land quality
 
The expansion of the frontier in Australia occurred earlier than in the other large countries 
(Figure 3.42) and it became less intense in the last decade of the 19th century. The expansion 
movement recovered in the 1910s (Figure 3.43). Throughout the period the main component was 
medium aptitude land, which apart from in the 1890s, made a higher positive contribution to total 
variation (Table 3.3). Therefore of the large economies only Argentina had a persistent land 
expansion process, and it was dominated by high aptitude land with almost no move onto land of 
low agricultural aptitude.  
Figure 3.42
AUSTRALIA: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
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Figure 3.43
AUSTRALIA: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
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Figure 3.44
CANADA: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Variations / Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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Figure 3.45
CANADA: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
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The small economies in the “club” share similar characteristics in terms of the dynamics of the 
process because the pace of expansion declined in the period, but the timing was different. In Chile 
this last trend was more intensive and land extension reverted in the 1910s (Figure 3.46). In the 
1850s-1870s, the main expansion was onto low aptitude land (Figure 3.47), but this characteristic 
changed in the 1880s and high aptitude land accounted for more than 80 per cent of the expansion 
(except in the 1910s) (Table 3.3). The highest expansion rates in New Zealand were in the 1860s 
and 1870s (Figure 3.48) and the move was mainly onto high aptitude land (Figure 3.49). However, 
the share of medium and low aptitude land was never negligible; almost 40 per cent of the variation 
in the period was due to these two types (on average). This pattern contrasts with that of Uruguay, 
where the highest expansion rates came later than those in New Zealand (the 1880s and 1890s) 
(Figure 3.50) and the contribution of high aptitude land dominated the evolution (Figure 3.51). 
During the period, this contribution exceeded 95 per cent of total variation. 
Figure 3.46
CHILE: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
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Figure 3.47
CHILE: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Contributions / Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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According to our framework, these different intensities in the incorporation of land of differing 
aptitudes can constitute an important factor that explains the economic performance of the settler 
economies. Therefore we can make our approach to this concept more precise by constructing 
“contributions indexes”. 
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Figure 3.48
NEW ZEALAND: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
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Figure 3.49
NEW ZEALAND: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Contributions / Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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Figure 3.50
URUGUAY: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Variations / Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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Figure 3.51
URUGUAY: INTENSIVE FRONTIER INDICATORS
Contributions / Benchmark 0.77 inhabitant/km2
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From the contributions calculated in the previous analysis, we elaborate indicators of 
contribution by type of land (1850s=100) and we contrast them in terms of the relative contribution 
of high and low land (H/L) aptitude (Figure 3.52) and between high and medium (H/M) land 
aptitude (Figure 3.53). We calculate the indexes considering contributions with the opposite sign 
because this provides a better illustration. Higher numbers represent wider gaps between the 
contributions of high aptitude land and other types of land. 71 
The gap between high and low aptitude was very great in Uruguay throughout the period, and 
after two decades when the New Zealand index increased more than the Argentine, the two 
indicators followed a similar trend. Canada and Australia did not show substantial differences 
between the two categories and Chile had an irregular trajectory. Chile started the period with 
indexes below 100 (in the 1860s and 1870s), and then it recovered and evolved in a way similar to 
Canada and Australia. The gap between high and medium aptitude shows a similar picture, but 
there are three important differences. The increasing evolution of Argentina is more moderate, the 
                                                 
71 Contributions represent percentage points of the variation of our indicators of land frontier expansion and, by 
construction, these variations are predominantly negative. In Chapter 5, where we present our statistical exercises, we 
will work with the original sign of the contribution.    
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trajectory of Chile is more stable than in the previous case and the index for New Zealand 
converges to the others. 
Figure 3.52
CONTRIBUTION INDEX: HIGH APTITUDE/LOW APTITUDE
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Figure 3.53
CONTRIBUTION INDEX: HIGH APTITUDE/MEDIUM APTITUDE
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4.3 In accordance with grassland and distance: an illustration of “land quality” 
Land quality improves the concept of land aptitude as it incorporates distance into the economic 
impacts of endowments. We discuss these analytical consequences and as an illustration we give 
evidence for Argentina in 1850 and 1910, which we choose as the reference years because they are 
the time period extremes in our previous analysis. We choose this country because Argentina was 
one of the larger economies in the “club” that underwent more intensive land frontier expansion 
during the period. We repeat some exercises from the previous sub-section to compare results. In 
accordance with our discussion in sub-section 3.1.3., we need a coefficient (s) for correcting area by 
distance and we define it as the result of a potential function like the following: s=γ (distanceθ), 
where we assume γ =10 and θ=1.7, which are the same values assumed in our numerical exercises 
in Chapter 2 (sub-section 2.2). 
In terms of agrarian aptitude to allocate grassland, the indicator of frontier expansion (F) fell 
from 0.94 to 0.79 between 1850 and 1910 (see Figure 3.15), but the indicator adjusted by distance 
(a proxy for “land quality”) decreased from 0.89 to 0.73.  Therefore the fall in the index that 
incorporates the effects of distance was greater (17.4 per cent against 15.7 per cent) and had lower 
levels (Figure 3.54). Therefore when we introduce distance into the analysis, land frontier 
expansion is seen to be a more intense process. An additional exercise is to calculate our “intensive 
indicators” to gauge the evolution of the frontier in accordance with different types of land.  
High quality land frontier expansion (Figure 3.55) shows a similar pattern to the high aptitude 
but, as before, with lower levels and a more intense decline (16.1 per cent against 12.9 per cent). On 
the contrary, when we include distance in the case of medium quality land (Figure 3.56), the levels 
of the indicator are higher and the decrease is lower (22.9 per cent against 24.3 per cent). In other 
words, the inclusion of distance in the calculations reduces the index for high aptitude land and 
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increases it for medium. Indicators of low quality land evolved in a similar way to those of medium 
quality land (Figure 3.57).  
Land frontier expansion was not a lineal process and sometimes we find “islands” of expansion 
in the territory. However, considering productive specialization and the key role of ports, the 
progressive and radial expansion from Buenos Aires that Argentina underwent was an expected 
process. But the way to take possession of the high aptitude land of the Pampas and the South was 
precisely to incorporate medium aptitude land, particularly dense shrubland.72 This explains the 
different evolutions between aptitude and quality indicators and the “sense” of the discrepancy. 
Agents looked for and occupied the best land in spite of distance and incorporated it endogenously 
into the production of commodities. 
Figure 3.54
ARGENTINA: LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION ACCORDING TO AGRARIAN 
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Source: own elaboration from Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, HYDE 3.1 and IMAGE Programmes. 
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Figure 3.55
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Figure 3.56
ARGENTINA: INTENSIVE LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION BY MEDIUM LAND - 
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Figure 3.57
ARGENTINA: INTENSIVE LAND FRONTIER EXPANSION BY LOW LAND - 
ACCORDING TO AGRARIAN APTITUDE AND DISTANCE 
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
1850 1910
Source: own elaboration from Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, HYDE 3.1 and IMAGE Programmes.
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In Chapter 2, Section 3, we insisted on the importance of distinguishing land qualities and we 
proposed different costs of clearing land depending on the types of land (high or low quality). We 
can replicate the same idea and repeat the exercises considering θH=1.4 and θL=1.2 for high and 
medium-low land aptitude instead of θ =1.7. Our estimates confirm our previous conclusions. The 
indicator of frontier expansion (F) adjusted by distance decreased from 0.87 to 0.71. Therefore the 
                                                 
72 Coloured red in Figure 3.4.d. 
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fall in the index that incorporates the effects of distance was greater (18.2 per cent against 15.7 per 
cent) and with even lower levels. These changes can be basically explained by changes to high 
quality land frontier expansion while the indicators for medium and low quality had only marginal 
variations. This exercise reinforces the accuracy of our simulations of Chapter 2. 
In the case of Argentina, where land aptitude and distance are important, our indicators show that 
distance to centres of gravity matters when we represent land frontier expansion, and particularly so 
when we characterize the dynamics of the process in terms of types of land. Our agenda includes 
extending this analysis to other members of the “club” in next stages of the research. 
5. Conclusions and final remarks 
We propose alternative measures of land frontier expansion to characterize the process and 
understand how it differed among the settler economies. The trajectories of the countries in the 
“club” were not homogenous, and when these countries faced the effects of the First Globalization 
two patterns based on the dynamics of settlement emerge. 
On the one hand, in the River Plate, land frontier expansion was persistent and it was dominated 
by high and medium aptitude land throughout the period, and this was also the pattern in Chile from 
the 1880s.  On the other hand, the timing of the land frontier expansion in Australia and Canada 
was different. In Australia it came before the First Globalization boom, and in Canada the process 
only became intensive at the end of the 19th century. In addition, and in contrast to Australia, the 
contribution of the three types of land was important for Canada. New Zealand showed features of 
both patterns. Like in Australia, land frontier expansion became more dynamic before the price 
boom, but high aptitude land featured heavily. Nevertheless, like in Canada, all three kinds of land 
played their part in the expansion. 
We present an illustration of the analytical effects of introducing distance into the analysis. It 
clearly shows that consideration of land quality instead of land aptitude would make a big 
contribution to improving our study. This is one of the main analytical lines we will follow in the 
next steps of our research.  
In accordance with our theoretical framework, we can expect that the different intensity of 
movements by differing natural resources would have resulted in a greater worsening of income 
distribution in the Southern Cone of South America –where the expansion by relatively better lands 
was more intensive– than in Australasia and Canada. Our aim in Chapter 4 is to present our 
estimates of the evolution of income distribution (in the agrarian sector) to contrast our results. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Historical application of GIS tools and methodological 
questions 
Georeferenced Information Systems (GIS) is a structure for capturing, storing, checking, 
retrieving, integrating, analyzing and displaying spatial information, and to coordinate data bases 
with maps to obtain relationships between economic and social processes and geographical 
locations. In recent years these systems have developed considerably in Economics but they have 
hardly been applied to Economic History. Academics generally share the perception that geography 
“explains” to a great extent the history of economies, but the main restriction in this field has been a 
lack of available information. Authors writing about the adverse effects of economic growth on the 
environment and global climatic change propose historical approaches to the geographical location 
of population, consumption and production in a world scale. This theoretical and empirical 
framework offers functional data for our purpose. We use data about two issues.  
First, the “Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)” includes two programmes: 
the History Database of the Global Environment (HYDE 3.1) and the Integrated Modelling of 
Global Environmental Change (IMAGE). Information about population is available on their 
website.73 For data about biome types we used the Atlas of the Biosphere from the Center for 
Sustainability and the Global Environment (SAGE), part of the Nelson Institute for Environmental 
Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.74 Georeferenced information presents data in 
terms of grid cells and our database represents distribution of population and biomes with a global 
5x5 minute resolution. Therefore we have grid cells of 69.4 km2, which are approximately 8.3 km 
in length and 11.8 km in diagonal.  
The aim of this Appendix is to describe the methodological strategy developed to apply GIS 
tools in our analysis (Section 1), and to comment on its main limitations and on the strategies we 
used to circumvent them (Section 2). 
1. GIS: methodological strategy 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) are computer-based systems that can deal with virtually 
any type of information about features that can be referenced by geographical location (Lillesand et 
al., 2004). They are a powerful tool for analyzing the spatial distribution of an event and how it 
behaves over time. Also some functions such as being able to overlay data layers from various 
                                                 
73 http://www.pbl.nl/en/themasites/hyde/index.html 
74 http://www.sage.wisc.edu/atlas/ 
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sources and to reclassify information according to preset thresholds and weighting for a particular 
area (conditions we wish to stress, biogeographical features, proximities to centroids) enables 
researchers to incorporate spatial analysis parameter modelling. Much of the power of a GIS comes 
from the database which contains the attribute data. This study is based on information provided by 
HYDE 3.1 developed under the authority of MNP with data on the population count every 10 years 
between 1800 and 1950, and also the biomes in the different countries considered.  
We basically used a raster data model integrating gridded population (total, urban and rural 
counts, densities) and biome areas (gridded cropland and pasture land use) extracted with a vector 
mask (Klein Goldewijk, et al., 2010). The grid is made up of 8.3 km squares (69.4 km2). In the 
raster (grid cell or pixel) format the location of geographic objects or conditions is defined by the 
row and column position of the cells they occupy. The value stored for each cell indicates the type 
of object or condition that is found at that location over the entire cell (Lillesand and et al., 2004). 
The methodological steps included: 
• To extract areas of interest from images with global population data through a mask vector for 
each country. In order to make this with a single source it was applied administrative 
boundaries shapefiles of the Free Country level and Spatial Data provided by the of Diva GIS 
webpage. 
• Once the areas of interest were isolated, they were classified for each year based on defined 
thresholds (0.3861, 0.7722 and 1.5444 inhabitants/km2). The attribute table enables us to know 
the number of cells and therefore the variation of population at each location for each decade. 
• Another task was to extract the biome area of each country and its classification in accordance 
with potential for agriculture development. There were 15 different ecosystems types grouped 
into 6 classes in order to their suitability for agricultural production (grassland). There is also a 
“no qualification” class. 
• Subsequently the area occupied by each group was calculated as people present at each 
extension for the periods of study. 
• Finally, in the case of Argentina, the pixels were weighted according to the distance from the 
historical developed nodes identified for each land area (Buenos Aires and Tucumán).  
This work was implemented using ESRI products like ArcGIS 9.3 and ArcView with Spatial 
Analyst Tools extension. The commands used most were “extraction” –to extract by mask, which 
extracts the cells of a raster that correspond to the areas defined by a mask– and “reclass”, which is 
to reclassify the values in the raster file. 
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2. Critical analysis of the data: limitations and decisions 
The accuracy of our land frontier expansion indicators depends critically on the original 
population data, and the aim of this section is to discuss the methodology and data of our source. It 
is an area closely related to ecology and environmental sciences and we consult articles and studies 
of the best Journals of the field. The interest in the historical evolution of occupied land by region 
of these sources is based on the consequent demand for food, services and building materials, and 
their consequences for the earth in terms of forestation and the conversion of land cover. 
In accordance with Klein Goldewijk, et al. (2011), the historical population numbers are mainly 
from McEvedy & Jones (1978), Livi-Bacci (2007) and Maddison (2001). These estimates are 
supplemented with sub-national population numbers from Populstat (from Lahmeyer, 2004) and 
many other sources, including time series that were constructed for each province or state of every 
country of the world.75 They obtained spatial patterns by using weighting maps based on the 
population density map patterns of Landscan (2006) for current time periods, and gradually 
replacing them, as they moved back in time, with weighted maps based on proxies such as distance 
to water and soil suitability. Klein Goldewijk et al. (2010) give a full description of this 
methodology. In recent economic history research the usual population source is Maddison (2001, 
2003) and we use these data as our control variable to evaluate the accuracy of our source. When 
data derived from this differs in amounts greater than 5 per cent, we adjust (proportionally and by 
pixel) the figures to achieve perfect coherence with Maddison (2001, 2003). In Table A3.1 we 
present Maddison’s (2001, 2003) series, data from our source (derived from the mapping 
processing), the ratio between the two sources and the definitive data for each country.  
Table A3.1 
POPULATION DATA 
Total and ratios 
 ARGENTINA  AUSTRALIA 
 (1) (2) (2)/(1) (3)  (1) (2) (2)/(1) (3) 
1850 1,100,000 1,081,504 0.98 1,081,504  605,000 521,684 0.86 605,000 
1860 1,405,560 1,383,622 0.98 1,383,622  1,326,000 1,180,805 0.89 1,326,000 
1870 1,796,000 1,845,921 1.03 1,845,921  1,775,000 1,768,650 1.00 1,768,650 
1880 2,462,376 2,462,376 1.00 2,462,376  2,197,000 2,302,783 1.05 2,302,783 
1890 3,376,000 3,446,894 1.02 3,446,894  3,107,000 3,189,664 1.03 3,189,664 
1900 4,693,000 4,854,945 1.03 4,854,945  3,741,000 3,817,625 1.02 3,817,625 
1910 6,836,000 6,870,068 1.00 6,870,068  4,375,000 4,521,329 1.03 4,521,329 
 CANADA  CHILE 
 (1) (2) (2)/(1) (3)  (1) (2) (2)/(1) (3) 
1850 2,485,000 2,478,348 1.00 2,478,348  1,409,885 1,294,094 0.92 1,409,885 
1860 3,369,000 3,400,058 1.01 3,400,058  1,660,659 1,663,954 1.00 1,663,954 
1870 3,781,000 3,900,934 1.03 3,900,934  1,944,569 1,958,608 1.01 1,958,608 
1880 4,384,000 4,557,542 1.04 4,557,542  2,264,042 2,276,984 1.01 2,276,984 
1890 4,918,000 5,136,497 1.04 5,136,497  2,607,769 2,583,152 0.99 2,583,152 
                                                 
75 For reasons of simplicity, current administrative units are kept constant over time and every historical source is 
adjusted to match the current boundaries of HYDE 3.1 (i.e. by taking fractions of former larger administrative units). 
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1900 5,457,000 5,563,944 1.02 5,563,944  2,958,986 2,899,299 0.98 2,899,299 
1910 7,188,000 7,303,061 1.02 7,303,061  3,317,166 3,346,023 1.01 3,346,023 
 NEW ZEALAND  URUGUAY 
 (1) (2) (2)/(1) (3)  (1) (2) (2)/(1) (3) 
1850 90,000 311,894 3.47 90,000  132,000 133,694 1.01 133,694 
1860 132,000 363,665 2.76 132,000  212,782 212,782 1.00 212,782 
1870 291,000 425,275 1.46 291,000  343,000 342,607 1.00 342,607 
1880 520,000 496,868 0.96 496,868  464,000 465,725 1.00 465,725 
1890 665,000 662,703 1.00 662,703  686,000 686,735 1.00 686,735 
1900 807,000 828,507 1.03 828,507  915,000 916,076 1.00 916,076 
1910 1,045,000 993,992 0.95 993,992  1,081,000 1,048,769 0.97 1,048,769 
          
(1) MADDISON, Angus (2001): A Millenial Perspective. Development Centre Studies, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (Update 2009). 
MADDISON, Angus (2003): The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris, OECD  
(2) KLEIN GOLDEWIJK, Kees, BEUSEN, Arthur, DE VOS, Martine, and VAN DRECHT, Gerard (2011): “The 
HYDE 3.1 spatially explicit database of human induced land use change over the past 12,000 years”. 
Global Ecology and Biogeography, 20 (1): 73-86. 
KLEIN GOLDEWIJK, Kees, BEUSEN, Arthur, and JANSSEN, Peter (2010): "Long term dynamic modeling of 
global population and built-up area in a spatially explicit way”. HYDE 3.1, The Holocene 20 (4): 565-573. 
(3) Our Data.         
 
The most important discrepancies between the two sources are for Australasia in the 19th century. 
In all cases we use Maddison (2001, 2003) for total population and rescale, by cell, the results from 
our source. The rest of the differences are not so great and our indicators, by construction, are not 
significantly sensitive to these discrepancies.  
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Chapter 4 
Inequality patterns: concepts and measures applied to settler 
economies in historical perspective (1870-1913) 
In Chapter 2 we proposed a complementary framework to the H-O-S model in order to explain 
the economic performance of settler economies during the First Globalization. In the literature it is 
usual to consider the evolution of GDP per capita to refer to the curse or the blessing. However, we 
want to go beyond this restricted concept and consider an idea that is more like a development 
notion, and then we will evaluate the curse or blessing in terms of economic growth and income 
distribution. Our hypothesis, which accords with our framework and the preliminary evidence, is 
that in recent settlement countries where the better land (high quality) was occupied first (or, in our 
terms, more intensively occupied), the worsening in income distribution was more pronounced. 
This evolution would be a consequence of agents obtaining greater differences in relative factor 
remuneration in favour of landowners and to the detriment of other income-earners (workers and 
capitalists). Therefore, we need to operationalize these concepts to be able to test our hypotheses 
empirically. Our empirical strategy –and the aim of this chapter– is to identify different distributive 
patterns in the settler economies so as to evaluate the likelihood of our propositions.  
When we identify different “distributive patterns” in settler economies we focus on two 
dimensions of the distributive process in the agrarian sector. As agriculture was the most important 
productive activity in the settler economies and one of the main sectors that drove land frontier 
expansion, a study of the evolution of inequality in this sector will be of interest. We consider 
inequality in terms of assets –land distribution– and incomes –functional income distribution– 
because both dimensions have immediate relationships with our conceptual framework. They refer 
to the ownership of the natural resource and to the appropriation of the rents derived form it. Asset 
distribution in settler economies is a common subject in the literature but up to now it has scarcely 
been measured or analyzed from a comparative perspective. In Section 1 we discuss land 
distribution in settler economies –and accept regional differences in large economies– on the eve of 
WWI. After that, in Section 2, we present the notion of functional income distribution and discuss 
the existence of two distributive patterns: in the countries that were British colonies it was capitalist 
relationships that predominated, but those countries that were colonies of Spain economic 
relationships were based on agrarian rental incomes. During the period, income distribution 
worsened in the Australasian economies and Canada, but it worsened even more in the South 
American Southern Cone countries, and the two groups had different dynamics of expansion onto 
new land. The ex-British colonies “moved” the frontier through the worse quality land (in relative 
terms) or, in other terms, low and medium quality lands contributed actively in the land frontier 
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expansion. In addition, the process was not such persistent as in the River Plate. In Australia and 
New Zealand, the land frontier expansion was more intense previous to the prices boom and, in 
Canada, it was just notorious at the end of the 19th century. In accordance with our measures of 
land frontier expansion, and with support from our theoretical framework, we argue that different 
endowments and the productive application of natural resources explain these differences, at least 
partially. In Chapter 5 we will test our hypothesis and introduce the consideration of institutional 
arrangements to supplement our analysis. 
1. Land distribution in the eve of WWI 
1.1 Data and results 
A question that is discussed repeatedly in the context of the historical evolution of the formation 
of land ownership rights in settler economies is land distribution and its consequences in terms of 
economic performance. What does the evidence tell us about inequality? Is it clear that, as a result 
of different evolutions, different distributive patterns developed? 
In a recent working paper, the relationships between inequality and economic growth are 
reviewed in the light of new evidence. Ehrhart (2009) establishes that, in the empirical field, the 
econometric estimates of the direct and indirect links from initial inequality to future growth led to 
overall results that were rather mixed. Cross-section reduced form regressions show that inequality 
of wealth (human capital and land) significantly and negatively affects the future growth rate. Asset 
inequality turns out to be a more robust determinant of growth than income inequality. Findings 
from cross-section structural form estimates reveal that only the endogenous fertility approach and 
the explanation based on political instability are substantially supported by the data. Finally, in 
panel data regressions, initial inequality of assets has a significant and negative effect on the future 
growth rate. Similar results were obtained by Deininger & Squire (1998) and Deininger & Olinto 
(2000) some years ago. A study permanently referenced as Barro (2000) has been recently updated 
to review the relationships with a similar approach as before but better data. International data 
would reveal that the Kuznets’ curve is a clear empirical phenomenon. A cross-country growth 
framework shows a negative effect from income inequality on growth, holding fixed a usual group 
of other explanatory variables. This effect diminishes as per capita product rises and may be 
positive for the richest economies (Barro, 2008:9). In the literature various different channels have 
been suggested to explain how inequality affects growth (political economy, imperfect capital 
markets, social conflicts, residence segregation, friction in factor markets, natural resources, and the 
creation of institutional arrangements)76 but the debate is still open theoretically and empirically.  
                                                 
76 Willebald (2006 and 2007) and Willebald & Bértola (2011) present an analysis of these relationships for settler 
economies in historical perspective, and now we propose a new step in this direction considering a different framework. 
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To compare and evaluate differences within the “club” we present land ownership inequality 
indicators, which include Gini and entropy indexes,77 percentiles and average establishment size. 
The specifications (year, area ranges78 and sources) are detailed in Table 4.1. The indicators are for 
the eve of WWI, which can be considered the “end” of the First Globalization era and is a good 
point in time to compare “results” (Table 4.2).  
Table 4.1 
SPECIFICATIONS IN THE CALCULATIONS OF LAND INEQUALITY INDICATORS 
PAÍS YEAR AREA RANGES SOURCE 
Argentina 
 
1914 9 classes expressed in hectares. 
Less than 25 
26-50 
51-100 
101-500 
501-1000 
1,001-5,000 
5,001-10,000 
10,001-25,000 
25,001 and over 
REPUBLICA ARGENTINA (1916): Tercer Censo Nacional, 
1914, Argentina. Tomo V: Explotaciones 
Agropecuarias. Capítulo 1: Las explotaciones 
agropecuarias clasificadas por escalas de extensión, 
pp. 3-6 
 
Australia 1911 9 classes expressed in acres. 
1-50 
51-100 
101-500 
501-1000 
1,001-5,000 
5,001-10,000 
10,001-20,000 
20,001-50,000 
50,001 and over 
VAMPLEW, Wray (Ed.) (1987):  Australians: historical 
statistics. Fairfax, Syme and Weldon, Canberra. 
Table AG 19-27 Landuse, Colonies, States and 
Territories, 1850-1980, p. 73. 
Canada 1911 7 classes expressed in acres  
Under 1 
1-5 
5-10 
11-50 
51-100 
101-200 
201 and over 
STATISTICS CANADA (1914): The Canada Year Book 
1913. Ottawa. V.-Production-Agriculture pp.167-
169, 171; 
http://www66.statcan.gc.ca/eng/acyb_c1913-
eng.aspx?opt=/eng/1913/191301960169_p.%20169
.pdf 
Table 14. Distribution of Farm Holdings, 1901-1911 
Table 16. Areas occupied and Areas possible of 
Occupation as Farm Land Canada, 1914 
Chile 1929-
1930 
6 classes expressed in hectares. 
0-5 
5-50 
50-200 
200-1000 
1001-5000 
5000 and over 
DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ESTADÍSTICA (1933): Censo 
Agropecuario 1929-1930, Santiago de Chile. 
1. Número y extensión de los predios rústicos incluidos 
en el Censo del año 1929-1930, por comunas, 
departamentos y provincias, pp. 4-7 
New Zealand 1911 12 classes expressed in acres  
1-10 
11-50 
51-100 
101-200 
201-320 
321-640 
641-1,000 
1,001-5,000 
5,001-10,000 
10,001-20,000 
20,001-50,000 
50,001 and over 
CENSUS AND STATISTICS OFFICE OF THE DOMINION OF 
NEW ZEALAND (1919): The New Zealand Official 
Year-Book, 1919. Wellington. Section XVII - Land 
tenure, settlement, etc. Subsection D - Occupation 
and Ownership of land Occupation of land, pp. 506-
507. 
Uruguay 1908 12 classes expressed in hectares. 
0-10 
11-100 
101-500 
501-1,000 
1,001-2,500 
BARRÁN, José y NAHUM, Benjamín (1977): Historia Rural 
del Uruguay Moderno. Tomo VI: “La civilización 
ganadera bajo Batlle (1905-1914)”. Ed. EBO, 
Montevideo, p. 277, based on DIRECCIÓN GENERAL 
DE ESTADÍSTICAS (1910): Censo General de 1908, 
                                                 
77 See definitions in Appendix 1 to Chapter 4. 
78 The number and size of ranges or classes impose limitations on the comparison of inequality indicators. However, the 
differences do not determine the general conclusions. 
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2,501-2,750 
2,751-5,000 
5,001-7,500 
7501-10,000 
10,001 and over 
Montevideo. 
MILLOT, Julio y BERTINO, Magdalena (1996): Historia 
Económica del Uruguay. Tomo II (1860-1910). Ed. 
Fundación de Cultura Universitaria. Montevideo. 
Cuadro III, p. 95. 
DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE ESTADÍSTICA: Anuario 
Estadístico de la República Oriental del Uruguay. 
Tomo II - Parte II, Montevideo, Propiedades rurales 
clasificadas por superficie, p. 1149 (total holdings 
exclude 285 estates with activity non-specified). 
 
1.2 Analysis and shortcomings 
When we compare two of the large economies –Argentina and Australia– we find that the former 
had significantly higher levels of inequality, and this result is consistent with the predominant view 
about high land concentration in the River Plate (see Willebald, 2006, for a review of the literature). 
On the Gini Index, Argentina has a value of 0.85, which is almost 10 points higher than the value 
for Australia, and the sense of the discrepancy is confirmed by all entropy indices. The average 
sizes of holdings in the two countries were similar (531 and 552 hectares, respectively) but there are 
big differences between regions within these countries. In Australia, the most unequal regions were 
New South Wales and Tasmania, which were colonized first (see the indicators of occupied land in 
Chapter 3). This would be linked to the different timing of the settlements, and as the agents were 
learning from the process they were able later on to implement more effective policies in terms of 
intensification and the division of the estates. In South Australia, Western Australia and Victoria the 
authorities implemented a more egalitarian land ownership rights distribution system and the results 
were favourable. Thus this evidence brings out the structural character of land distribution and 
indicates that policies were effective when they were systematically implemented from the very 
beginning of the settlement.79 We will discuss this point in Chapter 5. The distributive pattern in 
Argentina was different.  
The less unequal regions differ considerably as regards the timing of their settlement –La Pampa 
(0.76) was colonized early and Patagonia (0.74) was colonized late– and as regards the size 
structure of land ownership (the average holding size in Patagonia is 9 times greater than in La 
Pampa). The entropy indexes confirm this perception; Patagonia had the lowest GE(1), which 
indicates that it was a case of “equality among riches” and that policies of land intensification or 
division were not successful. In addition, these regions have different productive specializations (La 
Pampa is suitable for crops, especially wheat, and Patagonia for the wool industry) and their 
production scale requirements were dissimilar, which explains some of the differences between 
them. The most unequal region was Cuyo, a fact probably related to the long colonial history of that 
                                                 
79 It is probable that certain productive features contributed in the same direction (remember the increasing mining 
activity during the 1850s and 1860s in these regions) but we can not be conclusive in this argument.     
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area and the persistence of traditional property structures.80 These features are extensible to the 
entire region that has Tucumán as the centre of gravity (see Chapter 3, sub-section 3.1.3). 
Percentile ratios
p90/p10 p90/p50 p10/p50 p75/p25
Argentina 73.4 9.2 0.13 20.9
Australia 129.3 6.6 0.05 17.4
Canada 155.6 3.1 0.02 4.9
Chile 64.3 5.6 0.09 11.5
New Zealand 180.3 10.4 0.06 9.3
Uruguay 148.6 9.9 0.07 6.7
Generalized Entropy indices (GE), Gini coefficients and holding average size
GE(-1) GE(0) GE(1) GE(2) Gini Avg. Size
(Hectares)
Argentina 11.11 1.99 2.07 14.37 0.85 531
La Pampa 4.51 1.36 1.61 9.78 0.76 355
North East 10.76 2.23 2.13 12.08 0.88 515
North West 19.22 2.56 2.06 9.84 0.88 621
Cuyo 38.83 3.34 3.06 30.48 0.94 666
Patagonia 20.50 1.71 1.22 2.91 0.74 3,285
Australia 6.87 1.52 1.50 10.30 0.76 552
New South Wales 9.83 1.89 1.95 15.26 0.82 591
Victoria 3.31 1.04 0.95 3.22 0.65 426
South Australia 5.63 1.25 0.97 2.92 0.66 550
Western Australia 10.74 1.31 0.95 3.55 0.64 993
Tasmania 4.96 1.56 1.93 21.71 0.80 417
Federal 7.30 1.52 1.58 5.43 0.78 1,232
Canada 5.42 0.74 0.46 0.52 0.50 154
Prince Edward Island 1.64 0.42 0.30 0.35 0.40 84
Nova Scotia 3.62 0.84 0.60 0.78 0.57 98
New Brunswick 2.25 0.58 0.46 0.58 0.50 119
Quebec 4.42 0.62 0.32 0.29 0.42 98
Ontario 4.78 0.75 0.47 0.58 0.50 97
Manitoba 6.07 0.51 0.26 0.22 0.35 271
Saskatchewan 0.86 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.27 297
Alberta 2.01 0.29 0.21 0.21 0.32 289
British Columbia 10.73 1.59 1.10 1.73 0.73 138
Chile 25.16 2.85 3.48 49.99 0.93 187
New Zealand 16.75 2.01 2.13 21.44 0.83 220
Uruguay 7.73 1.52 1.37 4.31 0.77 394
Regions of Argentina: (i) La Pampa: Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe; (ii) North East: Corrientes, Chaco,
 Formosa and Misiones; (iii) North West: Catamarca, Jujuy, La Rioja, Los Andes, Salta, Santiago del Estero, Tucumán; 
(iv) Cuyo: Mendoza, San Juan and San Luis; (v) Patagonia: Chubut, Neuquén, Río Negro, Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego.
Source: see Table 4.1. 
Table 4.2
LAND OWNERSHIP IN SETTLER ECONOMIES: INEQUALITY INDICATORS
 
                                                 
80 The cities of Mendoza and San Juan were founded in 1561 and 1562 as part of the expansion of Chile under the 
authority of the Viceroyalty of Peru. Buenos Aires was founded later (1580) –after a failed attempt in 1536– as an 
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The situation in Canada was quite equitable; its Gini Index value was only 0.50, which contrasts 
sharply with that of the Anglo-Saxon countries in the southern hemisphere. “Even the strictest 
enforcement of the conditions that the selection laws prescribed could not have made Australia a 
nation of small independent farmers such as grew in this country [the US] and Canada”. (Burt, 
1965:75). The eastern provinces (Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick) had 
small estates and their rating fluctuated around the average for the economy as a whole. But the 
really interesting point is that the provinces that were formed at the end of the 19th century through 
land frontier expansion (Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta) had values close to 0.32 (simple 
average). The land ownership regime in these provinces was based on the farming system and 
holding sizes were in accordance with productive requirements (these holding sizes are the biggest 
in Canada and close to the sizes in La Pampa, in Argentina81). Finally, British Columbia had a 
distributive pattern close to other settler economies but its holding sizes were below average. 
When we compare the small economies –New Zealand and Uruguay– our results initially 
contradict the high-concentration distributive pattern in the River Plate region that we noted in the 
analysis of Argentina and Australia. In New Zealand the authorities made efforts to implement 
distributive land policies (see Chapter 5) but the Gini index remained at high levels (0.83 against 
0.77). However, the two countries were very different as regards average holding size. The indicator 
for Uruguay was almost 80 percent greater that the ratio for New Zealand, which indicates that the 
two countries had very different property size structures (see Álvarez, 2008, for an approach to this 
question). Starting in the 1890s, the authorities in New Zealand made an effort to break up the large 
estates and establish a holding size structure more suitable for the new economic conditions, 
especially the changes wrought by the introduction of refrigeration, the expansion of the dairy 
industry and the introduction of cooperative land tenure systems. The evolution of the indicators 
gives a clear picture. In 1891, the values of the Gini index and the GE(0) were very similar to their 
1911 levels (0.84 and 2, respectively) but GE(1) decreased (from 2.26 to 2.13), which indicates 
changes in the higher segments of the distribution.82 Rural changes was speeded up by further 
enabling legislation in the early 1890s and by the opening of large areas of crown land in North 
Island, which had hitherto been preserved from falling under the control of the big sheep farmers by 
Maori resistance. New Zealand then became a nation increasingly dominated by small independent 
farmers who formed the backbone of society. This achievement is in striking contrast to what 
                                                                                                                                                                  
autonomous development linked to Atlantic Ocean trade, and it had a secondary economic role until the 19th century. 
81 The average holding size in the “West” of Canada was 80 per cent of that of La Pampa. It was the region most similar 
to Argentina as regards production –land quality, crops and comparable technological options– and this would explain 
why their productive requirements looked alike.  
82 Entropy indices E(c) are a “family” of indicators where c is a parameter (positive). As c decreases, E becomes more 
sensitive to transfers in the low segment of the distribution. Then E(1) is more sensitive to changes in the situation of 
“rich” people (in this case, with much land) and E(0) is a better reflection of changes among “poor” agents.   
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happened in Australia but it is not at all surprising because New Zealand had what Australia lacked: 
a combination of soil and climate that was ideal for close agricultural settlement (Burt, 1965).83 
Another interesting aspect that highlights the importance of the regional differences is the 
comparison between Uruguay and La Pampa in Argentina. Gini Indexes (0.77 and 0.76) and 
holding sizes (394 and 355, respectively) were similar and this probably indicates comparable 
productive specializations and land ownership structures. Lastly, on the eve of the Great Depression 
(1929-1930), Chile’s Gini Index was over 0.9, which was the outcome of a long-run evolution in 
which the colonial heritage and the political power elite combined to maintain high levels of 
inequality in its various dimensions (incomes, productive activities and assets) (see Bértola and 
Rodríguez Weber, 2009; Rodríguez Weber, 2009; and Rodríguez Weber and Willebald, 2010). 
The Kuznets’ indicators (percentile ratios) clearly confirm that the “shapes” of the distributions 
are not uniform and there are several features that make it difficult to find clear patterns. For 
instance, the narrowest gaps between the rich and the poor (the lowest p90/p10) were in Argentina 
and Chile, but according to the Gini Index these were the most unequal economies in the group. In 
contrast, the third most unequal country (New Zealand) had the highest indicator. Land inequality 
in Australia and Uruguay was very similar, and the gap between rich and poor was also comparable, 
but there are big (and contradictory) differences in other percentile ratios. Finally, the most 
equitable economy –Canada– had the lowest value for the middle segments (p75/p25), which 
confirms a distribution with low concentration. These warnings are not new. Willebald & Bértola 
(2011) find that differences in land distribution in the “club” are not enough to explain differences 
in economic performance. Their analysis suggests that the dynamics of the generation of incomes is 
a better approach when it comes to explaining these differences. 
In other recent literature there are criticisms of the empirical approach to this question. Measures 
of land inequality only capture inequality among landholders and ignore people who do not have 
land (Erickson & Vollrath, 2004). Besides this, it is probable that the dispersion of the proprietors’ 
income was low and stable, which undermines the representativeness of the effect of inequality on 
economic performance. Therefore we supplement our analysis by considering the evolution of 
functional income distribution in the agrarian sector as the second dimension of the distributive 
pattern of settler economies in the period. 
2. Agrarian functional income distribution 
In the recent literature, research into inequality trends in countries that participated in the global 
economy in the second half of the 19th century and up to WWI looks at two kinds of empirical 
                                                 
83 Our analysis of inequality indexes does not consider differences in types of lands. In nexts steps of the research we 
will include land adjusted by quality in the calculations of the index, so as to reflect different agricultural conditions.     
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evidence. First, it considers the relative evolution of factor prices –typically land rental/unskilled 
wage (r/w)– and incomes –average income by worker/unskilled wage (y/w). Second, recently there 
have been efforts to estimate inequality directly from the economic conditions of the population and 
poverty in the long run, using diverse indices (see the review in Chapter 2). As a third alternative 
we work with estimates of functional income distribution, an intermediate line that circumvents the 
limitations of the first approach (we pay attention to the simultaneous movements in earn rates and 
quantity of the productive factors) and contributes to the second one by adding details to the 
characterization (especially because we include sector considerations). 
Functional income distribution is a depiction of how income (at the national or sector level) is 
distributed among the different groups involved in production. As a result, it shows how incomes 
earned by the owners of the various factors of production (labour, land and capital) are shared out in 
terms of remuneration (or wages), land rents and profits (dividends or interests). Therefore, in these 
terms, not only it is important to consider the evolution of the different earning rates (which is what 
the recent literature is concerned with) but we should also take account of changes in the quantities 
of factors applied to production. When we consider that agriculture was the main productive sector 
in the settler economies, and together with its productive linkages it was the main strength in the 
economic boom at the end of the 19th century, then a study of the evolution of income distribution 
in this sector will yield some interesting insights. 
We estimate functional income distribution in the agrarian sector during the First Globalization 
(from 1870 to the eve of WWI) in our settler economies (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, New 
Zealand and Uruguay). More specifically, we survey and estimate the agrarian product, wages and 
total land incomes in the agrarian sector while the profits were obtained as a residual. We select 
benchmark years in accordance with the long run evolution of the settler economies and the 
information available. We choose years that correspond to points in time prior to the strong 
expansion in the 1870s and 1880s, in the “initial boom” in the 1890s and in the period before WWI. 
Our sources and methodology to construct the series are given in detail in the Appendix 2 to 
Chapter 4. In the recent literature, attempts have been made to introduce these categories into the 
historical analysis by Álvarez (2008), Álvarez, et al. (2011) (both for New Zealand and Uruguay) 
and Álvarez & Willebald (2009) (for Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and Uruguay). Now we 
improve our estimates with more and better sources and thus make our assumptions more precise, 
and we can extend the analysis to include more countries (Canada and Chile). 
2.1 Two distributive patterns 
We can identify two “patterns” in the average for the period (see Table 4.3). In the countries in 
the South American Southern Cone –the River Plate countries (Argentina and Uruguay) and Chile– 
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income composition is dominated by land rents, with shares of over half total agrarian income. On 
the other hand, this share is smaller in Canada and New Zealand, with ratios of 47 and 43 per cent, 
respectively, and Australia with an average of 50 per cent. This relatively smaller share for land 
rents contrasts with the situation in the Southern Cone, but with different modalities.  
Wage Rent Profit Wage Rent Profit
1869 34% 54% 12% 1871 31% 51% 18%
1875 27% 59% 14% 1881 28% 46% 26%
1888 32% 48% 21% 1891 26% 60% 14%
1895 24% 41% 35% 1901 34% 53% 13%
1914 21% 67% 12% 1911 25% 39% 36%
Average 28% 54% 19% Average 29% 50% 21%
Wage Rent Profit Wage Rent Profit
1871 22% 48% 30% 1875 18% 61% 21%
1881 23% 44% 33% 1885 14% 57% 29%
1891 27% 55% 19% 1895 17% 62% 20%
1901 20% 37% 43% 1907 21% 49% 30%
1911 21% 50% 29% 1915 15% 57% 28%
Average 23% 47% 31% Average 17% 57% 26%
Wage Rent Profit Wage Rent Profit
1874 23% 33% 44% 1874 37% 46% 17%
1881 35% 42% 22% 1883 26% 49% 24%
1891 30% 41% 29% 1893 21% 49% 29%
1901 26% 48% 26% 1903 25% 48% 27%
1911 30% 51% 20% 1912 21% 68% 11%
Average 29% 43% 28% Average 26% 52% 22%
Source: see Appendix 2 to Chapter 4.
NEW ZEALAND URUGUAY
Table 4.3
AGRARIAN SECTOR: FUNCTIONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Shares on the total Agrarian GDP (%)
ARGENTINA AUSTRALIA
CANADA CHILE
 
On the one hand, in Australasia there was higher total wages in the agrarian sector, with ratios of 
almost 30 per cent. The “Australian settlers ranged in a gamut extending from the humble poor to 
the propertied middle class … More of the upper class was omitted from the fragment of British 
society which was Australia. The working classes predominated in its founding, and their attitudes 
were of a special character.” (Rosecrance, 1964: 282). In Australia, “…the cleavage between labour 
and capital was much more pronounced than in North America. Even farming was more capitalist 
… The average Australian was not his own economic boss. He was a wage earner, like the native of 
Britain…” (Burt, 1965: 75). On the other hand, the high share of profits in the Canadian distribution 
(an average of more than 30 per cent) can probably be explained by the fact that there were many 
family farms and small producers so property capital was a significant income source. New Zealand 
was very like Australia except that it had more intensive and more effective land policies, (at least 
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from 1890 onwards; see Chapter 5) and its pattern of high wages and profits make its income 
structure comparable to that of Canada. 
One problem in evaluating the structure of income distribution is that the three components are 
all moving at the same time and the proportions change in diverse directions. To help understand 
the figures, we present indicators that relate income shares: land rents/profits (R/P), wage/land rents 
(W/R), and wage/profits (W/P) (see Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). In the graphs, to illustrate the 
differences we show the averages in the period for each ratio compared to the mean for the “club”.84 
Source: see Appendix 2 to Chapter 4.
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R/P ratios are significantly higher in the River Plate, Chile and Australia than in New Zealand 
and Canada (Figure 4.1). Argentina (2.8), Chile (2.2), Uruguay (2.4) and Australia (2.3) had ratios 
where the land rent share was more than twice the profit share. Note that the ratios for New Zealand 
and Canada have a narrower gap (1.5 in both cases). At the same time, when we consider W/R ratios 
the “club” has a similar profile in which land rental predominates over wages (ratios lower than 1), 
although the Southern Cone shows the more intensive pattern. Canada has the same characteristic 
                                                 
84 Strictly speaking, the graphs do not cover the period 1870-1913 but they consider data from the 1870s to around 
WWI. 
 173
while Australia and New Zealand present the contrary feature, with relatively higher wages (Figure 
4.2). The relatively lower land rents in New Zealand are a common result in the comparison with 
profits and wages, while this outcome is true in the case of Australia and Canada when we compare 
rents with, respectively, wages and profits (Figure 4.3). It is interesting to distinguish between two 
distributive patterns. In one of them, the Spanish ex-colonies, the economic relationships based on 
agrarian rental incomes predominated, and in the other, the British ex-colonies, where capitalist 
relationships were predominant and encouraged the dynamics of larger markets. 
In economies in which a large proportion of the total wealth is in the form of land, total savings 
can be used either to accumulate capital and attend to market demand or to invest in land (Kurz & 
Salvadori, 1995; Foley & Michl, 1999). When land is still relatively abundant, investment in this 
asset is aimed at reaping the benefits that would come from rising land prices. As land prices go up, 
owners of capital spend a larger part of their wealth on land, and this slows down capital 
accumulation. On the other hand, when land is not abundant –the frontier is closed– rises in land 
rents depress profits and boost capital expenditure up to the point at which investment in physical 
capital virtually stops. In both cases resources are diverted from their alternative destination –capital 
accumulation– in a sense very close to the idea of the crowding out approach to the curse of an 
abundance of natural resources (see Chapter 1) and it bases our interest on a “rentist income 
structure” in some of the members of the “club”. When we consider that capital accumulation is one 
of the main sources of growth and technical change, economies in which land rents and/or 
opportunities for land speculation are greater, they will find obstacles to the structural change which 
will affect development in the long run. This expectative is not incompatible with stages of 
economic growth during the period of land frontier expansion. Difficulties arose when this 
incorporation of “new” productive factor ran out its influence and the economies faced the 
challenge of the industrialization. In our framework, these differences between economies may be 
understood in terms of the possibility of land to generate differential rents –more favourable on 
higher quality land– and the quality of the institutions that can moderate the “curse”. 
2.2 Income evolution in the face of the First Globalization 
What was the impact of the First Globalization? Or more specifically, what were the reactions to 
the price boom in the 1890s to WWI period? Again, instead of comparing wages and land rental 
rates as is proposed in the more extended literature (Williamson, 2000, 2002, was the precursor of 
extensive literature on this subject85), we can contrast the evolutions of total wages, rents and 
profits. This approach differs from the traditional analysis because our ratios include the double 
effect of changes in earning rates (wages, land rentals, profit rates) and in the number of earners 
                                                 
85 See Chapter 1, Section 1, for a review. 
 174
(workers, hectares and capital units).86 Considering that landowners are a minimal proportion of the 
population –and that these economies expanded during the period– the increasing share of land 
rental against wages (and profits) represents worsening inequality. However, the relation between 
profits and wages in the agrarian sector is not so evident. Estimates of the number of “capitalists” 
are even more imprecise than estimates of the number of workers, and the farm ownership structure 
means there are overlaps in these productive roles. In other words, while in some regions 
“capitalists”, “workers” and “landowners” are clearly different agents, in others (especially where 
family farms predominate) the returns to capital and labour can accrue to the same individual. Then, 
to focus the discussion on income distribution, we do not consider the W/P ratio as a reference and 
we take R/P because we want to catch the “rentist” character of the agrarian sector. Therefore, in 
our exercise we compare land rentals with wages (R/W) and profits (R/P). In both cases it is 
important to consider levels (by what factor do total rents exceed total wages and total profits?) and 
the evolution (rising trajectories represent a higher share for rental incomes in agrarian society). 
Although all settler economies underwent “rental drifts” during the First Globalization, the timing 
and intensity of the process was different in each case.87 
Until the 1890s, the average in the “club” was that total land rents amounted to twice total 
wages,88 but the commodity price boom and land frontier expansion in the First Globalization from 
the 1890s to WWI caused this ratio to increase to 2.7. The impact was not immediate; it only came 
after a period when the indicator decreased (see Figure 4.4). This result is consistent with our 
theoretical framework that considers that the incorporation of “new” land requires time and the 
application of resources to clear land, and this may delay the yield of the investment (which, 
depending on the type of the factor, may be rents or profits). At the same time, wages on the 
frontier may be higher for workers –wage-premium– and they may even be able to press for higher 
pay in other regions (see Harley, 2007, for an explanation about Canada). 
Canada (Figure 4.6) had levels and followed a trend very similar to the average for the settlers’ 
“club” (steady at around 2.1). In Australasia (Figures 4.5 and 4.8) levels were generally lower than 
the average although the evolutions followed different trajectories. The worsening impact in 
Australian income distribution was felt in the 1890s, before the other settler countries. It was 
probably linked to that country having an earlier process of land frontier expansion (see Chapter 3). 
Afterwards the ratio returned to the previous level. In New Zealand, worsening income distribution 
                                                 
86 We are assuming that the different groups are homogenous and the dispersion within the group is low. This 
simplification may lead to errors when the economies become more “sophisticated”, and when the owners of productive 
factors combine the roles of workers, capitalists and landowners. Our countries preserved features of traditional 
economies during the period so our assumption should not bias the results. 
87 Arroyo (2008) discusses a similar non-uniform evolution of the land rental/wage ratio when she extends the analysis 
to the decades prior to 1870.  
88 The average ratio for the 1870s was 1.94, for the 1880s it was 2.16, and for the 1890s it was 2.10. 
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was persistent, but it started from very low levels and did not reach the ratios of the River Plate on 
the eve of WWI. This process of worsening moderated at the beginning of the 20th century, a fact 
that is consistent with the intensification and subdivision of estates in that period (see Chapter 5). 
In Argentina, the impact of the price boom on inequality raised the indicator to 3.3 (Figure 4.4) 
and in Uruguay to 3.2 (Figure 4.9). Income distribution in Chile improved during the closing 
decades of the 19th century but this trend was reversed in the first decade of 20th. Chile began the 
1900s with the highest levels and the previous improvement was associated with changes outside 
agriculture. Frontier expansion in the 1880s and 1890s was led by mining (in the North), and the 
competitive effects on the labour market made for upward pressure in other sectors.89 
Figure 4.4
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Figure 4.6
CANADA AND SETTLERS: EVOLUTION INCOME DISTRIBUTION
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These trajectories are correlated with our findings about land frontier expansion in Chapter 3. In 
Argentina, Uruguay and New Zealand income distribution clearly worsened (from different levels) 
and they are precisely the economies that extended their frontiers to the “best” aptitude lands. At the 
same time, Chile’s income distribution evolution was not homogenous with a strong worsening in 
                                                 
89 See Rodríguez Weber (2009) and Bértola and Rodríguez Weber (2009) for an extensive analysis of the evolution of 
income distribution in Chile from the mid-19th century to 1930. See Rodríguez Weber and Willebald (2010) for an 
analysis of the evolution of agrarian functional income distribution in Chile during the First Globalization. 
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the end of the period, which is consistent with the irregular trajectory of its land frontier expansion 
that affected several sectors (mining and agriculture). Finally, the relatively moderate frontier 
expansion in Canada and Australia, with high contributions of medium and low quality lands, 
seems coherent with a steady movement in income evolution. 
Source: see Appendix 2 to Chapter 4.
Figure 4.8
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Until the 1880s, the difference between total land rentals and profits was greater than the 
difference between total land rents and wages (by a factor of 2.390) in the “club” and income 
distribution worsened to an equivalent extent (the ratio increased to 3.1 in the 1910s). The First 
Globalization had huge impacts in terms of the accumulation of land and capital and their returns, 
and the general rule was for pressure to make income distribution worse. However, unlike in the 
previous case, the representativeness of the average is lower and the differences between each 
economy and the mean of the “club” were marked, especially in the cases of Argentina (Figure 
4.10), Australia (Figure 4.11) and Uruguay (Figure 4.15).  
Figure 4.10
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In the River Plate the pattern was similar. In a process that might be a result of the increasing 
capitalization of agrarian activity (wire fences, buildings, irrigation channels), both indicators fell 
                                                 
90 The average ratio for the 1870s was 2.55 and for the 1880s it was 2.20. 
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up to the end of the 19th century. The impact of the price boom and land frontier expansion made 
for a significant rise in the index until it reached levels where rents almost 6 times profit shares. 
However, Australia showed an inverse evolution, and starting in the 1890s with values between 4 
and 5, the share of rents on profits decreased until similar values were reached (the ratio in the 
1910s was almost 1). The capitalization of Australian agriculture and the “desire to change the 
environment” (Williams, 1975:87), which became very noticeable in the closing decades of the 19th 
century, were led by the mechanization of production, the construction of irrigation systems and the 
progressively increasing use of fertilizers and special varieties of cereals that made for increasing 
profits. The evolution in Canada (Figure 4.12) and New Zealand (Figure 4.14) was predominantly 
below the settler average, which denotes an income structure where rents exceed profits with a 
narrower gap. In other words, they were less “rentist” and more “capitalist” economies than the 
others. Finally, Chile (Figure 4.13) had a similar trajectory to the mean of the club, which confirms 
that the main component in the inequality was the difference between landowners and workers 
(Figure 4.7). The capitalization in the agriculture only became important in the 20th century, and its 
effect would be very marked in the subsequent decades (see Rodriguez Weber & Willebald, 2010).  
Figure 4.12
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Source: see Appendix 2 to Chapter 4.
Figure 4.14
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It is important to consider that in our methodological approach total profits are estimated by 
difference. Therefore, strictly speaking, it is a variable that reflects not only total profits but 
estimation errors as well. We believe that the directions of the trends are correct, but it is possible 
that changes may have exaggerated the processes. This point is very important and we will enlarge 
upon it next stages of our research about settler economies and economic development. In 
particular, the debate as to whether economic growth is profit-led or wage-led 91 seems an attractive 
question to analyze and has a bearing on the long-run performance of the “club” and the creation of 
“(post) staples economies” in the second half of the 20th century (Wellstead, 2007). 
3. Final remarks 
Our analysis makes three main contributions, one of them in the empirical field and the others in 
analytical matters. In empirical terms, we present original estimates of functional income 
distribution in the agrarian sector of settler economies and we do comparative exercises with them. 
Calculation methodology, sources and assumptions are presented in the Appendix 2 to this Chapter. 
We make two contributions to advance in analytical fields. First, the impact of the First 
Globalization on natural resource abundant (land-abundant) economies in terms of inequality was 
that income distribution worsened, and in this finding we are consistent with the more extended 
evidence (although we are working with a different framework). Our estimates for the agrarian 
sector in the club show that wages and profits trended to lose share in sector income while land 
rentals gained (in a process that we call “rental drifts”). This evolution was clearer in the River Plate 
economies and Chile than in Australasia and Canada, where the evidence is mixed and the 
distribution among proprietors of productive factors varied. Second, it is interesting to distinguish 
between two distributive patterns. In one, the former British colonies, capitalist relations (related to 
profits) and broader markets (related to wages) were relatively predominant, but in the other, the ex-
colonies of Spain, economic relations were based on agrarian rental incomes. However, the 
trajectories of the club members were not uniform and they were affected in numerous ways, and 
our aim is to determine how the dynamics of land frontier expansion was probably one of the main 
factors in these different influences.  
The availability of land resources was the main comparative advantage that enabled these 
economies to participate in world commodity markets and was the basis for their export-led growth 
strategy. But at the same time the First Globalization created pressure to increase inequality. This 
pressure was expressed as a wider gap between land rentals and other income modalities (wages 
and profits), a process that combined rising rental rates and the expansion of the productive factor 
                                                 
91 See Bhaduri (2008) for a recent discussion of this concept.  
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more intensively used to produce food and raw materials (land reacts endogenously to 
improvements in the terms of trade). However, the natural endowments of the settler economies in 
the “club” were not homogenous throughout their respective territories, and this made for differing 
results. In our theoretical framework, moving the land frontier onto the “best” land would foster the 
adverse effects on inequality because it would enable a reduced segment of the population 
(landowners) to capture increasing rents. The more intensive worsening in income distribution in 
the agrarian sector in the River Plate was associated with the different timing of land frontier 
expansion onto land that was better as regards agricultural aptitude and distance. However, the 
effects of an abundance of natural resources on economic development are not determined by 
resource endowments alone; we must consider institutional factors so as to make the explanation 
more complete. The prevailing conditions contributed to the creation of a “rentist” pattern in 
Spain’s ex-colonies, where land ownership ensured the elite received incomes without having to 
make large investments in production, and because land concentration was high due to the colonial 
heritage (Bértola et al, 2010). In other words, land frontier expansion occurred at the same time that 
the institutional arrangements that created a new land ownership rights system were set up. This 
will be our central theme in Chapter 5.  
Willebald & Bértola (2011) analyze the impact of income and land distribution on the economic 
performance of settler economies, and they say that “…the fact that the distribution of land 
ownership has little explanatory power would suggest, as a first approach, that it is the generation of 
income flows, acting together with the incorporation of capital –in its various modalities– that 
creates the dynamics of demand that impacts on trade and productive specialization.” Like in that 
article, we find that in the “club” of settler economies there are clear differences in the evolution of 
inequality when we evaluate incomes, but the differences are less marked when we consider land 
ownership. These authors argue that it is also possible that, even in countries where competitiveness 
was highly dependent on natural resources, other forms of capital ownership might be more 
significant for wealth distribution, such as financial assets, urban property or industries processing 
primary products. Our analysis sheds new light on this question.  
The literature has concentrated on land ownership and not paid enough attention to the quality of 
land factor. We introduce this aspect into the discussion and consider agrarian aptitude, and the 
interaction with institutional quality. The appropriability problem arises when it is possible to 
capture huge rental differentials in the process of land frontier expansion. If institutions give 
legitimacy to this trajectory, income distribution will worsen more intensively. This was what 
happened in the settler economies in the South American Southern Cone. The evolution was more 
related to the generation of incomes than to the ownership of land, it was a process that involved all 
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agents regardless of whether or not they were proprietors, and the generation of wealth involved the 
participation of assets other than land, such as railways, ports, financial support and agrarian 
machinery. We deal with this subject in greater depth in Chapter 5. 
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 4 
Inequality measures 
 
1. Gini Index 
The Gini Index is the average difference between all possible pairs of incomes in the population, 
expressed as a proportion of total income.92 Considering the population size as n, the income (from 
other assets) of person i as yi –with i = 1, …, n–, and y  as the average income,93 we define Gini 
Index (G) in the following terms (Cowell, 2008:147): 
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2. Generalized Entropy indexes 
Generalized Entropy indexes are a family of indicators derived from the Information Theory that 
simultaneously satisfies the properties of the weak principle of transfers, decomposability, scale 
independence and the population principle (Cowell, 2008: 50-63).  It may be expressed as follows:  
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Where θ is a real parameter that may be given any value, positive, zero or negative, and higher 
values of Eθ represent increasing inequality. The maximum value of Eθ is ∞ if θ≤0 and  
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in other cases.  
 
                                                 
92 The Gini Index is usually defined from consideration of proportions of areas in the Lorenz Curve.  
93 In our exercises we use the hectares of land that a person posses as yi (and the average) in the following formulation.     
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Appendix 2 to Chapter 4 
Functional income distribution: estimation methodology, 
sources and assumptions  
1. Introduction 
We estimate the functional income distribution of the agrarian sector during the First  
Globalization –from 1870 to the WWI– in selected settler economies (Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
Chile, New Zealand and Uruguay), and we take one year from each decade as a benchmark. We 
choose years that represent points in time prior to the strong expansion (the 1870s and 1880s), the 
“initial boom” (during the 1890s) and the period before WWI. The available information on the 
settler economies varies, both in quantity and quality, and we need to make several assumptions and 
specific calculations to obtain compatible estimates. Our aim in this Appendix is to describe the 
estimation method and the different decisions we made. We survey and estimate the agrarian 
product, wages and total land rents in the agrarian sector. Profits were obtained as a residual in all 
the cases. In general, the evolution of the variables at current prices is irregular. As far as possible 
we smooth out the series by calculating 3-year averages to reduce the risk of taking an abnormal 
year as a benchmark, and we take the middle year of the three to name out mark. We usually use 
reverse chronological order starting with a benchmark year for the 1910s. Our decision to take some 
year close to WWI as a reference is based on the availability of data about the diverse components 
of the aggregated variables. Information from the previous decades is scarce and it is usually 
necessary to use indirect indicators. We select a year in each decade as a benchmark on the basis of 
information availability criteria and we explain this point separately for each country. 
In this introduction we outline the general themes and aspects that are common to all our 
economies and we organize our material by country (in sections) and by variable and period (in 
subsections). Each section includes details of (i) agrarian product, (ii) rents, and (iii) wages, 
although the ordering within each subsection differs depending on what is most suitable for the 
explanation. At the end of Appendix there are bibliographical references classify by section.  
1.1 Agrarian income 
To measure agrarian income we consider the gross domestic product (GDP) of the activity 
according to official data and the best available estimates. We have annual estimates at current 
prices for Australia, Canada and Uruguay, at constant prices for Argentina and Chile, and estimates 
of other variables for New Zealand that we associate with agrarian GDP. We have estimates of 
agrarian income for Uruguay and Chile. We use these data to calculate some components of the 
total distribution, but as we have agrarian GDP for the other countries we work with GDP to 
maintain homogeneity within the sample. We will refer to agrarian income as agrarian product. 
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1.2 Land income 
In a previous study (Álvarez & Willebald, 2009), to measure land income we followed Dwyer 
(2003) and Gaffney (1970). In general, when the value of land is stable, land income is the annual 
rental for the land. However, when land value increases, the future rentals for land are expected to 
be higher. As a result, land has two types of yields or returns, one directly associated with the 
productive activity and the other with land value appreciation (like in the case of an investment). 
(see Carmona & Rosés, 2009, for a discussion). There is little reliable historical data available about 
this so researchers usually adopt a conservative 5 per cent fixed rental yield and add a percentage to 
represent the accrual of future rentals. However, this method introduces too many assumptions and 
as far as possible we have used a different approach to estimating land income.  
Our aim is to calculate rents in terms of the earnings remuneration of land as a productive factor 
regardless of whether or not the land has been rented. Therefore we consider the total of land used 
for agricultural production (cultivated land and pasture) and measures of the rental rate per surface 
unit (hectares or acres). In order to consider the differences as regards the quality and relative 
remoteness of land we include in our estimation the geographical differential value of the land and 
its rental rates. This is especially important when dealing with large economies such as Argentina, 
Australia and Canada. In this sense, we follow the Ricardian concept of land rent. 
“Rent is that portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for the 
use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil. It is often, however, 
confounded with the interest and profit of capital, and in popular language the term is 
applied to whatever is annually paid by a farmer to his landlord. If, of two adjoining 
farms of the same extension and of the same natural fertility, one had all the 
convenience of farm buildings, and was properly drained and manured, and 
advantageously divided by hedges, fences and walls, while the other had none of these 
advantages, more remuneration would naturally be paid for the use of one than for the 
use of the other; yet in both cases this remuneration would be called rent. But it is 
evident, that only a portion of the money paid annually for the improved farm would be 
given for the original and indestructible powers of the soil; the other portion would be 
paid for the use of the capital which had been employed to ameliorate the quality of the 
land and to erect such buildings as were necessary to secure and preserve the produce.” 
[Ricardo (1821 [2010]), Ch.2:5]. 
However, it is usually very difficult to distinguish between land and land improvements, and 
sometimes our data include some components that exceed the strict concept “of the original and 
indestructible powers of the soil”. 
It is common in the literature to use the evolution of the price of land to gauge the movement of 
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rental rates (Austin, 2007; Bértola, et al., 1999; Bohlin & Larsson, 2007; Emery, et al., 2007; 
Greasley & Oxley, 2005; Shanahan & Wilson, 2007; Williamson, 2000 and 2002) and we employ a 
similar definition. However, it is not enough to apply land price movements to estimate the rental 
rate because the evolution has to be corrected by the interest rate. 
In our conceptual framework (see Chapter 2) the key relation –as a decision rule– is the 
following: ρ
φ
=Λ=
)('
)('
N
npa       (1) 
In the long run, the rate of return on clearing land (Λ) –the relation between the marginal income 
[pa’(n)] and the marginal cost [φ’(N)] of clearing land– must be equal to the interest rate ρ  (which 
represents the opportunity cost). The marginal income on clearing land is the value (considering the 
relative price of land output or agricultural good, p) of the marginal physical productivity of the 
land (a’(n)), and this relation equals the land rent (q) in the equilibrium. The marginal cost of 
clearing –that is, the cost for one unit of (new) land– is the land price (pN).  Therefore, we can 
rewrite the relation (1) as: q= pN . ρ       (2) 
Therefore, if we want to deduce the evolution of the rental rate (the rent for one unit of land) in 
the long run we need to consider the movement of land prices and the interest rate. Williamson 
(2007):204 gives the same warning when analyzing the recent literature about this question and 
Arroyo Abad (2008) proposes this empirical correction for four Latin American countries in the 19th 
century.94 Data about interest rates is scarce but some partial information indicates a downward but 
not continuous trend during the period (see Willebald, 2010, for a survey). A proxy for the local 
interest rate is the yield of government bonds, a homogenous measure that quantifies the financing 
opportunity cost in those economies. We use data from Obstfeld & Taylor (2003) and we work with 
triennial averages centred in the mid-year. Usually we refer to the coefficient “price-interest rate” as 
the index to adjust rental rates in the long run. The amount of land used for crops and livestock 
grazing is agricultural census data, and where this is not available we use technical coefficients of 
production to estimate areas by regions (this was our procedure for Argentina, Uruguay and New 
Zealand). We refer to land income as total land rents or rental mass. 
1.3 Labour income 
To measure labour income we consider the salary mass in agrarian activity including cattle 
production, crops and farming, and as a reference we take the income of an unskilled day labourer. 
During the period, specialized work usually involved seasonal tasks (harvests or the shearing 
season) and paid very high (abnormal) wages. Whenever possible we take into account three 
                                                 
94 Their conceptual reference is Jorgenson (1963), who proposes a theoretical explanation of capital accumulation 
within the Neoclassical Theory framework. 
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components: the number of agrarian labourers (wage-earners), the wage rate (without board 95) and 
the number of hours worked. Information availability varies among the six countries, and depending 
on the data we use official statistics, index numbers, other estimates or even data from particular 
labour-contracts (in which case we discuss how representative they are). In several cases we obtain 
different levels of wages that are not consistent with the result of applying the Nominal Wage Index 
to our benchmark. This is not strange because the index can cover other items and involve different 
weights, but we can presume that the indicator correctly follows the dynamics of the variable. We 
interpolate intermediate values between levels with the movement of the index and so re-scale the 
series. The method is as follows: 
We have two values of our variable (w): w0, wage rate in t=0, and wj, wage rate in t=j. 
We have an appropriate index to approach wage evolution:  
NWIt: Nominal wage index, with t=0, …, j 
Our objective is to join w0 and wj with the trajectory of NWIt, maintaining the same “shape” of 
the evolution but re-scaling the index to splice the series and interpolate values for specific years. 
We calculate the variations for the whole period from 0 to j.  
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The yearly correction coefficient (YCC) is calculated as the (annualized) relation between the 
two whole variations:  
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We adjust each annual variation in the index with the YCC (as the ratio of the two factors) and 
re-calculate variations to apply to the extreme figures of our interest variable.96 
We refer to labour income as total wages or salary mass.   
2. Argentina 
Our selection of benchmarks basically depends on the availability of census data, and we 
supplement this with additional information. We propose the following benchmarks: 1869, 1875, 
1888, 1895 and 1914. 
2.1 Agrarian product 
The agrarian product at constant prices (1914 million pesos) comes from Cortes Conde 
                                                 
95 Board is the provision of meals and lodging. Our series correspond to wages without board. If the labour contract was 
negotiated in terms of monetary payments, meals and lodging, we put a value on this payment-in-kind. Wages without 
board are higher than wages with board because wages, in our terms, are associated with monetary payments.  
96 Some similar operations are applied to land prices. 
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(1994):16 and covers the period 1875-1913. Previous years are estimated from Maddison (2001) 
considering the total GDP growth from 1870 to 1890.97 Figures were inflated by a cost of living 
index presented in Williamson (1999) and commented on Williamson (1995):163. The deflator does 
not cover all GDP but as the share of consumption is very high we assume it is a good proxy.98 
2.2 Rents 
• Total land rents 1914 
The Third National Census in the Republic of Argentina (Tercer Censo Nacional de la 
República Argentina, henceforth TCRA) of 1914 has information about land rents (precio del 
arrendamiento) for farming and livestock establishments at the provincial level (24 provinces99), 
and it distinguishes leasing periods (less than 3 years, 3, 4 and 5 years, and more than 5 years) and 
monetary ranges (Argentine pesos per hectare). 
For cattle establishments,100 the ranges are as follows: less than 0.20 Argentine pesos, 0.21-0.5, 
0.51-1, 1.1-2, 2.1-5, 5.1-10, 10.1-15, and more than 15 Argentine pesos. For farming activities, the 
ranges are: less than 5 Argentine pesos, 5-10, 11-20, 21-30, and more than 30 pesos.101 In addition, 
the ranges are presented in accordance with percentages of crops (10%, 20%, 30% and more) but 
this information is not considered in our calculations. By considering the simple average for total 
rented establishments (105,899 in 306,603 estates) we obtain rental rates by types of production for 
each province. The census has information about the area of total exploitation in accordance with 
the main activity. Our estimate of total rents in 1914 is based on farming and livestock areas valued 
at rental rates and the value represents the 67% of total income (1,133 million Argentine pesos). 
• Land areas 1869, 1875, 1888 and 1895 
Data about rents in different regions in previous periods are not available, so we need to gauge 
their evolution from indirect indicators. Total rents constitute a value with two factors –quantity and 
price components– and we estimate the changes in both over time by using appropriate proxies. We 
start by looking at the quantity component by considering the land used for pastoral production.  
We assume that in our period of analysis pastoral land, by bovine unity, expanded at the same 
rate as total factor productivity (TFP) in the agrarian activity. Pastoral production in Argentina 
included cattle and sheep and the “bovine unity” is the equivalent number of animals considered as 
                                                 
97 Maddison (2001) presents information corresponding to 1870 and 1890. 
98 In 1913-1915, the private consumption (included changes in stocks) amounted to 76 per cent of GDP (Ferrerés, 
2005:171-172) and the composition of consumption included a high proportion of food, beverages and raw materials 
derived from agriculture. 
99 At the time of the census, the territory of Los Andes was surveyed as a separate administrative jurisdiction. However, 
in our estimates this region is included in Salta. 
100 We place available or non-used plots in this category. 
101 Such differences in the levels of rents between lands for livestock and for crops can be considered as differences in 
terms of land quality (or, equivalently, productivity). This evidence is our fundament to assume the higher rent of high 
quality land respect to low quality land (qH > qL in Chapter 2). 
 187
if there was only cattle production. In this sense, the number of bovine unities per hectare is a 
measure of productivity, and we assume that this measure moved like TFP. As we know the number 
of animals per hectare in 1914 and the corresponding land that was used, we can calculate a 
technical coefficient for each province.  
Considering that in terms of the use of the nutritive characteristics of grass, 8 sheep are 
equivalent to 1 cow (Cortes Conde, 1979:63102), we calculate the “equivalent cattle” per province 
and the ratio between this figure and land surface area in 1914.103 These are measures of 
productivity and we reduce them in accordance with changes in the TFP (Newland & Poulson, 
1998104) to estimate the corresponding ratios for 1895. As the TCRA has information about the 
numbers of rural animals in 1895, we can immediately estimate the extent of land per province used 
for pastoral production.105 We repeat the method to estimate the 1888 (according to TCRA) and the 
1875 values (in accordance with Vázquez-Presedo, 1971: 52106). We took data for 1869 from Cortes 
Conde (1979): 277. We do not have data for all the provinces, and we assume that provinces 
without figures did not have sheep or cattle (scarce information is probably associated with small 
numbers of animals). 
As regards agricultural activity, we approach the changes in the amount of land used for crops by 
gauging the amount of land used to grow plants per province. Our data for 1914 are from the TCRA 
and include cereals, industrial plants, legumes and vegetables. The data for 1895 are from the 
Second Republic of Argentina census (Segundo Censo de la República Argentina, henceforth 
SCRA) of 1895 and include trees, cereals (wheat, corn, flax, barley), industrial plants (vines, 
peanuts, sugar cane, tobacco, cotton), legumes and vegetables, and fodder.107 We apply the growth 
rates calculated to the agricultural land area of 1914 to obtain 1895 data for each province.  
For 1888 it is not possible to replicate the same method at a provincial level. Therefore we use 
the data for the total cultivated area of four important crops (wheat, maize, sugar cane and potatoes) 
in 1875, 1888 and 1895, derived from Mitchell (2007), and apply the movements to the closer 
                                                 
102 Cortes Conde (1979:63, Chart 2.8) uses this relation in accordance with census definitions (Censo General de la 
Provincia de Buenos Aires, 1881). In Uruguay, the relation extensively used for agrarian production is lower (1 cow = 5 
sheep) (Astori et al., 1979; Moraes, 2001). Clearly the ratio changes over time –because of technological progress and 
changes in the regions to do with the natural conditions of the soils– although our results are no much affected by these 
changes. If we change the relation by 30 per cent and consider values of 5.6 instead of 8, we obtain a share of rents in 
total agrarian GDP of 42 per cent in 1895 instead of 41 per cent, and 50 per cent in 1888 instead of 48 per cent. The 
biggest difference occurs in 1869 when we obtain a share of 60 per cent instead of 54 per cent.   
103 Land intensity was greatest in Buenos Aires (0.60 equivalent cattle per hectare) and lowest in San Juan (0.02). 
104 The annual rates of change in the TFP were 0.5 per cent in 1865-1908 (2 per cent in 1825-1908). Newland & 
Poulson (1998): 341, Table 3. 
105 Our data for 1895 aggregate Buenos Aires province and the Federal Capital. The information about the latter is from 
the Segundo Censo de la República Argentina. Our estimates follow this criterion in all cases.  
106 The sum of provincial data differs from the total that the source reports. For total sheep, the difference is 1,000 out 
of 57,547,000 sheep, and was not considered. For total cattle, the difference is 502,000 out of 13,993,000 cattle, and it 
was proportionally distributed among the provinces that had data in 1888. 
107 Cultivated land increased by a factor of 3 in the period and almost 90 per cent of the expansion was in four 
provinces: Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, Córdoba and La Pampa. 
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figure maintaining the same provincial structure as for 1895. To estimate the land extension of 
agricultural activity in 1869, we maintain the rate of growth in the 1872-1888 period (1872 is the 
first available figure). 
• Land prices 1869, 1875, 1888 and 1895 
Argentine Ministry of Agriculture (1926) provides information about land prices in the period 
1904-1924 (annual data) and 1899-1903 (average, in Argentine pesos per hectare) for 15 provinces 
and for an aggregate category of 9 provinces. However, there is scant information about land prices 
in each province in the 19th century. Diaz Alejandro (1970):46 presents information for 1888 for 5 
provinces (Buenos Aires, Santa Fé, Córdoba, Entre Ríos and La Pampa) that is compatible with the 
data mentioned above. The figures for 1895 were estimated by simple interpolation. We assume the 
evolution of land prices in the rest of the provinces to be the same as in the closer territories, and in 
some cases we take account of some specific characteristics of a province. We give a summary of 
our decisions in Table A4.1. 
Table A4.1 
PROVINCES ASSUMED AND REFERRED IN LAND PRICES 
1895 interpolations 
Province assumed  Provinces of reference 
Tucumán Same movement as Buenos Aires 
Corrientes and Misiones Same movement as Avg. Entre Ríos and Santa 
Fe 
San Luis, Mendoza and San 
Juan 
Same movement as Avg. Córdoba and La 
Pampa 
Santiago del Estero and 
Catamarca 
Same movement as Avg. Córdoba and Tucumán 
La Rioja Same movement as Avg. Córdoba and San Luis 
Salta and Jujuy Same movement as Avg. Tucumán and 
Catamarca 
Chaco Same value as Avg. Santiago del Estero 
and Catamarca 
Rest of the provinces Same value as  Chaco 
 
Mulhall & Mulhall (1869), (Sec. C, Ch. II, p. 16) present a sheep-farmer budget with information 
from Buenos Aires and consider a land price of £3,000 per half square league (equivalent to £3.35 
per hectare). We convert this value to the currency at that time (pesos papel) (Mulhall & Mulhall, 
1875, p. 412 and Global Financial Data) and then to the currency used in the previous sources 
(pesos moneda nacional) (Ferreres, 2005) to obtain compatible series. We interpolate the figure for 
1875 from the prices in 1888 and 1869 and adopt the same province structure as in 1888. 
• Total land rents 1869, 1875, 1888 and 1895 
We updated the rent rates (pesos argentinos per hectare) of 1914 by the movement in the land 
prices –corrected by the change in the interest rates– and multiply by the land occupied by crops 
and livestock (in hectares) obtained previously. 
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2.3 Wages 
We estimate total wages from estimates of wage-earners in agrarian activities (workers) and 
wage rates for each benchmark.  
• Wage rates 1914 
Information about wage rates by province is scarce and incomplete, and we assume that regional 
wage dispersion was low because we are mainly considering unskilled workers.  
Cortes Conde (1979):226-228 presents annual data (incomplete) of agrarian wages (porteros and 
peones; by month) from 1882 to 1914. We assign the level of 1913-1914 –40 Argentine pesos– to 
1914 as our initial benchmark. We compare with other source of 1912 (Boletín del Departamento 
Nacional de Trabajo, No. 25108) that provides data for two provinces and the levels are compatible. 
According with this source, wages per month without board were 40 and 37.50 Argentine pesos in 
Buenos Aires and Santa Fe, respectively (cattle production). We consider annual wages and 
therefore we multiply each figure by 12. 
• Wage rates 1869, 1875, 1888 and 1895  
Williamson (1999) presents a Nominal Wage Index for 1864-1940 and quotes Williamson 
(1995) as the main reference for the data. He uses Cortes Conde (1979) to calculate the index from 
1883 to 1903, so the figures are consistent with our initial benchmark. We project backwards the 
level of 1914 by the movement in the Williamson’s Nominal Wage Index to estimate the 1895 and 
1888 wage rates. For the previous period, he uses a different source that does not offer satisfactory 
results for our purposes, and we employ an alternative source. 
Barsky et al. (2005):389 present rural wages data for 5-year periods from 1860 to 1895, and they 
coincide with Cortes Conde’s figures for the respective years.109 We interpolate those data to 
complete annual series, calculate an index, and retropolate our 1888 level (17.9 Argentine pesos per 
month) by its movement to calculate the wage rates for 1875 (14 Argentine pesos) and 1869 (12 
Argentine pesos). As before, we multiply these values by 12 to obtain annual wages.  
• Agrarian workers 1895 and 1914 
In the Fourth Republic of Argentina Census (Cuarto Censo de la República Argentina, 
henceforth CCRA) of 1947, there are estimates of agrarian occupation in 1895, 1914 and 1947 
(552,114, 828,420 and 1,536,968, respectively). These data give us general trends but we must 
adjust the levels because these figures include occupiers with incomes other than wages, so we 
contrast them with alternative information. 
                                                 
108 Data kindly provided by Prof. Esteban Nicolini.  
109 Barsky et al. (2005) quote the following source: SEGUÍ, Francisco (1898): Investigación parlamentaria sobre 
agricultura, ganadería, industrias derivadas y colonización ordenada por la H. Cámara de Diputados en resolución de 
19 de junio de 1896. Anexo B. Provincia de Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires, Penintenciaría Nacional. 
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The TCRA presents data about the economically active population in agrarian activity in 1914. It 
classifies the population as “director’s family” or “employees”, and it distinguishes among male, 
female and children by province. We consider that employees are wage-earners, and from the 
director’s family only males earn wages when they are non-owners (otherwise their remuneration 
would be profits or rents). We assume that each establishment has one owner. Hence we consider 
total wage-earners as the sum of employees and director’s family males minus the total of land 
proprietors (estimated as total agrarian real estate units, from República Argentina, 1919: 3-6) and 
we obtain a figure of 732,632 workers (provincial distribution). We apply to this figure the growth 
of occupied population from the CSRA and so calculate the total of wage-earners in 1895 (488,275). 
• Agrarian workers 1869, 1875 and 1888 
The First National Census in the Republic of Argentina (Primer Censo Nacional de la República 
Argentina, henceforth PCRA) of 1869 and the SCRA of 1895 have information about the occupied 
population by professions, and in the second of these sources these categories are grouped into 
broad productive activities. We use the “production of raw material” as a reference to reproduce the 
same group in 1869 because it is the activity best linked to agriculture. We adjust the two groups to 
include only agrarian professions110 and assume that the 50 per cent of jornaleros work in 
agriculture.111 We discount professions with earnings other than wages (estancieros, hacendados 
and arrendatarios) and obtain 481,000 persons in 1895 (very close to our previous estimate) and 
229,640 for 1869; this amounts to an increase of 109.5 per cent over the period. With this growth 
rate we retropolate the 1895 estimate (488,275) to obtain a total of 233,117 wage-earners in 1869. 
The figures for 1875 and 1888 are obtained by interpolation. 
• Total wages 
Wages for each benchmark were estimated as the product of wage rates and agrarian workers.  
3. Australia 
Our selection of benchmarks basically depends on the availability of census data and specific 
surveys. The information is more complete and systematic than for Argentina. We propose the 
following benchmarks: 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911.  
                                                 
110 We include the following categories: abastecederos, agricultores, arrieros, cazadores, estancieros, hacendados, 
horticultores, leñadores, mayordomos, obrajeros, pasteros, pastores, vaqueros, sericultores, reconocedores de frutos, 
vinicultores, alambradores, arzoneros, fusteros, arboricultores, arrendatarios, baqueanos, capataces, clasificadores de 
frutos, chacareros, caballerizos, chancheros, cañamoneros, cañeros, colmeneros, domadores, estereros, enfardadores, 
gallineros, hortelanos, hueveros, labradores, medianeros, montaraces, puesteros, podadores, quinteros, segadores, 
tamberos, and lecheros. 
111 The occupation jornalero is a broad category that includes day labourers regardless of their type of economic 
activity. The conditions of this occupation varied across the country. In Buenos Aires it was very common to find 
jornaleros in port jobs but in provinces, with their greater agriculture specialization, they were mainly in the agrarian 
sector. We consider that our criterion is suitable because we obtain a total population occupied in agriculture that is 
close to the census data of 1895   
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3.1 Agrarian product 
We use data calculated by Butlin (1962). Although his estimates have been widely criticized (see 
for example, Haig, 2001) they are still in general use as the main statistical reference. 
3.2 Rents 
• Total rents 1911 
To our knowledge, the only study that estimates land income from the beginning of the 20th 
century is Dwyer (2003), who follows two studies by Robert Scott (1969 and 1986).112 To measure 
land income, he uses the same methodology as Gaffney (1970). In general, when land values are 
stable, land income is the annual rental for the land. However, when land values increase then 
future rentals for the land are expected to be higher. Therefore land has two types of yields or 
returns; one directly associated with the productive activity and the other with land value 
appreciation (like for any other asset). However, reliable historical data about these types of returns 
are usually not available so the author adopts a conservative 5 per cent fixed rental yield plus a 
representative percentage of the accrual from future rentals. He calculates the latter value by 
considering a 30-year period (1910-11 to 1939-40) and applying an iterative process that renders an 
“accrual yield” of 1.9679 per cent. For 1911/12, he estimates total land rents (smoothed land 
income) at AUD 63.7 million (£31.6m) and total land value at AUD 914 million (£453.6m) 
(exchange rates from Vamplew, 1987). The share of rents in the agrarian product for that year 
(£80.9m) is 39 per cent, and this will be our reference ratio as the initial benchmark.  
Australia has a very large surface area and it is important to bring regional differences into our 
estimates. Therefore we calculate the value of agrarian land in each state, on the assumption that the 
structure of rents coincides with the land value structure. 
• Land areas 1871, 1881, 1891 and 1901 
Since the second half of the 19th century data on land use has been published, with differing 
regularity, by all the states (Vamplew, 1987), depending on the availability of information, we 
interpolate figures or backwards project data in accordance with the evolution in other states to 
complete the series. The details are shown in Table A4.2. 
 
Table A4.2 
 STATES ASSUMED AND REFERRED IN AGRARIAN LAND AREA 
 Available data Interpolation Backward projection With the movement of: 
New South Wales 
1875, 1880 
1883-1913 
1876-1879 
1881-1882 
1871-1874 Victoria 
Victoria  1865-1913    
Queensland 1875, 1880-1913 1876-1879 1871-1874 South Australia 
South Australia 1862-1913    
                                                 
112 We were unable to consult these studies but Dwyer (2003) presents the results, discusses them and explains clearly 
the differences from his own estimates.  
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Tasmania 
1875, 1885...1910, 
1915 
1876-1879, 1886-
1889, ..., 1911-1914 
1871-1874 Victoria 
Western Australia 
1875, 1885...1910, 
1915 
1876-1879, 1886-
1889, ..., 1911-
1914. 
1871-1874 South Australia 
North Territory 
1900, 1905...1915 1901-1904,...1911-
1914 
  
• Land prices 1911 
The paper that is usually used as a basis for studying the evolution of Australian land prices 
during the First Globalization is Taylor (1992).113 He presents figures for Victoria (1865-1913), 
New South Wales (1883-1893, 1897-1913), Queensland (1881-1913) and South Australia (1862-
1913). He is cautious in his inter-state comparisons and especially so as regards New South Wales, 
whose data seems excessively high.114 On the other hand, he is confident that his indicators 
adequately represent the trends. We agree with him in all cases with the exception of New South 
Wales. In Figure A4.1 we present land prices in New South Wales (on the left axis) and Victoria 
(right axis) and compare their evolutions. The lack of information for the years 1894-1896 seems to 
coincide with a change in the trend and this raises doubts as to whether our calculations are suitable. 
Victoria’s evolution shows a decline in about the same period that New South Wales declines but 
the magnitude of the decrease is significantly less (9 and 27 per cent, respectively). Therefore, by 
level and evolution, we 
prefer to work with 
alternative information for 
New South Wales.  
One of the most 
important innovations in 
New South Wales 
government land policy at 
the beginning of the 20th 
century was the Closer 
Settlement Acts 1904 to 
1909, and the Closer 
Settlement Promotion Act 
1910. Under this regime, 
land prices in New South Wales reached 52 per cent of the value in Victoria in 1910-1912 and this 
ratio remained relatively stable until the 1930s (see Australia Statistical Yearbooks for 1934, 1932, 
                                                 
113 Taylor (1992) is the source of Williamson (2000, 2002). 
114 For instance, the land price of New South Wales in 1900 (£14) is almost ten times higher than Victoria’s figure.   
Figure A4.1
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1922, 1913, 1912 and 1911).115 Therefore we use the prices from Taylor (1992) for Victoria, 
Queensland and South Australia, and apply the relative prices derived from closer settlement 
transactions to calculate the New South Wales values. We employ similar criteria for Western 
Australia and Tasmania. North Territory was the last region in Australia to be occupied and we 
would have to consider the price was close to zero. Therefore, we use the lowest price (which was 
the price in Queensland) to give a value for occupied land in this territory. When we consider 
occupied land and prices by state, the exercise yields a total land value of £484m for 1911, which 
exceeds Dwyer’s (2003) calculation by just 10 per cent. The resulting state structure of land value is 
applied to total rents in 1911 (strictly, the average 1910/11-1911/12). 
• Land rent rates 1871, 1881, 1891 and 1901 
We use the Taylor (1992) series for Victoria, Queensland and South Australia, and we assume 
that the movement of land prices in Western Australia and the Northern Territory was similar to 
Queensland’s evolution, and movements in Tasmania were similar to those in Victoria. As to New 
South Wales in 1911, we maintain our reference of 52 per cent of Victoria’s price for 1901, and in 
the absence of better options, we consider Victoria’s land prices as a reference for the 19th century. 
• Total land rents 1871, 1881, 1891 and 1901 
We update total rents by state in 1911 by the movement in land prices –corrected by the change 
in interest rates– and multiply by the area of farm holdings.  
3.3 Wages 
• Agrarian workers 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911 
Vamplew (Ed.) (1987) provides data on employment in rural industries classified by colonies, 
states and territories for the years 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911. These data represent the 
economically active population and include non wage earners, casual and permanent employees, 
and proprietors and their families, but it excludes aborigines. The lack of 1891 and 1901 data for the 
Northern Territory means that Australia’s total is slightly underestimated. However, the share of 
this territory in total rural employment is very low (0.12 per cent at the beginning of the 1910s) and 
we interpolate the figures in accordance with the data for 1881 and 1911. Butlin & Dowie (1969) 
propose a division of the agricultural workforce in Australia in accordance with their grade and 
occupation classes (data for the whole country). They distinguish employees, the self employed, 
people providing assistance (unpaid) and wage-earners (receiving wages or a salary) by gender for 
1891, 1901, and 1911. The total workforce differs from the total employment figures in Vamplew 
(Ed.) (1987) by an average of 8 per cent. We consider the wage earners in Butlin & Dowie (1969) 
                                                 
115  1921 (57%). 1931-1933 (47%). 
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as farm workers and we apply Vamplew’s (Ed.) (1987) state structure to obtain data for 1891, 1901 
and 1911.116 We calculate data for 1881 and 1871 using the evolution of employment by colony in 
Vamplew (Ed.) (1987) and apply this to the figures above. 
• Wage rate 1914 
The Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics (1914) (CBCS) provides information on 
wage rates (minimums) for agriculture and livestock activities by state. There are three classes with 
various categories including farming (general labourers, harvesters, milkers, ploughmen), gardening 
–gardeners, nurserymen–, and pastoral workers –cooks, shearers (per 100), shed hands and wool 
pressers. We consider the simple average of all the categories except shearers because they were 
employed on a piecework system. There is information available for New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania, and calculating the weighted 
average (in accordance with the weights presented in CBCS, 1914: 45) we obtain a wage for all 
Australia of £2.65 in 1914. This figure is consistent with Withers et al. (1985) (£2.45), who presents 
series of minimum weekly wage rates by industry groups (adult male), in annual data for 1891, 
1896, 1901, 1906-1914. The source is the same (Labour Reports up to 1938) and we think that the 
difference (8 per cent) can be explained by the use of other weights or by gender differentiation. 
• Wage rates 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911 
We apply the structure of state wages (compared to the mean) in 1914 to the wage level that 
Withers et al. (1985):140 presents, and we consider the 1910-1912 average as the figure for 1911 
and express the data in annual terms.117 Then we project these figures back in time with the changes 
in minimum agriculture weekly wage rates by states (adult males) presented in Withers et al. 
(1985):144 corresponding to the years 1901 and 1891, and with the evolution of the weekly money 
wage indexes presented in Butlin (1962):158 and surveyed in Withers et al. (1985):154. Indexes are 
not available for Western Australia and Tasmania so we apply the same movements as in the New 
South Wales series. For North Territory we use the same wage level as Western Australia. 
• Total Wages 
Total wages for each benchmark were estimated as the product of wage rates and agrarian 
workers classified by colony and state. 
4. Canada 
The information available for Canada is similar to what is available for Australia except that, for 
some series, the coverage is better and the concepts more precise. Our selection of benchmarks is 
governed by census data and we propose the following years: 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911. 
                                                 
116 We include the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) in New South Wales.  
117 Huberman (2004) and Huberman and Minns (2007) estimate 49.6 annual weeks worked in this period. 
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4.1 Agrarian product 
Urquhart (1986) gives estimates of gross domestic product by industry –at current prices in 
Canadian dollars– for the years 1870-1926. His estimates are commonly used in the literature and 
they are methodologically compatible with another source, (McInnis, 1986), who proposes agrarian 
value-added (constant prices and deflator) for the same period.  
4.2 Rents 
• Total land rents 1911 
Bertram (1973) discusses previous calculations of land rents for the period 1901-1921 
(especially Chambers & Gordon, 1966) and proposes new estimates for the prairie regions: 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. He obtains the estimated value of farm rents by multiplying 
farm values by the rate of interest corresponding to the first mortgage on farm property.  
We work with 1911 as our reference year and replicate Bertram’s exercise. We obtain land area 
(in acres) from Statistics Canada (1983) (census data) and land prices from Statistics Canada 
(1917). Land prices –by province– correspond to the average values per acre of occupied farm land 
for 1908-1910 and 1914-1916 (in Canadian dollars-CAD)118 and we obtain the figures for 1911 by 
interpolation. Our results exceed Bertram’s estimates in 16, 8, and 17 per cent in Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, and Alberta respectively, so we extend the calculations to the other provinces and 
correct down land values by 10 per cent, assuming that the differences between our figures and 
Bertram’s will remain.119 The interest rates on the first mortgage on farm property are published in 
Statistics Canada (1915), and they contain different numbers of observations: Prince Edward Island 
(5), Nova Scotia (9), New Brunswick (4), Quebec (6), Ontario (43) and British Columbia (6).  
We calculate total rents for Canada for 1911 by aggregating the data from the provinces (CAD 
226 million, which is equivalent to 50 per cent of agrarian GDP).  
• Land areas 1871, 1881, 1891 and 1901 
The area of land in farm holdings (census data) by province for 1871, 1881, 1891 and 1901 are 
from Statistics Canada (1983).  
• Land prices 1871, 1881, 1891 and 1901 
Emery et al. (2007) were the first to try to bring regional aspects into the recent discussion about 
the evolution of relative factor prices in Canada during the global expansion of the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. They report land prices for three locations in Ontario (Augusta-Elizabethtown, 
Medonte, and Wellington) to represent the “east region” and three provinces in western Canada: 
                                                 
118 Prices are estimated by correspondents. 
119 If our assumption is correct, our estimates would be the maximum values of land rents. It is a conservative 
assumption that biases the results against our hypothesis because we would be working with a country with levels of 
land rent above those we could expect considering factor endowments quality. 
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Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. We correlate these places to their provinces in accordance 
with Table A4.3.  
Table A4.3 
LOCATION LAND PRICE REFERENCES TO PROVINCES OF CANADA 
Province Referred to Location 
Prince Edward Island  Augusta–Elizabethtown 
Nova Scotia Augusta–Elizabethtown 
New Brunswick Augusta–Elizabethtown 
Quebec Augusta–Elizabethtown 
Ontario Medonte-Wellington 
Manitoba Manitoba 
Saskatchewan Saskatchewan 
Alberta Alberta 
British Columbia Alberta 
 
• Total land rents 1871, 1881, 1891 and 1901 
We updated total rents by province for 1911 by the movement in land prices  
–corrected by the movement in interest rates– and multiplied by the land area devoted to agrarian 
activities. 
4.3 Wages 
• Agrarian workers 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911  
McInnis (1986) presents census data (1871, 1881, 1891, 1901, 1911 and 1921) with information 
about the agricultural workforce by status in terms of farmers (proprietors of farm units of 10 acres 
or more), family workers and paid labourers. We consider the latter two as wage-earners. No 
classification by provinces is available, but Statistics Canada (1983) provides data on male workers 
classified by province for 1891, 1901, 1911 and 1921.120 The two series differ by an average of just 
4 per cent over the period (the former exceeds the latter) and this gap can probably be explained by 
the presence of female workers. We project the total of male workers from Statistics Canada (1983) 
back in time (for 1881 and 1871) with the movement of the total agriculture workforce in McInnis 
(1986), and we distribute workers by province in accordance with the 1891 structure. This may be a 
reasonable assumption because women in agriculture in Canada worked only at peak periods of 
labour demand (McInnis, 1986:753). As the wheat boom started in the 1890s, and this period 
coincided with strong land frontier expansion, the error is not very serious in this case. Total wage-
earners (family and paid labourers; McInnis, 1986) are distributed by province and gender in 
accordance with workforce structure (Statistics Canada, 1983). For Alberta, the number of agrarian 
workers is marginal from 1901 back in time, so it is considered equal to zero in benchmarks 
corresponding to 19th century. 
                                                 
120 According to the source, figures for the 20th century are adjusted to a 1931 classification of occupations, and the 
1891 figures are unadjusted data.  
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• Wage rates 1911 
 Statistics Canada (1917) provides wage information by province and gender for 1909, 1910, 
1914, 1915 and 1916.  These are wages per year including board, per month in the summer season 
including board, and the average value of board per month. We consider the first concept above and 
interpolate figures to obtain the data for 1911.121 The denomination “including board” used in the 
source may cause confusion. We contrast this with another source (Statistics Canada, 1983, Series 
M78-88) and confirm that they are wages without board. 
• Wage rates 1901 
Statistics Canada (1906) provides information on the cost of labour with board by provinces and 
by territories (a denomination that includes Saskatchewan and Alberta) in 1901. We assign the 
figure of the territories to Saskatchewan because we have no data about the number of agrarian 
workers in Alberta. According to our estimates, the ratio between wages “without” and “with” 
board was 1.9 in 1910-1914. In other ex-British colonies like New Zealand the ratio was 1.98 in 
1900-1902. We assume a value of 2 and adjust the previous figures to calculate total wages. 
• Wage rates 1871, 1881 and 1891 
We calculate the wage rates for 1871, 1881 and 1891 in accordance with the movement of 
regional wages presented in Emery et al. (2007). These data register daily wages in Toronto and 
Winnipeg according to two sources: salaries on the Canadian Pacific Railway and wage statistics 
published by the Department of Labour. We construct a triennial average index (1913=100) for the 
two regions from the annual average of both series. We use the Toronto index to update wages for 
Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec and Ontario (“East”) and the index of 
Winnipeg to adjust wages for Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia (“West”). 
• Total Wages 
Total wages for 1911 were estimated as the product of wages and agrarian workers classified by 
province and gender (CAD 94 million, equivalent to 21 per cent of agrarian GDP). The total wages 
with board for 1901 classified by province were obtained directly from a source and they were 
adjusted to obtain “without board” figures. We calculate the data for 1891, 1881 and 1871 
projecting backwards the previous estimates according to the movement of the total agrarian 
workers and the index of daily wages. 
5. Chile 
Our selection of benchmarks basically depends on the availability of census information and 
population data. We had to consult many additional sources and propose specific assumptions to 
                                                 
121 We interpolate 1910 and 1914 data in all the provinces with the exception of British Columbia, for which we use 
1909 and 1914 because no figures are available for 1910.  
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complete the picture and determine the best statistics in each case. The benchmarks are 1875, 1885, 
1895, 1907 and 1915.122 
5.1 Agrarian product 
To measure agrarian income we consider the gross output or gross domestic product (GDP) of 
agrarian activity, as given in official data and the best available estimates.  
The main recent contribution in this field was Rodriguez Weber (2009), who gives an estimate of 
income distribution in Chile for the period 1860-1930.123 He estimates the generation of income by 
industry and occupational category and considers four benchmarks (1875, 1885, 1907 and 1930) 
and annual income indicators (for the period 1860-1930). Thus he obtains estimates of total and 
sector (agrarian, industrial and services) income. However, to avoid dealing with inter-sector and 
international income transfers (which are associated with different sector price evolutions and with 
the external ownership of assets, respectively) we focus our analysis on income generated within 
the sector (with the productive factors employed in economic activity). Therefore we work with the 
agrarian product. Information at current prices is available from 1900 onwards (Haindl, 2008) and 
we spliced this series with figures from Díaz, Lüders & Wagner (1998) (1908-1910 constant prices) 
which we inflated using the Agrarian Price Index presented in Wagner (1992).124 
5.2 Rents 
• Land prices 1917-1921 and 1875 
Information about land prices in Chile in the 19th century is scant and incomplete. Even in the 
20th century there are few systematic studies of the whole country and they do not cover long 
periods. Hurtado, Bustos and Galmez (1979) are an exception to this, but the information they 
present is just for the second half of the 1910s and only covers two specific regions. 
For Coquimbo and Curicó (Regions IV and VII, north and central zones, respectively) and Talca 
and Bío Bío (Regions VII and VIII, central and south zones, respectively), they register land prices 
for agricultural land with irrigation (either with fruit trees and vineyards or without them) and dry 
land. The figures are in constant December 1978 dollars and they are 5-year averages (beginning in 
1917-1921). We convert the data to Chilean currency (using the exchange rate) and inflate them 
using the Consumer Price Index (from Braun et al., 2000) to obtain land prices in “new” Chilean 
pesos. Our estimates are expressed in “old” Chilean pesos so we convert the figures at the rate of 1 
“new” peso = 1,000,000 “old” pesos.125 We use the symbol $ to denote “old” pesos. 
                                                 
122 Our estimates were presented in Rodriguez Weber & Willebald (2010). 
123 A previous advance had been presented in Bértola & Rodríguez Weber (2009). 
124 The Agrarian Price Index is called “Índice de Precios Agrícolas Latorre Extendido” (IPALS) from Wagner (1992). 
125 From the 19th century up to today Chile has had three legal currencies: (i) 1830-Dec/1959: peso chileno or “peso 
antiguo”; (ii) 1960-Sep/1975: escudo; (iii) Oct/1975 to the present: peso chileno or “peso nuevo”. The relation is: 1 
peso nuevo = 1,000 escudos = 1,000,000 pesos antiguos. See Braun et al. (2000): 88-89 for an explanation. 
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As fruit trees and vineyards are improvements closer to the idea of physical capital (which yields 
profits) we calculate an average land price that excludes them, so we consider the price of irrigated 
land without trees or vineyards and the price of dry land, and the two types of land are weighted by 
their share in the total agrarian area in 1936. The Segundo Censo Agropecuario de Chile (1935-
1936) (henceforth SCACh1936) has information about agrarian area with irrigated and dry land and 
considers four zones: north, central, south and austral (extreme south). For our calculations, the 
south and austral zones are considered as the south region. As we have land prices for two regions  
–Coquimbo and Curicó; and Talca and Bío-Bío– we rearrange the data from the census into two 
large regions, the North-central and South-central zones, by dividing the central region in half and 
adding the areas to North and South, respectively. We have the weights for land prices: North-
central with irrigation (3%) and dry land (29%); South-central with irrigation (2%) and dry land 
(66%). We assign the average price in 1917-1921 to each year in the period ($ 109 per hectare). 
Correa (1938) comments on a document written in the 19th century called “Studies of the 
economic state of agriculture in Chile” (Ensayos sobre el estado económico de la agricultura de 
Chile) that has various kinds of information about the situation in 1875. The value of the total land, 
including arable land with irrigation, dry land, pasture and woodland, was equivalent to $ 233.3 
million for a total area of 11.4 million hectares and with an average price $ 20 per hectare.126 
However, at that time irrigation meant a considerable investment, and like trees and vineyards in the 
20th century this was closer to the generation of profits than rents. Therefore we exclude this kind of 
land and consider 11 million hectares at an average price of $ 11 per ha.  
• Land prices 1885, 1895 and 1907 
In other instances we complete several series of land prices using lineal interpolations. However, 
this case is different because the period (1875-1917) is extremely long and our underestimation of 
the fluctuations would be excessive. Moreover, Chile had high inflation at the beginning of the 20th 
century and this would distort the estimation considerably (see Millar Carvacho, 1994). Agrarian 
prices may be conceptualized as a weighted average of the return on the productive factors that 
participate in agrarian production, and this can give us some clues as to how to proceed.127 
Theoretically, rentals would have increased in real terms during the First Globalization (see the 
literature based on the H-O-S approach or Chapter 1 and 2) and risen higher than prices in the 
sector (even when corrected by interest rates it is reasonable to assume ∆q>∆pA). Estimating the 
                                                 
126 Figures are presented in pesos de 6 peniques, and from the text we deduce that the relation is 1 peso antiguo = 4 
pesos de 6 peniques. 
127 Considering Y as the gross domestic product of agrarian activity, we can express it as the sum of the total yield of 
the productive factors:  Y ≡ w L + ρ Κ + q N. Where L, K and N represent the volume of labour, capital and land used in 
the production and w, ρ and q the respective earn-rates (wage, profit and land rents) (see a similar representation for the 
whole economy in Chapter 2). As Y=y.pA –the product of the volume produced in the agrarian activity and the prices of 
the sector– pA may be interpreted as a “weighted” average of w, ρ and q. 
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evolution of land prices –i.e. land 
rents– by lineal interpolation 
would exaggerate the 
intermediate points (when they 
were not yet affected by 
inflation), but doing this with 
agrarian prices would cause the 
opposite effect (land prices would 
have exceeded the evolution of 
agrarian prices). We have no 
criteria to prefer one approach to 
land prices to the other so we opt 
to take an average of the two 
series. Figure A4.2 illustrates our 
three scenarios. Land prices in 1885, 1895 and 1907 are estimated as the average evolution. 
• Land areas  1875, 1885, 1895, 1907 and 1917 
According to the SCACh1936, the total land used for agricultural activities in 1919 was 18.2 
million hectares, and we assign this area to the period referred to in the price sub-section (1917-
1922). When we check this value against the number of rural properties we find that the average 
size of a farming establishment was 188 hectares. We consider that in 1907 this number was 69,988 
(Salazar, 1985), so we estimate the total area at 13.2 million hectares (we assume that the average 
size of establishments did not change significantly). The area for 1875 was taken from Correa 
(1938) (see previous sub-section) and the figures for 1885 and 1895 were obtained by interpolation. 
• Total rents 1907 
To calculate total rents for 1907 we follow the methodology of Dwyer (2003). Reliable historical 
data about land rent rates are not available and it is usual to adopt a conservative 5 per cent fixed 
rental yield plus a representative percentage of the accrual of future rentals. In the case of Chile, 
that rental rate is a reasonable percentage. Bengoa (1990):38 comments that a conservative 
calculation for that time is a rental ratio of 5 per cent on capital. Correa (1938):252 presents data 
about rents for 1834, 1854 and 1875 –probably derived from fiscal information– that, for the last 
year, amount to almost 5 per cent of the land value (considering the total value of the land, 
including investments). We calculate the accrual yield by computing the internal rate of return on 
an investment equivalent to the land value in 1875 (the same value used to estimate the price) which 
was recovered in 1907. The resulting accrual factor for this period is 5.1 per cent. Therefore we 
Figure A4.2
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calculate total rents as 10.1% of land value in 1907, a figure equivalent to the 49 per cent of the 
total agrarian product. 
• Total rents 1875, 1885, 1895 and 1915 
We update the total rents estimated for 1907 by the movement in land prices –corrected by the 
change in interest rates– and multiply by the area of farm holdings.  
5.3 Wages 
• Wage rates 1907 
Rodríguez Weber (2009) presents information on wage rates for each benchmark (1875, 1885, 
1907 and 1930) but we make some changes to 1907 to consider regional differences. Bengoa (1990) 
presents daily wages128 for several provinces around 1911, and we classify these by regions129 and 
update to 1907 with an Agrarian Wage Nominal Index (Matus, 2009). 
Rodriguez Weber (2009) discusses the number of days agrarian workers worked per year and 
assumes that the number increases from 200 days in 1875 to 260 in 1930.130 We adjust our daily 
wages to transform them into the 
annual income from 227 working 
days in 1907. In Table A4.4 we 
present our assumptions and the data. 
• Agrarian workers 1875, 
1885, 1907 and 1930 
We consider agrarian wage-earners 
as the income category identified with 
the “gañanes” (peasant) in Rodríguez 
Weber (2009). He provides 
information about the number of 
earners for each benchmark (1875, 
1885, 1907 and 1930) and we use 
these data as a reference. 
• Total wages in 1875, 1885, 1895, 1907 and 1915 
Based on the agrarian workers and wages rates, we calculate the total wages of 1907, which 
come to 21 per cent of the total agrarian product (triennial average centred in 1907) and we estimate 
                                                 
128 We use “forastero/día” because it is the category similar to “gañán”, the unskilled worker in agrarian activity.  
129 Rodríguez Weber (2009):44 and Willebald (2009) discuss proposals to regionalize Chile to facilitate the analysis. 
Here, we apply the same criterion as in Chapter 4. 
130 See Rodríguez Weber (2009), pp. 42, 45, 54 and 231. 
Year Province Region $/day $/year 1907, $/year
1910 Santiago Central 1.0 227 204
1910 Curicó Central 0.7 159 143
1910 Parral Central 0.6 136 122
1910 Macul Central 1.4 318 285
1911 San Javier Central 1.0 227 174
1911 Malloco Central 2.0 454 349
1912 Rancagua Central 1.5 341 244
1912 Chillán Central 1.2 272 195
1912 San Felipe Central 1.5 341 244
1913 Maule Central 0.8 182 125
Average 208
1911 Copiapó North 2 454 349
Average 349
1907 Osorno South 1.5 341 341
1910 Temuco South 1.3 295 265
Average 303
Sources: Bengoa (1990):18 and 196. Rodriguez Weber (2009).
WAGE RATES BY PROVINCE IN 1907
$ by day and $ by year
Table A4.4
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the proportions of the other benchmarks taking this year as a reference.131 We project the total 
wages for 1875 and 1885 by the movement of wage rates and the number of workers from 
Rodríguez Weber (2009). Neither of these years distinguishes between regions so we consider the 
same wage for the whole country. Finally, we project total wages for 1907 backwards to 1895 and 
forwards to 1915 by the movement of wage rates in the Wage Nominal Index of Matus (2009) and 
the annual series of “gañanes” of Rodríguez Weber (2009). 
6. New Zealand 
As with the other ex-British colonies there is more information available, with periodic census 
data and many adequate secondary sources. We propose the following benchmarks: 1874, 1881, 
1891, 1901, and 1911. The recent attempts to introduce these categories empirically into a historical 
perspective are Álvarez (2008), Álvarez, et al. (2011) and Álvarez & Willebald (2009), but our 
estimates consider a longer period and have more accurate information. Furthermore, the second 
article of the three mentioned above does not distinguish between land rentals and profits. Now we 
can improve the estimates with more sources and make our assumptions more precise. 
6.1 Agrarian product 
We do not have data about sector product in New Zealand before WWI. Linehman (1968) 
presents annual data by industry and total GDP at current prices from 1918 to 1939. There are other 
estimates of total GDP at current prices made with other methodologies. We use the series 
published in Briggs [2003 (2007)] –based on Rankin (1991)– and Easton (2004) and contrast them 
with Linehman’s estimates. 
The ratio between the Linehman and Briggs estimates of total GDP for the whole period (1918-
1939) is 0.97 (average), although for some years the differences are greater. For instance, during the 
first 5-year period the ratio is just 0.8 and this difference is important in our study because these 
values are our splicing period. When we compare the sector structure with Easton’s series, the 
compatibility with Lineham’s data is marked. According to this source, the shares of nominal 
agriculture GDP in total GDP were 29.8, 26.2 and 23.2 per cent in 1920, 1930 and 1939, 
respectively, while the shares in the Lineham’s series were 31, 26.3 and 23.1 per cent.  
Information about agriculture for the period prior to 1918 is available for the gross value of 
agricultural production (GVP) for the years 1900/01, 1905/06, 1910/11, 1915/16 and 1920/21, and 
we assign the values to 1901, 1906, 1911, 1916 and 1921, respectively. We estimated the agrarian 
product (value-added) for 1916 by applying the movement in the GVP from 1916 to 1921 to the 
average value added of 1920-1922. The other figures are backward estimates –for 1901, 1906 and 
1911– in accordance with the same criterion. The engine of the agrarian activity was the 
                                                 
131 We repeat our estimates with the 1907 day-wage of the agrarian worker of Matus (2009) and the result is the same.  
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international market so export dynamism may be a good indicator of the evolution of the sector. 
However, the domestic market was developing at the same time and the result was a combination of 
the two processes. We expect that the share of agrarian exports –from livestock and agriculture; 
Bloomfield, 1984132– in agrarian GDP increased during the period and our methodology confirms 
it. When we consider triennial averages the figures are as follows: 0.84 (1901), 0.85 (1906), 0.92 
(1911), 0.95 (1916), 1.08 (1921), 1.08 (1926), 1.04 (1931), 1.23 (1936).133 We propose an exercise 
of lineal regression to extrapolate the shares in 1891 and 1881 and we obtain shares of 0.71 and 
0.61, respectively. We applied both ratios to agrarian exports (triennial average centred in those 
years) to estimate the agrarian product. For 1874 we assume the same ratio as for 1881.  
6.2 Rents 
• Land areas 1874, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911 
Bloomfield (1984) presents series of land occupied from 1867 onwards with varying periodicity. 
New Zealand has a small surface area but land values are not homogenous and the differences 
between different establishments depend on geographic and institutional conditions. It was not 
possible to find different prices and rents by regions, but some institutional arrangements governing 
land make it possible to bring in these differences.  
Gould (1969) publishes almost the same series as Bloomfield (1984) and provides a useful 
classification for our approach. He distinguishes between Crown land for pastoral purposes only  
–that is Crown Pastoral Leases (CPL), and from 1886 onwards Small Grazing Runs– and other 
agrarian land that is not under CPL. CPL land was especially suited to extensive pastoral farming, it 
was relatively infertile and/or inaccessible and it was subject to specific tenure conditions. 
In addition, farm intensity differed on non-CPL land, depending on the type of production. This 
difference became increasingly important as agriculture and the dairy industry (associated with 
refrigeration) extended their influence in the agrarian economy. Therefore we differentiate kinds of 
land in accordance with its productive uses (livestock and crops). Bloomfield (1984) presents data 
about cultivated land and we include in this category grain crops, greens, root crops, orchards and 
other cultivated land from 1890 to 1911. We make estimates for years prior to 1890 using the 
evolution of the area of major crops (wheat, oats and barley). 
Therefore we consider three types of land: CPL, non-CPL specialized in crops, and the rest of 
the non-CPL. Each type is related to different returns and prices; the lowest values for the first type, 
the highest values for the second and intermediate values for the third.  
                                                 
132 Pastoral includes meat (preserved and frozen), butter, cheese, hides and skins, tallow and wool. Agriculture includes 
grain, flour, meal, potatoes and seed. 
133 We take 5-year data to maintain the periodicity pre-WWI. Shares higher than 100 per cent are possible considering 
stock variations.  
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• Rental rates and land prices 1874, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911 
Data about rents is scarce and scattered. CPL rents are calculated as the ratio between the yearly 
rental (or instalment payable) and the total area held from the Crown in 1913 and 1906 including 
deferred payments, occupation with the right of purchase, leases in perpetuity, renewable leases, 
small grazing-runs and pastoral runs. The calculation covered 11.4 and 15.6 million acres, 
respectively, for the two years. The 1896 source does not distinguish rental categories and we 
consider the total amount (New Zealand Yearbook, 1897, 1907 and 1914).  Non-CPL non-crop 
rents are calculated from the annual rental paid by selectors under the closer settlement land policy, 
which was actively promoted by the government from the beginning of the 20th century. The 
calculations cover 105,239 acres in 1906 and 1.5 million acres in 1913. Finally, Greasley & Oxley 
(2008) propose an estimate of per capita rental values for cultivated land that enables us to calculate 
an implicit rental rate for 1890, 1914, 1919 and 1929 (population data from Briggs, 2003 (2007)).134 
Therefore we have land rental rates for different types of land and periods (see Table A4.5).  
Table A4.5 
LAND RENTAL RATES BY LAND CATEGORY AND YEAR 
Land category Reference year Rental rate (£/acre) 
CPL 1896 0.008 
 1906 0.014 
 1913 0.035 
Non-CPL Crops 1890 0.98 
 1914 2.27 
 1919 3.81 
 1929 3.10 
Non-CPL Non-crops 1906 0.21 
 1913 0.24 
We calculate agrarian rental rates for each type of land and update by the coefficient “price- 
interest rate”.135 The only exception is non-CPL land specialized in agriculture for 1901, for which 
the land rent rate was interpolated between the 1890 and 1914 figures because the evolution turned 
out to be more reliable. We obtained land prices from Greasley & Oxley (2005). They present a real 
land price index that we inflated with the price index implicit in the relation between the nominal 
and the real wage (Greasley & Oxley, 2005, Data Appendix, p. 43-44). With that index we obtain 
the series of land prices in pounds, and update the value they give for 1915 (p. 28) (£7.4 per acre). 
                                                 
134 The calculation of total land rents in this article exceeds the GDP of the agrarian sector, and this is an important 
conceptual error. However, the problem derives from considering that all cultivated land yields the same (high) rents. 
The implicit rental rate is derived from applying a mortgage interest rate to the price (per acre) of this type of land. We 
use this rental rate for our estimates. 
135 The source of interest rate does not present data for 1915-1924. We assume the same movement as Australia’s 
interest rate.  
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• Total land rents 1874, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911 
We update total rents by land category for 1911 by the movement in the estimated land rentals  
and multiply by the area of farm holdings.  
6.3 Wages 
• Agrarian  workers 
Hawke (1979) proposes a disaggregation of the New Zealand labour force for the years 1871-
1936. He corrects the census data (such as those presented in Bloomfield (1984); agricultural and 
pastoral occupation) in line with a modern classification of economic activities and the reallocation 
of residual census categories like “others” and “indefinite occupations”. He presents 5-year data 
from 1881 onwards (1886, 1891, 1901, 1906 and 1911). For years previous to this period, when the 
changes are more accelerated and the labour force increased very quickly, he presents figures for 
shorter periods. We smooth the figures in a similar way as for GDP data. We average 1871-1874 
and 1878-1881 to calculate the total labour force in 1874 and 1881, respectively. The agrarian 
labour force includes non wage-earners (land proprietors and family workers) so it is necessary to 
adjust our series. Considering that many landowners may have been registered as labour force, one 
way to correct our figures is to take these people out by assuming that each establishment has one 
owner. Bloomfield (1984) presents the number of farm holdings for the period. 
• Wage rates 
Arnold (1982) provides information about remuneration by industry for the period 1873-1911 
and considers wages paid in shillings per week. For farm or agrarian labourers the data are 
presented with and without board, and we use the latter category. We calculate the annual wage 
with the same ratio as that used for Australia (Huberman, 2004 and Huberman and Mins, 2007). 
Arnold (1982) does not include information about farm wages without board in 1873-1877 because 
his source (Statistics of New Zealand) does not report it. Greasley & Oxley (2004) propose nominal 
wage indexes by industry for 1873-1913 in a way that is compatible with Arnold’s data. We 
complete Arnold’s series with the evolution of their nominal farming wages index presented.  
• Total Wages 
We calculate the total wages by multiplying the number of wage-earners and the wage rates. 
7. Uruguay 
We selected our benchmarks in function of the information available about land rents. Unlike for 
the other countries, we have land rental series (4- or 5-year periods) and we use these data in the 
estimation. The first estimate of land used for agrarian activities was in 1872 and this year will be 
our starting point. We propose the following benchmarks: 1874, 1883, 1893, 1903 and 1912. 
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As in the case of New Zealand, the recent attempts to introduce these categories empirically into 
the historical perspective are Álvarez (2008), Álvarez et al. (2011), and Álvarez & Willebald 
(2009). The same comments apply to the Uruguay data; our estimates are based on broader 
information and we work with a longer period. 
7.1 Agrarian product 
Bértola (2005) proposes an estimation of income distribution in Uruguay –by productive sector 
and occupation classes (annual data)– from 1908 to 1966, and this is one of our starting points. 
However, to maintain consistency in our estimates in the sample of countries, we work with 
agrarian product (livestock and crops value-added) at current prices. Bértola (1998) presents these 
series (annual data) for 1870-1936. During the period when the two series coincide (1908-1936), 
the lineal correlation is close to 0.9 although agrarian income exceeds agrarian product by more 
than 50 per cent (an average of 54 per cent for the whole period). 
7.2 Wages 
• Total wages 1912 
Bértola (2005) presents various occupational categories: unskilled labourers (“peon”), foremen 
(“capataz”), servants, landowners, lessees and lessors, and considers numbers of persons and 
income rates. We use the three first categories as wage-earners. Total wages for the years 1911-
1913 amounted to 21 per cent of total income, and we apply this proportion to agrarian GDP in the 
same period. We project this value back in time in accordance with movements in the wage rate and 
the number of farm or agrarian workers. 
• Wages rates 1874,  1893, 1883 and 1903 
The information used to calculate total wages in 1912 may be disaggregated in terms of amount 
(number of workers) and price (wage rates) to estimate a weighted average wage. The result is $ 
363, as the average of $ 300 (unskilled worker), $ 720 (foremen) and $ 351 (servants) (triennial 
averages centred in 1912). Analogously, we have data for 1909-1911 ($334). 
There is scant data for agrarian wage rates in previous periods and we have to rely on partial 
information and indirect indicators. An initial possibility was to work with Williamson’s (1999) 
Nominal Wage Index for 1870-1940, based on Bértola et al. (1999a, b), to update the figures, but 
there are some problems that make this option unsuitable. This index was constructed in accordance 
with the following occupational classes: unskilled public building workers (1870-1886); unskilled 
building workers in a particular firm (1886-1900); building sector labor cost (1900-1907); and 
unskilled building workers (1907-1926). Therefore the series have an urban profile that makes it 
difficult to apply them to our figures as we move back in the 19th century. We do not have evidence 
about the composition of the labour market in Uruguay but it is reasonable to suppose that 
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integration was high on the eve of WWI. However, this assumption is doubtful for previous 
decades, so we look for alternatives and wage levels in accordance with agrarian payments. 
Barran & Nahum (1971) analyze the agrarian profitability of a cattle and sheep establishment in 
1891. For each peso ($) paid in wages (for contract and also piecework), $ 0.81 was paid for board 
and lodging. Therefore, by considering this ratio and the number of contracted workers, we 
calculate an annual wage of $ 196 ($88 with board).136 This annual wage was applied for 1893 (the 
Nominal Wage Index for 1891-1893 has the same value, which denotes salary stability).  
These authors also present calculations for the returns on a sheep and cattle farm in 1868-
1869,137 and in addition they obtain information for 1871 from a specialized journal.138 In the case 
of the sheep and cattle farm, we consider an annual wage of £37 that converted into pesos –Millot 
& Bertino (1996), Officer (2011)– and adjusted by board and lodging (in accordance with the 
estimates for 1891) yields a wage of $ 320. In the second case, monthly wages between $12 and 
$15 are reported for cattle farming wage-earners and between $15 and $17 for sheep farming wage-
earners. By considering averages, annual wages and board and lodging, we get a very similar level 
to the previous one ($ 321), which is consistent with the high stable values in the period.  
As a result we have wage levels for 1871, 1893, 1909 and 1912, and we need to estimate figures 
for 1874, 1883, 1893 and 1903. We rescale Williamson’s (1999) Nominal Index Wage to make our 
data compatible with this evolution and obtain our reference values (see subsection 3.3).  
• Agrarian  workers 1874, 1883, 1893 and 1903 
We estimate the number of workers in crop and cattle farming.  
The Ministry of Livestock and Agriculture’s series data (Ministerio de Ganadería y Agricultura - 
Dirección de Agronomía, 1950) on the crop farming workforce distinguishes land proprietors, 
family workers and wage-earners for 1925, and Bertino & Bucheli (2000) extend the series of the 
total workforce of the activity to cover 1913-1924 and 1908. We project the total wage-earners 
from the first source with the movement in total workforce in the second source. Barran & Nahum 
(1967) estimate the crop farming workforce in 1892-1894 and get values compatible with those of 
Bertino and Bucheli (2000),139 and we use the same above-mentioned methodology to calculate 
wage-earners in 1893. Before the 1890s, crop farming was not an important sector, it was related to 
subsistence occupations, and we do not consider wage-earners in that activity.  
In addition, we follow an exercise by Rial (1982): 119 to estimate the number of labourers 
                                                 
136 The ratio between wages without and with board is 2.2. It is close to the New Zealand value for the same year and 
considers official data (2.1; average 1890-1892). 
137 Barran & Nahum (1971):265 quote an English book edited by J.H. Murray in 1871. 
138 Barran & Nahum (1971):266 quote the journal of the organization representative of agrarian interests (Revista de la 
Asociación Rural) published in January, 1873. The article is a letter that answers some questions from a Portuguese 
citizen about the costs and returns of agrarian activity in Uruguay.  
139 44,023 (1892), 43,409 (1894) and 41,631 (1908), respectively. They are farming workforce and not wage-earners. 
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employed in the livestock sector in accordance with technical coefficients. According to the 
testimony of agrarian producers, during the 1860s one worker was employed per 300 cattle and per 
1,500 sheep, and from the first decade of the 20th century one worker was employed per 580 and 
1,000 animals, respectively (Barrán & Nahum, 1967, 1977). Therefore, considering the number of 
cattle and sheep and these technical coefficients (we assume that the coefficients changed lineally 
between 1860 and 1900, and maintain the last ratio in the 20th century) it is possible to estimate the 
number of workers.  
We have data on the number of animals from Dirección General de Estadísticas (1937) 
(livestock census) for 1900 and 1908, and from Barrán & Nahum (1971a, b) for 1883 and 1874.  
We obtain the figures for 1893 and 1903 by lineal interpolation (between 1885 and 1900, and 
between 1900 and 1908, respectively) and the values for 1883 and 1874 are the simple averages of 
two estimates by these authors.140 We use the sum of our estimates of crop cultivation and cattle 
farming labourers for 1908 (43,667), 1903 (37,095) and 1893 (33,409) to project Bértola’s (2005) 
1908 figure (47,082) back in time. For 1874 and 1883 we use our estimates of cattle farm workers 
(28,256 and 23,394, respectively).  
7.3 Rents 
Balbis (2005) presents information about land rents (Uruguayan pesos/hectare) by province141 
for five-year periods (with the exception for one three-year period) from 1886 to 1924. Thanks to 
the detailed data available we can carry out a different exercise that is more precise than for the 
other countries. We estimate total land rents in 1912 by considering rent rates and cattle and crop 
farming area by province, and we classify the provinces in accordance with their agrarian aptitude. 
The CONEAT index is an indicator of agrarian productivity that classifies regions in accordance 
with their agrarian aptitude (MAP-CONEAT, 1979) and we use it as reference. Depending on the 
availability of information, we apply land rents and land prices (adjusted by the interest rate) to 
estimate land rents for each benchmark and area devoted to cattle or crops.  
Balbis (2005) presents a breakdown of the country in four zones: South (Canelones, San José, 
Flores), Littoral (Paysandú, Río Negro, Soriano and Colonia), North (Salto, Artigas, Rivera, 
Tacuarembó, Treinta y Tres and Cerro Largo), and Centre (Lavalleja, Durazno, Maldonado, Florida 
and Rocha). For our purposes it is more suitable to rearrange the regions so as to incorporate 
differing land quality and to “homogenize” the zones. We place Florida in the South region and 
Paysandú in the North. 
                                                 
140 Barrán & Nahum (1971b) present two data items by category for 1874 –4.75 and 6.33 million (cattle) and 9.75 and 
13 million (sheep)– and for 1883 –6 and 8 million (cattle) and 14.56 million (sheep)– derived from different sources. 
We do not have any criterion to prefer one or other figure so we opt to work with the average. 
141 Uruguay has 19 administrative jurisdictions called departamentos., which are equivalent to the “provinces” or 
“states” in other settler economies.  
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• Land areas 1874, 1883, 1893, 1903 and 1912 
The information sources for the total cattle farming area in each year is as follows: 1872 (Jacob, 
1969:11), 1900, 1908 and 1916 (Moraes, 2001:55), the crop area for 1872 (Jacob, 1969:11), 1900 
and 1908 (Bertino et al., 2005:158-159). We obtained the crop area for 1912 and 1916 by 
considering a total agrarian area of 16.6 million hectares and taking the difference. We calculated 
the benchmarks by lineal interpolation. The cattle farming area was distributed proportionally 
among the provinces in accordance with province areas because all the land is suitable for raising 
cattle and sheep (see Chapter 4). We distributed the crop farming area proportionally among 
provinces with a CONEAT index higher than 100 as these areas were more suitable for intensive 
agrarian activities. These provinces or “departamentos” are the following: Canelones, Colonia, 
Flores, Florida, Río Negro, San José and Soriano. 
• Land rent rates 1874, 1883, 1893, 1903 and 1912 
Balbis (2005) provides data for 1911-1913 and 1891-1895 and we assign these to 1912 and 
1893, respectively, but we do not consider the information for 1901-1905 because it is so scant. 
There is no information for 1912 for three provinces –Treinta y Tres, Maldonado and Rocha– 
therefore we estimate these figures by taking the changes in Cerro Largo (for the first case) and 
Lavalleja (for the two latter cases), from the period 1906-1910 to the eve of WWI (average of 1911-
1913). There is no information for 1893 for six provinces –Colonia, Salto, Rivera, Treinta y Tres, 
Maldonado and Rocha– and we estimate them using a variety of criteria. We estimate Colonia, 
Salto and Treinta y Tres in line with the average movement in Río Negro and Soriano, Paysandú, 
and Cerro Largo, respectively, from 1891-1895 to 1896-1900. We assume Rivera had the same land 
rate as Artigas.  Lastly, we estimate Maldonado and Rocha using the average growth in land rents in 
Lavalleja and Durazno from 1891-1895 to 1906-1910. There is no information available for the 
province of Montevideo so we consider the same land rent as Canelones. They are next to each 
other and they share similar agrarian characteristics.  
We calculate the rest of the benchmark land rent rates (1903, 1883 and 1874) in accordance with 
movements in land prices and interest rates. For 1903 we have prices per province from Balbis 
(1995). The series are complete with the exception of figures for Durazno and Maldonado in 1911-
1913, and we calculate these in accordance with the movement in Lavalleja. We estimate land rents 
by moving the 1912 figures in accordance with the evolution from 1903 to 1912. We applied the 
same methodology to estimate the figures for 1883 and 1874, using averages by zones (not by 
departamentos) and moving the figures from 1893 and 1883, respectively. Data by province begin 
in 1886-1890 and therefore we compare the average of our regional analysis in 1893 with the 
Balbis’s (2005) regional average for the same year. The differences will not be very important and 
we confirm that our methodology is satisfactory.   
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• Total land rents 
We multiply our calculations of the area and the land rent rates to obtain our estimates of total 
land rents. 
8. Our estimates 
We present our agrarian GDP component estimates (current currency) in Table A4.6. 
Wage Rent Profit Wage Rent Profit
1869 33,718 54,038 11,782 1871 6,716 11,007 4,010
1875 46,371 100,192 23,899 1881 9,940 16,327 9,167
1888 85,856 129,327 55,726 1891 11,661 27,490 6,415
1895 163,802 272,953 236,296 1901 12,153 19,024 4,523
1914 351,663 1,132,937 200,433 1911 21,239 32,863 29,997
Wage Rent Profit Wage Rent Profit
1871 31,839 70,268 43,379 1875 10,669 37,355 12,802
1881 43,857 82,062 61,165 1885 10,097 42,701 21,855
1891 50,000 102,349 35,405 1895 20,297 73,619 24,140
1901 48,457 90,394 104,934 1907 60,559 142,285 85,156
1911 94,265 225,923 129,792 1915 98,908 377,697 186,395
Wage Rent Profit Wage Rent Profit
1874 1,289 1,887 2,505 1874 4,390 5,385 2,022
1881 2,617 3,140 1,664 1883 4,338 8,080 3,997
1891 3,099 4,223 2,969 1893 4,700 10,879 6,424
1901 3,038 5,639 3,028 1903 7,132 13,724 7,716
1911 5,526 9,414 3,671 1912 12,137 39,196 6,656
Source: see Text.
Table A4.6
AGRARIAN SECTOR: FUNCTIONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Agrarian GDP components in current currency
ARGENTINA (000s pesos) AUSTRALIA (000s pounds)
CANADA (000s Canadian dollars) CHILE  (000s "old" pesos)
NEW ZEALAND  (000s pounds) URUGUAY (000s pesos)
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Chapter 5 
Natural resources and institutional quality: the hypothesis of 
appropriability revisited from an historical perspective 
A new literature has developed, inspired by the work of Sachs & Warner (1995), which focuses 
on the so-called “resource curse hypothesis”, a puzzling paradox whereby resource-rich countries 
seem to tend to grow more slowly than resource-poor ones. However, natural resources –essentially 
coal and iron– played a key role in the emergence of “modern economic growth” since the 18th 
century, with Great Britain as the leader and Belgium, Germany, France and the US as followers. 
Besides this, during the 19th century other regions were brought into the expanding Atlantic 
economy and participated successfully in international trade, which suggests that other resources 
apart from minerals might be important for economic growth. In other words, these economies 
showed that there were other blessings apart from mineral resources. The Second Industrial 
Revolution had important repercussions in extensive regions of the world periphery –parts of South 
America, Australasia and the north and south of Africa– as it brought technological progress 
(railways, refrigeration, a reduction in the cost of inter-oceanic transport) to these areas where a 
temperate climate and fertile soils were particularly suitable for producing a range of commodities 
like wool, meat and cereals. 
Therefore, rather than considering the curse as a general pattern we can see it as being subject to 
the influence of supply and demand conditions, technological progress and institutional structures, 
in a process with strong historical specificity. Settler economies, which are regions with abundant 
natural resources, are an interesting “natural experiment” in this sense. We select six economies  
–Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand and Uruguay– and evaluate a period of strong 
economic expansion based on their dynamic participation in primary international trade, namely the 
First Globalization (1870-1913), to shed new light on the subject. 
One of the main analytical branches of the curse of natural resources hypothesis has to do with 
the role institutions play in economic relationships. In this sense, we use the appropriability 
hypothesis to consider the idea that different types of natural resources interact with institutional 
quality to render dissimilar economic results. The literature usually refers to the curse (or the 
blessing) considering the evolution of GDP per capita, but we want to go beyond this (restricted) 
concept and consider an idea closer to a broad definition of development. Then we evaluate the 
curse in terms of sector economic growth and income distribution. While the intensity of the First 
Globalization and its consequences for settler economies followed a common pattern, the countries 
reacted in different ways, and this probably determined their economic performance in the 
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subsequent decades. These economies based their production on primary activities but in spite of 
this, around the time of WWI, they achieved levels of development close to the “core”. However, 
income per capita was higher and inequality was worsening less in ex-British possessions 
(Australia, New Zealand, Canada) than in the South American Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay), and in the former group economic specialization was relatively less concentrated on 
primary activities. In terms of the curse/blessing of natural resources, the ex-British colonies were 
more blessed and less damned by their abundance of natural resources than the other ex-colonies.  
According to the more extended literature, settler economies would have similar natural 
resources. However, it is important to consider the idea of “quality” to identify differing “types” of 
natural resources. In this Chapter, we introduce the consideration of different types of land  
–depending on agrarian aptitude– to incorporate a gradient of appropriability possibilities that 
ranges from land of high quality (more likely to yield differential rentals) to low quality. Our 
conclusion is that the productive application of the abundance of natural resources (as initial 
endowments) was a blessing for settler economies in terms of economic growth, but they suffered 
the curse of increasing inequality in the agrarian activity. These processes were not homogenous in 
the countries of the “club”, and this can be explained by differences in productive application by 
type of land. Economies that expanded their frontiers into high agrarian aptitude lands welcomed 
the blessing of economic growth in the agrarian sector, but they were cursed with the concentration 
of agrarian rents in the hands of small and privileged classes.  
Nevertheless, natural resources did not perform alone; they interacted with various different 
institutional arrangements such as different kinds of government actions, in particular the 
establishment of the land ownership rights. We propose two methodological approaches to tackle 
this subject, and they depend on our operationalization of the concept of institutional quality. This 
concept is approached in terms of (i) constraints on the executive and the enforcement of property 
rights (which we call the “macro level”; the concept that is used more in the literature), and (ii) the 
formation of the land ownership system, which we understand as the main institution in the agrarian 
activity (it considers agents’ behaviour and is closer to the “micro level”). 
The first approach is based on estimating the statistical relationship between economic 
development in the agrarian activity, natural resources (land) and institutions. For this analysis we 
use panel data estimation and include the interaction between the two latter variables, and we study 
six economies and consider data for each decade from 1860 to 1913. These exercises are not 
conclusive but they help to identify some of the main features of the process and offer clues as to 
how to proceed with the second approach. This is based on a historical description of the 
distribution of land rights –from the beginning of the 19th century to WWI– and the institutional 
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arrangements governing land ownership in the River Plate (Argentina and Uruguay) and Australasia 
(Australia and New Zealand). Our discussion is focalized on the role of national authorities (state) 
and the definition and enforcement of land rights, and we attempt to identify two “models” –the 
“British” and the “Hispanic” models– that determine different distributive patterns (considering 
land and income related to the activity). 
After this introduction, this Chapter is structured as follows. First, we review the concept of the 
curse of natural resources and present the appropriability hypothesis (Section 1). Next we present 
our statistical results (Section 2), and to cater to the main shortcomings of the analysis we use the 
notion of appropriability to guide the depiction of the historical formation of the land ownership 
system (Section 3). This analysis enables us to identify two models of distribution and the creation 
of institutional arrangements governing land ownership that generate different distributive patterns 
of assets (land) and incomes (in the agrarian sector). 
1. Institutional quality and the appropriability hypothesis 
In Chapter 2 we review theories that offer interesting predictions about why different resource-
rich economies may be affected differently by their natural wealth. Countries with extensive 
plantation crops (sugar, bananas) or very valuable minerals (oil, diamonds) are more likely to obtain 
unfavourable results than countries with wheat, rice or livestock. But why is it that in our club of 
settler economies some seem to gain relatively more from their endowments when they all have 
comparable natural resources? 
Boschini, et al. (2005) propose a framework that provides arguments to answer this question. 
They show that the effect of natural resources on economic development is not determined by 
resource endowments alone, but rather by the interaction between the type of resources and the 
quality of the country’s institutions. This combination of factors represents the so-called 
“appropriability” of a resource, a concept that alludes to the environmental factors that control the 
innovator’s ability to obtain returns generated by an innovation. In the case of natural resources, this 
concept captures the probability that these resources will lead to rent-seeking, corruption, anti-
competitive strategies or conflicts over the rents from natural capital, which in turn hamper 
economic development. In economies where resources are highly appropriable their abundance may 
hinder economic performance, while in countries where resources are less appropriable their 
abundance may contribute to economic development in the long run. The appropriability hypothesis 
may be conceived in terms of the institutional and the technical dimension. On the one hand, natural 
resources abundance affects the economic development under weak institutions and, on the other 
hand, the impact of the institutional quality and abundant natural resources is more pronounced 
when the natural resources are technically more appropriable. 
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In a similar way, Mehlum et al. (2006) develop a model in which entrepreneurs choose between 
becoming “producers” or “grabbers”. The relative payoff from each strategy depends on how 
“grabber friendly” the country’s institutions are, and this also determines the effect of natural 
resources on the economy. More natural resources raise national income if institutions are 
“production friendly” but reduce it if they are “grabber friendly”. Robinson et al. (2002) develop a 
model with similar predictions but in which political incentives generated by the resources are the 
key factor. In countries with good institutions resources are positive because the perverse political 
incentives are mitigated, but in countries with bad institutions resources remain a curse. 
In a recent working paper, Camilo García-Jimeno and James Robinson show a renewed interest 
in land frontier expansion, and this is interesting for us empirically and analytically. This concept is 
associated with the incorporation of land (a natural resource) into production, a process that is 
accompanied by the establishment of a new system of land ownership rights (institutional 
arrangements), so there is an immediate connection with our area of study. The interesting point in 
their specification is that if we reinterpret the analytical relation the model is equivalent to that used 
in Boschini, et al. (2005) (see our conceptual framework in Chapter 2, Section 4). 
1.1 Our model 
Settler economies had an abundance of land and excellent conditions for the competitive 
production of primary commodities. Some of them also had considerable mineral deposits, which 
had important effects on the social-economic context and population dynamics. However, we focus 
our analysis on land abundance as we want to emphasize land as a productive factor in the 
generation of agricultural products (foods and raw materials).142 In Chapter 3, we estimated the land 
frontier expansion of the settler economies taking into account agrarian aptitude as a proxy for 
“land quality”, and we examine the role of distance from “markets” or “centres of gravity” as a 
possible other component of this concept. Therefore we can bring these indicators into our model as 
our proxy for natural resource wealth (land wealth), and we then control for the effect of 
institutional quality on the natural resources.143 In this sense we differ from Boschini et al. (2005) as 
we understand the technical dimension in terms of its potential productivity instead of “point” and 
“diffuse” natural resources. In addition, we apply the García-Jimeno & Robinson (2009) 
formulation but we differ from their approach in that we work with a more accurate concept of 
                                                 
142 Even in the case of Chile, the evolution prior to the incorporation of mineral wealth –from the mid-19th century to 
the 1880s– had several features common to economies that produce food and raw materials, which makes it a 
comparable case. Denoon (1983) argues that Chile and South Africa constitute “limit cases” of settler economies.  
143 García-Jimeno & Robinson (2009):18 admit that “…[t]here are many caveats with these findings. For example, we 
did not control for variation in the ‘quality’ of the frontier. For instance there may be a big difference between 
Oklahoma in the United States and the Atacama Desert in northern Chile, both of which were frontiers in 1850.” 
 221
frontier144 and we consider several benchmarks. This captures the dynamism that characterized the 
process, an element that was lacking in their analysis. We use panel data to estimate the equation: 
yit=β0+ β1 NRi, t-1+ β2Insti, t-1+ β3 (NRi, t-1 x Insti, t-1 )+εi      (1) 
where yit is the dependent variable of interest for country i (six settler economies) in the period t 
(with t representing decades from the 1870s to the WWI) considering the economic performance  
–annual GDP growth rate (GDPAG) and the index level (GDPA); 10-year average– and the income 
distribution within the agrarian activity, which constituted the more important economic sector of 
the period.145 Our indicator of inequality is the relation between income components (functional 
income distribution in the agrarian sector); specifically, the ratio of the total mass of land rents to 
wages (RW), which higher values correspond to increasing inequality (as the Gini Index) and a 
“rentist” profile of the agrarian production.146 
1.1.1 Explanatory variables: institutional quality 
Like García-Jimeno & Robinson (2009), we consider Insti,t-1 as the constraints on the executive 
(C) from Polity IV in period t-1 but, unlike in their approach, we admit changes in the time of the 
index. This measure of historical political institutions is defined as the extent of institutional 
restrictions on the decision making powers of the chief executive, whether individual or collective. 
In a democracy, constraints would come from the legislative or judicial branches of government. In 
a dictatorship constraints may come from the ruling party in a one-party system, a council of nobles 
or powerful advisors in monarchies, or perhaps the military in polities which are subject to the 
threat of military coups. The extent of constraints on the executive are coded as being between 1, 
meaning “unlimited executive authority” and 7 for “executive parity or subordination”. A country 
would be in the first category if “constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored” or if 
“there is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called or dismissed at the executive’s 
pleasure”. A country would be in the upper category if “a legislature, ruling party or council of 
nobles initiates much or most important legislation” or “the executive is chosen by the 
accountability group and is dependent on its continued support too remain in office” (Marshall & 
Jaggers, 2009: 23-24). (See specifications in Appendix 1 to Chapter 5). These indicators are 
systematic subjective ratings generated by specialists to provide different agents (typically 
politicians and investors) with measures of political and institutional risks, governance and 
democracy. However, considering that they are the results of value judgments and entail evolutions 
                                                 
144 Instead of using the area of the current national territory as reference, our indicators consider the area suitable for 
grassland and different kinds of land (see our discussion in Chapter 3). 
145 Boyce & Emery (2006) and Bravo-Ortega & De Gregorio (2005) propose and test models with the growth rate and 
level of income per capita as dependent variables, and our exercises follow a similar line.   
146 The data were presented in Chapter 4.  
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in which periods of absolutely stability are interrupted by sudden jumps (the discrete evolution of 
the index), their application to statistical long-run studies has disadvantages. We introduce 
alternative indicators in order to obtain robust estimations. 
Clague et al. (1999):187 say that the government has four crucial roles to play in contract 
enforcement and the protection of property rights: (i) It provides third-party enforcement when no 
self-enforcing mechanism exists; (ii) It may be the entity that connects the branches of the contract; 
(iii) It may enforce the arrangement that private agents use to constitute themselves as a formal 
group; and (iv) the government ensures peace. These characteristics are applicable to the creation 
and distribution of landowner rights and the enforcement of the property system. Therefore these 
concepts are interesting as a guide in our approach to this question. The argument is that to capture 
the potential gains of activities intensive in contract enforcement and property rights it is possible to 
employ the relative use of currency, by applying the concept of “contract-intensive money”. 
Contract-intensive money (CIM) is defined as the ratio of non-currency money to the total money 
supply, or CIM=(M2-Curr)/M2, where M2 is a broad definition of the money supply and Curr is 
currency held by people (outside banks). In other terms, to capture the effectiveness of contract 
enforcement through time, it is possible to use the societies’ reliance on non-currency money, since 
such “means of payment” and “reserves of value” would not be chosen by agents that are skeptic 
about the government’s willingness or capacity to enforce contracts. 
The application of these ideas to settler economies is not new. Prados de la Escosura & Sanz-
Villarroya (2006, 2009) use the same concept to evaluate the role of institutional arrangements in 
the long-run decline of Argentina by comparing the evolution of the CIM with the cases of 
Australia and Canada.  Both Clague et al. (1999) and Prados de la Escosura & Sanz-Villarroya 
(2009) argue about how well these indicators fit, and the evidence is convincing. “CIM is a 
reflection or measure of the type of governance that improves economic performance rather than a 
cause of that performance” (Clague et al., 1999: 189). Hence this can operate as an instrumental 
variable in the historical analysis. To justify our decision we compare the evolution of the two 
indicators for each country. The association between indicators by country is evident in Australia 
(Figure 5.2), New Zealand (Figure 5.5) and Chile (Figure 5.4) and increasingly congruent in 
Canada (Figure 5.3). In Argentina (Figure 5.1) and Uruguay (Figure 5.6) the evolution of CIM is 
highly irregular and this is related to the low values of Polity IV indicators.147 We repeat our 
statistical analysis of executive constraints (C) with CIM indicators to estimate equation (1).  We 
have doubts about the differences in levels among economies because the comparability of the 
                                                 
147  See the calculations in Appendix 1 to Chapter 5. 
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indicators is not yet satisfactory. To overcome this deficiency we include an index of CIMs 
(1860s=100; CIMI) to rule out levels and just consider evolutions. 
Figure 5.1
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AUSTRALIA: QUALITY INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS
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Figure 5.3
CANADA: QUALITY INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS
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Figure 5.4
CHILE: QUALITY INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS
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Source: see Appendix 1 to Chapter 5. 
Figure 5.5
NEW ZEALAND: QUALITY INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS
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Figure 5.6
URUGUAY: QUALITY INSTITUTIONAL INDICATORS
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In all our estimates we consider indicators for each country i in time t-1 to control for possible 
effects of endogeneity in the model. 
1.1.2 Explanatory variables: natural resources 
“Natural resources” is a more restricted category of analysis than “natural capital” because they 
are just one function of natural wealth and, in consequence, they do not consider its systemic 
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character (Ayres, et al., 1997). However, as category, they acquire precision in the historical 
analysis of economies where the constitution of markets and others institutions were determined at 
the same time as natural resources were first exploited.   
To discuss the impact of natural resources on economic development it is useful to distinguish 
among resource abundance (a stock measure of resource wealth), resource rents (the ‘windfall’ flow 
of earnings derived from the natural resources at some point in time) and resource dependence (the 
degree to which economies have access to alternative sources of income other than resource 
extraction; usually related to export specialization). Obviously these concepts may be inter-
connected because economies with large natural capital may get high incomes from extraction, 
specialize in primary exports and become dependent on resources. But some resource-rich countries 
are not dependent on resources and some relatively resource-poor economies are. Besides, there is 
much confusion about the exact meaning of the concept “resource abundance”. The sense may vary 
from one science to another and even among different areas of Economics. In the natural sciences 
or Environmental Economics, resource abundance usually refers to the amount of potentially 
exploitable natural resources. But when we study the Dutch disease, resource abundance refers to 
the amount of already exploited natural resources and reserves.  
The share of potential resources that eventually becomes economically exploitable depends on 
many factors such as economic and political conditions and technological progress, which adds 
historical specificity to the explanation of economic processes. The literature initially proposed the 
“curse” as an empirical fact almost undoubtedly and based mainly on the analysis of an index  
–GDP shares of primary exports– more suitable to measure dependence on rather than abundance 
of natural resources. In these terms, the focus of the analysis concentrated on the channels that 
connect the two processes –rich natural resources and economic growth– in accordance with the 
typical factors that affect economic performance: the accumulation of productive factors 
(investment, human capital) and technological progress. However, the literature about the curse has 
actively incorporated institutional arrangements into the analysis because: (i) institutional aspects 
have increasingly become part of recent mainstream economic thought; (ii) a central point of the 
natural resources question is ownership –of the assets and the rents associated with their productive 
application–; and (iii) the interest groups and the state are key agents in the formation of the 
property system. Results have been mixed, but there is a general consensus in the literature that 
some kind of conditionality is operating. This is the idea that the quality of institutions plays a key 
role in the curse or blessing of natural resources and, even when natural resources are abundant, 
economies can have promising economic performance when institutions are “good” (these countries 
would show some kind of curse reversal). There has been a reaction to this line of thought and 
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several authors put the emphasis in to distinguish between natural resource dependence and natural 
resource endowment or abundance, taking into account alternative indicators such as the stock of 
natural capital148 or total natural resource assets. In this analytical line, there is empirical work that 
challenges the traditional view inverting the relationship –resource abundance positively affects 
growth and institutional quality (Ding & Field, 2004; Brunnschweiler, 2008)– and claiming the 
curse is “a red herring” (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2006). In accordance with these considerations, 
our measure of abundance of natural resources in settler economies needs some further explanation 
to precise its implications. In our proposal, NR corresponds to natural resource wealth expressed in 
terms of the land that is not occupied or not incorporated into production, and in this sense it is 
closer to an abundance than a dependence concept. We propose several measures of NR, which was 
one of the main “potential” productive factors that the colonizers encountered when they arrived in 
these new territories. We work initially with an indicator similar to the index F of García-Jimeno & 
Robinson (2009). However, our F differs because it measures the proportion of non-occupied land 
to the land suitable for grassland and to raise animals, instead of the whole national territory.149 
Then: 
1,
1,
1, 1
−
−
− −=
ti
ti
ti PVG
OA
NR          (2) 
Where: 
OA i t-1: is the occupied area (in km2) of country i in period t, with t=1870, 1880, 1890, 1900 and 
1910. . We classify territories with more than 2 people per square mile (0.7722 people per square 
kilometre) as occupied land (closed frontier) as it is standard in the literature. 
PVG i: is the “potential vegetation grassland” area (in km2) of country i.  
An important point in our definition is that our indicator F shows a decreasing trajectory –with 
some breaks of reversal expansion– that denotes the progressive and sometimes intermittent 
advance of the population across the territory. Therefore, in fact, our economies became less land-
rich during the period, and if we assume the standard hypothesis they would be “escaping” from the 
curse. In other words, natural endowments become relatively scarcer with the expansion of the 
population on the “open” frontier, and they become limited as more land is incorporated into 
production. Seen in this way, natural abundance is not a static concept but changes in the long run. 
As in the previous case, we consider measures for each country i in time t-1 to control for possible 
effects of endogeneity. 
How can we represent the gradient of different appropriability conditions of natural resources? In 
Chapter 3 we present indicators corresponding to different types of land in accordance with its 
                                                 
148 See, for example, World Bank (2006). 
149 For details and extensive discussion of the indicator see Chapter 3. 
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aptitude to allocate as grassland. We classify land as having high, medium or low aptitude, and we 
analyze the evolution of each frontier depending on the total grassland (“extensive indicators”), for 
each type of endowment (“intensive indicators”) and by the contribution of each type of land to the 
total expansion of the frontier (“contribution indexes”). Specifically, (i) with “extensive indicators” 
we compare the expansion by each type of land in relation to total grassland; (ii) with “intensive 
indicators” we compare the expansion by each kind of land in relation to the total land of this type 
available; and (iii) with “contribution indexes” we measure the contribution of each type of land to 
the total expansion of the frontier. Our graphical analysis –from Figure 3.27 to 3.52– showed 
dissimilar trajectories by indicators and countries which, combined with our findings in Chapter 4, 
led us to propose an overall pattern and the following conjecture. The economies that during the 
First Globalization expanded their frontier by incorporating high aptitude land would have enjoyed 
stronger agrarian sectors, but at the same time there would have been a more intensive worsening in 
income distribution. This conjecture may be evaluated in terms of an appropriability problem that 
emerges from the different land quality notion, and our analysis contrasts the impact of each type of 
frontier on economic development (in terms of growth and distribution). Therefore we need to work 
with several indicators that provide an appropriability gradient to represent different capabilities of 
capturing rents. 
We include F as a reference and to facilitate comparisons with other studies (especially with 
García-Jimeno & Robinson, 2009), but it does not offer useful results for our analysis. We consider 
our contribution indexes for high (HI) and medium (MI) land aptitude to represent the 
appropriability gradient (from more to less appropriability) and compare coefficients to test our 
hypothesis. In addition, we build relative indicators to contrast the evolution of the last indexes with 
those of low land aptitude (LI): HI/LI=HL and MI/LI=ML. Finally, we consider the “extensive 
indicators” FEH, FEM and FEL of land as another way to test our hypothesis (as before, 
considering from more to less appropriability). The “sense” of the appropriability is given by the 
technical conditions of the different land, understanding “technical” as the intrinsic features of the 
natural resources. Better land –the most productive land– makes it possible to generate and 
appropriate rents in a more intensive way. In other words, higher appropriability would be related to 
cursed results. However, natural resources do not perform alone but interact with institutions. This 
interaction is at the core of our third explanatory variable. 
1.1.3 Explanatory variables: interaction between natural resources and institutions 
For economic and technical reasons, some land qualities are more likely than others to cause 
problems like rent-seeking, conflicts and the crowding-out effects. However, this problem could be 
countered by “good” institutions, and whether natural resources are good or bad for a country’s 
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development can depend on the interaction between the prevailing institutional arrangements and 
the types of resources the country has. We consider the joint action of natural resources and 
institutional quality indicators to test this question, and we introduce the multiplication of the two 
indicators as an additional variable. 
1.1.4 Our empirical model 
We can not estimate the general formulation of equation (1) because we have multicollinearity 
problems. By the nature of their construction, the indicators of institutional quality are highly 
correlated to the respective interaction components and this would distort the results. Therefore, we 
work with two models:  
yit=β0+ β1 NRi, t-1+ β2Insti, t-1+εi         (3) 
yit=β0+ β1 NRi, t-1+ β2 (NRi, t-1 . Insti, t-1 )+εi       (4) 
Where we consider, alternatively:  
y:  GDPAG,  GDPA and RW. 
NR: F, HI, MI, HL, ML, FEH, FEM, and FEL.  
Inst: C, CIM and CIMI 
NR x Insti,t-1: FC, HIC, MIC, HLC, MLC, FEHC, FEMC, FELC, FCIM, HICIM, MICIM, HLCIM, 
MLCIM, FEHCIM, FEMCIM, FELCIM, FCIMI, HICIMI, MICIMI, HLCIMI, MLCIMI, FEHCIMI, 
FEMCIMI and FELCIMI. 
1.1.5 Hypotheses 
What do we expect? A reasonable assumption is to identify economic development with richer 
economies (faster economic growth and higher incomes) and more egalitarian societies. During the 
First Globalization, the settler economies expanded strongly led by agrarian sectors but also 
suffered worsening income distribution. Both processes were the result of incorporating abundant 
land into production, and in this sense long run economic performance was the outcome of 
decreasing natural wealth. We test two hypotheses: (i) “good” institutions, and especially when they 
interact with natural resources, bring about a reversion of the curse (or they reinforce the blessing); 
(ii) the different degree of appropriability conditions the magnitude of the impact on economic 
development. 
First, we work with model (3). On the one hand, in the case of GDPA (growth rate and level) β1 
should be negative in accordance with the standard hypothesis of the curse of natural resource 
abundance, and β2 should be positive because the standard results are that good institutional quality 
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is beneficial for growth. On the other hand, we would expect a positive effect of resources (β1) on 
inequality (worsening in income distribution as the curse) and a negative effect of institutions (β2), 
which would indicate improving equality derived from good institutions. Second, we estimate 
equation (4), and we propose similar arguments as in the previous model, although we work with 
the interaction component instead of institutional quality indicators. Both formulations are suitable 
for evaluating the different impact of natural resources depending on their appropriability 
conditions. We compare the coefficients β1 derived from the successive estimations of equation (3) 
and (4) to test our hypothesis of appropriability in accordance with the technical dimension. We 
compare the coefficients β2 derived from the successive estimations of equation (3) with the 
corresponding of estimations of equation (4) to evaluate the institutional dimension of the 
appropriability problem. Evidence in favour of this hypothesis would require us to find more 
intensive effects of institutions when we estimate equation with an interaction variable.  
1.2 Results 
We work using panel data and we consider the most suitable model for each case among fixed 
effects (MFE), random effects (MRE) and ordinary least square (OLS). As is usual in the literature, 
we initially tested the correlation between the individual effects and the other regressors with the 
Hausman test to see if the results allow us to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation and to use 
fixed effects model, or do not reject it, and estimate the model of random effects. In addition, we 
tested the significance of the individual effects computing the Breush-Pagan for random effects, and 
the F test statistic for fixed effects. For cases in which individual effects were not significant, we 
use OLS. To control for heteroscedasticity we always use robust standard errors. We select the 
models that provide important insights for our objective (essentially to do with natural resources) 
and exclude the non-significant relations (see database in Appendix to Chapter 5). 150 
1.2.1 Estimates that include institutional quality 
We present our estimates of equation (3) using institutional quality as an explanatory variable of 
economic growth, level of production and income distribution in the agrarian sector. Only in the 
first case we also include the results of equation (4) because it is suitable for the presentation. 
• Economic growth in the agriculture 
Our first exercises have economic expansion as the dependent variable; we consider growth rates 
(10-year periods) of income in agrarian activity (Table 5.1). We introduce the lagged value of 
GDPA to allow for the presence of convergence effects (we obtain the usual negative and 
significant coefficients). It turns out that an abundance of natural resources is significant in few 
                                                 
150 All estimates may be obtained by request from the author. 
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cases, and as expected the signs are negative (MI and ML) so we do not reject the curse hypothesis. 
In other words, extensive “open” territories (large natural endowments) in the last 10-year period 
would have adverse consequences on economic growth in subsequent decades. However, the results 
are far from conclusive. One of our indicators, low quality land (FEL), has a positive and significant 
sign. This outcome is interesting because it shows that differences in terms of land quality may 
explain differences among economies. 
Dependent variable: Growth Agriculture GDP (GDPAG)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Constant 9.8 9.2 10.4 17.2 0.0 -1.9 9.7 9.2 10.4 17.5 0.1
0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.97 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.94
lnGDP(-1) -0.51 -0.50 -0.48 -0.51 -0.46 -0.46 -0.51 -0.50 -0.48 -0.51 -0.46
0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
MI -7.42 -6.92 -7.33 -6.90
0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
ML -8.15 -15.07 -8.17 -15.29
0.06 0.09 0.05 0.09
FEM
FEL 2.23 4.17 2.18
0.01 0.01 0.01
C -0.01 0.00 0.01
0.62 0.92 0.71
CIMI -0.02 0.11 0.10
0.63 0.16 0.06
Interac_C -0.01 0.00 0.01
0.64 0.90 0.73
Interac_CIMI -0.02 0.11
0.63 0.15
Rsq 0.57       0.48      0.58       0.60       0.48       0.59       0.57       0.48       0.58       0.46       0.48       
F stat 3.83       3.93      5.49       5.44       8.71       6.60       3.87       3.93       5.54       6.65       8.35       
(Prob) 0.02      0.02     0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00      0.02      0.02      0.00      0.00      0.00      
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
All coefficients were estimated with robust standard error. p-value in italic.
Interac_C, and _CIMI mean interaction between the corresponding  land abundance index and, respectively, C and CIMI.
ECONOMETRIC EXCERCISES: GROWTH OF AGRICULTURE GDP AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
Table 5.1
 
The signs of institutional quality (C and CIMI) are predominantly positive in accordance with our 
hypothesis, although a few of them are significant coefficients. The fact that good institutions do 
not affect income expansion may be evidence in two different directions. On the one side, 
institutional quality was not so important to economic growth in the case of agrarian activities 
during the First Globalization. In other words, economic growth would have been based on bringing 
into productive use idle resources to fuel economic growth rather than the creation of institutions to 
promote expansion. On the other hand, these results may be warning us about the shortcomings of 
our institutional indicators. Similar considerations correspond to interaction variables. 
• Economic growth: GDP in agriculture production 
Our second set of exercises (Table 5.2) have to do with the volume of agriculture production 
index as a dependent variable (10-year averages, expressed in logarithms) and land frontier 
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indicators and institutional quality as explicative variables. The negative and significant effect of 
the abundance of natural resources on agrarian income level does not allow us to reject the curse 
hypothesis. In other words, large “open” territories (huge natural endowments) in the last 10 years 
would affect agricultural production. The institutional arrangements have positive signs, a result 
consistent with the standard hypothesis and which, unlike the previous outcome, does not present 
contradictions between models. Therefore the quality of institutions would be important to explain 
higher levels of agrarian production, although only some coefficients are significant. In particular, 
the most convincing models are those that include “relative intensive” indicators (HL and ML), 
which is an encouraging result because they are the more suitable ratios to test our hypothesis.  
Dependent variable: Agriculture GDP (GDPA)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS MRE MRE OLS OLS OLS MFE MFE MRE OLS OLS MEF OLS
Constant 5.8 5.5 5.5 7.3 6.1 35.2 32.4 7.2 5.7 7.4 62.4 50.1 22.8 6.7 5.1 49.6 8.7
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00
F -2.9 -3.4 -2.0
0.02 0.00 0.07
HI -4.1 -2.9
0.01 0.01
MI -31.9 -29.5
0.02 0.04
HL -4.0 -2.5 -4.0
0.01 0.01 0.01
ML -61.0 -48.9 -19.5
0.01 0.02 0.01
FEH -3.8 -2.1
0.01 0.01
FEM -48.6
0.10
FEL -6.3
0.05
C 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.1
0.11 0.12 0.61 0.11 0.00 0.07
CIM 1.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 3.9 1.0 1.4 1.9
0.01 0.17 0.26 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.18 0.02
CIMI 0.0 0.2 0.3
0.24 0.01 0.02
Rsq 0.20     0.72       0.80     0.77     0.15     0.16     0.12     0.19     0.19     0.14     0.21     
Within 0.59     0.62     0.68       0.70       0.56     0.64       
Between 0.21     0.14     0.07       0.09       0.23     0.02       
Overall 0.59     0.08     0.02       0.03       0.12     0.02       
F stat 3.20     5.24       3.67     4.90     5.38     4.38     4.50     5.00     17.46     12.87     4.09     5.21     7.98       3.05     
(Prob) 0.06    0.01      0.04    0.02    0.01    0.02    0.02    0.01    0.01      0.01      0.03    0.01    0.03      0.06    
F all u_i=0 14.59     14.83     11.02     
(Prob) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald chi2 6.44     5.41     6.83     
(Prob) 0.04    0.07    0.03    
BP chi2 5.00     5.09     9.34     
(Prob) 0.03    0.00    0.00    
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
All coefficients were estimated with robust standard error. p-value in italic.
Table 5.2
ECONOMETRIC EXCERCISES: AGRICULTURE GDP AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
 
What happens to our appropriability hypothesis? We compare three sets of coefficients to evaluate 
our hypothesis; first, contribution indicators (HI and MI), second, relative intensive indicators (HL 
and ML), and third, “extensive indicators” (FEH, FEM and FEL), and in all cases we contrast 
coefficients derived from the same group of control variables. 
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In the first appropriability gradient we obtain coefficients around -3 for HI and -30 for MI. 
Therefore negative coefficients are significantly lower when we estimate the model with medium 
land aptitude contribution. In other words, an abundance of an open frontier with land of high 
aptitude is relatively better (less bad) for economic performance than medium aptitude and we 
therefore reject the appropriability hypothesis. According to our evidence, countries that moved 
their frontier onto high aptitude land faced lower adverse effects in terms of economic growth, 
technically speaking. When we estimate models comparing the movement onto high and medium 
aptitude land as against low aptitude (HL and ML) the sign and the direction of the differences are 
alike. The same happens when we compare FEH and FEM. The “curse was more cursed” when 
land frontier expansion presented a more intensive presence of medium than high quality land. 
• Income distribution: total rents in relation to total wages  
The exercises for income distribution show how the different specifications of abundant 
resources have negative and significant coefficients that enable us to reject the curse hypothesis. 
Dependent variable: Rents/Wages ratio (RW)
MRE OLS MFE MFE MRE MFE MFE MFE MFE MRE MFE OLS OLS OLS OLS
Constant 5.66 5.63 7.19 6.51 5.97 6.87 7.03 27.92 34.62 5.88 6.87 14.39 11.70 13.27 9.69
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F -3.94 -2.86
0.00 0.01
HI -4.82 -4.54
0.00 0.00
MI
HL -3.79 -5.03 -5.08
0.00 0.00 0.01
ML -26.58 -32.87
0.00 0.01
FEH -3.89 -5.14
0.00 0.00
FEM -12.44 -8.98
0.00 0.03
FEL -10.93 -6.95
0.00 0.03
C -0.05 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 -0.14
0.53 0.03 0.62 0.70 0.24 0.00
CIM -1.63 -0.04 0.17 1.13 -0.02 -1.38 -1.33
0.00 0.94 0.71 0.22 0.98 0.01 0.01
CIMI 0.00 0.20
0.98 0.02
Rsq 0.47       0.40       0.46       0.57       0.49       
Within 0.22       0.26       0.24       0.29       0.28       0.28       0.28       0.31       0.25       0.24       
Between 0.39       0.01       0.08       0.07       0.23       0.16       0.92       0.31       0.00       0.01       
Overall 0.32       0.01       0.00       0.00       0.00       0.00 0.24       0.00       0.01       0.01       
F stat 12.53    16.34    22.66    37.74    38.33    50.35    13.31    18.77    8.12       13.09    16.21    15.43    
(Prob) 0.00      0.01      0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00      0.01      0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00 0.00
F all u_i=0 9.80       4.96       57.30    5.11       5.50       5.44       5.18       
(Prob) 0.00 0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00      0.00      
Wald chi2 8.82       65.76    5.18       
(Prob) 0.01      0.00 0.08      
BP chi2 9.67       10.34    13.45    
(Prob) 0.00      0.00      0.00      
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
All coefficients were estimated with robust standard error. p-value in italic.
Table 5.3
ECONOMETRIC EXCERCISES: INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
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An abundance of land was associated with lower rentals/wages ratios and so we identify the 
blessing of natural resources in terms of equality (Table 5.3). We obtain mainly negative 
coefficients for the institutional quality indicators, which show that institutions contributed to the 
blessing (they would be associated with low levels of R/W), although few of them are significant.  
As in the previous analysis, we compare sets of coefficients to evaluate our appropriability 
hypothesis. We cannot compare contribution indicators (HI and MI) because medium land does not 
turn out to be significant. However, when we estimate the models with relative indexes (HL and 
ML) it is clear that “the blessing was more blessed” when economies moved their land frontier onto 
medium aptitude land. The indicator of abundant high aptitude land exceeds that for medium 
aptitude land, both in relation to low aptitude land (they are lower in absolute values), and therefore 
the movement onto high aptitude land would contribute less intensively to an improvement in 
income distribution. Similar relations show the comparison for the extensive indicators. 
1.2.2 Estimates that include the interaction between land abundance and institutional 
quality 
We present our estimates of equation (4) using the interaction between the indicator for land-
abundance and institutional quality as the explanatory variable. In general the results show a pattern 
similar to previous exercises. 
• Economic growth: GDP level in agricultural production 
As in the previous exercises, our estimates show a negative and significant relationship between 
the abundance of natural resources indicators and agricultural production so we cannot reject the 
curse hypothesis. In other words, large “open” territories (huge natural endowments) in the last 10-
years affected agrarian production in subsequent decades. 
Some models are not strictly comparable but they reveal some interesting insights. The 
coefficients corresponding to medium aptitude land show that economies with more natural 
resources of this type undergo more intense curses. In other words, economies that in the last 10 
years had greater medium aptitude land wealth (as against low aptitude) registered lower levels of 
agricultural GDP. These results are apparent when we compare the coefficients of HI with MI, HL 
with ML, and lastly FEH with FEM and FEL. We therefore reject the hypothesis of appropriability 
in technical terms, a result coherent with the historical evidence. Settler economies used their high 
aptitude land to produce commodities and raw materials and achieved a sustained trajectory of 
export-led growth.151 In other words, an abundance of high aptitude natural resources was a less 
                                                 
151 More than half the land suitable for grassland was of high aptitude. The average in the club was 52 percent, with a 
maximum of 98 per cent in Uruguay and a minimum of 2 per cent in Canada.   
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intensive curse –a blessing in comparative terms– for settler economies, and economies that moved 
their frontiers onto comparatively worse land suffered a “more damning curse”. In spite of the high 
appropriability of high aptitude land, economic growth in agriculture was possible and encouraged 
–in relative terms– by this type of natural resource. 
Dependent variable: Agriculture GDP (GDPA)
OLS OLS OLS OLS MRE MRE OLS OLS OLS MFE MFE MRE OLS OLS MFE MEF OLS
Constant 6.4 6.9 7.7 6.7 35.6 33.3 7.6 6.3 7.6 64.3 52.7 23.1 7.3 5.8 54.1 50.3 9.7
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.08 0.00
F -3.8 -5.3
0.02 0.00
HI -4.5 -3.5
0.01 0.00
MI -32.2 -30.4
0.02 0.04
HL -4.4 -3.0 -4.2
0.01 0.01 0.01
ML -62.9 -51.5 -19.7
0.01 0.02 0.01
FEH -4.5 -2.9
0.01 0.00
FEM -52.9 -49.4
0.06 0.09
FEL -7.5
0.04
Interac_C 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1
0.10 0.12 0.59 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.16
Interac_CIM 2.6 0.8 1.0 0.8 3.9 1.1 1.6 2.1
0.01 0.17 0.25 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.15 0.02
Interac_CIMI 0.2 0.3
0.01 0.02
Rsq 0.22 0.34 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.14 0.22
Within 0.60 0.62 0.68 0.70 0.56 0.62 0.65
Between 0.20 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.23 0.02 0.02
Overall 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.07
F stat 3.39 5.41 4.90 5.34 4.39 4.47 4.99 17.53 12.73 4.19 5.26 7.66 8.92 3.11
(Prob) 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06
F all u_i=0 14.57 14.89 11.75 11.16
(Prob) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald chi2 14.72 16.89 6.82
(Prob) 0.00 0.00 0.33
BP 50.50 5.16 9.28
(Prob) 0.02 0.02 0.00
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
All coefficients were estimated with robust standard error. p-value in italic.
Interac_C, _CIM and _CIMI mean interaction between the corresponding land abundance index and, respectively, C, CIM and CIMI.
Table 5.4
ECONOMETRIC EXCERCISES: AGRICULTURE GDP AND INTERACTION NNRR-INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
 
Coefficients of the interaction variable are positive and significant in many cases and, as before, 
the models than include HL and ML are the most convincing. This is very important because we 
have proved that good institutions interacting with natural resources can mean favourable 
consequences and strengthen high levels of welfare. However, the evidence in favour of the 
institutional dimension of the appropriability question is not clear. We would not reject this 
hypothesis if the results of our estimation were significantly higher than previous estimates, but the 
differences between β2-coefficients in Table 5.2 and Table 5.4 are not so great.   
• Income distribution: total rents in relation to total wages  
As in the previous analysis the different specifications of land frontier expansion indicators have 
negative and significant coefficients that allow us to reject the curse hypothesis. In other words, an 
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abundance of land was associated with lower rentals/wages ratios, and therefore we would identify 
the blessing of natural resources in terms of equality. However, in this context the key question is 
about appropriability. What do our results suggest about it? 
When we compare the coefficients of the different specifications of land frontier expansion we 
find evidence in favour of the appropriability hypothesis (we compare HL with ML, and FEH with 
FEM and FEL). Economies that expanded their frontiers onto high aptitude land had the least 
blessing from their abundance of natural resources. To advance onto the land in the high aptitude 
regions opened up possibilities to appropriate higher rents, and this worsened income distribution 
more intensively. 
Dependent variable: Rents/Wages ratio (RW)
MRE MFE MFE MFE MRE MFE MFE MFE MFE MRE MFE OLS OLS OLS OLS
Constant 5.43 6.87 6.46 6.53 5.89 6.97 7.04 28.68 34.62 5.75 6.83 14.11 10.98 12.60 9.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
F -3.78
0.01
HI -4.53 -4.52 -4.53
0.01 0.00 0.00
HL -3.72 -5.16 -5.08
0.00 0.00 0.01
ML -27.36 -32.87
0.00 0.01
FEH -3.76 -5.14
0.00 0.00
FEM -12.16 -8.21
0.00 0.06
FEL -10.24 -6.22
0.00 0.06
Interac_C -0.03 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.14
0.76 0.07 0.61 0.70 0.25 0.00
Interac_CIM 0.01 0.23 1.15 0.05 -1.45 -1.41
0.98 0.61 0.22 0.93 0.01 0.01
Interac_CIMI -0.04 0.00 0.19
0.04 1.00 0.02
Rsq 0.40 0.46 0.54 0.49
Within 0.21 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.25 0.24
Between 0.40 0.01 0.10 0.18 0.08 0.26 0.17 0.92 0.31 0.01 0.01
Overall 0.32 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.01
F stat 11.63 20.67 25.97 32.08 38.08 50.59 13.31 17.44 7.95 12.46 15.33 14.79
(Prob) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F all u_i=0 9.80 5.02 4.78 5.71 5.13 5.48 5.44 5.26
(Prob) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wald chi2 12.72 68.07 44.59
(Prob) 0.00 0.00 0.00
BP 9.56 10.71 13.32
(Prob) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
p-value in parenthesis (Robust Standard Errors).
Interac_C, _CIM and _CIMI mean interaction between the corresponding land abundance index and, respectively, C, CIM and CIMI.
Table 5.5
ECONOMETRIC EXCERCISES: INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND INTERACTION NNRR-INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
 
We obtain mostly negative coefficients for the institutional quality indicators and several of them 
are significant (significance level of 0.1), but their influence seems inferior to that we perceived in 
agrarian production. The signs of the coefficients show that the combination of natural resources 
and institutions yielded favourable results, which led income distribution to improve in these 
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economies. However, institutions would not be such important to explain distribution as in the case 
of the product of agriculture. As in the previous exercises, evidence in terms of the institutional 
dimension of the appropriability problem is not convincing (compare β2-coefficients in Tables 5.5 
and 5.3). At a conjectural level, the fact that good institutions interacting with natural resources do 
not present differential consequences in terms of distribution (and production) may constitute 
evidence in two directions. On the one hand, it may be that the interaction was not an important 
component in the economic performance of settler economies and, on the other hand, these results 
may be a warning about the shortcomings of our institutional indicators. We probably need a more 
accurate indicator of institutional quality, and our description of the formation of the ownership 
land system embodies this warning.  
1.3 Highlights and shortcomings 
Our exercises are far from conclusive, basically because our data base is small, but they provide 
interesting insights. We do not reject the curse of the natural resources hypothesis in terms of 
economic expansion (growth and level of agrarian production). But, if we admit that the curse can 
be represented in terms of inequality, it is possible to reject the natural resources curse hypothesis 
considering the relationship between rents and wages in the agrarian activity. 
Institutional quality, acting alone or in combination with the natural resources, was able to induce 
positive effects because it moderated the curse or strengthened the blessing of the natural resources. 
However, our evidence suggests that the incidence of institutional quality would be more relevant to 
explain production than distribution. It is not enough to state categorically this assertion but the 
evidence shows interesting trends. 
In addition, we find evidence in favour of the appropriability hypothesis in terms of inequality, 
but we reject it in terms of agricultural production. The expansion of the land frontier onto 
relatively higher aptitude land meant a more moderate curse on the production side of the economy, 
but it meant a “blessing less blessed” in distributive terms. These considerations are valid for the 
technical dimension of the appropriability question, but we do not find evidence in favour of the 
institutional dimension.  
What were the consequences of these conditions in the long run? As the abundance of natural 
resources (land) decreases with the occupation of territory, economies that incorporated “new” land 
into production “escaped from the curse” of natural resources and sustained a trajectory of 
expansion until they reached levels of income close to the core of the world economy. However, in 
this process, our economies left the blessing, in terms of income distribution, of an extensive open 
territory behind them, to shape a persistently non-egalitarian environment. 
 236
The most important shortcomings of the previous analysis derive from the analytical treatment of 
institutions. It is possible to identify at least three clear limitations in our approach.  
First, we reduce the complexity of institutional arrangements (as regards structure and change) to 
“one number”. It is clearly questionable whether we can add up all kinds of different institutions 
into a composite concept and measure its quality. This may be useful to study some economic 
relationships, but it minimizes the analytical and explicative power of institutions in economic 
development. 152 Second, in our analysis, we consider institutions as an exogenous component of 
the economic system, but there is extensive literature that emphasizes the endogeneity of 
institutions (see Alston & Mueller, 2005, 2003, for a literature review). A classical discussion in the 
study of the settler economies is about the latifundia and the huge damage to economic growth this 
property structure caused (see CIDE, 1965, for Uruguay; and Heaton, 1925, for Australia). 
However, several authors argue that these large estates are not given structures but the results of 
economic and technological forces (see Williams, 1975, for Australia). This analysis is perfectly 
compatible with the notion of institutional endogenenity and we will deal with it in depth in future 
stages of our research. Finally, the statistical exercise based on a “macroeconomic” level does not 
deal with the decision behaviour of the agents. It is true that in settler economies agrarian interests 
were in early contact with the political power and induced decisions or participated directly in 
government. In this sense, our previous approach would capture the expressions of the relationships 
among agents at a macro level. However, with this approach we are unlikely to understand the 
specific actions of the different groups or the dynamics of the process in particular sectors.  
The way to overcome, at least partially, the deficiencies in our method is to change the approach 
to complement –and not to replace– the previous analysis. A first step in this direction is to identify 
the specific institutional arrangements that regulate –formally or informally– the appropriability 
conditions of the land (and, as consequence, of rents); i.e. the conditions that determine the agent’s 
capabilities for capturing rents. We describe the process of the distribution of land ownership rights 
and the characteristics of land tenure systems in a historical and comparative perspective and 
consider as illustration four economies in the “club”: Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and 
Uruguay. We will try to remedy the previous shortcomings by working in three different directions. 
First, it is possible to give additional dimensions to the “constraints on the executive” (C) and the 
evolution of the CIM (and CIMI) to make both types of indicators more representative. Second, we 
can introduce into the analysis elements that characterize the endogenous formation of institutions 
in the society such as the political confrontations, the influence of different power groups or the 
impact of technology. Finally, when we describe the process of distribution of land ownership 
                                                 
152 For a critical overview, see Chang (2010). 
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rights we propose our approach to the agents’ decisions. This option does not completely remedy 
the shortcomings of our previous macro level analysis, but it is a first step in this direction. 
2. Appropriability and the formation of the land ownership system 
In the 19th century one of the main social and economic processes in the settler economies was 
frontier expansion and the creation of the institutions (formal and informal) that determined wealth 
distribution and the general conditions of inequality. Initially we discuss two key components of the 
process: the characterization of the land tenure system and the role of the state in this institutional 
configuration. Afterwards we present the features of both components in the particular cases of 
Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and Uruguay, and we identify two models.153 One of them –
which is closer to the “British model”– is characterized by an active state with developmental 
features that promotes a pattern of greater equality. The other –which is the “Hispanic model”– is 
dominated by a state pressured by financial difficulties, recurring disorder in the administration of 
public land, and a high degree of intervention by the agrarian oligarchy in political power, all of 
which promote income (and asset) concentration. 
2.1 Land tenure systems: characteristics and conditions 
Land tenure refers to the collection of rights and obligations under which land is held, used, 
transferred and inherited. The meaning of the concept varies with the social and historical context. 
It is used to allude to land tenure prescribed by statutory or common law, to customary land tenure, 
and to practices or routines (Alston & Mueller, 2005; Moyo, 1995; Shivji et al., 1998). The 
specification (definition and interpretation) and the enforcement of land ownership rights constitute 
two fundamental dimensions in the process of the appropriability of natural resources because they 
affect the timing of settlement and the use of the land. Therefore, and from a conceptual point of 
view, the formation of the land ownership system is as important as the role of the state in 
establishing land ownership rights. We consider the relation between the two dimensions to make 
our concept of appropriability more precise. 
2.1.1 Land ownership system 
Arrangements vary enormously between rural and urban areas because land is used for 
agriculture in the former and for residential and business purposes in the latter. Land ownership 
systems can be categorized in line with three essential dimensions: (i) the presence or absence of 
formal land deeds, defined as the registration of land ownership rights with a government authority; 
(ii) the extent of landowner and landholder rights to contract voluntarily for use of the land; and (iii) 
the spectrum of private-communal ownership rights to the land, and in this there are two extremes, 
                                                 
153 A first approach to the question was presented previously in Álvarez & Willebald (2009). For New Zealand and 
Uruguay also see Álvarez (2008).   
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one is the independent farmer owning land with freehold (or fee-simple) deeds, and the other is 
bound labourers working on plots of land temporarily assigned to them by the authorities in a 
communal land system. Freehold ownership is perpetual, it can be inherited by a freely-designated 
successor, it is freely alienable, it is often registered with a central authority that has undertaken a 
survey of the land (sometimes called a cadastral survey), and it is characterized by fixed annual 
obligations (La Croix, 2002). Leasehold land is based on a system of rentals for long periods. Land 
belonging to one entity –either the state or an individual– is leased by contractual agreement to 
another entity. These leases may be long or short. In practice, 99-year leases are considered to be as 
secure as a freehold tenure system. The lease agreement is then registered with the ownership of 
that land to create land rights that are enforceable (Economic Commission for Africa, 2004: 20-21). 
2.1.2 Role of the state 
The arrangements governing land ownership rights vary depending on who specifies them and 
who enforces them. In these two dimensions the possible actors range from the first person that 
claimed ownership of the land in question (the claimant) –or a group of claimants who act 
collectively– to the state, if it is interested in the “agrarian question” and acts on the matter.  
Usually it is the state that defines, interprets and enforces land ownership rights. The definition 
of these rights is a legislative function of the state, the interpretation is a judicial function and 
enforcement is a police function. These functions entail costs and in consequence the state may 
leave some rights as open access. Many assets have numerous components and it is costly to define 
land ownership rights for all the dimensions of value. Some attributes may be either de jure or de 
facto left as open access. There are incentives for individuals or groups to expropriate the right to 
use land exploiting attributes that the state leaves as open access. In many situations, individuals or 
groups use violence as a strategy to capture land ownership rights. By individual enforcement we 
mean the efforts that individuals make to maintain their rights (putting a fence around the land, 
posting “no trespassing” signs in strategic places, etc.). Governments enforce land ownership rights 
through the police and the courts (Alston & Muller, 2003, 2005). 
In the economies of recent European settlement, the colonizer state (usually represented by the 
Crown) had an additional function. The doctrine underlying the traditional view of settlement was 
that in the age of discovery the “new” areas were “terra nullis”, that is to say land belonging to no 
one. European rulers adopted the position that territories without political organization, systems of 
authority or legal codes could legitimately be annexed. This view, with slight differences, embodied 
the idea that Europeans were superior to native peoples because they were civilized and Christian, 
and this superiority was clearly expressed in the art of war (Reynolds, 1987). By definition, the 
focus of the debate was the “new” territories owned by the Crown, which then transferred land from 
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the public to the private sphere. For decades there was debate about land ownership, tenure systems, 
prices, conditions of tenure and land taxes, and the authorities in different places established a 
variety of different frameworks and instruments, which yielded differing results.  
As regards the typology of political states, some authors (Auty & Gelb, 2001; Lal, 1995; 
Leftwich, 1995) differentiate between “developmental” states and “predatory” states. 
Developmental states act in an autonomous manner and pay attention to long run welfare 
maximization, while predatory states have factions and act in the service of section interests. The 
participation of the state in the distribution of land ownership rights and the creation of a land 
ownership system provides interesting ways in which states can be characterized. It is not our aim 
in this study to find evidence about this, but our description will shed some light on the matter. 
2.2 Australasia: the definition of ownership rights and the intensification of settlement 
It has been emphasized in Australasian historiography that the process of land distribution in 
Australia and New Zealand was highly idiosyncratic, and this contributed to the emergence of an 
agrarian society with high welfare levels and democratic values. The distribution of land constituted 
a political and economic resource that the state used widely in the 19th century to promote efficient 
land use and to intensify settlement. 
2.2.1 Australia 
The development of agriculture depended on the application of capital and labour to abundant 
land, like in the other recent settlement economies, but in Australia two other factors were 
important as well: (i) government activity to provide the legal framework for land settlement, to 
encourage immigration and to install the social capital needed for economic growth; (ii) the 
development of agricultural technologies appropriate to the conditions of the environment 
(Clarkson, 1971:90). We attempt to identify the main features of the first dimension –“the vital and 
living issue in public affairs” (Reeves, 1902 [1968]: 193)– and we work only tangentially on the 
second one (we will consider this issue in detail in new steps in our research).    
In the early days of colonization, land was alienated by grants and orders from the Crown. The 
first Crown instructions (1787-1788) authorized the governor to make grants only to liberated 
prisoners, but in subsequent instructions issued by the Secretary of State in 1789 the privilege of 
obtaining grants was extended to free immigrants and men belonging to the detachment of marines 
serving in New South Wales. The maximum grant did not exceed 100 acres and was subject to a 
quit-rent of one shilling per annum for every 50 acres, to be paid within five years of the date of 
issue. In many cases these grants were made conditional upon a certain proportion of the land being 
cultivated or upon certain services, but these conditions do not seem to have been enforced. 
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In 1811 the governor started to grant town allotments on lease for periods of 14 or 21 years, and 
the rents varied significantly from time to time depending on the governor. In the 1820s further 
regulations relating to grants to immigrants were issued. In 1825 the principle of alienation of land 
by sale to free settlers was introduced, and in 1829 leases were entirely abolished and grants of 
freehold estates were established. However, in 1834 leases were re-introduced. Land was allowed to 
be sold to private agents at a minimum price of 5 shillings an acre, but no individual was allowed to 
buy more than 4,000 acres and no family more than 5,000 acres. 
In the 1820s grants were usually tied to the applicants’ capital resources, and the policy of land 
grants was continued until 1831. In the same decade sheep and cattle farmers were taking their 
flocks into outlying areas without any formal land grant. The governor of New South Wales 
sanctioned this by issuing tickets of occupation, but in 1826 the British government imposed 
settlement limits (this was adjusted in 1829) beyond which no land could be occupied before it was 
surveyed, and within which the title to land had to be obtained by grant or purchase. 
In 1831 the government issued an order that no Crown lands could be disposed of in the future 
except by public auction.154 The minimum price for country land was fixed at 5 shillings an acre, 
and in 1839 this was raised to 12 shillings, and the applicant had the power to select land at the 
upset price,155 for which there was no bid at the auction, or upon which the deposit paid at the time 
of sale had been forfeited. This was the time the selection principle was introduced into Australia’s 
land laws, and it was then applied to land which was put up for sale by auction.  
The British government now regarded Australia not as a prison but as a place with economic 
activity and an outlet for Britain’s poor. As a result, New South Wales was settled by a significant 
number of farmers with the resources to buy their land, and they provided employment for landless 
labourers shipped to Australia on the proceeds of revenues from the sale of land. However, the 
effective action of colonial sheep farmers was in a way more effective. These farmers simply 
occupied land beyond the limits of settlement and produced wool for the British textile industry. 
This squatting was a spectacular manifestation of the desire to use what was unused. 156 Enormous 
areas were occupied in a short time, practical-minded pioneer farmers learned about the potential 
uses of Australia’s environment and transformed the country into a place that could be lived in 
(Williams, 1975). In the 1830s, the New South Wales government was forced to recognize the 
squatters and it granted annual grazing licenses to sheep farmers upon payment of a quit-rent of 20 
shillings per 100 acres and with the proviso that if the conditions were not fulfilled the land would 
                                                 
154 The introduction of the principle of land sales in place of grants is, usually, referred to as the “Rippon Regulations”. 
155 The upset price is the lowest price acceptable for something that is for sale by auction. 
156 The movement of the people on the territory is consistent with our findings referred to the land frontier expansion; 
this was a process that preceded the price boom of the last decades of the 19th century. 
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have to be vacated six months after notification.157 In 1839, a border police force was set up to 
preserve law and order in these districts and it was financed by a tax on the number of head of 
livestock held by the squatter (Robertson, 1924: 176-180). As their wealth increased the squatters 
acquired political power and during the 1840s these sheep farmers forced changes in land 
legislation (Clarkson, 1971; Williams, 1975). 
 In 1842, new regulations from an Imperial Act of Parliament came into force. The principle of 
sale by auction was maintained, land was surveyed before being put up for sale, and the upset price 
was fixed at 20 shillings per acre. It was established that, after deducting an initial charge for the 
survey, half the proceeds from land sales would be used to finance immigration into the colony in 
which the revenue was acquired. 
In 1846, a new land classification system was established in the Waste Lands Act. The land was 
divided into “settled districts”, “intermediate districts” and “unsettled districts” (Robertson, 1924: 
186-188). The principles of sale by auction or by private contract were maintained, but a system 
was introduced whereby leases were granted for various terms and for pastoral purposes only. 
While the lease was valid the leaseholder could purchase the freehold at the upset price of £1 per 
acre, and when the term expired he had a pre-emptive right to purchase all or any part of the land at 
the same price. An entirely new system for the occupation of pastoral land was introduced whereby 
fixity of tenure of the lease was granted and the fee was paid on the stock carrying capacity. In 
unsettled districts the term of the lease was fixed at 14 years, in the intermediate districts it was for 
8 years and in the settled districts the yearly tenure system was retained. 
The 1846 legislation remained in force in New South Wales until 1861 and in the colonies of 
Victoria, Tasmania, and Queensland (which were separated from the mother colony in 1851, 1856 
and 1859, respectively) until repealed by acts of the colony parliaments. Gold was discovered in 
1851 and the subsequent gold rush greatly changed the conditions of colonization. States of the 
Commonwealth have found it to their advantage to adopt different systems for securing the 
settlement of an industrial and agricultural population (Yearbook, Australia, 1911). 
Western Australia and South Australia did not feel the influence of the New South Wales 
legislation because in these states new conditions prevailed. Under a different set of circumstances 
and origins (very different from the original convict base of the other colonies) settlement was 
affected by legislation of a special and novel nature, and it was not until a later date that the land 
laws in these territories were brought more into line with those of the eastern states. During the 
1860s, 1870s and 1880s all the colonies tried to make land available to small farmers who would 
                                                 
157  Previously land had been maintained for grazing purposes under “tickets of occupation”. 
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grow food for the expanding population, and they did this by allowing cultivators to select holdings 
from among the livestock grazing leases. Except in South Australia these efforts to “unlock the 
land” were not very successful.158 The advantages of the country favoured sheep and cattle rather 
than crops, and where the land was suited to crops, as in South Australia, farms were large rather 
than small. The stock-rearers were firmly in control of the situation and policies for the disposal of 
Crown land could not successfully run counter to economic realities (Clarkson, 1971:93). 
In New South Wales, the passing of the Crown Lands Act and the Occupation Act in 1861 
promoted the interests of small farmers. The aim of these Acts was to facilitate the establishment of 
an agrarian population side by side with stock-rearing tenants. Men with limited capital found it 
difficult to establish themselves with any chance of success, but under the new principle of free 
selection before survey, land was sold in limited plots of from 40 to 320 acres at a price of £1 per 
acre, partly payable by deposit (one quarter of the purchase price), and carrying an interest rate of 5 
per cent per year. The colony was divided into first- and second-class settled districts and unsettled 
districts, and all the pastoral leases were left open to the operations of free selectors. The system of 
unconditional sales was still continued and remained in force until its abolition in 1884. This Act 
represented benefits, but the way it operated also caused considerable mischief, mainly because the 
fact that land was held under pastoral leases meant it was not exempt from free selection and could 
be the target of speculators who had no bona fide intention to settle on it. The Crown Lands Act of 
1884 and the supplementary Act of 1889 were aimed at bringing this situation under control. These 
regulations maintained the principle of free selection before survey and were designed to give fixity 
of tenure to pastoral leaseholders, but at the same time they tended to restrict the land area sold 
without conditions. Pastoral leases were required to be surrendered to the Crown and divided into 
two equal parts. One of them was returned to the lessee under a lease with fixity of tenure for a 
certain period, and the other half (“the resumed area”), the lessee was allowed to hold under an 
annual occupation license, but it was always open to selection. 
Further Acts in 1884 and 1889 did not succeed in their objectives. Settlement proceeded very 
slowly and the accumulation of land into large estates continued. Parliament introduced new 
principles into agrarian legislation in the state, embodied in the Crown Lands Acts of 1895 to 1909, 
the Labour Settlements Act of 1902, the Closer Settlement Acts of 1904 to 1909 and the Closer 
Settlement Promotion Act of 1910. These measures still gave fixity of tenure to pastoral 
leaseholders, retained the principle of free selection before survey and offered bona fide settlers 
special inducements by the introduction of new forms of tenure on easy terms and conditions 
(Yearbook, Australia, 1911). 
                                                 
158 Remember our analysis about land distribution in Chapter 4.  
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The early history of land settlement in Victoria was closely connected to that of New South 
Wales. For the first fifteen years of its existence,159 the regulation of the alienation of Crown lands 
was governed by the Orders in Council of the mother state and was in accordance with the general 
regulations. The Orders in Council were established under the Imperial Acts of 1842 and 1846 and 
remained in force until 1860, when an Act was passed by the Victoria state government that divided 
all Crown lands into country and special classes. The former were available after survey for 
selection in allotments (from 40 to 60 acres), while special lands, situated near towns, railways, 
rivers, etc., were sold quarterly by auction at an upset price of £1 per acre.  
Free selection before survey was introduced in 1862, it provided for large agricultural areas to be 
set apart and in these areas land could be selected at a uniform price of £1 per acre. This regulation 
imposed alternative conditions, such as the effect of certain improvements or cultivating part of the 
land, and the mode of payment was changed. As regards pastoral lands, license fees and 
assessments of stock were abolished, and provision was made for the payment of rent for runs in 
accordance with their value, based on their stock-carrying capacity. There was more legislation in 
1869 that consolidated and amended all previous regulations. The system of free selection before 
survey was retained in the Land Act and the Pastoral Act, and it applied to all unoccupied Crown 
land, but the selected area was limited to 320 acres and was held under license for a term of 3 years. 
During the first two and a half years the selector had to reside on the land, fence it, and cultivate a 
certain proportion of it. At the end of the license period the selector could either purchase the land 
outright or obtain a further lease of 7 years, with the right to purchase at any time during this term. 
The regulations governing the occupation of land for pastoral purposes comprised two systems: 
runs under license or lease, or grazing rights. After this there were repeated changes in land 
legislation until WWI that covered special forms of tenure and small-improved holdings.160 
Like in Victoria, the initial history of land settlement in Queensland is closely related to that of 
New South Wales.161 Queensland separated from its mother colony in 1859, and the first Parliament 
of the new colony passed three acts dealing with Crown lands that involved pastoral leases and 
general settlement. In the subsequent decades the regulations were more an expansion of existing 
laws than the adoption of a new land policy. Several situations were defined and amended in terms 
of conditional purchases, the government had the power to repurchase land to promote closer 
settlement, and cooperative land settlement communities were set up. 
                                                 
159 The region was known as the District of Port Phillip. 
160 In addition, the alienation and occupation of the territory know as the “Malle”, which was an area of about 
11,000,000 acres in the north-west of the state, had its own special regulations.      
161 The region was known as the District of Moreton Bay.  
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In a similar way, the early settlement of Tasmania was carried out under the regulations framed 
for the disposal of Crown lands in New South Wales, because it was a part of this colony until its 
constitution as a separate administration in 1825. In 1828 the first land sales on the island took 
place, and in 1831 the system of issuing free grants of land was abolished. In 1855-56, the 
government of the island colony became more autonomous and took responsibility for a land 
settlement policy.162 The Waste Lands Act of 1858 introduced the principle of free selection before 
survey. During the 1860s several Land Acts were passed and the Waste Lands Act of 1870 
embodied and consolidated many of the salient features of previous enactments. It gave the 
governor the power to reserve such land as might be considered necessary for public purposes, and 
the rest was divided into “town”, “agricultural” and “pastoral” land. The upset price for agricultural 
land was £1 an acre and that for pastoral lands was a sum equivalent to 12 years of rents, but not 
under any circumstances more than 5 shillings an acre. Numerous amendments to the 1870 Act 
were passed, and in 1890 the various Acts then in force were consolidated. The 1890 Act was itself 
amended from time to time and subsequently included Crown lands and closer settlement Acts. 
In 1834, the British Government approved the colonization of South Australia, and under an 
administrative Act the colony was founded. The members of a special commission executed the 
plan and declared all the land in the colony, except what was reserved for roads and footpaths, to be 
open to purchase by British people. The commission made regulations for the survey and sale of 
this land at an appropriate price for letting unsold land for periods of not less than three years. They 
might sell the land by auction or otherwise, but only for cash, at a uniform price, and at not less than 
20 shillings per acre.163 This system ran into problems due to the financial crisis of the early 1840s 
and had to be modified, but it was not until 1872 that the authorities approved regulations that 
conformed more to the legislation in the neighbouring colonies. The new legislation gave settlers 
with only a small amount of capital an opportunity to settle on Crown land under fair conditions and 
with a reasonable chance of success. The Act of 1872 was amended from time to time, and in 1888 
it was repealed and its provisions consolidated by the Crown Lands Act. The principles of closer 
settlement were introduced by the Closer Settlement Act of 1897, which was repeatedly amended in 
subsequent years.164 
                                                 
162 In 1856 the colony was granted responsible self-government with its own representative parliament, and the name of 
the island and colony was changed from Van Diemen’s Land to Tasmania. 
163 The principles on which the colony was established were created by Mr. Edward Wakefield. The main idea in 
Wakefield’s scheme was to sell waste land at a high price and to use the revenue to bring in immigrants, so as to secure 
a constant supply of hired labour for agricultural work and to develop the settlement. Other leading features of the 
scheme were that no convicts should be sent there, that no State Church should be established, and that the new colony 
should be financially independent and not be a burden on Britain (see Robertson, 1924, and Williams, 1975). 
164 An interesting aspect of the institutional development of the region was the proposal of the “Torrens Act”. This was 
a Real Property Act originally proposed in 1858 in South Australia by Sir R. R. Torrens, and it was adopted in all the 
States of the Commonwealth, New Zealand and South Africa. The aim of this Act was to give security and simplicity to 
all land dealings by providing for registration of ownership that protected all involved interests. By this system 
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The colonization of Western Australia started in 1829. The first settlers received large grants of 
land proportional to the amount of capital they brought in, at a rate of 40 acres for every sum of £3, 
and of 200 acres for every labourer brought into the colony. However, the grants were subject to 
various conditions about land improvements. In 1832, free grants were abolished and land was sold 
at a minimum price 5 shillings per acre. In 1837 the price of allotments in Perth, Fremantle, and 
Albany was fixed at a minimum of £5 per acre. New land regulations were formulated by the 
Colonial Office in the subsequent decades. In 1890, the colony was granted constitutional 
government and from time to time the land laws were changed until a Land Act was passed in 1898 
amending and consolidating previous legislation. The colony was divided into six divisions; sale by 
auction was permitted in all of them but the occupation conditions differed. This Act was repeatedly 
amended, and the Agricultural Lands Purchase Acts 1896 to 1904 introduced the principle of the 
administration being able to repurchase Crown land for the purposes of closer settlement (Year 
Book Australia, 1911).  
In 1863, part of New South Wales that lay in the north (latitude 26° S., and between longitude 
129° and 138° E.) was annexed to South Australia. However, the regulations governing the sale and 
occupation of land differed in this state and they were regulated by the Northern Territory Crown 
Lands Act 1890, the Northern Territory Lands Act 1899 and the Northern Territory Tropical 
Products Act 1904.  
The review of this complex field, with its formidable array of Acts, varying attitudes, different 
regional realities and a persistent strategy of trial and error make it difficult to identify a clear 
settlement pattern. However, “it is suggested that the single theme of intensification, the idea that 
more and smaller holdings was a desirable aim, unites much of the complexity” (Williams, 1975: 
62). The vigorous (and belligerent) squatter movement transformed the livestock-rearing settlers of 
the first half of the 19th century into a strong social class that was active in politics and spread its 
economic influence throughout the territory. Nevertheless, if there was a turning point in Australian 
history it was the Gold Rush of 1851 (Williams, 1975: 74-75). This altered the basic economic 
profile of the country and the composition of the population as around 750,000 new inhabitants 
arrived over the next ten years. One expression of these changes at the administrative level was the 
creation of colonial legislatures in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania. Gold 
became increasing difficulty to get in the second half of the 1850s and it was natural to advance on 
the land which, in fact, was sparsely settled. This was in line with the progressive and predominant 
view which, explicitly or implicitly, was held by politicians and theorists, about that the Australian 
                                                                                                                                                                  
everyone who acquired land or an interest in land obtained a title deed that if not absolutely was at least practically 
secure against anyone whose claim did not appear in the registry. This effectively established the two elements of 
simplicity and security in land acquisition. 
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society evolved from one stage to another. But many people believed that this vision did not fit in 
with the “squattocracy” that held the land. What was the reaction of society to the pretensions of 
this quasi-aristocracy? According to Rosecrance (1964):286, “the pastoral way of life could not 
support a full-blown aristocracy. Despite the peculiar nature of the Australian frontier, the 
squattocracy provided no more than rudimentary insight into the nature of traditional European 
conservatism”.  
In the latter half of the 19th century, Australia emerged as a truncated version of a European 
socio-economic environment. In political terms, Australia was the “radical” fragment of British 
society. “A certain admixture of ‘philosophical radicalism’ mitigated the working-class ethos of 
convicts, gold diggers, Chartists, and trade-unions. At the same time, Australian’s political bias was 
already skeptical of the liberal position” (Rosecrance, 1964:285). The colonial social hierarchy did 
not seem to be fixed or permanent, and it was relatively common for people to change status. This 
social homogeneity made for powerful unity in political questions. The grazers maintained a 
privileged political position into the 1850s and land control into the 1860s, but in the 1890s they fell 
very far from their high status due to the consolidation of militant radicalism of society.  
In general, the authorities’ strategy to tackle land concentration and open the frontier consisted of 
four connected elements: survey, price, residence, and improvement, and was supported by a 
combination of supervision, progressive taxation and repurchase. The results were not always 
successful. There were many limitations on surveys and supervision, and the average size of estates 
increased progressively, which indicates a certain relationship between expansion (to land of lower 
quality) and land productivity. Price exigencies were subject to the better organization of credit 
channels, and in the absence of suitable financial conditions, certain requirements meant that in fact 
the rich had privileges. Conditions of residence and improvement were dominated by evasion and 
corruption. Estate subdivision (often more fictitious than real), closer settlement (associated with 
the state purchase and new sale of lands), “[s]ettlement and cultivation advanced at snail’s pace … 
Alienation of land in small holdings went on apace, but under some strange adaptation of 
Gresham‘s Law the big holdings drove out the small ones” (Heaton, 1925: 415). 
In consequence, the pattern of occupation established by the squatters well over fifty years 
before endured. They maintained their economic primacy but did not retain political power 
(Rosecrance, 1964; Williams, 1975) which was disputed with “small farmers [that] increasingly 
resorted to the creation of political associations to do their bidding in the colonial legislatures” 
(Denoon, 1983: 102). This balance echoes the idea we commented on above, in Chapter 4, about 
the incomplete picture that an analysis of the land ownership distribution indicators offer when it 
comes to understanding inequality in settler economies (Willebald & Bértola, 2011). Income 
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distribution in general and particularly functional income distribution are key elements in the 
explanation of economic performance in our club. Nevertheless, an analysis of institutional 
achievement must not obscure the fact that the intensification of settlement was equally a matter of 
environmental factors like quality of the soil, rainfall, vegetation and distance, all of which 
contributed to the final outcome and make our analysis pertinent.  
2.2.2 New Zealand 
Land distribution among the colonizers followed the British custom of the Crown being the 
ultimate owner of the land. Colonizers could not negotiate directly with the natives but required the 
intermediation of the Crown (in this first stage of colonization, the Crown’s right of pre-emption 
was only suspended in the period 1844-1845). The Colonial authorities and the representatives of 
the autonomous government created a legal framework that regulated the expropriation of land from 
the Maoris and the granting of ownership to European colonizers. These conditions were formally 
expressed in the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, which established that only the government could buy 
land from the natives. Once land was acquired, the government wanted to get it into productive use 
as soon as possible and aimed at distributing it among individuals (Hawke, 1979).  
The government resold part of this land in order to finance immigration, disposed of some of it 
as grants to individuals in return for services, and retained some on a perpetual leasehold basis 
(Keall, 2000). In Article II of the Waitangi Treaty, the UK acknowledged the individual and 
collective rights of the native Maoris to their territories. The Waitangi Treaty was a turning point in 
New Zealand economic history as it was when the Maoris ceded sovereignty of their territory in 
exchange for autonomy and land ownership rights. For the most part the Treaty was systematically 
disregarded and land was transferred to European colonizers on a massive scale (Hawke 1985; 
Prichard Lloyd, 1970). In 1852 the Constitution Act empowered the General Assembly to make 
laws regulating the sale, disposal, and occupation of Crown land and authorized the division of New 
Zealand into provinces. The governor approved the regulations in the provinces, which ensured that 
there was a degree of consistency in their settlement policies even though there were different 
systems in operation (sales with deferred payments, ballot systems, sales by auction, etc.).  
A lot of land was held by speculators who were asking excessive prices for it, and new settlers 
looked to the Crown for low-priced land. This increasing demand coincided with the rise of Maori 
nationalism and there was more resistance to the sale the land, which exacerbated existing conflicts 
and led to serious fighting between government forces and the native inhabitants.165 In 1862, the 
Crown’s right to pre-empt Maori land was abolished and it was not re-established until 1892. This 
                                                 
165 The New Zealand Wars or Maori Wars were a series of armed conflicts that took place in New Zealand between 
1845 and 1872, and in them the main point of contention was the ownership and sale of land. 
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meant there was a thirty-year period of uncontrolled dealing, and together with Crown purchases 
and confiscations it made for the take-over of large swathes of Maori land. In 1891, a Royal 
Commission commented that these alienations of land were against the public interest, and in most 
of the leases and purchases land was obtained on a large scale by capitalists (McLintock, 1966).  
The provincial governments were abolished in 1876 and the “labyrinth” of local legislation was 
replaced by the Land Act of 1877, which abolished 56 land statutes and created a uniform system. 
The new Act provided for Crown land to be sold for cash or with deferred payments and it required 
the purchaser to improve the land and reside there. In Canterbury and Otago special conditions were 
applied to sheep runs, leases were offered at auction and occupiers were given the right to obtain 
freehold land around their homesteads. There was a lot of speculation in both provinces and a great 
deal of aggregation took place. 
In the 1880s, there were several experiments in land organization public land such as a 30-year 
perpetual lease with the right to renew or purchase, small grazing run leases, associative modalities 
of settlement and village homesteads, but small farming still did not prosper because large estates 
thrived on demand from the wool industry. Only in the 1890s were the conditions suitable to make 
lasting changes to the land ownership system, and the focus was on breaking up the big estates. The 
population was increasing, the labour market was troubled (there were high unemployment rates in 
the 1880s) and refrigeration arrived, all of which made small farming more important. In addition to 
these economic pressures there were political changes. The Liberal Party won the 1891 general 
election with a policy that included promoting closer settlement, extending state leasehold rather 
than freehold, re-purchasing large estates and sub-dividing them, introducing a land tax to force 
sub-division, and providing cheap finance for the development of new farms. 
The 1892 Land Act proposed a lease in perpetuity for 999 years with no right to freehold, 
established restrictions on the acquisition of Crown land by individuals who already had sufficient 
land, limited the area for new settlers and introduced changes in the small grazing and cooperative 
modalities. In the same year a progressive land tax was introduced, which was aimed at breaking up 
the big estates. In 1892, the government was authorized to buy private land to promote closer 
settlement. The land was disposed of on the basis of leases in perpetuity or small grazing runs with 
fixed rents (5 per cent on capital value), and mechanisms to facilitate farming credit were set up. 
The same Law granted the government a budget of ₤50,000 per year to expropriate land and 
promote the sub-division of the big estates, and in 1894 the amount was raised to ₤250,000.  
In 1903, the government implemented a policy of land recovery and undertook to drain, reclaim 
and settle swamp land. In 1907, the lease in perpetuity was abolished and tenants had the right to 
purchase the land outright. However, most leaseholders preferred to retain the benefits of low rents 
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(with contracts for 33 or 66-year terms and periodic revaluations) and the state established a new 
system of land tenure whereby only leasehold was admitted (National Endowment). The state 
bought and distributed land and thereby contributed to dividing up the large estates, particularly in 
North Island where small farmers now formed a numerous and important class. The total surface 
area of the large estates fell from 3.2 million hectares in 1891 to 1.4 million in 1910 as a result of 
public policies and because more capital-intensive types of exploitation were coming to the fore 
with dairy farming challenging the wool industry.  
On the eve of the WWI, a new political change closed a long and intensive period of formation 
of the land system landownership. The Reform Party extended the right to obtain freehold Crown 
leases, made the terms on which perpetual leases could be purchased more favourable to tenants, 
and extended freehold rights (with some limitations) to leaseholders of national endowments. WWI 
marked the end of the era of general land settlement. From then until 1961, official land settlement 
was geared to placing restricted classes of settlers on land, particularly ex-servicemen from the two 
world wars and unemployed people during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
In New Zealand democracy can be seen as a movement that used the instrument of expanded 
state action and intervention to bring about a more humane, democratic and egalitarian society. 
“New Zealand shared the same fragment culture as Australia, even its Liberal reforms would reflect 
the same underlying egalitarian, communally-focused, working-class radical values and 
presuppositions as Australia’s ‘mateship’ society.” (Paulson, 1988). In a similar way to Victoria and 
New South Wales, in South Island, “…most of the colonial wealthy had their origins in the British 
lower-middle class or among wage-earners” (Mcaloon, 2002:208), which made for shared values 
and a consensus in society about certain questions. This socio-political context made land one of the 
main issues in public policy, and politicians, theorists, and common citizens identified these 
concerns early on.  
“Two main aspects of the land question have from time to time loomed large in the 
public mind in New Zealand. The first of these is, ‘Should the state sell its lands at all or 
merely lease them? The second is, ‘What is the most effective means of preventing land 
monopoly and the aggregation of large estates” (Downie, 1909b:82).   
These concerns at the beginning of the 20th century clearly reflected the problems that different 
governments had faced since the closing decades of the 19th century. From the very beginning, land 
regulations in New Zealand seem to have been expressly designed to prevent land aggregation, but 
people circumvented the regulations by various strategies like “gridironing” and “spotting”, and the 
common pattern was land grabbing. The Land for Settlement Act of 1894 was the main starting 
point of the state policy to acquire and divide up large estates for closer settlement. These 
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regulations promoted the re-purchase of land (supported by external financial resources) and its 
division into small farms that had long-run leases (initially for 999 years and afterwards on a lease 
renewable every 33 or 66 years) at a fixed rental rate on capital value. This policy placed many 
settlers on the land but at an increasing financial cost to the government, and there were serious 
conflicts of opinion between experts about the value of land (Downie, 1909a). The administration 
reacted to this situation by passing the Land and Income Assessment Act in 1907 to implement a 
graduated land tax.  According to the figures, it “…would appear that there has been a reduction in 
the total held in areas of 10,000 acres and over of 2,797,658 acres during the period 1889-1906. 
Purchasing by government contributed to this result, but only to the extent of about one-third, 
voluntary subdivision accounting for the balance.” (NZOY, 1908). This change in the remainder 
was due to new economic conditions, especially the growth of the dairy industry (Hawke, 1985), 
and people avoided the taxes in the most ingenious ways. There were many methods to evade taxes 
such as bogus partnership, one-man companies, collusion in sales and leases, declaring trusts and 
making nominal gifts (Downie, 1909b), but the most common way was to divide ownership of the 
property among members of the family but continue working it as one estate.  
The state had a central role in challenging the economic conditions and the rational behaviour of 
agents so as to promote the intensification of settlement and the break up of the large estates. The 
results show that it seemed more successful in terms of incomes than assets (see Chapter 4), and 
that probably because reforms contributed with a better functioning of the markets and a more 
efficient assignation of resources. Additionally, the social culture and the predominant ideology 
would contribute significantly in this direction with the formation of appropriability conditions 
more favorable to promote an egalitarian structure of the income.  
2.3 The River Plate: land-ownership concentration and weak states 
In the historiography of Argentina and Uruguay it has been emphasized that the process of land 
distribution in the 19th century was characterized by confused and insecure arrangements that 
usually favoured the accumulation of land in few hands. Only in the 1870s did local governments at 
last establish the institutional structure of land ownership systems. They gave security and 
effectiveness to the different types of land tenure, but it was the same old story and the result was 
that land ownership was concentrated in few hands, there was owner absenteeism, and agrarian 
production was mainly based on large estates.   
2.3.1 Argentina 
In the 19th century the expansion of the Argentine frontier was led by successive governments 
that waged various military campaigns to conquer land that was controlled by native communities. 
From a long run perspective, frontier expansion and the distribution of land ownership rights was a 
 251
process of acquisition and territorial concentration by rich owners (mostly stockbreeders and 
speculators) who were closely connected to political power and the social elites. In this process the 
state was consolidated and organized on a national scale. Most land was appropriated and 
distributed before the mass arrival of European immigrants, which happened towards the end of the 
19th century and in the first decades of the 20th century. 
Starting in the independence period (1816-1822), different governments tried to set up a new 
legal framework for the ownership of land. After years of revolutionary confrontation and the 
dissolution of the Spanish colonial dominion, land distribution was a problem that had to be solved 
as the new state was organized and national authorities took control. During this time provincial 
governments granted land ownership rights called moderada composición (with the obligation to 
make some improvements) or simply made grants called donations (donación or mercedes). The 
liberalism that inspired Argentine governments facilitated the private ownership of the land and 
eliminated restrictions that during the colonial period had tended to keep the realengas lands or 
fiscal territories subject to public authority. Thus, after independence, cattle farmers expanded their 
estates, and the territorial borders of Buenos Aires province pushed outwards at a time when the 
natives were a permanent threat to settlers outside its borders.166 The state had a problem in that it 
was difficult to sell land if ownership rights were not adequately protected, and the solution was to 
concede the land to private agents. In this agrarian regime the diffusion and propaganda of novel 
democratic ideas represented liberty and equality in land distribution, encouraged work and 
guaranteed property rights. However, this ownership system was in fact based on compulsion and 
fraud, and legislation governing land suffered from the severe ill effects of the country’s colonial 
heritage (Cárcano, 1917[1972]:26). 
During the Rivadavia presidency167 (1826-1827), the government enacted a law to consolidate 
the public debt, which affected liabilities contracted before 1820. This law established that public 
land was the guarantee for the payment of the debts and forbade the sale of land throughout the 
country (Avellaneda, 1865). In 1826, the National Law of enfiteusis banned the sale of state land 
(Halperin Dongui, 1963, 1971; Trías, 1974) and created a new public land regime. Public land was 
a financial and political resource and enfiteusis was the mechanism to provide the guarantee for 
international credit and to meet the need to populate the countryside. This law meant that land was 
given to individuals on 20-year leases and subject to the payment of annual canons. In the first 10 
years, the holder (enfiteuta) would pay a cannon equivalent to 8 per cent of the value of the land for 
cattle breeding purposes and 4 per cent for agricultural production. The valuation was made by a 
                                                 
166 A series of military fortifications marked the “limits of the civilization” to the south along the Salado River 
(Chascomus, Ranchos, Lobos, Monte, Navarro, among others). (Lobato and Suriano, 2004:185).  
167 Bernardino Rivadavia was president of the Provincias Unidas del Río de la Plata from February 1826 to July 1827. 
 252
panel of neighbours, and at the end of 10 years the legislature set the rent to be paid from then on, 
which depended on new estimates (Scorkink, 2001). This national law was not applied nation-wide 
but only in the province of Buenos Aires (where it came into force in 1822) and Corrientes (from 
1830). In the initial stage, the law did not cover basic aspects such as the establishment of 
maximum land areas or the obligation to occupy the estate. This situation not only fostered 
speculation but also allowed transfers among private individuals and contributed to the 
concentration of land (Ramos, 1965).168 The state’s main aim in renting out public land was to 
increase fiscal income, and a secondary objective was to make the state financially stable so it did 
not have to depend on customs duties. However, the government did not try to prevent the 
concentration of land in the hands of a few rich owners. The enfiteusis law did not work towards 
this end, and in fact huge areas of land were given to private agents (some of these properties 
exceeded 27,000 hectares). Between 1826 and 1837 around 1 million hectares were given as 
enfiteusis but the fiscal incomes generated from leasing were poor and the enfiteusis system did not 
improve public finances (Burgin, 1946). The enfiteusis system was problematic for a number of 
reasons. The government had very few tax collectors. A commission of owners (a panel or jury, 
who were not public servants) valued the land in accordance with their own economic interests so 
land was consistently undervalued. Until the first half of the 19th century, land ownership laws were 
not completely consolidated and occupiers of land confused de jure and de facto occupation. 
Landowners, tenants or squatters without legal title enjoyed the advantages of the “open 
countryside” and used grazing land without any limits. 
During the period dominated politically by Juan Manuel de Rosas (1829-1852) the enfiteusis 
system underwent progressive changes. In 1828 the law had been amended to establish a uniform 
valuation for all land ($ 3,000 to the north of the Salado River and $ 2,000 to the south) and to fix 
the canon at the low rate of 2 per cent of the arbitrary fixed value. In 1832 Rosas enacted a decree 
which authorized grants of properties of 2,328 hectares in areas where the province of Buenos Aires 
bordered on land controlled by native communities. This was part of the preparations for the 
Campaña del Desierto (Desert Campaign), an armed invasion and war against those autochthon 
communities that took place in 1833 and 1834. This was a part of the official policy to extend the 
productive land frontier and it involved the privatization of public land on a massive scale.  
In 1836, a new land law authorized the government to sell off millions of hectares of public land, 
and a huge part of the land under the enfiteusis system passed into private hands. About 2.5 million 
hectares were donated to army officers who took part in Campaña del Desierto, and the dominant 
pattern was for land ownership to be concentrated. Like in the past, the aim was not to foster the 
                                                 
168 At the end of 1827 the maximum size of a holding was fixed at 12 leagues, and in 1832, the norm was changed by a 
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population of the frontiers with military forces but to reward the military for their services in the 
campaign. The officers sold their titles or just gave the land away, which opened up great 
opportunities for speculation. From 1836 to 1840, various regulations crucially undermined 
people’s rights in the enfiteusis system and the government sold huge swathes of land to private 
agents. In 1840, 52,000 square miles of Argentina, that is to say 13.3 million hectares, was owned 
by just 893 individuals (Avellaneda, 1865:122). Between 1830 and 1852, people occupied 16.5 
million hectares which belonged to 782 landowners (Ramos 1965; Trías, 1974). There were over 
100 estates of more than 40,000 hectares. At that time there were internal conflicts, Argentina was 
very unstable, and each province was administered as an independent region in accordance with the 
intentions and interests of its local leaders (caudillos169). Cattle production developed considerably 
during the period, “However, this system of exploitation did not induce people to settle in the 
countryside and nor did it give the country greater capacity to progress. It preserved the same 
features as in colonial times: links between power groups, rootless individuals and land 
devaluation.” (Cárcano, 1917 [1972]: 72; own translation). 
The Constitution of 1853 established individual land ownership as a right for everyone 
throughout the country, but conflicts and confrontations about the form of government caused a 
brief separation between Buenos Aires and the Confederation of Provinces (1853-1860). The two 
sides had contrasting settlement strategies: Buenos Aires was confident that spontaneous 
immigration would come, attracted by rich land and liberal institutions, but the Confederation was 
proactive in the process and contracted colonizer entrepreneurs, financed ship tickets, granted land 
and gave economic support.  
After the Rosas’ administration, new laws governing the sale and leasing of public land were 
enacted. By that time, the enfiteusis system had deteriorated and it was abolished in 1857 through a 
law that regulated the leasing of large areas for long periods. All the people in the enfiteusis system 
were recognized as the legal holders of public land (Scornik, 2001) under a form of a leasing for a 
period of 8 years, but the state retained the right to sell the land at any time, although it had to give 
preference to the current occupier. Between 1858 and 1863, more than 2,000 square leagues (9,660 
km2) outside the frontier line had been conceded and 759 within the defended borders. Subsequent 
laws (1859, 1864) reiterated the conditions and served the government’s purposes in terms of 
coping with financial difficulties and raising the value of the currency. Part of the government’s 
intention was to attract settlers to these lands, but that was a secondary objective in the overall plan. 
From 1856 to 1876, some 650 leasing contracts were signed, and as a result private individuals 
                                                                                                                                                                  
decree that established effective land occupation within a 6-month period.  
169 Caudillo is a Spanish term for the political-military leaders with charismatic and populist features that characterized 
the history of Latin America during most of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
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occupied some 5 million hectares (D’Agostino, 2005). In 1864, the authorities sold 2 million 
hectares in Buenos Aires province, and in 1871 there was a new law that allowed leasing contracts 
for public land outside the province boundaries. As a consequence, 3.8 million hectares went into 
the hands of just 438 owners. 
During Mitre’s presidency170 the consolidation of the Argentine union began, the country was 
reorganized and central authority was enforced. In 1862 it was legally established that all land not 
in the possession of province authorities was “national” land, and this was a fundamental change in 
the distribution and land ownership. Demand for public land for colonization increased, the 
construction of railways and roads was reactivated and politicians and authorities came to recognize 
that the best way to attract immigrants and settle the land was to have stable institutions and secure 
land ownership systems. This new attitude found expression in the “Avellaneda” law of 1876. In 
the 1870s, economic and political conditions were changing and the authorities moved from a 
“defensive conception” of the territory to an offensive and active stance (Rapoport, 2007:42). 
During Avellaneda’s presidency171 a law with some elements from North American land 
legislation was enacted, and the authorities changed their priorities from fiscal concerns to two 
other main objectives: to attract settlers to the countryside and to distribute land on the basis of 
individual ownership. In accordance with the law of 1876, leasing was not a suitable system for 
holding land, and the state established the progressive sale of public land when leasing contracts 
expired. These regulations involved graduated prices depending on the region, no interest payments, 
and that the current occupier had the option to buy. If he did not wish to take up his option the land 
was sold by auction, or as a last resort was bought by the government. At the same time the 
government faced up to the problem of the sale and subdivision of the ejidos and areas adjacent to 
cities and villages. Slowly the character of Buenos Aires province changed from an economic 
structure based on cattle exploitation to an increasing share for agriculture. The first signs of the 
“wheat boom” that surprised the world by the end of the century started to emerge in the 1870s.  
The law authorized five settlement or colonization systems: (i) Direct control by the state; (ii) 
Indirect state control through private enterprises; (iii) By individual initiative; (iv) By provincial 
governments and stimulated by the central government; (v) By private agents. The national 
government supported immigration, subdivided the land and prepared the soil. The first 100 
families to arrive at each colonization section (a land area of 16 square leagues) received plots of 
100 hectares free of charge, and those who came later paid a fixed price of $ 2 per hectare, in 
instalments, and when this was fully paid the holders would acquire definitive legal ownership. 
                                                 
170 Bartolomé Mitre was President of Argentina from 1862 to 1868. 
171 Nicolás Avellaneda was Minister of Justice and Public Instruction in the period 1868-1873 and President of the 
Republic from 1874 to 1880.  
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According to Cárcano (1972 [1917]), the law had many limitations but it would have been possible 
to improve it within the same conception of public land. However, subsequent administrations 
opened the door to large land grants, speculation and favouritism and the consequence was that 
“public land was distributed all over the country without people were being settled on it” (Cárcano 
[1972 (1917)]:163; own translation). 
In 1878 a new frontier law was passed that established the borders of the provinces of La Pampa, 
Buenos Aires, Córdoba, San Luis and Mendoza, which traditionally had jurisdiction ambitions that 
extended to Patagonia. Expansion to the south was up and running. The government issued land 
titles of $ 400 (from a total emission of $ 1.6 million that was increased to $ 2.2 million) with an 
interest rate of 6 per cent and repayment with adjudication of the ownership of the land within a 5-
year period. The land price was fixed at $ 400 per league and the purchase only could be effective 
in titles. This solved the financial difficulties of the project, and land was acquired by the military 
conquest of new territory. In 1879 Julio Roca led the “Conquista del Desierto” (Conquest of the 
Desert) and overthrew many native communities (Mapuches, Tehuelches, Ranqueles). The main 
aim of this effort was to extend the frontiers to the west of Buenos Aires and to the south into the 
Patagonia region. The “Conquista del Desierto” (1879-1884) added huge areas of land to the 
productive system. According to Di Tella (1989), around 30 million hectares were added as a result 
of wars against the native population. 
In 1882 the government enacted legislation that showed how little expertise it had, how much it 
was guided by wishful thinking and how completely it was dominated by the interests of 
speculators. This law classified land as either cattle or cultivation land and provided for its division 
into sections of 1 million and 10,000 hectares, respectively, subdivided into estates of 10,000 and 
100 hectares. Cattle land would be auctioned with a fixed upset price, with a maximum (40,000 
hectares172) and a minimum (2,500 hectares) that each purchaser could acquire, and with the 
obligation to capitalize the estate in two years. Cultivation land was sold privately in lots of 
between 24 and 400 hectares, at fixed prices, and with the obligation to cultivate the land within a 
3-year period. Most of the purchasers did not pay the stated price and claimed that official 
information about the quality and location of the land and about the threat from native communities 
was false, and then legal procedures were delayed. Ruffini (2006) points out that people used false 
names and fake documents to break the rules. The end result of all of this was that, yet again, land 
ownership was concentrated in few hands. Evidently, institutions were not capable to reduce the 
appropriability conditions of natural resources and landowners capturing rents derived from the 
high quality land that characterized land frontier expansion in Argentina.  
                                                 
172 40,000 hectares was the traditional measure used for estates in the colonial times (“suertes de estancia”). 
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A number of the conditions established previously were consolidated in a law of 1884 and, in 
addition, the norm included a couple of specific clauses related to pioneering people and national 
organization of territories. On the one hand, this legislation dealt with a group of particular cases 
and different situations concerning “pioneers” and people settled in the southern region in special 
relationships with native communities or other countries’ jurisdictions (Chile or Britain). To a large 
extent the actual expansion of the frontier was being effected by these people, and the state was 
compelled to recognize and institutionalize a de facto situation. However, speculators and swindlers 
took advantage of loopholes in the law and weak central control of the system to appropriate large 
areas for themselves. On the other hand, “national territories” were set up, which constituted 
administrative divisions that were not provinces. This concept lasted until the first half of the 20th 
century in the margins of the federal system, and then these areas were officially changed into 
provinces (Chaco, Chubut, Formosa, La Pampa, Misiones, Neuquén, Río Negro, Santa Cruz and 
Tierra del Fuego) and integrated into the federal regime. 
Previous analysis refers to rules issued from Buenos Aires or central government, but each 
province had public lands under own jurisdiction and acted in particular way. In the middle of the 
19th century, Santa Fe, which owned large areas of fertile public land, began to improve and 
organize these properties. The government implemented a colonization policy as a more general 
way to distribute the land and contracted private firms to administer it. Land was offered freely, but 
this was not in line with a general regulation but flowed from a succession of special dispositions. 
The construction of the railways contributed to a policy that combined the promotion of small 
holders, cultivation and groups of colonies. Like Santa Fe, the province of Entre Ríos did well in 
regularizing the public property situation and organizing land ownership, but it was always very 
compromised by de facto situations inherited from tradition and custom. The provincial government 
rented out and sold public land, created official registers of estates, imposed the obligation to 
measure land and promoted settlement by groups of colonizers. In Córdoba, the law of 1862 
regularized and clearly divided private property from public land, and this facilitated the transfer of 
estates. The province government set up a new land deeds register and used auctions as its main 
sale mechanism. In the 1870s it started to receive immigrants and it promoted colonization, 
especially after 1887. The province government used public land to obtain resources, and between 
1860 and 1885 all fiscal land had been transferred. On the eve of WWI, Corrientes had a land 
ownership system very similar to the regimes that dominated the rural environment in the first half 
of the 19th century, in spite of the fact that it was relatively close to the Pampa region. Its successive 
governments undertook various public land distribution initiatives, first by leasing and later by 
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private sales, 173 and they promoted centres of colonization, but significant progress was impeded 
by persistent political struggles and fiscal financial problems. It is not casual we find evidence 
about institutions arrangements ruling –informal and formally– the distribution of lands in those 
provinces that we called “La Pampa” in Chapter 3, Subsection 3.1.3. This was the more dynamics 
region of Argentina in the First Globalization and it was permanently subject to pressures derived 
from the land frontier expansion. 
The land legislation structure and its effective application were the result of historical 
circumstances, where “the power of facts was superior to the power of ideas” (Cárcano, 1917 
[1972]:291; own translation], and specific action and regulations were often overturned in power 
struggles between rival interest groups. The initiatives of the Confederation government and the 
first constitutional presidents, the mechanisms to protect immigrants and farmers, the private 
colonization projects in Santa Fe, Entre Ríos and Córdoba, the Avellaneda law and the railway 
concessions174 all created firm bases for agrarian progress. The 17 million hectares sold from 1880 
to 1895 was in no way equally distributed, nor was the sale carried out on a scientific land 
ownership organization basis; it was the disorderly occupation of these territories by different social 
groups. Special laws were used continually to distribute fiscal land. From 1884 to 1896 41 laws 
were enacted to administer the sale or granting of large areas of land. In 1895, the government 
decreed the auction of 100 leagues in Rio Negro but did not take responsibility for the land’s 
productive condition. The authorities knew very little about the public land in question, and it was 
also an effective way to keep small capitalists away from the expanding southern land frontier. 
Only the big capitalists had the resources to invest in territory that might be useless or unsafe. 
However, in the 1890s these government laws and deals began to come in for angry criticism.  
Starting in 1895, the authorities undertook new exploration and measured and sub-divided land 
to offer title deeds and contracts, and they also organized agrarian statistical offices and set out to 
exploit forests and yerbatales. In 1903 a new land law was enacted to organize the 8 general laws 
that were in force plus other special laws, decrees and resolutions. The starting point of the new 
regulations was a careful exploration and characterization, in terms of land aptitudes, of the new 
territories. Seven land categories were established: cultivation, cattle breeding, forest, mineral, 
yerbatales, mixed production and islands. There were various mechanisms for land transfers 
including grants, direct sales, auction, and leasing with an option to buy and the obligation to make 
improvements (buildings, crops, cattle) within a 2-year period. However, this law did not alter the 
country’s traditions in the agrarian sphere; speculation and corruption continued under weak 
                                                 
173 Until the 1870s, leasing alleviated the government’s financial difficulties but sale was not a viable solution. The 
value of the land was so low that it seemed better to wait for property transfer.  
174  Especially, this is the case of the Central Argentino railway. 
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governments, and capitalists took over federal lands before the settlers arrived.  
Cárcano (1917 [1972]) emphasizes that abuses were rife under all the governments and under all 
the different laws. The power of the big landowners (latifundistas) and the central administration’s 
lack of knowledge about public land were the main factors that undermined the successive land 
laws, and the situation was exacerbated by the fact that the administrations were politically weak 
and corrupt. The provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Córdoba and Entre Ríos consolidated their 
agrarian wealth and successfully penetrated international markets with cereals and meat products. 
There were also other successful developments like vineyards in Mendoza, the expansion of sugar 
cane cultivation in Tucumán and the forestry industry in Santiago del Estero. The country left its 
internal armed struggles behind and moderated the risk of international conflicts. It was taking 
advantage of the long upward trend of the First Globalization and the time was ripe to incorporate 
all its national resources into the development effort. On the eve of WWI the government was 
promoting large infrastructure projects like the railways to the south and, along with the irrigation 
law, this was a clear indication it intended to bring the new territories of Neuquén, Chubut, Santa 
Cruz, Formosa and Chaco into the general economic movement. As we found in our econometric 
exercises, institutions were functional to economic growth, but were not capable to moderate the 
curse of a worsening income distribution derived from the land frontier expansion in the interaction 
with the natural resources. 
2.3.2 Uruguay 
In Uruguay, like other settler societies, the distribution of land during the colonization process 
meant the transfer of land ownership rights from the state to colonists. The distribution of land 
began in the colonial period, before the 1810s, and the landowner was the King of Spain, who held 
the land as a “trophy of conquest” (Ots Capdequi, 1946). Land distribution was governed by the 
Leyes de Indias (1680) which were established especially in the River Plate. There were several 
ways in which colonists could acquire land  rights: i) repartimiento (sharing out) to the settlers of 
the first urban centres established on the territory; ii) gracia or merced real, a type of grace and 
favour which amounted to enormous areas of land being given to individuals that the Spanish 
authorities regarded as favourites; iii) venta, an expensive, intricate bureaucratic procedure that 
could only be carried out in Buenos Aires; iv) composición, a procedure which meant occupation 
and the exploitation of natural resources. 
In the second half of the 18th century the process of land occupation and frontier expansion 
received a new impulse, and there were several reasons for this. First, native communities moved to 
the North; second, the Real Instrucción of 1754 made grants of land occupied before 1700 
automatic and ownership did not require royal confirmation; and lastly, the Pragmática de Libre 
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Comercio (free trade pragmatism) of 1778 made it easier to export agrarian production, and 
consequently stimulated the institution of land ownership rights. 
In general, the appropriation of land took place in an imprecisely-defined legal framework. In 
most cases the people occupying land did not have title deeds, and many of the legal owners lived 
in the cities (Montevideo or Buenos Aires) and knew nothing about their land. In the colonial period 
large estates came into being and there was a lack of legal transparency about property rights. There 
were three reasons for this: i) the territory was very sparsely populated; ii) the economy was 
extractive but the main wealth was in cattle, not land; and iii) the Kingdom of Spain was politically 
weak in the region because the main aim was to consolidate the border against the Portuguese 
Empire rather than to define internal land ownership rights. 
In 1830, when Uruguay enacted its first Constitution, some 80 per cent of the territory was 
public land, the country’s frontiers had been explored and the borders fixed, and the total population 
was only 70,000 inhabitants. Acquiring land was a very conflictive process and the government 
failed to organize it properly because of pressure from the big landowners, the financial demands of 
frequent fiscal crises, and the military and political power of the caudillos. The occupation of public 
land was so chaotic that at the beginning of the 20th century, when the Batlle y Ordoñez’s175 
administration tried to implement new policies to encourage agricultural production, it did not know 
what the actual extent of public land was. It is likely that at that time some 15 per cent of the 
country’s territory was public land but the state received no income at all from it. 
In the 19th century there was no clearly defined policy on public land. On the contrary, the state 
was very vulnerable politically as regards institutions and it suffered recurring financial crises and 
did not effectively control the national territory. Between 1830 and 1870, successive governments 
followed a policy of selling public land instead of leasing it, and between 1830 and 1836 private 
ownership rose from 20 per cent to 42 per cent of total land. Laws were enacted in 1831, 1833 and 
1835 to promote private ownership and to regulate the leasing of public land, the extension of 
granted land and the contract duration of leasing. But the political instability in Uruguay at that time 
was such that a genuine land market was not established before 1870. The state lost its control of 
public land and was unable to determine precisely how much land it had and where it was. 
In the period from 1850 to 1870, after the “Guerra Grande”, the authorities sought to bring 
order to the public land situation. 176 This was part of a process that included the political 
reorganization of the country. The 1852 land law forbade the sale of public land to individuals so as 
                                                 
175 José Batlle y Ordoñez was President of Uruguay in 1903-1907 and 1911-1915.   
176 “Guerra Grande” was an armed conflict in the River Plate (1839-1851). The two main political forces in Uruguay 
(Partido Blanco and Partido Colorado) were at war and both received backing from Argentine political parties 
(federales and unitarios), and the British Empire and France also participated, as well as a legion of Italian volunteers. 
 260
to use it to guarantee the service of the public debt. A decree enacted in 1854 again suspended the 
prohibition on sales of public land. In 1860 there was another decree, which made it incumbent 
upon people who were occupying land but had no legal title deeds to declare their current situation 
and obtain the land as renters, and if they did not comply they could be expelled from their holding. 
In accordance with this decree, some 313,580 hectares were reported by their informal owners. 
It was only in the second half of the 1870s, in the context of a military regime under Lorenzo 
Latorre (who came to power in March 1876), that land ownership rights in the rural sector were 
finally established. The government acquired a decisive advantage over the rural caudillos thanks to 
new technologies in weaponry (Mauser and Remington rifles), transportation (the railways) and 
communications (the telegraph). In addition, the delimitation of rural properties was made possible 
by the diffusion of the wire fence (alambramiento) in the countryside (Barran and Nahum, 1967, 
1971, 1972, 1973, 1977, 1978; Jacob, 1969; Millot & Bertino, 1996; Moraes, 2001; Vázquez 
Franco, 1968). This consolidated the dominance of large estates in the rural sector, and a substantial 
amount of public land was eventually incorporated into these holdings. A significant proportion of 
the rural population, almost 10 per cent (Barrán and Nahum, 1971), was driven off the land as a 
consequence of the consolidation of the large estates. 
In the early years of the 20th century various governments tried to limit the estates and the 
economic power of the cattle stock-rearers by imposing taxes on land, but this initiative was not 
successful. The main characteristic of the agrarian structure in Uruguay was the concentration of 
land ownership, and this was consolidated even more during the First Globalization. As in the 
Argentine case, where the functional income structure was “dominated” by land rents, the 
concentration of the land meant, in fact, the concentration of the income. Institutional arrangements 
did not moderate the capacity of the landowners for capturing rents, and the incomes derived from 
the natural capital structured an unequal income distribution.    
2.4 Discussion about the main characteristics: two “models” of land tenure systems 
2.4.1 An overview 
In our analysis we have identified two land distribution patterns in our settler economies, which 
are connected to different ownership structures and land tenure systems.   
In Australia and New Zealand, the British colonial regime established a strong state that 
regulated the settlement of European colonists and attempted to promote equitable land distribution. 
This process was regulated by a legal framework that transferred property rights since early in the 
19th century from the Crown (the “original” owner) to the colonists, and this ensured the effective 
ownership of land and moderated land concentration. These objectives were achieved because these 
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two states had enough political and institutional power to guarantee secure property rights and this 
favoured a suitable functioning of the productive factor markets. The high salary mass in agrarian 
activity in the two economies is a clear effect of this process and it makes Australasia different from 
the settler economies of the River Plate where the rentist profile predominated. Land was 
considered as an important economic resource in economies like Australia and New Zealand that 
were based on agrarian production and that needed immigrants in order to develop, and this 
importance was expressed in public policies. Land was also important as a source of fiscal income, 
together with the transference of land ownership rights, and different tenure regimes were set up 
(leasing, grants, sale by auction, etc.). The leasing systems made it possible for small agrarian 
producers to access land even though they did not have enough capital to become owners. In 
addition, state limitations on the size of estates moderated (but they did not eliminate) the trend 
towards land ownership concentration. 
In Argentina and Uruguay the processes of land distribution started before the wars of 
independence and, therefore, initially it developed under the Spanish legal regime. In that period 
land was not very valuable and the main economic resource was wild cattle. Large estates 
(latifundia) came into being because populations were very small and the Spanish forces in the 
Viceroyalty of the River Plate were politically weak and mainly concerned with combating resistant 
native populations to the west and the south and the Portuguese Empire in the east. According to the 
Spanish land distribution laws, colonists were supposed to physically occupy the land and to 
produce on it, but in fact these conditions were rarely fulfilled. 
Most land frontier expansion and the transfer and distribution of land ownership rights occurred 
after Argentina and Uruguay became independent. Public land was transferred from the state to 
settlers through a variety of legal regimes that moved incoherently between direct sales and leasing. 
The former was inspired in liberal principles and it was aimed at transferring land to the private 
sector, and the latter was an effort to retain public land as a source of fiscal income and support the 
public debt. However, it turned out that neither Argentina nor Uruguay benefited for the transfer of 
land. Both countries lacked the political power to make an ordered distribution of land. Until the 
last quarter of the 19th century these states were weak in political, institutional and military terms, 
and the land distribution process favoured social and economic groups and local elites. During First 
Globalization land became much more valuable because of its connection with rising international 
commodity prices, and the large estates consolidated their position in the land ownership structure. 
These social groups also supported the oligarchy regimen that dominated the political scene up to 
WWI. A basic concept in the Argentine Constitution of 1853 was “to govern is to settle”, a notion 
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first advanced by Juan María Alberdi. But it turned out that hard facts were stronger than ideas and 
most of the land fell into the hands of capitalists and absentee landowners rather than settlers. 
The land distribution pattern in the River Plate did not have secure ownership rights and was 
further undermined by political weakness on the part of the authorities. Public policies were 
incoherent and inefficient, and when land ownership rights finally became more secure (in the 
1880s) the result was that a highly concentrated ownership pattern was consolidated. For decades 
the authorities focused their efforts on organizing the country and the provinces instead of on how 
land was distributed within those boundaries, and this weakened the state’s capacity for action in 
that matter. A combination of deficient functioning of the productive factor markets, a strong 
association between economic and political power (with features of the colonial heritage), and a 
persistent social differentiation (based also on idiosyncratic factors) are, at least partially, the result 
of land concentration, and it created the “environment” of worsening of income distribution 
experienced by both countries in the last decades of the 19th century. 
2.4.2 Similarities and differences 
On a conceptual level and taking a broad view, the process in the settler economies in the 19th 
century was dominated by four principles:  
(i) The creation of a private land tenure system whereby, depending on the period and with 
differing intensity, land ownership was transferred to colonizers. Initially the land was 
freehold and this was seldom questioned, but it was not long before doubts began to arise, 
especially towards the end of the 19th century, and there were tentative experiments with 
leasehold systems that were not always well thought out.   
(ii) There was a permanent idea that a new population should be brought onto the land so as to 
create a society based on immigrants. 
(iii) The authorities were convinced that land was the nation’s wealth and land settlement would 
be the basis of prosperity. 
(iv) There was a notion that equality in land distribution was valuable as the basis to construct 
an independent and democratic nation. 
The authorities in the different countries all had these notions and all faced similar problems: 
(i) Strictly, the land was not “empty”. The expansion of the frontier meant displacing the native 
population and taking over the land they had subsisted on for centuries. However, land had 
to be brought into civilization and put to use, and the best results would be obtained by 
bringing in settlers to establish a stable, sedentary society of farmers (Williams, 1975: 63). 
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(ii) There was a certain amount of theory involved,177 but basically the way land was 
administered and how ownership rights for public land came into being was a matter of trial 
and error. It was very difficult to define land boundaries because of ignorance and 
information asymmetries, and there were problems too with determining the size of estates 
and their productive aptitude.  
(iii) Land policies were dominated by conflicts among interest groups in which each faction 
played its own game. Occupiers used their wealth and influence to evade attempts to 
reallocate land, and many evasion methods were used such as “dummying”, “peacocking” 
and forcing auctions.178 In addition, land oligarchies usually participated actively in the 
various levels of government and fostered legislation that furthered their own interests.  
There are two main models, and there are four main differences between them: 
(i) The colonial heritage in the River Plate –as explained by Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2005) and 
Engerman & Sokoloff (1997, 2002)– contrasts with the delayed institutional development of 
Australasia.179 In some sense, in Australia and New Zealand the absence of “path-
dependence” allowed a really “new” system to be created that was close to the British 
tradition and had the North American system as a model. 
(ii) The oligarchic elites in the River Plate exerted broad control over land ownership, and with 
the development of constitutional government they consolidated their hold on political 
power. This contrasts with the pastoral economy of Australasia that was shaped by rules 
imposed by a bureaucracy that was relatively disinterested –it was dependent on the Crown– 
and involved the active political participation of small farmers (Denoon, 1983),180 who were 
motivated by democratic values.  
(iii) In Australasia the various states participated in the “agrarian question”, and a well-
organized public administration made it possible to implement and enforce autonomous 
action. In the River Plate, on the other hand, chronic fiscal deficits and continuous political 
struggles –even after the independence– prevented the implementation of long-run policies. 
As a result, the governments of Australasia set up administrative and institutional 
arrangements that were closer to the notion of a developmental state. 
                                                 
177 Some of the most influential theorists were Robert John Wilmot-Horton and Edward Gibbon Wakefield in the early 
part of the 19th century, and Alfred Russell Wallace and Henry George toward the end of that century. 
178 “Dummying” is acting on the behalf of another individual in legal matters. “Peacocking” refers to the acquisition of 
the best pieces of land in such a way that the surrounding land is useless to others. 
179 Bértola et al. (2010) present an analysis of the evolution of income distribution in the Southern Cone of South 
America considering the colonial heritage as a main factor.  
180 “…Australian wheat-farmers enjoyed a security of tenure and a degree of state sympathy which ‘arrendatarios’ in 
Argentina would scarcely have believed possible” (Denoon, 1983:102).  
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(iv) Australia and New Zealand shared the same fragment culture and the reforms reflected the 
same fundamental egalitarian, communally-focused, working-class radical values. Both 
societies shaped a socio-political context in which the land question was one of the main 
aspects of public policy, and quite early on politicians, theorists, and citizens identified with 
these concerns. The colonial social hierarchy lacked the appearance of permanence and a 
change of status was a relatively common experience. This social homogeneity made for a 
powerful unity in political questions (Paulson, 1988; Rosecrance, 1964). 
Questions of land tenure were enormously important in the political economy of newly settled 
regions, and there was concern “with property as a function rather than a right” (Hawke, 1979: 
382). This notion can help us understand the differences that emerged. In conceptual terms, the 
institutional arrangements than governed the distribution of land ownership and the behaviour of 
landowners (effective as well as potential) were similar between the regions. The regulations were 
written with similar concerns and interests in mind, and the American system was identified as an 
attractive model. Agents acted in accordance with their own interests, created mechanisms to obtain 
land for themselves and took advantage of other proprietors when circumstances permitted. The 
great differences between the two systems were that the governments in the River Plate were weak 
when it came to enforcing regulations, and there were elites (whose power was based on land 
ownership) that influenced state policy. This aspect is dealt with by Robinson, et al. (2006), and it is 
a feature that derived from a strong colonial heritage. The authorities in Australasia created a more 
favourable environment for colonization and land settlement because they had the power to enforce 
the regulations, they were guided by notions of development that stemmed from the colonial 
government, and they enjoyed a context that was more stable economically and politically. In terms 
of land distribution the differences were not so significant between regions (see Chapter 4) but, in 
terms of the functioning of the markets and the incomes derived from the productive factors, they 
were. In particular, the different appropriability capacity of the agents might go some way towards 
explaining why income evolved differently in the two regions. The conditions of appropriability 
were clearly different; they were more intense in the River Plate where they influenced distinctly 
income distribution rather than wealth distribution, and where they were accompanied by 
idiosyncratic factors that reinforced the negative consequences on inequality of natural resources 
exploitation. 
Therefore, we can come back to our appropriability hypothesis. The environmental factors –the 
landholding system– that control the innovator's ability –the holder’s capability– to get returns 
generated by an innovation –the incorporation of “new” land– characterized two different “models”. 
Within similar economic growth conditions, one of them rendered an income inequality pattern of 
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high concentration and rentist societies (Hispanic model) and, the other, a more egalitarian model 
with higher participation of wages and profits and, consequently, broader markets (associated to 
wider middle-social classes) that function more efficiently and encourage economic growth (British 
model). The differences in terms of income distribution in the agrarian activity, land property, 
capacity of influence of the states, colonial heritage and social homogeneity, explain two different 
ways to interact with the abundant natural resources. 
3. Conclusions and final remarks 
We analyze the effect of natural resources on economic growth and on functional income 
distribution in agrarian activity, and our discussion is guided by considering the hypothesis of the 
curse (or blessing) of natural resources. Our initial conjecture is that settler economies are 
characterized by abundance of natural resources, but natural capital is not homogeneous in 
composition (soils, humidity, temperature) or in intensity (as regards ease of extraction and use) and 
this generates differences in terms of economic development. 
We focus on the effects of a country’s abundance of natural resources and of the quality of its 
institutions in terms of making resources appropriable. We propose two methodological approaches. 
One is based on estimating the statistical relationship between economic performance, natural 
resources and institutions. The other is a historical description of the distribution of land ownership 
rights and the institutional arrangements related to land property in four countries, Argentina and 
Uruguay (Spanish ex-colonies) and Australia and New Zealand (British ex-colonies). 
In the first approach we do not reject the curse of natural resources on agricultural production, 
but if we admit that the curse can also be seen in terms of high inequality, it is possible to reject it. 
In other words, open frontiers (huge natural resources that may be incorporated into production) 
would be associated with low levels of agrarian production and egalitarian societies. Institutional 
quality, acting alone or in combination with natural resources, was able to promote positive effects 
because it strengthened the blessing or moderated the curse. In addition, we find evidence in favour 
of the appropriability hypothesis in terms of inequality and in the technical dimension, but we reject 
it in terms of agricultural production. The expansion of the land frontier onto relatively higher 
aptitude land meant a more moderate curse on the agrarian production, but it amounted to a “less 
blessed blessing” as regards income distribution. 
What were the consequences of these conditions in the long-run? As abundance of natural 
resources (land wealth) decreases (in relative terms) with the occupation of territory, economies that 
incorporated “new” land into production “escaped from the curse” of natural resources and enjoyed 
sustained expansion that raised their income to levels approaching that of the core countries in the 
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world economy. However, in this process, our economies left the blessing, in terms of income 
distribution, of an extensive open territory, to configure a persistent non-egalitarian trajectory. 
Our second approach is based on a historical description of the distribution of land rights and the 
formation of institutional arrangements for land ownership in the River Plate (Argentina and 
Uruguay) and Australasia (Australia and New Zealand). The enforcement capacity of the authorities 
in Australasia, which had its roots in the colonial government, made for a more stable economic and 
political context and markets that functioned better, and created an environment more conducive to 
colonization and land settlement. The conditions of appropriability in the Anglo-Saxon settler 
economies were clearly different to those in the River Plate. 
The question of appropriability is an attractive dimension to the argument about the relationship 
between economic performance and natural resources. The institutional arrangements regulating 
land ownership may be suitable for economic growth but inadequate when it comes to promoting 
more egalitarian societies. This evolution was more apparent in the Hispanic ex-colonies that in the 
economies that adhered to the Anglo-Saxon model in which “good” institutions foster the blessing 
(and moderate the curse) of natural resources. Differences in land aptitude would create different 
incentives and possibilities for agents to appropriate the rental differential between different types 
of land. The appropriability dimension will be more important, or more intense, when the land 
occupied is of higher quality because the agents in question would have greater opportunities to 
appropriate rents, but this process did not affect the production side but the inequality pattern. This 
trend could be moderated by the action of institutions and the path dependence of the settlement (as 
in the Australasian case) or legitimated by the “environment factors” that regulated the capacity of 
the holders to appropriate the returns of the “new” land (River Plate). 
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
Institutional quality indicators and database 
1. Polity IV: constraints on the executive 
1.1 Presentation 
“Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2008” is a program 
that provides broad information for coding the authority characteristics of states in the world system 
for purposes of comparative and quantitative analysis (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity 
/polity4.htm). The “Constraints on executive” data base is accessible through the Integrated 
Network for Societal Conflict Research (INSCR), and it considers a wide sample of countries from 
the mid-19th century to 2008. 
 “Constraints on the executive” is a measure of historical political institutions and is defined as 
the extent that institutions can restrict the decision making powers of the chief executive, whether 
individual or collective. According to Marshall & Jaggers (2009), in a democracy, constraints 
would come from the legislative or judicial branches of government. In a dictatorship, constraints 
may come from the ruling party in a one-party system, military coups, a council of nobles or 
powerful advisors. The extents of constraints on the executive are coded from 1, meaning 
“unlimited executive authority” to 7, which is “executive parity or subordination”. A country would 
be in the first category if “constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored”, or if “there is 
no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called or dismissed at the executive’s pleasure”. A 
country would be in the latter category if “a legislature, ruling party or council of nobles initiates 
much or most important legislation” or if “the executive is chosen by the accountability group and 
is dependent on its continued support too remain in office” (Marshall & Jaggers, 2009: 67-68). 
1.2 Time coverage 
Argentina: 1860-1913; Australia: 1901-1913; Canada: 1867-1913; Chile: 1860-1913; New 
Zealand: 1860-1913; Uruguay: 1860-1913.  
The data base (annual data) considers only independent countries and this is why Australia and 
Canada have shorter series. Both were dependent on British Crown in the 19th century but enjoyed a 
governmental regime with a high degree of autonomy and had political systems with broad popular 
participation, at least compared to other countries at that time. For both, independence was not a 
traumatic episode and political and governmental conditions changed gradually. It seems reasonable 
to give both countries the same level of the indicator that they had in their first year (1867 for 
Canada and 1901 for Australia). However, to avoid introducing a bias towards our hypothesis, we 
“punish” them by reducing them one step in the indicator rating. 
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2. CIM: contract-intensive money 
2.1 Presentation 
Clague et al., (1999) define contract-intensive money (CIM) as the ratio of non-currency money 
to the total money supply, or CIM= (M2-C)/M2, where M2  is a broad definition of the money supply 
and C is currency held by people (outside banks). 
2.2 Sources 
o For Argentina, Australia and Canada we use Prados de la Escosura and Sanz Villarroya 
(2009, 2006). Data kindly provided by the authors. 
o For Chile we use our own elaboration with data derived from Jeftanovi et al. (2003).  
o For New Zealand we use our own elaboration with data derived from Statistics New 
Zealand-Long Term Data Series (SNZ-LTDS) based on Bloomfield (1984), and our own 
estimates.  
The source considers banknotes and coin held by the public since 1935, and for the previous 
years (1875-1934) the category considers notes in circulation. The first figure is $ 
10,778,000 and the average of the second for 1933-1935 is 11,049,000. The differences are 
small and we consider notes in circulation as a good proxy for the currency held by the 
public.  
SNZ-LTDS presents its own estimates of M2 for 1877-1913, and for the previous years we 
adjust these data with the movement of M1 series.  
o Uruguay: the data is from Román & Willebald (2010). Data kindly provided by the authors. 
BLOOMFIELD, Gerald (1984): New Zealand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics. G.K. Hall & Co., 70 Lincoln Street, 
Boston, Mass. Table XI: Trading Banks:  Assets and Liabilities 1857-1934, pp. 386-387.  
CLAGUE, Christopher, KEEFER, Philip KNACK, Stephen and OLSON, Mancur (1999): “Contract-Intensive Money: 
Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance”, Journal of Economic Growth, 4, pp. 185–211, 
June. 
JEFTANOVIC, Pedro, JOFRÉ, José, LÜDERS, Rolf and PAGLIA, Marcelo (2003): “Economía Chilena 1860-2000. 
Estadísticas Monetarias”. Documento de Trabajo Nº 189,  Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago. 
Appendix Nº 5.B. Money Supply “M2”, 1860-1937: Authors elaboration, p. 75. 
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, Leandro and SANZ VILLARROYA, Isabel (2009): “Contract Enforcement, capital 
accumulation, and Argentina’s long-run decline”. Cliometrica, 3, pp. 1-26. 
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, Leandro and SANZ VILLARROYA, Isabel (2006): “Contract Enforcement and 
Argentina’s Long-Run Decline”. Economic History and Institutions Series Working Paper 06-06, Dpto. de Historia 
Económica e Instituciones, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid. 
ROMÁN, Carolina and WILLEBALD, Henry (2010): “Contract-intensive money in Uruguay during the First 
Globalization: concepts, methodology of construction and conjectures". Notas de Investigación, Área de Desarrollo, 
Instituto de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administración, Universidad de la República, Uruguay, 
unpublished (available by request to hwillebald@iecon.ccee.edu.uy). 
STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND-LONG TERM DATA SERIES, Series Finance, Table: F.1.4, Sub-series: Banks, Total 
Currency in Circulation and Total Currency held by the Public, http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/ 
economic_indicators/NationalAccounts/long-term-data-series/finance.aspx, retrieved 28, May, 2010.  
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STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND-LONG TERM DATA SERIES, Series Finance, Table: F.4.1, Sub-series: Money 
Supply, M1, M2, M3, http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/economic_indicators/NationalAccounts/long-term-
data-series/finance.aspx, retrieved 28, May, 2010.  
3. Database for econometric exercises 
 
Country Year GDPA GDPAG RW C CIM CIMI F HI MI LI HL ML FEH FEM FEL 
1 1860 1   3 0.56 1.00 0.92 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.96 1.00 
1 1870 2 0.95 1.60 3 0.55 0.97 0.90 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.95 1.00 
1 1880 8 2.66 2.16 3 0.55 0.97 0.89 0.96 0.97 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.95 1.00 
1 1890 30 3.01 1.51 3 0.55 0.98 0.86 0.94 0.95 1.00 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.93 1.00 
1 1900 62 1.05 1.67 3 0.66 1.17 0.83 0.92 0.93 1.00 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.92 1.00 
1 1910 84 0.35 3.22 3 0.74 1.31 0.79 0.89 0.92 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.89 0.90 1.00 
2 1860 21   6 0.77 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 
2 1870 34 0.63 1.64 6 0.83 1.08 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 
2 1880 51 0.48 1.64 6 0.88 1.15 0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 
2 1890 72 0.42 2.36 6 0.92 1.19 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 
2 1900 91 0.26 1.57 7 0.92 1.20 0.96 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.99 
2 1910 123 0.35 1.55 7 0.94 1.22 0.96 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 
3 1860 24   6 0.47 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 
3 1870 31 0.29 2.21 7 0.63 1.33 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.93 
3 1880 40 0.29 1.87 7 0.72 1.52 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.94 
3 1890 47 0.17 2.05 7 0.79 1.68 0.93 1.00 1.00 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.94 
3 1900 67 0.41 1.87 7 0.85 1.81 0.93 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.94 
3 1910 99 0.48 2.40 7 0.89 1.88 0.92 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.93 
4 1860 39   2 0.09 1.00 0.70 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.01 1.01 0.95 0.89 0.86 
4 1870 48 0.25 3.50 3 0.28 3.07 0.69 1.00 0.99 0.96 1.05 1.04 0.95 0.89 0.85 
4 1880 53 0.10 4.23 4 0.39 4.21 0.67 0.98 0.99 0.96 1.03 1.04 0.95 0.89 0.83 
4 1890 61 0.16 3.63 7 0.51 5.55 0.65 0.98 0.99 0.96 1.02 1.04 0.93 0.88 0.83 
4 1900 71 0.15 2.35 7 0.63 6.83 0.65 0.97 0.99 0.96 1.02 1.03 0.93 0.88 0.83 
4 1910 94 0.34 3.82 7 0.75 8.12 0.65 0.98 0.99 0.96 1.02 1.03 0.93 0.88 0.83 
5 1860 8   7 0.81 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.99 0.99 
5 1870 21 1.78 1.46 7 0.87 1.08 0.85 0.88 0.96 0.97 0.90 0.99 0.91 0.97 0.97 
5 1880 39 0.84 1.20 7 0.92 1.14 0.77 0.85 0.95 0.96 0.88 0.99 0.85 0.95 0.96 
5 1890 59 0.51 1.36 7 0.93 1.15 0.73 0.82 0.94 0.96 0.85 0.98 0.83 0.94 0.96 
5 1900 72 0.23 1.86 7 0.93 1.16 0.69 0.80 0.93 0.95 0.84 0.98 0.80 0.94 0.95 
5 1910 99 0.37 1.70 7 0.93 1.16 0.66 0.78 0.92 0.95 0.89 0.97 0.78 0.93 0.95 
6 1860 25   1 0.57 1.00 0.87 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.88 0.99 1.00 
6 1870 38 0.56 1.23 1 0.61 1.07 0.81 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 
6 1880 54 0.41 1.86 1 0.64 1.13 0.77 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.76 1.00 0.77 1.00 1.00 
6 1890 81 0.50 2.31 1 0.69 1.22 0.66 0.68 0.99 1.00 0.68 0.99 0.67 0.99 1.00 
6 1900 88 0.08 1.92 2 0.65 1.14 0.59 0.63 0.99 1.00 0.63 0.99 0.60 0.99 1.00 
6 1910 97 0.10 3.23 4 0.63 1.11 0.54 0.57 0.99 1.00 0.77 0.99 0.56 0.99 1.00 
1: Argentina; 2: Australia; 3: Canada; 4: Chile; 5: New Zealand; 6: Uruguay. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions, final remarks and contributions 
The First Globalization was a period of expansion for the Atlantic economy from the mid-19th 
century up to WWI. It was characterized by the incorporation of new regions into the global 
economy and the configuration of broad markets for commodities and productive factors. We 
focused our analysis on regions of recent European settlement (“settler economies”), which were 
involved in this process in the period 1870-1913. At the beginning of the 20th century these 
economies appeared to have a promising future, but it became apparent in the 1930s that the results 
of several members of this “club” had fallen short of these expectations. In the 20th century the main 
problem for these countries was how to deal with the transition from a settler economy to some 
form of post-settler society, and they took different paths and adapted to the new environment with 
different degrees of success. However, even considering a similar development pattern of the 
“club”, differences were important and they constitute one of the main motivations of our research. 
Levels of product per capita were higher and the deterioration of income distribution less intense in 
the ex-British colonies (Australia, New Zealand and Canada) than in ex-Spanish ones (Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay), and manufacturing came to the fore much more in the first economies.  
How did the similarity among the members of the club operate historically? Many parts of South 
America, Oceania and Africa benefited from the consequences of the Second Industrial Revolution 
as their temperate climate and fertile soils were especially suitable for the production of food and 
raw materials. Their natural resource endowments enabled them to make dynamic progress and 
reach income per capita levels on a par with the richest economies in the world. Their abundance of 
natural capital was understood as a “blessing” as these economies participated in external trade with 
resources that had been practically unexploited and for which international demand, mainly from 
Europe, was strong and sustained for a long period. However, in recent years, and particularly since 
the 1990s, the perception of the connection between abundant natural resources and economic 
growth has changed. 
A new literature has developed that focuses on the so-called “resource curse hypothesis”, a 
confusing paradox whereby resource-rich countries would tend to grow more slowly than resource-
poor ones. Evidently, in the context of the settler economies during the First Globalization, it is 
difficult to see the issue in terms of clear and determinant causalities. The First Globalization was a 
period in which settler economies developed sustained export-led growth with a persistent primary 
specialization and worsening income distribution (we call these processes as the three main stylized 
facts of the period). Therefore we cannot label an abundance of natural resources as a complete 
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blessing or a complete curse. Current theoretical and empirical literature about the “curse 
hypothesis” discusses mixed influences and proposes wider perspectives that introduce concerns 
other than economic growth, such as poverty, education and inequality. In this new perspective 
some processes are seen as conditional upon the formation of specific aspects of the economic 
environment, typically the institutional arrangements that came into being. Following this approach, 
we find that when the settler economies were exposed to the effects of the First Globalization they 
took advantage of their abundant natural capital, applied their resources productively, and in this 
process they received the blessing of their natural wealth but at the same time incurred the curse of 
an increasing inequality. 
The recent literature on the evolution of the Atlantic economy during the First Globalization uses 
the H-O-S trade theory to explain the performance of the New World economies. This theoretical 
framework can be useful to explain the three typical overall trends in the period –productive 
expansion, primary specialization and inequality– and it considers international economic relations 
and the formation of prices as key factors, but it does not pay enough attention to domestic 
conditions and it does not offer arguments to differentiate performance within the “club”. For this 
reason we are interested in an alternative analytical approach based on the tradition of the “staple 
thesis” and supplemented with elements from the appropriability hypothesis of natural resources. 
This should give us new insights into the question. 
Our approach has a different focus to recent standard analyses and this enables us to discuss key 
aspects of the First Globalization in terms of the endogenous expansion of the land frontier, 
differentials in sector productivities and different evolutions in functional income distribution. The 
main “domestic contribution” of settler economies to economic growth was the incorporation of 
“new” land (of variable quality) into production. This had consequences for structural change, the 
evolution of factor remuneration and the quantity and intensity of the use of productive factors. In 
spite of this, natural endowments are not the whole story. The expansion of the land frontier was 
related to the formation of land property rights, and consequently to the configuration of different 
land ownership systems and different designs of incentive mechanisms associated with them. These 
differences in land frontier expansion and the corresponding formation of institutional arrangements 
governing it are core factors in the explanation of why incomes and distributive patterns in settler 
economies evolved in different ways. Land quality and institutional quality are central elements in 
our analytical and empirical approach. 
Our main argument is that the mere availability of abundant natural resources can not explain the 
success or failure of the settler economies. Indeed, it was the discovery of natural resources, the 
existence of commercial opportunities, the rate of exploitation and the distribution of rents all acting 
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together that created the conditions for economic development. Therefore we focused on the 
transformation of natural resources as an endogenous process that explains the evolution of these 
economies and their structures in productive and distributive terms. The incorporation of “new” 
land was a process that went on at the same time that specific institutions dealing with land 
ownership were being set up. In consequence, a second central aspect of our research was to 
examine the connection between the evolution of land incorporation and the quality of the 
institutions involved. Because worsening income distribution is a key subject, we employed a 
theoretical framework that proposes the different rental appropriability capacities of natural 
resources as a key element, and we evaluated the formation of the land ownership system in 
accordance with it. The appropriability conditions of natural resources (depending on their quality), 
the quality of institutions (in terms of their capacity to moderate concentrated rent appropriation and 
crowding-out effects) and the interaction between both had different consequences in different 
countries. In the English-speaking countries, and in relative terms, these conditions moderated the 
crowding-out effects of natural resources because stimulated a more efficient functioning of 
productive factor markets, with increasing capital accumulation (physical and human) and 
salarization of the agrarian production. The result was a better economic performance than that of 
the South American Southern Cone in the long run, where the rental profile of the agrarian 
production characterized economies with small markets and low chances to affront the structural 
change of the industrialization (persistent primary specialization was a feature present in all settlers, 
but it was more intensive in the Spanish speaking economies). 
In accordance with our hypotheses and a review of the literature about the curse and the blessing 
of the natural resources, and paying attention to the main stylized facts or overall characteristics of 
our “club” of economies, we focused our efforts on three main questions, (i) endogenous land 
frontier expansion; (ii) the influence of land quality on economic performance; and (iii) the 
interaction between an abundance of natural resources and institutional quality. To deal with these 
questions we worked in three different directions, (i) to design an analytical model suitable to tackle 
our questions and hypotheses, (ii) to operationalize two of the main concepts and variables of 
interest: land frontier expansion and functional income distribution in agriculture; and (iii) to 
propose empirical exercises and detailed descriptions to understand the relationships between 
natural resources and institutional quality (in terms of the appropriability hypothesis).  
First, in Chapter 2, we presented an analytical model that represents the three stylized facts 
mentioned above so as to analyze some aspects of the blessing and the curse of natural resources. 
This complements the view derived from the H-O-S theory. In the tradition of “specific factors” 
models, we studied two main aspects of domestic conditions: endogenous land frontier expansion 
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(our proxy for the effects of the land abundance) and the use of a decision rule whereby agents 
could understand this movement (agents react to marginal changes in incomes and costs related to 
the land that, potentially, can be incorporated into the production). Our main contribution is to 
propose some modifications to the theoretical formulation and introduce the effect of different land 
qualities on the results. Our objective is to emphasize the role of endogenous advance on the land in 
the First Globalization as a reaction to changes in the relative prices of commodities and changes in 
the relative endowments of productive factors (basically, capital and labour). We extend the model 
to increase its flexibility and adapt its application to the different ways the countries in the “club” 
developed. In particular, we focused out discussion on the influence of different patterns of land 
frontier expansion (or settlement) –depending on land quality– on the formation of particular 
income distribution patterns. We assume specific formulations of the equations of the model and 
propose numerical analyses to determine the changes in functional income distribution derived from 
changes in relative prices (agricultural versus manufacture goods). With this we represent the price 
boom of the closing decades of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century that settler 
economies enjoyed, and its consequences in terms of growth, structural change and worsening 
income distribution. Under these assumptions, the different intensity of the increase in inequality in 
the settler economies during the First Globalization may be explained by the fact that land of 
differing quality was occupied and thus agents received differing rewards. The wide gaps between 
land rentals and wages that characterized the period depended on the effective existence of land 
returns that could be appropriated. The abundance of excellent land in La Pampa or Uruguay made 
for greater possibilities to capture rents –as against wages– but this was not the case in Australia, 
where the territory became more arid the farther inland the producer moved, or Canada, where the 
exceptional prairies were all of 2,000 km from the east coast. But, land frontier expansion occurred 
at the same time as specific institutional arrangements came into being, so the institutional 
explanation of the natural resource curse (and blessing) is a useful tool to guide our analysis.  
The effect of natural resources on economic development is not determined by resource 
endowments alone but rather by the interaction between the type of resources and the quality of 
institutions. This combination represents the so-called “appropriability” of a resource. This concept 
generally alludes to the environmental factors that control the innovator’s ability to obtain returns 
generated by an innovation. In the case of land, we can express the concept in terms of the 
landholding systems that control innovator’s ability (the land proprietor) to obtain rents derived 
from the incorporation of “new” land. The concept captures the probability that they will lead to 
rent-seeking, corruption, anti-competitive actions or conflicts, which in turn hamper economic 
development. In economies where resources are highly appropriable, the abundance of resources 
may make economic development difficult, and the opposite would happen in countries where 
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resources are less appropriable. We applied these concepts to help us understand the evolution of 
settler economies during the period. 
From the discussion of Chapter 2, two questions are crucial for our analysis of economic 
performance: land frontier expansion and income distribution, and we operationalize these two 
concepts in two chapters. 
In Chapter 3, we present different notions and measures of land frontier expansion. First, we 
review the literature about the “frontier myth” of settler economies, from the pioneering 
contributions of Frederick Turner to the recent theoretical and empirical developments that, with a 
critical and sometimes excessively superficial approach, deal with that conceptualization. Second, 
in order to identify different “settlement patterns”, we present and discuss ways to measure the 
process. We base our quantification proposal on the use of Georeferenced Information Systems 
(GIS) and the elaboration of land frontier indexes (“extensive”, “intensive”, and “contribution” 
indicators). With this strategy we can circumvent some of the limitations of previous approaches. 
First, we calculate indicators of natural resource abundance in terms of the stock potentially used 
for production (we work with indicators of wealth), and of their evolution on time. Second, we 
consider different land aptitudes (in agricultural terms) and distances (from certain “centres of 
gravity” in the case of Argentina) depending on the potential vegetation, and thus we define specific 
settlement patterns. The trajectories of the countries in the club were not homogenous and they 
reacted to the effects of the First Globalization in different ways, depending on their dynamics of 
settlement. In these terms, we can identify two patterns.  
On the one hand, in the River Plate, frontier expansion was mostly onto high and medium 
aptitude land throughout the period (low aptitude land contribution was absolutely marginal), and 
this was also the pattern in Chile from the 1880s. On the other hand, land frontier expansion came 
at a different time in the development of Australia and Canada. In Australia it came before the First 
Globalization boom, and in Canada the process only became intensive at the end of the 19th century. 
In addition, and in contrast to Australia, the contribution of the three types of land (high, medium 
and low quality) was important for Canada. New Zealand had features of both economies. As in 
Australia, land frontier expansion became more dynamic before the price boom but, like in Canada, 
all three kinds of land made their contribution to development. In accordance with our theoretical 
framework, we can expect that the different intensity of expansion onto different natural resources 
would have resulted in a more serious worsening of income distribution (a “blessing less blessed”) 
in the Southern Cone of South America than in Australasia and Canada. In Chapter 4 we present 
our estimates of income distribution and contrast our findings. 
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In accordance with the discussion of Chapter 2, we advance different notions and measures of 
two dimensions of inequality in settler economies. We consider asset and income distribution to 
identify different “distributive patterns” in the club. First we study the distribution of land 
ownership in the eve of the WWI. We present percentile indicators, Gini indexes and land holding 
sizes for each country in the club and for large regions within them. Inequality indexes hide certain 
“shapes” in land distribution that relativize some comparisons and drive us to put the emphasis on 
different regional realities that improve our approach to the topic. Second, we estimate functional 
income distribution in the agrarian sector. Agriculture was the most important productive activity in 
the settler economies and it played a leading role in land frontier expansion. Therefore we study the 
evolution of income distribution in this sector and gain some interesting insights. We present the 
notion of functional income distribution and elaborate a database with figures by decade between 
the 1870s to the 1910s for all the settler economies. This contains estimates of total wages, land 
rentals and profits. With this information, we discuss the two distributive patterns. In the Anglo-
Saxon countries capitalist relationships predominated and in the Spanish-speaking countries 
economic relationships were based on agrarian rental incomes. The former group suffered a less 
severe worsening of income distribution than the latter group, and this pattern coincided with 
different dynamics of frontier expansion (settlement patterns in Australasia and Canada where high 
quality land did not predominate or it evolved together with the contributions of the other qualities). 
In accordance with our measure of land frontier expansion in terms of aptitude –which we use as an 
indicator of the productive application of natural capital– and supported by our theoretical 
framework, we argue that the different endowments of natural resources and their effective 
productive application go some way towards explaining these differences. 
Lastly, the formation of specific institutional arrangements, especially property rights, and land 
frontier expansion were concurrent processes, so their influence on economic performance should 
not be studied separately. In Chapter 5 we examine how they both evolved and the effects they had. 
We discuss the effect of natural capital on economic development through the interaction between 
the type of natural resources a country possesses and the quality of its institutions. We consider 
types of natural resources in terms of land aptitude (“high”, “medium” and “low” aptitude to be 
used as grassland). We approach institutional quality in two ways. First, we use a macro approach 
to analyze governance, contract enforcement and property rights, and second, we use an agents’ 
behaviour approach to study the formation and configuration of the land ownership system. We 
guide our argument with the appropriability hypothesis and we study the question in two separate 
directions. One of these is based on estimating the statistical relation between economic 
development (growth, production and income distribution in the agrarian sector), natural resources 
and institutions, where we apply the concepts of constraints on the executive and contract-intensive 
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money as indicators of institutional quality. The other is a historical description of the distribution 
of land ownership rights and the institutional arrangements governing land ownership in four 
countries: Argentina and Uruguay (as representatives of the Spanish ex-colonies) and Australia and 
New Zealand (as British ex-colonies). 
In accordance with the first approach, we do not reject the curse of natural resources on 
agricultural production, but if we admit that the curse can also include severe inequality we can 
reject it. For this reason, open frontiers –huge natural resources that may be incorporated into 
production– would be related to low levels of agrarian production and egalitarian societies. 
Institutional quality –acting alone or in combination with natural resources– was able to reverse the 
possible negative effect of natural resources because it strengthened the blessing or moderated the 
curse. In addition, we find evidence in favour of the appropriability hypothesis in its technical 
dimension, as regards inequality, but we reject it as regards agricultural production. The expansion 
of the frontier onto relatively higher aptitude land (with a greater degree of appropriability) made 
for a more moderate curse on the production of the economy, but it was a “blessing less blessed” in 
distributive terms. In other words, to advance relatively more by high quality land (when they 
showed higher contributions to the land expansion) is “good” for growing but bad for equality. 
What were the consequences of these conditions in the long-run? As an abundance of natural 
resources (land wealth) decreases (in relative terms) with the occupation of territory, economies that 
incorporated “new” lands into production “escaped from the curse” of natural resources, enjoyed 
sustained expansion and reached income levels similar to those in the core of the world economy. 
However, in this process our economies left the blessing (in terms of income distribution) of an 
extensive open territory behind and evolved along a persistently non-egalitarian trajectory. 
In accordance with the second approach, we confirm that the land tenure question was extremely 
important in the political economy of the newly settled regions, and the emphasis of our discussion 
was on identifying ownership as a function rather than a right. The institutional arrangements than 
governed the distribution of land ownership and the behaviour of the landowners involved 
(effective and potential) were similar in Australasia and the River Plate. The regulations were 
written with the same kinds of concerns and interests in mind, and the United States system was 
seen by both as an attractive model for constituting rules and norms. Agents acted in accordance 
with their own interests, they created mechanisms to obtain land for the lowest price possible and 
took advantage of other proprietors when circumstances permitted. What were the differences 
between the two regions or systems? 
The most far-reaching differences between the two systems were that the governments in the 
River Plate were too weak to effectively enforce the regulations, and there were elites whose power 
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was based on land ownership that influenced state policy, a feature that probably had its roots in the 
field of colonial heritage. Governments in Australasia created a more positive context for 
colonization and land settlement because they had more power to enforce the regulations. 
Furthermore, they were guided by ideas close to development notions and they enjoyed a more 
stable economic and political environment, where a higher social homogeneity helped to put the 
land question in the centre of the debate. The differences were not as significant in land distribution 
as they were in terms of income distribution and, in consequence, in the functioning of factor 
markets, and this might help to explain the income divergence between the two regions. The 
adverse conditions of appropriability were clearly more intense in River Plate economies. 
We now return to our appropriability hypothesis and express it in terms of our main questions. 
The “environmental factors” in this concept may be identified with the landholding systems that 
emerged in the settler economies. This framework controls the “innovator’s ability” to obtain 
“returns generated by an innovation”, which is to say that framework governs the landholder’s 
capacity to obtain rents derived from the incorporation of “new” land. Under similar economic 
growth conditions and external forces, the Hispanic model led to an income inequality pattern with 
high concentration and rentist societies. The British model, on the other hand, generated a more 
egalitarian pattern with a greater share of wages (and profits) and broader markets (associated with 
a larger middle class). This functioned more efficiently and encouraged economic development. 
These two different ways to interact with abundant natural resources can be explained by 
differences in land ownership, in the government’s ability to influence development, in colonial 
heritage and in social homogeneity. This is why the “blessing was dammed” in some economies but 
in others was a factor that promoted development. 
What are the main contributions of our Thesis?  
(i) We extend an analytic model in the tradition of the “staple thesis” to incorporate land quality 
into the conceptual and empirical analysis. We propose calibration and contrafactual exercises 
from the numerical analysis of the model to make our understanding of the economic changes 
that took place in the period more precise.  
(ii) We apply the natural resources curse hypothesis in a historical perspective and, in accordance 
with the appropriability hypothesis, we relate land frontier expansion to the formation of 
institutional arrangements (land ownership rights) in terms of a gradient of appropriability of 
rents associated with different land qualities. 
(iii) We discuss the concept and measurement of the land frontier expansion process and the use of 
tools that are innovative in economic history, such as the Georeferenced Information Systems 
(GIS). 
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(iv) We make new estimates of functional income distribution in agriculture for the six countries in 
the settler “club”, covering the period from the 1870s to WWI.  
(v) We use panel data econometric exercises to test our main hypotheses, and this yields interesting 
insights of indicative character. 
(vi) We give a historical account of the development of land ownership rights in four economies in 
the “club” (Argentina, Australia, New Zealand and Uruguay) from the beginning of the 19th 
century to WWI. We pay attention to the formation of the different land ownership systems and 
the behaviour of the agents involved, with special emphasis on the role of the state and of social 
groups. 
We consider our Thesis as part of a research programme that opens up new areas for further 
research, which will improve our knowledge of the development process we are studying. 
Specifically, our future aim is to advance in two directions that together can enrich some of our 
conclusions. First, our analysis requires the exploration of questions connected to technological 
progress. Land frontier expansion is closely related to the technical conditions that make it possible 
to access new territories and our issue results an interesting guidance to advance in that direction. In 
particular, we will study: (i) the relationships between the dynamics of the land frontier expansion 
and the extension of the railways along the territory, especially to precise our concept of “frontier”; 
(ii) those technological progresses directly induced by the land quality. Second, from our historical 
analysis of land ownership systems in agrarian activity, it emerges that many components respond 
to the endogenous formation of institutional arrangements. In particular, we will study: (i) how 
some characteristics of the land ownership structure (as the size of the estates) depended on the land 
quality; (ii) how some features of the agrarian entrepreneur organization depended on the natural 
endowments and its effective exploitation. We will propose to pursue these questions in next stages 
of our research. 
 280
 
 281
References 
Chapter 1. Presentation and introduction 
ACEMOGLU, Daron, JOHNSON, Simon and ROBINSON, James (2005): “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of 
Long-Run Growth”. In Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S. (Ed.): Handbook of Economic Growth, Amsterdam: North 
Holland. 
ACEMOGLU, Daron, JOHNSON, Simon and ROBINSON, James (2002): “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and 
Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, pp. 
1231-1294. 
ACEMOGLU, Daron, JOHNSON, Simon and ROBINSON, James (2001): “Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation”. American Economic Review 91, pp. 1369-1341. 
ADELMAN, Jeremy (1994): Frontier Development. Land, Labour and Capital on the wheatlands of Argentina and 
Canada, 1890-1914. Clarendon Press, Oxford.  
AGHION, Philippe and HOWITT, Peter, (1992): “A model of growth through creative destruction”, Econometrica, 
Vol. 60, Nº 2, March, pp. 323-351.  
ALBERDI, Juan Bautista (1852): Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina. 
Valparaiso,  
ALTMAN, Morris (2003): “Staple Theory and Exported-led growth: constructing differential growth”. Australian 
Economic History Review, 43, No. 3, pp. 230-255, November. 
ÁLVAREZ, Jorge, BÉRTOLA, Luis y PORCILE, Gabriel (2007): “Introdución”. En Álvarez, J., Bértola, L. y Porcile, 
G. (Comp.) Primos Ricos y Empobrecidos. Crecimiento, distribución del ingreso e instituciones en Australia-Nueva 
Zelanda vs Argentina-Uruguay, pp. 7-53.  Ed. Fin de Siglo, Montevideo, Uruguay. 
ANDERSEN, Jørgen and ASLAKSEN, Silje (2007): “Constitutions and the resource curse”. Journal of Development 
Economics, Volume 87, Issue 2, pp.227-246, October.b  
AMIN, Samir (1974): Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment. Monthly 
Review Press, New York. 
ARROYO ABAD, Leticia (2008): “Inequality in Republican Latin America: Assessing the Impact of Factor 
Endowments and Trade”. GPIH Working Paper No. 12, UC Davis, November. 
ASCHER, William (1999): Why Governments Waste Natural Resources: Policy Failures in Developing Countries. 
Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.  
ATKINSON, Giles and HAMILTON, Kirk (2003): “Savings, growth and the resource curse hypothesis”. World 
Development 31, pp. 1793-1807. 
AUTY, Richard (2006): “Pattern of Rent-Extraction and Deployment in Developing Countries. Implications for 
Governance, Economic Policy and Performance”. UNU-WIDER, United Nations University and World Institute for 
Development Economics research, Research Paper No 2006/16, February. 
AUTY, Richard (2001a), “Introduction and Overview”. In Auty, R. (Ed.): Resource Abundance and Economic 
Development, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 3-18.  
AUTY, Richard (2001b): “The Political Economy of Resource-Driven Growth”, European Economic Review 45 (4-6), 
pp. 839-846. 
AUTY, Richard (1997): “Natural resources, the state and development strategy”, Journal of International Development, 
9, pp. 651-663. 
AYRES, Robert, CASTANEDA, Beatriz, CLEVELAND, Cutler, COSTANZA, Robert, DALY, Herman, FOLKE, 
Carl, HANNON, Bruce, HARRIS, Jonathan, KAUFMANN, Robert, LIN, Xiannuan, NORGAARD, Richard, 
RUTH, Matthias, SPRENG, Daniel, STERN, David and VAN DEN BERGH, Jeroen (1997): “Natural Capital, 
Human Capital, and Sustainable Economic Growth”. MacArthur Foundation-Center for Energy and Environmental 
Studies at Boston University, Boston. 
BAIROCH, Paul (1976): “Europe’s Gross National Product: 1800-1975”. Journal of European Economic History, 5, 
pp. 273-340. 
BALAND, Jean-Marie and FRANCOIS, Patrick (2000): “Rent-Seeking and Resource Booms”. Journal of Development 
Economics 61, pp. 527-542.  
BARAN, Paul (1957):  The Political Economy of Growth. Monthly Review Press, New York.  
 282
BARBIER, Edward (2007): “Frontiers and Sustainable Economic Development”. Environmental and Resource 
Economics 37, pp. 271-295.  
BARBIER, Edward (2005): Natural Resources and Economic Development. University of Wyoming, November.  
BARBIER, Edward (2003): “Frontiers and Sustainable Economic Development”. Benjamin H. Hibbard Memorial 
Lecture, Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, April. 
BARBIER, Edward, BURGESS, Joanne and FOLKE, Carl (1995): “Paradise Lost?” The Ecological Economics of 
Biodiversity, Vol. 14 (3), pp. 216-218, Earthscan, London, September. 
BARRÁN, José Pedro y NAHUM, Benjamín (1978): “Agricultura, crédito y transporte bajo Batlle (1905 – 1914)”. En 
Historia Rural de Uruguay Moderno, Tomo VII. Ed. Banda Oriental. Montevideo. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis (2005), “A 50 años de la Curva de Kuznets: distribución del ingreso y crecimiento económico en 
Uruguay y otros países de nuevo asentamiento desde 1870”, Investigaciones de Historia Económica, Otoño, Nº 3, 
pp. 135-176. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis, CASTELNOVO, Cecilia, RODRÍGUEZ, Javier and WILLEBALD, Henry (2010): “Between the 
Colonial Heritage and the First Globalization Boom: On Income Inequality in the Southern Cone”. In Revista de 
Historia Económica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Vol. 28, Issue 2/2010, Madrid, 
España, pp. 307-341. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis and PORCILE, Gabriel (2002): “Rich and impoverished cousins: economic performance and income 
distribution in southern settlers societies”. XIII International Economic History Congress, Buenos Aires, July. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis and RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier (2009): “Income inequality in Chile 1860-1930”. Paper presented 
in the Conference A Comparative Approach to Inequality and Development: Latin America and Europe. Instituto 
Figuerola, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, May 8-9.  
BÉRTOLA, Luis and WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2003): “Globalization in Latin America Before 1940”. NBER Working 
Paper Series 9687, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., May. 
BERTRAM, Gordon W. (1963): “Economic growth and Canadian industry, 1870-1915: The staple model and the take-
off hypothesis.” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science. 29, no. 2, pp. 162-184. 
BIRDSALL, Nancy, PINCKNEY, Thomas and SABOT, Richard (2000): “Natural Resources, Human Capital, and 
Growth”. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working papers, Washington DC, February. 
BLOOM, David and SACHS, Jeffrey (1998): “Geography, Demography, and Economic Growth in Africa”. Brookings 
Papers on Economics Activity 2: 207-273. 
BOSCHINI, Anne, PETTERSSON, Jan and ROINE, Jesper (2005): “Resource curse or not: A question of 
appropriability”.  Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, Nº 3, pp. 593-617, September.  
BOYCE, John and EMERY, J.C. Herbert (2006): What can exhaustible resource theory tell us about per capita income 
growth in resource intensive economies? University of Calgary, Department of Economics, mimeo. 
BRAVO-ORTEGA, Claudio and DE GREGORIO, José (2005): “The relative richness of the poor? Natural Resources, 
human capital and economic growth.” The World Bank Policy Research, Working Papers Series, No. 3484. 
BRUNNSCHWEILER, Christa (2008): “Cursing the blessings? Natural resource abundance, institutions, and economic 
growth”. World Development. Elsevier, vol. 36 (3), pp. 399-419, March. 
BRUNNSCHWEILER, Christa and BULTE, Edwin (2006): “The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of 
Paradoxes and Red Herrings”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pp. 248-
264, May.  
BULTE, Erwin, DAMANIA, Richard and DEACON, Robert (2005): “Resource intensity, Institutions and 
Development”. World Development, Vol. 33, No 7, pp. 1029-1044.  
CHAMBERS, Edward J. and GORDON, Donald F. (1966):  “Primary Products and Economic Growth: An Empirical 
Measurement”. Journal of Political Economy 74 (4), pp. 315-332. 
CIMOLI, Mario and DOSI Giovanni (1995): “Technological paradigms, patterns of learning and development: an 
introductory roadmap”.  Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 5, Nº 3, pp. 243-268 September. 
CIMOLI, Mario, PORCILE, Gabriel, PRIMI, Annalisa and VERGARA, Sebastián, (2005): “Cambio estructural, 
heterogeneidad productiva y tecnología en América Latina”. En Cimoli, M. (Ed.), Heterogeneidad estructural, 
asimetrías tecnológicas y crecimiento en América Latina.  CEPAL, BID, Santiago de Chile, pp. 9-39, Noviembre. 
COLLIER, Paul and HOEFFLER, Anke (2005): “Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict”. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 49, pp. 625-633. 
 283
COLLIER, Paul and HOEFFLER, Anke (2002): “Greed and grievance in civil war”. Centre for the Study of African 
Economies Working Paper (01).  
COLLIER Paul and HOEFFLER Anke (1998): “On economic causes of civil war”. Oxford Economic Papers 50, pp. 
563-573. 
CORDEN, Max (1984): “Booming Sector and Dutch Disease Economics: Survey and consolidation”, Oxford Economic 
Papers 36: 359-380. 
CZELUSTA, Jesse and WRIGTH, Gavin (2007): “Resource-Based Growth Past and Present”. In Lederman, D. and 
Maloney, W. (eds.): Natural Resources: Neither Curse nor Destiny”.  World Bank/Stanford University Press, pp. 
183-211. 
CZELUSTA, Jesse and WRIGTH, Gavin (2004): “The Myth of the Resource Curse”. Challenge, pp. 6-36, March-
April. 
DALGAARD, Carl-Johan and OLSSON, Ola (2008): “Windfall Gains, Political Economy and Economic 
Development”. Journal of African Economies 17 (Supplement 1):72-109. 
DAVID, Paul and WRIGHT, Gavin (1997):  “Increasing Returns and the Genesis of American Resource Abundance”.  
Industrial and Corporate Change 6, pp. 203-245. 
DENOON, Donald (1983): Settler Capitalism: the Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphery. 
Oxford: Clarendon University Press.  
DIAZ ALEJANDRO, Carlos (1975): Ensayos sobre la historia económica argentina. Amorrourtu editores, Buenos 
Aires. 
DI TELLA, Guido (1982): “The Economics of the Frontier”. In Kindleberger, Ch. and Di tella, G. (Eds): Economic in 
the Long View.  Macmillan, London, pp. 210-227. 
DI TELLA, Guido y ZYMELMAN, Manuel (1967): Las etapas del desarrollo económico argentino. Ed. Universitaria 
de Buenos Aires. 
DIEGUEZ, Héctor (1969): “Argentina y Australia: algunos aspectos de su desarrollo económico comparado”. 
Desarrollo Económico, N° 32, Vol. 8, enero-marzo. 
DING, Ning and FIELD Barry (2004): “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth”. University of 
Massachusetts Amherst Resource Economics Working Paper No. 2004-7, July. 
DIXON, Robert and THIRWALL, Anthony P. (1975): “A Model of Regional Growth Rate Differences on Kaldorian 
Lines”, Oxford Economic Papers 27, pp. 201-214.  
DOMENECH, Jordi (2008): “Mineral Resource Abundance and Regional Growth in Spain, 1860-2000”. Journal of 
International Development, 20, pp. 1122-1135.  
DOSI, Giovanni (2007): “Technological innovation, institutions and human purposefulness in socioeconomic evolution: 
A preface to Christopher Freeman ‘Systems of Innovation. Selected Essays in Evolutionary Economics’”. LEM 
Working Paper Series, 2007/18 , Laboratory of Economics and Management, Sant’Anna School of Advanced 
Studies, September. 
DOSI, Giovanni (1988): “Sources, procedures and microeconomics effects of innovation”. Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 26, Nº 3. 
DOSI, Giovanni and NELSON, Richard (2009): “Technical change and Industrial Dynamics as Evolutionary 
Processes”. LEM Working Paper Series, 2009/07 , Laboratory of Economics and Management, Sant’Anna School of 
Advanced Studies, August. 
DOSI, Giovanni, PAVITT, Keith and SOETE Luc (1990): The Economic of Technical Change and International Trade. 
London, Harvester Wheatsheaf Press/New York University Press. 
DRELICHMAN, Mauricio (2005): “The curse of Moctezuma: American silver and the Dutch disease”. Explorations in 
Economic History, Volume 42, Issue 3, pp. 349-380, July. 
DUNCAN, Tim and FOGARTY, John (1984): Australia and Argentina. On parallel paths. Melbourne University 
Press. 
EASTERLY, William and LEVINE, Ross (2003): “Tropics, Germs and Crops: How Endowments Influence Economic 
Development”.  Journal of Monetary Economics 50:3-39. 
EMERY, Herbert, INWOOD, Kris, and THILLE, Henry (2007): “Hecksher-Ohlin in Canada: New Estimates of 
Regional Wages and Land Prices”. Australian Economic History Review. Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 22-48, March. 
 284
EMMANUEL, Arrighi (1972): Unequal Exchange: A Study in the Imperialism of Trade. Monthly Review Press, New 
York. 
ENGERMAN, Stanley and SOKOLOF, Kenneth (2002): “Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development 
among New World Economics”. Economía - Volume 3, Number 1, Fall 2002, pp. 41-88. 
ENGERMAN, Stanley and SOKOLOF, Kenneth (1997): “Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of 
Growth among New World Economies”. In Harber, S. (Ed.): How Latin America Fell Behind. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
FAGERBERG, Jan (1994): “Technology and international differences in growth rates”. Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. XXXII, pp. 1147-1175. 
FEINSTEIN, Charles Hilliard (1972): National income, expenditure and output of the United Kingdom, 1855-1965. 
Cambridge [Eng.] University Press.  
FINDLAY, Ronald (1995): Factor Proportions, Trade, and Growth. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
FINDLAY, Ronald and LUNDAHL, Mats (1994): “Natural Resources, ‘Vent-for-Surplus’ and the Staples Theory”. In 
Mmeier, G. (Ed.): From Classical Economics to Development Economics: Essays in Honor of Hla Myint.  St. 
Martin’s Press, New York, pp. 68-93. 
FOLEY, Duncan and MICHL, Thomas (1999): Growth and distribution. Harvard University Press  
FOREMAN-PECK, James (1995): A history of the world economy: international economic relations since 1850. 
Harvester Wheatsheaf.  
FRANK, André Gunder (1978): Dependent Accumulation and Development. Macmillna, London.  
FRANK, André Gunder (1967): Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and 
Brazil. Monthly Review Press, New York.  
FREEMAN, Christopher (1987): Technology and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan. Pinter, London. 
FREEMAN, Christopher (1963): “The plastic industry: a comparative study of research and innovation”. National 
Institute Economic Review, Nº 26. 
FRENKEL, Jeffrey (2010): “The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey”. Faculty research Working Paper, Harvard 
Kennedy School, February.  
FURTADO, Celso (1969): Teoría y política del desarrollo económico. Editorial Siglo XXI. 
FURTADO, Celso, (1966): “Desarrollo y estancamiento en América Latina: un enfoque estructuralista”. En Revista 
Desarrollo Económico 6 (22-23) jul-dic. 
GELB, Alan and Associates (1988): Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 
New York.  
GILLIS, Malcolm, PERKINS, Dwigth, ROEMER, Michael and SNODGRASS, Donald (1996): Economics of 
Development.  Norton, New York, NY. 
GRAY, Cheryl and KAUFMANN, Daniel (1998): “Corruption and development”. Finance and Development 35, pp. 7-
10, March. 
GREASLEY, David and OXLEY, Les (2005): “Refrigeration and distribution: New Zealand land prices and real wages 
1873-1939’. Australian Economic History Review, 45, pp. 23-44.  
GREASLEY, David and OXLEY, Les (2004): “Globalization and real wages in New Zealand 1873-1913”. 
Explorations in Economic History, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 26-47, January. 
GREASLEY, David and OXLEY, Les (2001): “Real wages in New Zealand 1873-1913: some comparison with 
Australia”. Paper presented in the XIV International Economic History Congress (2006), Helsinki, Finland. 
GROSSMAN, Gene, HELPMAN, Elhanan, (1994): “Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth”. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8, Nº 1, pp. 23-44.  
GYLFASON, Thorvaldur (2007): “The International Economics of Natural Resources and Growth”. Minerals and 
Energy-Raw Materials Report, Vol. 22 (1 & 2), pp. 7-17 June.  
GYLFASON, Thorvaldur (2006): “Natural Resources and Economic Growth: from Dependence to Diversification”.  In 
Broadman, H., Paas, T. and Welfens, P. (Eds.): Economic Liberalization and Integration Policy: Options for 
Eastern Europe and Russia. Springer, Heidelberg and Berlin.  
GYLFASON, Thorvaldur (2004), “Natural Resources and Economic Growth: from Dependence to Diversification”. 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper Nº 4804, December. 
 285
GYLFASON, Thorvaldur (2001): “Natural resources, education, and economic development”. European Economic 
Review 45, 847-859. 
GYLFASON, Thorvaldur and ZOEGA, Gylfi (2006): “Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The Role of 
Investment”. World Economy, August. 
GYLFASON, Thorvaldur and ZOEGA, Gylfi (2003): “Inequality and Economic Growth: Do Natural Resources 
Matter?” In Eicher, T. and Turnovsky, S. (eds.): Growth and Inequality: Theory and Policy Implications, MIT Press. 
HALL, Robert and JONES, Charles (1999): “Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Per Worker Than 
Others? Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1), pp. 83-116. 
HANSEN, Bent (1979): “Colonial Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Land: A Ricardian Case”. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 27, pp. 611-627. 
HERBERTSSON, Tryggvi, SKULADOTTIR, Marta and ZOEGA, Gylfi (1999): “Three symptoms and a cure: a 
contribution to the economics of the Dutch disease”. CEPR Discussion Paper Nº 2364, Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, London, UK. 
HIRSCH, S. (1965): “The US electronics industry in international trade”. National Institute Economic Review Nº 34. 
HIRSCHMAN, Albert (1958): The Strategy of Economic Development. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press. 
HOFFMAN, W.G., GRUMBACH, F. and HESSE, H. (1965): Das Wachstum der Deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte 
des 19 Jahrhunderts, Springer: Berlin. 
INNIS, Harold (1956): Essays in Canadian economic history. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.  
INNIS, Harold (1940): The Cod Fisheries: The History of an International Economy. Yale University Press, New 
Haven. 
INNIS, Harold (1930):  The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History. Yale University 
Press, New Haven. 
ISHAM, Jonathan, WOOLCOCK, Michael, PRITCHETT, Lant and BUSBY, Gwen (2005): “The Varieties of Resource 
Experience: How Natural Resource Export Structures Affect the Political Economy of Economic Growth”. The 
World Bank Economic Review 19 (2), May, pp. 141-174. 
KAMARK, Andrew (1976): The Tropics and Economic Development.  Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
KARL, Terry (1997): The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California Press, Berkeley. 
KRUEGER, Anne (1974): “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.” American Economic Review 64, 3, 
pp. 291-303, June. 
KRUGMAN, Paul (1991): “Increasing returns and economic geography”. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99 (3), 
pp. 483-499, June. 
KRUGMAN, Paul (1987): “The Narrow Moving Band, the Dutch Disease, and the Competitive Consequences of Mrs 
Thatcher: Notes on Trade in the Presence of Dynamic Scale Economies”.  Journal of Development Economics 27, 
pp 41-55. 
KRUGMAN, Paul (1981): “Trade, Accumulation, and Uneven Development”. Journal of Development Economics 8, 
pp. 149-161. 
KURZ, Heiz D. and SALVADORI, Neri (1995): Theory of Production: A Long Period Analysis. Cambridge University 
Press. 
KUZNETS, Simon (1955): “Economic growth and income inequality”. American Economic Review, Vol. XLV, N° 1, 
March, 1-28. 
LANDES, David (1998): The Wealth and the poverty of nations. New York: W.W. Norton. 
LEITE, Carlos, and WEIDMANN, Jens (1999): “Does mother nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption and 
economic growth”. IMF Working Paper No. 99/85, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
LÉVY-LEBOYER, Maurice and BOURGUIGNON, François (1985): L'économie française au XIXème siècle. Analyse 
macro-économique.  Economica, Paris. 
LEWIS, Arthur (1983): Crecimiento y fluctuaciones. Fundación de Cultura Económica, México.  
LEWIS, Arthur (1955): The Theory of Economic Growth. London. 
LEWIS, Arthur (1954): “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour”. Manchester School of Economic 
and Social Studies, XXII, 2, pp. 139-191. 
 286
LINDERT, Peter and WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2001): “Does Globalization make the world more unequal?” NBER 
Working Paper Series 8228, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., April. 
LLOYD, Christopher and METZER, Jacob (2006): “Settler Colonization and Societies in History: Patterns and 
Concepts”.  XIV International Economic History Congress. Helsinki, Session 97, 21-25 August. 
LUNDAHL, Mats (1998): “Staples Trade and Economic Development”. In Lundahl, M. (Ed.): Themes of International 
Economics. Ashgate Publishing, Boston, pp. 45-68. 
MADDISON, Angus (1995): Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992. Paris: OECD. 
MATSEN, Egil and TORVIK, Ragnar (2005): “Optimal Dutch disease”. Journal of Development Economics, pp. 494- 
515. 
MATSUYAMA, Kiminori (1992): “Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and Economic Growth”.  
Journal of Economic Theory, 58, pp. 317-334, December.  
MCCOMBIE, John S. L. and ROBERTS, Mark (2002): “The role of the balance of payments in economic growth”. In 
Setterfield, M. (Ed.): The Economics of Demand-led Growth. Challenging the Supply-side Vision of the Long Run. 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham - UK, Northampton-MA-USA, pp. 87-114. 
MCCOMBIE, John. S. L. and THIRLWALL, Anthony. P. (1994): Economic Growth and the Balance of Payments 
Constraint.  St. Martin's Press, New York. 
MCLEAN, Ian (2006): “Recovery From Depression: Australia In An Argentine Mirror 1895-1913”. Australian 
Economic History Review., vol. 46(3), pp. 215-241, November.  
MCLEAN, Ian (2005): “Recovery From Depression: Australia In An Argentine Mirror 1895-1913”. Working Paper 
2005-19, School of Economics, The University of Adelaide, Australia.   
MCLEAN, Ian (2004): “Australian Economic Growth in Historical Perspective”. Economic Record, Vol. 80, No. 250, 
pp. 330-345, September. 
MITCHENER, Kris and MCALEAN, Ian (2003): “The Productivity of U.S. States Since 1880”. NBER Working Paper 
Series Nº 9445, National Bureau of Economic Research.  
MYINT, Hla (1958): “The Classical Theory of International Trade and the Underdeveloped Countries”. Economic 
Journal 68, pp. 315-337.  
MYRDAL, Gunnar (1957): Economic Theory and Under-developed Regions. Londres, Duckworth. 
NEARY, Peter and VAN WIJNBERGEN, S. (Eds.) (1986): Natural Resources and the Macro-Economy. MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
NELSON, Richard (ed.) (1994):  National Systems of Innovation. Oxford University Press. 
NELSON, Richard and WINTER, Sidney (1982): An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Growth. Harvard University 
Press. 
NORTH, Douglass (2003): “The role of institutions in Economic Development”. Discussion Paper Series No. 2003.2, 
United Nations. October. 
NORTH, Douglass, WALLIS, John, WEBB, Steven, and WEINGAST, Barry (2010): “Limited Access Orders: An 
Introduction to the Conceptual Framework”. June, 14, http://politicalscience.stanford.edu/faculty/weingast.html 
 NORTH, Douglass, SUMMERHILL, William, and WEINGAST, Barry (2000): “Order, Disorder and Economic 
Change: Latin America versus North America”. In Mesquita, B.B. d., and Root, H (Eds.): Governing for Prosperity, 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
NURSKE, Ragnar (1962): “Patterns of Trade and Development”. In Haberler, G. and Stern, R. (Eds): Equilibrium and 
Growth in the World Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
NURSKE, Ragnar (1953): Problems of Capital Formation in Underdevelopment Countries. New York, Oxford 
University Press. 
O’ROURKE, Kevin, TAYLOR, Alan and WILLIAMSON Jeffrey (1996):  “Factor Price Convergence in the Late 
Nineteenth Century”. International Economic Review 37: 499-530, August. 
O’ROURKE, Kevin and WILLIAMSON Jeffrey (1999): Globalization and History. Cambridge Mass: MIT Press. 
O’ROURKE, Kevin and WILLIAMSON Jeffrey (1994):  “Late 19th Century Anglo-American Factor Price 
Convergence: Were Heckscher and Ohlin Rigth?” Journal of Economic History 54, 4, pp. 1-25. 
PAPYRAKIS, Elissaios and GERLAGH, Reyer (2006): “Resource windfalls, investment, and long-term income”. 
Resources Policy 31, pp.17-128. 
 287
PAPYRAKIS, Elissaios and GERLAGH, Reyer (2004): “Natural Resources, Innovation, and Growth”. Nota di Lavoro 
129.2004, The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm, 
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract=609764, october. 
PLATT, Desmond and DI TELLA, Guido (eds) (1985): Argentina, Australia and Canada: Studies in comparative 
development 1870-196.  New York: St Martin´s Press. 
POSNER, Michael (1961): “International trade and technological change”, Oxford Economic Paper, Vol. 13. 
POWER, Daniel (1999): “Introduction. A Frontiers: Terms, Concepts, and the Historians of Medieval and Early 
Modern Europe”. In Power, D. and Standen N. (eds.): Frontiers in Question: Eurasian Borderlands 700-1700, 
Basingstoke, pp. 1-12.  
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, Leandro (2007): “Inequality and Poverty in Latin America: A Long-Run Exploration”. 
In Hatton, T.J., O’Rourke, K.H., and Taylor A.M. (eds.): The Comparative Economic History. Cambridge, Ma: 
M.I.T. Press, pp. 291-315. 
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, Leandro (2005): “Growth, inequality, and poverty in Latin America: historical 
evidence, controlled conjectures”. Economic History and Institutions Series Working Paper 05-41(04), Dpto. de 
Historia Económica e Instituciones, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid. 
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, Leandro (2000): “International Comparisons of Real Product, 1820-1990: An 
Alternative Data Set”. Explorations in Economic History, 37, pp. 1-41. 
PREBISCH, Raúl (1959): “Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries”. The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 49, Nº 2, pp. 251-273, May. 
PREBISCH, Raúl (1950): “The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems”. Economic 
Bulletin for Latin America 7 (1), pp.  1-22. 
RAY, Debraj (2000): “What’s new in development economics?”. The American Economist 44, 3-16.  
ROCK, David (1986): “The Argentine Economy, 1890-1914: some salient features”. In Di Tella, G. and Platt, D., 
(eds.): The Political Economy of Argentina 1880-1946. London: Macmillan.   
RODRÍGUEZ, Francisco and SACHS, Jeffrey (1999): “Why Do Resource-Abundant Economies Grow More Slowly? 
Journal of Economic Growth 4, pp. 277-303, September. 
RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier (2009): Los tiempos de la desigualdad. La distribución del ingreso en Chile, entre la 
larga duración, la globalización y la expansión de la frontera, 1860-1930. Tesis para optar por el grado de Magíster 
en Historia Económica, Programa de Historia económica y Social, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, 
mimeo. 
ROS, Jaime (2000):  Development Theory and the Economics of Growth. The University of Michigan Press.  
ROSENSTEIN-RODAN, Paul (1961): “Notes on the Theory of the Big Push”. In Ellis (ed.): Economic Development 
for Latin America. 
ROSS, Michael (1999): Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdowns in Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK. 
ROSTOW, Walt (1953): “The Process of Economic Growth, Oxford.  
SACHS, Jeffrey and WARNER, Andrew (2001): “The Curse of Natural Resources”. European Economic Review 45, 
pp. 827-838. 
SACHS, Jeffrey and WARNER, Andrew (1999a): “The big push, natural resource booms and growth”. Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 59, pp. 43-76. 
SACHS, Jeffrey and WARNER, Andrew (1999b): “Natural Resource Intensity and Economic Growth”. In Mayer, J., 
Chambers, B. and Farooq, A. (Eds.): Development Policies in Natural Resource Economies. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, pp. 13-38. 
SACHS, Jeffrey and WARNER, Andrew (1995): “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth”. NBER 
Working Paper Series 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., December. 
SALA-I-MARTIN, Xavier and SUBRAMANIAN, Arvind (2003): “Addressing the natural resource curse: An 
illustration from Nigeria”. NBER Working Paper 9804, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.  
SANZ-VILLAROYA, Isabel (2005): “The convergence process of Argentina with Australia and Canada: 1875–2000”. 
Explorations in Economic History 42, pp.  439-458 
SHANAHAN, Martin and WILSON, John (2007): “Measuring inequality trends in Colonial Australia using factor price 
ratios: the importance of boundaries”. Australian Economic History Review. Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 6-21, March. 
 288
SCHEDVIN, C.B. (1990): “Staples and Regions of Pax Britannica”. The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 
43, No. 4, pp. 533-559, November. 
SEERS, Dudley (1962):  “A Model of Comparative Rates of Growth in the World Economy”. The Economic Journal 
Vol. 72, Nº 285, pp. 45-78, March.  
SINGER, Hans (1950): “The Distribution of Gains between Investing and Borrowing Countries”. The American 
Economic Review Vol. 40, Nº 2, pp. 473-485, May.   
SMITH, Sheila (1976): “An Extension of the Vent-for-Surplus Model in Relation to Long-Run Structural Change in 
Negeria”. Oxford Economic Papers 28 (3), pp. 426-446, November. 
SOLOW, Robert (1956): “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
70, N° 1: 65–94. 
SOUTHEY, C. (1978): “The Staples Thesis, Common Property and Homesteading”. Canadian Journal of Economics 
Studies 11(3), pp. 547-559. 
STIJNS, Jean-Philippe (2001): Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth Revisited. NBER Working Paper 
Series 7784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., March.  
SWAN, Trevor (1956): “Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation”. Economic Record, 32, pp. 334-361, November. 
TAYLOR, Alan and WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (1997): “Convergence in the Age of Mass Migration”. European Review 
of Economic History 1, pp. 27-63, April. 
TORNELL, Aaron and LANE, Philip (1999): “The Voracity Effect”. American Economic Review 89, pp. 22-46. 
TORNELL, Aaron and LANE, Philip (1998):  “Are Windfalls a Curse? A Non-Representative Agent Model of the 
Current Account”. Journal of International Economics 44, pp. 83-112. 
TORVICK, Ragnar (2002): “Natural Resources, Rent Seeking and Welfare”. Journal of Development Economics 67, 
pp. 455-470. 
TORVICK, Ragnar (2001): “Learning by Doing and the Dutch Disease”. European Economic Review 45 (2), pp. 285-
306, February.  
TURNER, Frederick J. (1894): “The significance of the Frontier in American History”. Annual Report of the American 
Historical Association for 1893. Washington D.C. pp. 199-227. Reprinted in TURNER, Frederick J. (1920): The 
Frontier in American History. New York: Henry Holt. 
van WIJNBERGEN, S. (1984): “The ‘Dutch Disease’: A Disease after all”. Economic Journal 94, pp. 41-55. 
VERNON, Raymond (1966): “International investment and international trade in the product cycle”. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 80. 
WAHBA, Jackline (1998): “The Transmision of Dutch Disease and Labour Migration”. Journal of International Trade 
and Economic Development 7 (3), pp. 355-365, September.  
WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel (1974): The Modern World-System. Academic Press, New York.  
WATKINS, M.H. (1963): “A Staple Theory of Economic Growth”. The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political 
Science 29(2), pp. 141-158. 
WEBER, David and RAUSCH, Jane (1994): Where Cultures Meet. Frontiers in Latin American History. Jaguar Books 
on Latin America, No 6, Wilmington, Delaware.  
WELLSTEAD, Adam (2007): “The (Post) Staples Economy and the (Post) Staples State in Historical Perspective”. 
Canadian Political Science Review. Vol. 1 (1), pp. 8-25, June. 
WILLEBALD, Henry (2007): “Desigualdad y especialización en el crecimiento de las economías templadas de nuevo 
asentamiento, 1870-1940”. En Revista de Historia Económica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic 
History, 2/2007, pp. 291-345, Madrid, España. 
WILLEBALD, Henry (2006): Distribución y especialización productivo-comercial: Uruguay y las economías 
templadas de nuevo asentamiento, 1870-2000. Programa de Historia Económica y Social, Facultad de Ciencias 
Sociales, Universidad de la República, Uruguay, Tesis de Maestría en Historia Económica, diciembre, mimeo. 
WILLEBALD, Henry and BÉRTOLA, Luis (2011): “Uneven development paths among Settler Societies, 1870-2000”. 
In Lloyd, C., Metzer, J. and Sutch, R. (Eds.): Settler Economies in World History, Ch. 4, forthcoming.  
WILLIAMS, Michael (1975): “More and smaller is better: Australian rural settlement 1788-1914”. In Powell, J.M. and 
Williams, M. (eds.): Australian space: Australian time. Oxford University Press, Melbourne, pp. 61-103. 
 289
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2004): “De-Industrilization and Underdevelpment: A Comparative Assessment Around the 
Perphery, 1750-1939”, Harvard University, December. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2002): “Land, Labour and Globalization in the Third World, 1870-1940”. Journal of 
Economic History. 62 (1), pp. 55-85, March. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2000): “Land, Labour and Globalization in the Pre-industrial Thirld World”, NBER Working 
Paper Series 7784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., July. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (1999): “Real Wages, Inequality, and Globalization in Latin America Before 1940”. Revista de 
Historia Economica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Vol. 17, No. especial, pp. 101-142. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (1996): “Globalization, Convergence and History”. Journal of Economic History, No. 56, pp. 
1-30, June. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (1995): “The Evolution of Global labour Markets Since 1830: Background Evidence and 
Hypothesis”. Explorations in Economic History, 3/95, pp. 141-196. 
WOLF, Nikolaus (2001): “Regional GDP across Germany-Some first estimates at the level of NUTS-1, 1895-2000”. 
Draft.  
WOOD, Adrian and BERGE, Kersti (1997): “Exporting Manufactures: Human Resources, Natural Resources, and 
Trade Policy”.  Journal of Development Studies 34 (1), pp. 35-59.  
WOOD Adrian and MAYER, Jörg (2001): “Africa’s Export Structure in a Comparative Perspective”. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 25: 369-94.  
WOOLCOCK, Michael, PRITCHETT Lant, and ISHAM Jonathan (2001): “The social foundations of poor economic 
growth in resource-rich economies”. In Auty, R. (ed.): Resource Abundance and Economic Development. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
WORLD BANK (2006): Where is the Wealth of Nations? Measuring Capital for the 21st Century. Washington D.C.  
WRIGTH, Gavin (2001): “Resource-based growth then and now”. Standford University, June, mimeo.  
WRIGTH, Gavin (1990): “The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879-1940”. American Economic Review 80 
(4), pp. 651-668. 
 
Chapter 2. Land abundance, frontier expansion and income distribution in settler economies 
during the First Globalization (1870-1913): analytical framework 
ÁLVAREZ, Jorge, BILANCINI, Ennio, D’ALESSANDRO, Simone and PORCILE, Gabriel (2011):  “Agricultural 
Institutions, Industrialization and Growth: The Case of New Zealand and Uruguay in 1870-1940”. Explorations in 
Economic History, 48, pp. 151-168. 
ÁLVAREZ, Beatriz and NICOLONI, Esteban (2010): “Income Inequality in the North-West of Argentina during the 
first globalization. Methodology and Preliminary Results”, 2or Congreso Latinoamericano de Historia Económica y 
Cuarto Congreso Internacional de la Asociación Mexicana de Historia Económica. Simposio “Los orígenes y 
tendencias de la desigualdad en América Latina”, Mexico DF, February. 
ARROYO ABAD, Leticia (2008): “Inequality in Republican Latin America: Assessing the Impact of Factor 
Endowments and Trade”. GPIH Working Paper No. 12, UC Davis, November. 
AUTY, Richard (2001b): “The Political Economy of Resource-Driven Growth”, European Economic Review 45 (4-6), 
pp. 839-846. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis (2000): “El crecimiento de la industria temprana en Uruguay”. En Bértola, L: Ensayos de Historia 
Económica. Uruguay y la región en la economía mundial 1870-1990, Cap. 6: 149-166. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis y Colab. (2000): “Salarios, distribución del ingreso y aprendizaje en escenarios de convergencia y 
divergencia entre el Cono Sur y la economía mundial”. En Bértola, L (ed): Ensayos de Historia Económica. 
Uruguay y la región en la economía mundial 1870-1990 , Cap. 4: 91-119. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis, CALICCHIO, Leonardo, CAMOU, María and PORCILE, Gabriel (1999): “Southern Cone Real 
Wages Compared: a Purchasing Power Parity Approach to Convergence and Divergence Trends, 1870-1996”. 
Documento de Trabajo 44, Unidad Multidisciplinaria, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, 
Montevideo. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis, CASTELNOVO, Cecilia, REIS, Eustaquio and WILLEBALD, Henry (2007): “Income distribution in 
Brazil, 1836-1930”, 1er Congreso Latinoamericano de Historia Económica y 4as Jornadas Uruguayas de Historia 
Económica, Simposio 21, Montevideo, Uruguay, December. 
 290
BÉRTOLA, Luis, CASTELNOVO, Cecilia, RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier and WILLEBALD, Henry (2010): 
“Between the Colonial Heritage and the First Globalization Boom: On Income Inequality in the Southern Cone”. In 
Revista de Historia Económica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Vol. 28, Issue 2/2010, 
Madrid, España, pp. 307-341. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis, CASTELNOVO, Cecilia, RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier and WILLEBALD, Henry (2009a): 
“Income distribution in the Latin American Southern Cone during the first globalization boom and beyond”. Paper 
presented in the Conference A Comparative Approach to Inequality and Development: Latin America and Europe. 
Instituto Figuerola, Universidad Carlos III Madrid, May 8-9.  
BÉRTOLA, Luis, CASTELNOVO, Cecilia, RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier and WILLEBALD, Henry (2009b): 
“Income distribution in the Latin American Southern Cone during the first globalization boom and beyond”. In 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Volume 50, No. 5-6, October/December, pp. 452-485. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis, CASTELNOVO, Cecilia, and WILLEBALD, Henry (2009c): “Income distribution in Brazil, 1870-
1920”. Paper presented in the Conference A Comparative Approach to Inequality and Development: Latin America 
and Europe. Instituto Figuerola, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, May 8-9.  
BÉRTOLA, Luis and RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier (2009): “Income inequality in Chile 1860-1930”. Paper presented 
in the Conference A Comparative Approach to Inequality and Development: Latin America and Europe. Instituto 
Figuerola, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid, May 8-9.  
BOHLIN, Jan and LARSSON, Svante (2007): “The Swedish Wage-Rental Ratio and its Determinants, 1877-1926”. 
Australian Economic History Review. Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 49-72, March. 
BOSCHINI, Anne, PETTERSSON, Jan, and ROINE, Jesper (2005): “Resource curse or not: A question of 
appropriability”.  Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, Nº 3, pp. 593-617, September.  
CLEMENS, Michael and WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2004): “Wealth Bias in the First Global Capital Market Boom, 
1870-1913”. The Economic Journal, 114, pp. 304-337, April.  
DING, Ning and FIELD Barry (2004): “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth”. University of 
Massachusetts Amherst Resource Economics Working Paper No. 2004-7, July. 
DI TELLA, Guillermo (1982): “The economics of frontier”. In Kindleberger, C.P. and Di Tella, G. (eds.): Economics in 
the Long View, vol. 1. Macmillan, London. 
EMERY, Herbert, INWOOD, Kris and THILLE, Henry (2007): “Hecksher-Ohlin in Canada: New Estimates of 
Regional Wages and Land Prices”. Australian Economic History Review. Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 22-48, March. 
FINDLAY, Ronald (1995): Factor Proportions, Trade, and Growth. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
London, England. Chapter 5: “Trade, Migration, and the Moving Frontier”, pp. 121-145. 
FINDLAY, Ronald and LUNDAHL, Mats (2001): “Natural Resources and Economic Development: The 1870-1914 
Experience”. In Auty, R. (Ed.): Resource Abundance and Economic Development. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
pp. 95-112. 
FINDLAY, Ronald and LUNDAHL, Mats (1994): “Natural Resources, ‘Vent-for-Surplus’ and the Staples Theory”. In 
Meier, G. (Ed.): From Classical Economics to Development Economics: Essays in Honor of Hla Myint. St. Martin’s 
Press, New York, pp. 68-93. 
GARCÍA-JIMENO, Camilo and ROBINSON, James (2009): “The Myth of the Frontier”. NBER Working Paper Series 
14774, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., March. 
GREASLEY, David and OXLEY, Les (2005): “Refrigeration and distribution: New Zealand land prices and real wages 
1873-1939’. Australian Economic History Review, 45, pp. 23-44.  
HARLEY, Knick (2007): “Comments on factor prices and income distribution in less industrialized economies, 1870-
1939: refocusing on the frontier”. Australian Economic History Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 238-248, November.  
HARLEY, Knick (1978): “Western settlement and the price of wheat 1870-1913”. Journal of Economic History 38, pp. 
865-878. 
HENNESSY, Alistair (1978): The Frontier in Latin American History. Histories of the American Frontier, University 
of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque. 
ISHAM, Jonathan, WOOLCOCK, Michael, PRITCHETT, Lant and BUSBY, Gwen (2005): “The Varieties of Resource 
Experience: How Natural Resource Export Structures Affect the Political Economy of Economic Growth”. The 
World Bank Economic Review 19 (2), May, pp. 141-174. 
JONES, Ronald (1979): “A Three-Factor Model in Theory, Trade, and History”. In Jones, R. (Ed.): International 
Trade: Essays in Theory. Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 85-101 (first published in 1971). 
 291
KNACK, Stephen and KEEFER, Philip (2002): “Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality 
and Growth”. Public Choice, Vol 111, No. 1-2, pp. 127-154, April. 
KNACK, Stephen and KEEFER, Philip (1995): “Institutions, and Economic Performance: Cross Country Test Using 
Alternative Institutional Measures”. Economics and Politics, 7, pp. 207-227, November. 
LINDERT, Peter and WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2001): “Does Globalization make the world more unequal?” NBER 
Working Paper Series 8228, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., April.  
MADDISON, Angus (2001): A Millenial Perspective. Development Centre Studies, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (Update 2009). 
MILANOVIC, Branko, LINDERT, Peter and WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2007): “Measuring Ancient Inequality”. Policy 
Research, The World Bank Development Research Group Poverty Team, Working Paper Series 4412. 
MEHLUM, Halvor, MOENE, Karl and TORVIK, Ragnar (2006): Institutions and the Resource Curse. The Economic 
Journal, 116 (January), pp. 1-20. 
O’ROURKE, Kevin and WILLIAMSON Jeffrey (2005): “From Malthus to Ohlin: trade, industrialisation and 
distribution since 1500”. Journal of Economic Growth, 10, 5–34. 
O’ROURKE, Kevin and WILLIAMSON Jeffrey (1999): Globalization and History. Cambridge Mass: MIT Press. 
PORCILE, Gabriel y BÉRTOLA, Luis (2007): “Cambio estructural y crecimiento en el Río de la Plata y Australasia”. 
En Álvarez, J., Bértola, L. y Porcile, G. (Comp.): Primos Ricos y Empobrecidos. Crecimiento, distribución del 
ingreso e instituciones en Australia-Nueva Zelanda vs Argentina-Uruguay, pp. 171-187. Ed. Fin de Siglo, 
Montevideo, Uruguay. 
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, Leandro (2007): “Inequality and Poverty in Latin America: A Long-Run Exploration”. 
In Hatton, T.J., O’Rourke, K.H., and Taylor A.M. (eds.): The Comparative Economic History. Cambridge, Ma: 
M.I.T. Press, pp. 291-315. 
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, Leandro (2005): “Growth, inequality, and poverty in Latin America: historical 
evidence, controlled conjectures”. Economic History and Institutions Series Working Paper 05-41(04), Dpto. de 
Historia Económica e Instituciones, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid. 
ROBINSON, James, TORVICK, Ragnar and VERDIER, Thierry (2006): “Political foundations of the resources curse”. 
Journal of Development Economics, 79, pp. 447-468. 
RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier (2011): “Globalización, expansión de la frontera y desigualdad en Chile durante el auge 
salitrero (1880-1905)”. Investigaciones en Historia Económica, Febrero, pp. 21-55. 
RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier (2009): Los tiempos de la desigualdad. La distribución del ingreso en Chile, entre la 
larga duración, la globalización y la expansión de la frontera, 1860-1930. Tesis para optar por el grado de Magíster 
en Historia Económica, Programa de Historia Económica y Social, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, 
mimeo. 
RYBCSZYNSKI, Tadeusz (1955):  “Factor Endowment and Relative Commodity Prices”. Economica 22 (88), pp. 336-
341 
SACHS, Jeffrey and WARNER, Andrew (1995): “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth”. NBER 
Working Paper Series 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass. 
SALA-I-MARTIN, Xavier (1994): Apuntes de Crecimiento Económico. Anmtoni Bosch Editor, Barcelona. 
SHANAHAN, Martin and WILSON, John (2007): “Measuring inequality trends in Colonial Australia using factor price 
ratios: the importance of boundaries”. Australian Economic History Review. Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 6-21, March. 
WEBB, Walter Prescott (1952): The Great Frontier. Austin: University of Texas, Press.   
WEBER, David and RAUSCH, Jane (1994): Where Cultures Meet. Frontiers in Latin American History. Jaguar Books 
on Latin America, No 6, Wilmington, Delaware.  
WILLEBALD, Henry (2009): “Land abundant economies, frontier expansion and functional income distribution: settler 
economies during the first globalisation and interwar period (1870-1940)”. Paper presented in XXIX Encontro da 
Associaçao Portuguesa de Historia Econômica e Social Universidad do Porto, 13 e 14 Novembro. 
http://web.letras.up.pt/aphes29/data/5th/HenryWillebald_Texto.pdf 
WILLEBALD, Henry (2007): “Desigualdad y especialización en el crecimiento de las economías templadas de nuevo 
asentamiento, 1870-1940”. En Revista de Historia Económica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic 
History, 2/2007, pp. 291-345, Madrid, España. 
WILLEBALD, Henry (2006): Distribución y especialización productivo-comercial: Uruguay y las economías 
templadas de nuevo asentamiento, 1870-2000. Programa de Historia Económica y Social, Facultad de Ciencias 
 292
Sociales, Universidad de la República, Uruguay, Tesis de Maestría en Historia Económica, diciembre, mimeo. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2004): “De-Industrilization and Underdevelpment: A Comparative Assessment Around the 
Perphery, 1750-1939”, Harvard University, December. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2002): “Land, Labour and Globalization in the Third World, 1870-1940”. Journal of 
Economic History. 62 (1), pp. 55-85, March. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2000): “Land, Labour and Globalization in the Pre-industrial Thirld World”, NBER Working 
Paper Series 7784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., July. 
WOOLCOCK, Michael, PRITCHETT Lant and ISHAM Jonathan (2001): “The social foundations of poor economic 
growth in resource-rich economies”. In Auty, R. (ed.): Resource Abundance and Economic Development. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Chapter 3. Land frontier expansion: concepts and measures applied to settler economies in 
historical perspective (1850-1920)  
AITON, Arthur (1940): “Latin-American Frontiers”. Canadian Historical Association Report, pp. 100-104. Reprinted in 
Weber, D. and Rausch, J. (1994): Where Cultures Meet. Frontiers in Latin American History. Jaguar Books on 
Latin America, No 6, Wilmington, Delaware, pp. 19-25. 
ÁLVAREZ, Jorge (2008): Instituciones, cambio tecnológico y distribución del ingreso. Una comparación del 
desempeño económico de Nueva Zelanda y Uruguay (1870 – 1940). Programa de Historia Económica y Social, 
FCS, Universidad de la República, Uruguay, Tesis de Maestría en Historia Económica, mimeo. 
ARROYO ABAD, Leticia (2008): “Inequality in Republican Latin America: Assessing the Impact of Factor 
Endowments and Trade”. GPIH Working Paper No. 12, UC Davis, November. 
BADIA-MIRÓ, Marc (2008): “The Ports of Northern Chile: A Mining History in Long-run Perspective, 1880-2002".  
En Bergholm, T., Fischer, L.R. and Tonizzi, E. (ed): Making Global and Local Connections: Historical 
Perspectives on Ports. En Research in Maritime History, No. 35 series. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis, CASTELNOVO, Cecilia, RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier and WILLEBALD, Henry (2010): 
“Between the Colonial Heritage and the First Globalization Boom: On Income Inequality in the Southern Cone”. In 
Revista de Historia Económica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Vol. 28, Issue 2/2010, 
Madrid, España, pp. 307-341. 
BELAÚNDE, Víctor (1923): “The Frontier in Hispanic America”. Rice Institute pamphlets 10, October, pp. 202-213. 
Reprinted in Weber, D. and Rausch, J. (1994): Where Cultures Meet. Frontiers in Latin American History. Jaguar 
Books on Latin America, No 6, Wilmington, Delaware, pp. 33-41. 
BOLTON, Herbert (1917): “The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish-American Colonies”. The American 
Historial Review, Vol. 23, No. 1, October, pp. 42-61. 
BURT, A.L. (1965): “If Turner Had Looked at Canada, Australia, and New Zealand When He Wrote about the West”. 
In Wyman, W. and Kroeber, C. (ed): The Frontier in Perspective. The University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 59-79. 
BUTLAND, Gilbert (1966): “Frontiers of Settlement in South America”. Revista Geográfica 65, pp. 93-108. 
CAO, Horacio y RUBINS, Roxana (1996): Cuestión Regional y la Conformación del Estado-Nación en la Argentina. 
Instituto Nacional de la Administración Pública (INAP), 2ª Edición, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
CARIOLA, Carmen y SUNKEL, Osvaldo (1982): La historia económica de Chile entre 1830 y 1930: dos ensayos y 
una bibliografía. Ed. Cultura Hispánica, Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, Madrid. 
CENTER FOR SUSTAINABILITY AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT: The Atlas of the Biosphere. SAGE- 
Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin - Madison. retrieved December 27, 2009 
COGHLAN, T.A. (1904): A statistical account of Australia and New Zealand, 1903-4. Sidney: W.A. Gullick, 
Government Printer.  
COLEMAN, Peter (1958): “The New Zealand Frontier and the Turner Thesis”. Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 27, No. 
3, August, pp. 221-237. 
COMMONWEALTH BUREAU OF CENSUS AND STATISTICS (1910): Official Year Book of the Commonwealth 
of Australia. Nº 3, Melbourne, pp. 669-677. 
CRAFTS, Nicholas (2005): “Market potential in British regions, 1871-1931”. Regional Studies, 39(9), pp. 1159-1166. 
CROSS, Michael (ed) (1970): The Frontier Thesis and the Canadas: The Debate on the Impact of the Canadian 
Environment. Toronto: Coop Clark.   
 293
DAVIS, Richard (2006): “Introduction: transforming the frontier in contemporary Australia”. Chapter 1. In Bird Rose, 
D. and Davis, R. (ed): Dislocating the frontier. Essaying the mystique of the outback. The Australian National 
University Press, pp. 7-22.  
DENOON, Donald (1983): Settler Capitalism: the Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphery. 
Oxford: Clarendon University Press.  
FINDLAY, Ronald (1995): Factor Proportions, Trade, and Growth. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
London, England. Chapter 5: “Trade, Migration, and the Moving Frontier”, pp. 121-145. 
FINDLAY, Ronald and LUNDAHL, Mats (2001): “Natural Resources and Economic Development: The 1870-1914 
Experience”. In Auty, R. (Ed.): Resource Abundance and Economic Development. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
pp. 95-112. 
FINDLAY, Ronald and LUNDAHL, Mats (1994): “Natural Resources, ‘Vent-for-Surplus’ and the Staples Theory”. In 
Meier, G. (Ed.): From Classical Economics to Development Economics: Essays in Honor of Hla Myint. St. Martin’s 
Press, New York, pp. 68-93. 
FRANCIS, Douglas (1992): “The Frontier and Images of the Canadian West in the Settlement Era”. Sophia University, 
http://repository.cc.sophia.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/123456789/166/1/200000260873_000009000_19.pdf 
FURNISS, Elizabeth (2006): “Imagining the frontier: comparative perspectives from Canada and Australia”. Chapter 2. 
In Bird Rose, D. and Davis, R. (eds): Dislocating the frontier. Essaying the mystique of the outback. The Australian 
National University Press, pp. 7-22. 
GARCÍA-JIMENO, Camilo and ROBINSON, James (2009): “The Myth of the Frontier”. NBER Working Paper Series 
14774, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., March. 
HARLEY, Knick (2007): “Comments on factor prices and income distribution in less industrialized economies, 1870-
1939: refocusing on the frontier”. Australian Economic History Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 238-248, November.  
HARRIS, Chauncy (1954): “The market as a factor in the localization of industry in the United States”. Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 44(4), pp. 315-348. 
HARTZ, Lous (1964): The Foundations of New Societies. Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, 
South Africa, Canada, and Australia. Hartcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York.  
HIGHAM, Carol and THACKER, Robert (ed.) (2006): One West, Two Myths II. Essays on Comparison. University of 
Calgary Press.  
HURTADO, Carlos (1966): Concentración de Población y Desarrollo Económico. El caso chileno. Instituto de 
Economía, Universidad de Chile. 
KLEIN GOLDEWIJK, Kees, BEUSEN, Arthur, DE VOS, Martine and VAN DRECHT, Gerard (2011): “The HYDE 
3.1 spatially explicit database of human induced land use change over the past 12,000 years”. Global Ecology and 
Biogeography 20 (1): 73-86. 
KLEIN GOLDEWIJK, Kees, BEUSEN, Arthur and JANSSEN, Peter (2010): “Long term dynamic modeling of global 
population and built-up area in a spatially explicit way”. HYDE 3.1, The Holocene 20 (4): 565-573. 
KLEIN GOLDEWIJK, Kees and VAN DRECHT, Gerard, and BOUWMAN, A.F. (2007): “Mapping contemporary 
global cropland and grassland distributions on a 5 x 5 minute resolution”. Journal of Land Use Science, 2:3, pp. 
167-190. 
KLEIN GOLDEWIJK, Kees and VAN DRECHT, Gerard (2006): “HYDE 3: Current and historical population and land 
cover”. In Bouwman, A.F., Kram, T. and Klein Goldewijk, K. (Ed.): Integrated modelling of global environmental 
change. An overview of IMAGE 2.4, pp. 93-111. 
LANDSCAN (2006): Landscan global population database, the 2004 revision. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak 
Ridge, TN. Available at: http://www.ornl.gov/landscan (accessed June 2006). 
LILLESAND, Thomas, KIEFER, Ralph and CHIPMAN, Jonathan (2004): Remote Sensing and Image interpretation. 
Wiley&Sons Inc., USA. 
LINDERT, Peter and WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2001): “Does Globalization make the world more unequal?” NBER 
Working Paper Series 8228, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., April. 
LIVI-BACCI, Massimo (2007): A concise history of world population, 4th Ed. Blackwell Publishing,Oxford, UK. 
LOVEDAY, Peter (1991): “Political History of the North”. In Moffatt, I. and Webb, A. (eds): North Australian 
Research; Some Past Themes and New Directions, pp. 146-172, ANU, North Australia Research Unit, Darwin.   
MADDISON, Angus (2003): The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris, OECD 
 294
MADDISON, Angus (2001): A Millenial Perspective. Development Centre Studies, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (Update 2009). 
MARTINEZ GALARRAGA, Julio (2009): “The determinants of industrial location in Spain, 1856-1929”. Paper 
presented in the Fourth Summer School: ‘Growth and Globalization: Hardships, Barriers and Economic Policies, 
GlobaEuroNet, Lisboa, June-July.  
MCEVEDY, Colin, and JONES, Richard (1978): World atlas of population history. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 
UK. 
MCKINNON, M. (Ed.) (1997): New Zealand historical atlas. Auckland, NZ: David Bateman.  
MIKESELL, W. (1960): Comparative Studies in Frontier History”. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
50, March, pp. 62-74. 
O’ROURKE, Kevin, TAYLOR, Alan and WILLIAMSON Jeffrey (1996):  “Factor Price Convergence in the Late 
Nineteenth Century”. International Economic Review 37: 499-530, August. 
O’ROURKE, Kevin and WILLIAMSON Jeffrey (1999): Globalization and History. Cambridge Mass: MIT Press. 
O’ROURKE, Kevin and WILLIAMSON Jeffrey (1994): “Late 19th Century Anglo-American Factor Price 
Convergence: Were Heckscher and Ohlin Rigth?” Journal of Economic History 54, 4:1-25. 
RAMANKUTTY, Navin and FOLEY, Jonathan (1999): “Estimating historical changes in global land cover: Croplands 
from 1700 to 1992”. Global Biogeochemical Cycles, Vol. 12, No. 4, December, pp. 997-1027. 
REPÚBLICA ARGENTINA (1919): Tercer Censo Nacional, 1914, Argentina. Tomo IV: Población: Censo de las 
embarcaciones. 
ROSÉS, Joan (2003): “Why isn't the whole of Spain industrialized? New Economic Geography and early 
industrialization, 1797-1910”. The Journal of Economic History, 63(4), pp. 995-1022. 
REYNOLDS, Henry (2003): The Law of the Land. Penguin Books (3ed edition). 
REYNOLDS, Henry (1987): Frontier: Aborigines, Settlers and Land. Allen and Unwin, Sidney. 
RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier (2009): Los tiempos de la desigualdad. La distribución del ingreso en Chile, entre la 
larga duración, la globalización y la expansión de la frontera, 1860-1930. Tesis para optar por el grado de Magíster 
en Historia Económica, Programa de Historia Económica y Social, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, 
mimeo. 
SCHULZE, Max (2007): “Regional income dispersion and market potential in the late nineteenth century Hapsburg 
Empire”. LSE Working Papers, No. 106/07. 
SHARP, Paul (1955): “Three Frontiers: Some Comparative Studies of Canadian, American, and Australian Settlement”. 
Pacific Historical Review, November, pp. 369-377. 
SLOTKIN, Richard (1992): Gunfigther Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in the Twentieth Century America. Atheneum, 
New York.  
SLOTKIN, Richard (1985): The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 1800-
1890. Atheneum, New York.  
STATISTICS CANADA (1915): The Canada Year Book 1914. Ottawa.  
STATISTICS CANADA (1914): The Canada Year Book 1913. Ottawa.  
STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND (1991): New Zealand Official Yearbook, 1990. (NZOYB 1990). Wellington, NZ. 
TAYLOR, Alan and WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (1997): “Convergence in the Age of Mass Migration”. European Review 
of Economic History 1: 27-63, April. 
TIRADO, Daniel, PONS, Jordi and PALUZIE, Elisenda (2006): “Los cambios en la localización de la actividad 
industrial en España, 1850-1936. Un análisis desde la Nueva Geografía Económica”. Revista de Historia Industrial, 
31, pp. 41-63 
TURNER, Frederick J. (1894): “The significance of the Frontier in American History”. Annual Report of the American 
Historical Association for 1893. Washington D.C. pp. 199-227. Reprinted in TURNER, Frederick J. (1920): “The 
Frontier in American History”. New York: Henry Holt. 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, MUSEUM OF PALEONTOLOGY: website, 
http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/exhibits/biomes/index.php, retrieved December 27, 2009. 
WEBER, David and RAUSCH, Jane (1994): Where Cultures Meet. Frontiers in Latin American History. Jaguar Books 
on Latin America, No 6, Wilmington, Delaware.  
 295
WINKS, Robert (1981): “Australia, the Frontier, and the Tyranny of Distance”. In Wolfskill, G. and Palmer, S. (eds): 
Essays on Frontiers in World History. pp. 121-146. 
WINKS, Robin (1971): “The Myth of the American Frontier. Its relevance to America, Canada and Australia”. Sir 
George Watson Lecture, University of Leicester, 21 January. 
WILLEBALD, Henry (2009): “Land abundant economies, frontier expansion and functional income distribution: settler 
economies during the first globalisation and interwar period (1870-1940)”. Paper presented in XXIX Encontro da 
Associaçao Portuguesa de Historia Econômica e Social Universidad do Porto, 13 e 14 Novembro. 
http://web.letras.up.pt/aphes29/data/5th/HenryWillebald_Texto.pdf 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2002): “Land, Labour and Globalization in the Third World, 1870-1940”. Journal of 
Economic History. 62 (1), pp. 55-85, March. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2000): “Land, Labour and Globalization in the Pre-industrial Thirld World”, NBER Working 
Paper Series 7784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., July. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (1999): “Real Wages, Inequality, and Globalization in Latin America Before 1940”. Revista de 
Historia Economica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Vol. 17, No. especial, pp. 101-142. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (1996): “Globalization, Convergence and History”. Journal of Economic History, No. 56, pp. 
1-30, June. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (1995): “The Evolution of Global labour Markets Since 1830: Background Evidence and 
Hypothesis”. Explorations in Economic History, 3/95, pp. 141-196. 
ZAVALA, Silvio (1965): “The Frontier of Hispanic America”. In Wyman, W. and Kroeber, C. (ed): The Frontier in 
Perspective. The University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 35-58. 
 
Chapter 4. Inequality patterns: concepts and measures applied to settler economies in 
historical perspective (1870-1913) 
ÁLVAREZ, Jorge (2008): Instituciones, cambio tecnológico y distribución del ingreso. Una comparación del 
desempeño económico de Nueva Zelanda y Uruguay (1870 – 1940). Programa de Historia Económica y Social, 
Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, Uruguay, Tesis de Maestría en Historia Económica, 
diciembre, mimeo. 
ÁLVAREZ, Jorge, BILANCINI, Ennio, D’ALESSANDRO, Simone and PORCILE, Gabriel (2011):  “Agricultural 
Institutions, Industrialization and Growth: The Case of New Zealand and Uruguay in 1870-1940”. Explorations in 
Economic History, vol. 48(2), pp. 151-168, April.  
ÁLVAREZ, Jorge and WILLEBALD, Henry (2009): “Land ownership systems and the conditions for the economic 
growth: settler economies during the First Globalization”. Paper presented in the XV World Economic History 
Congress, Utrecht, Netherlands, Session J4: Property Rights, Institutional Settings, and Economic Growth, August  
(http://www.wehc2009.org/programme.asp). 
ARROYO ABAD, Leticia (2008): “Inequality in Republican Latin America: Assessing the Impact of Factor 
Endowments and Trade”. GPIH Working Paper No. 12, UC Davis, November. 
BARRO, Robert (2008): “Inequality and Growth Revisited”. Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration 
No. 11, Asian Development Bank , January. 
BARRO, Robert (2000): “Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries”. Journal of Economic Growth, 5, March, pp. 
5-32. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis, CASTELNOVO, Cecilia, RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier and WILLEBALD, Henry (2010): 
“Between the Colonial Heritage and the First Globalization Boom: On Income Inequality in the Southern Cone”. In 
Revista de Historia Económica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Vol. 28, Issue 2/2010, 
Madrid, España, pp. 307-341. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis and RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier (2009): “Between La Longue Durée, Globalization and the 
Expansion of the Frontier: Income Inequality in Chile 1860-1930”. Paper presented to the Conference A 
Comparative Approach to Inequality and Development: Latin America and Europe, Madrid, 8-9 May. 
BHADURI, Amit (2008): “On the dynamics of profit-led and wage-led growth”. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 32, 
pp. 147-160. 
BURT, A.L. (1965): “If Turner Had Looked at Canada, Australia, and New Zealand When He Wrote about the West”. 
In Wyman, W. and Kroeber, C. (ed): The Frontier in Perspective. The University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 59-79. 
COWELL, Frank (2008): Measuring Inequality. Series LSE Perspectives in Economic Analysis, Oxford University 
Press. 
DEININGER, Klaus and OLINTO Pedro (2000): “Asset distribution, inequality and growth”, World Bank, Mimeo. 
 296
DEININGER, Klaus and SQUIRE, Lyn (1998): “New Ways of Looking at Old Issues: Inequality and Growth”, Journal 
of Development Economics, 57 (2), pp. 259-287. 
EHRHART, Christopher (2009): “The effects of inequality on growth: a survey of the theoretical and empirical 
literature”. ECINI WP 2009-107, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, February. 
ERICKSON, Lennart and VOLLARTH, Dietricht (2004): “Dimensions of Land Inequality and Economic 
Development”. IMF Working Paper WP/04/158, International Monetary Fund.   
FOLEY, Duncan and MICHL, Thomas (1999): Growth and distribution. Harvard University Press  
HARLEY, Knick (2007): “Comments on factor prices and income distribution in less industrialized economies, 1870-
1939: refocusing on the frontier”. Australian Economic History Review, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 238-248, November.  
KURZ, Heiz D. and SALVADORI, Neri (1995): Theory of Production: A Long Period Analysis. Cambridge University 
Press. 
RODRÍGUEZ WEBER Javier (2009): Los tiempos de la desigualdad. La distribución del ingreso en Chile, entre la 
larga duración, la globalización y la expansión de la frontera, 1860-1930. Tesis para optar por el grado de Magíster 
en Historia Económica, Programa de Historia económica y social, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, mimeo. 
RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier and WILLEBALD, Henry (2010): “Agrarian functional income distribution in Chile 
(1870-1915): First Globalization, land frontier expansion and capital formation”. Séptimas Jornadas de 
Investigación en Historia Económica, Asociación Uruguaya de Historia Económica, 4 y 5 de Agosto. 
ROSECRANCE, Richard (1964): “The Radical Culture of Australia”. In Hartz, L. (ed): The Foundations of New 
Societies. Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia. Harcourt, 
Brace & World, Inc., New York. 
WELLSTEAD, Adam (2007): “The (Post) Staples Economy and the (Post) Staples State in Historical Perspective”. 
Canadian Political Science Review. Vol. 1 (1): 8-25, June. 
WILLEBALD, Henry (2007): “Desigualdad y especialización en el crecimiento de las economías templadas de nuevo 
asentamiento, 1870-1940”. En Revista de Historia Económica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic 
History, 2/2007, pp. 291-345, Madrid, España. 
WILLEBALD, Henry (2006): Distribución y especialización productivo-comercial: Uruguay y las economías 
templadas de nuevo asentamiento, 1870-2000. Tesis de Maestría en Historia Económica, Facultad de Ciencias 
Sociales, Universidad de la República, Montevideo, mimeo. 
WILLEBALD, Henry and BÉRTOLA, Luis (2011): “Uneven development paths among Settler Societies, 1870-2000”. 
In Lloyd, C., Metzer, J. and Sutch, R. (Eds.): Settler Economies in World History, Ch. 4, in print.  
WILLIAMS, Michael (1975): “More and smaller is better: Australian rural settlement 1788-1914”. In Powell, J.M. and 
Williams, M. (eds.): Australian space: Australian time. Pp. 61-103. Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2002): “Land, Labour and Globalization in the Third World, 1870-1940”. Journal of 
Economic History. 62 (1), pp. 55-85, March.  
WILLIAMSON, Jeffrey (2000): “Land, Labour and Globalization in the Pre-industrial Thirld World”, NBER Working 
Paper Series 7784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., July. 
 
Chapter 5. Natural resources and institutional quality: the hypothesis of appropriability 
revisited from an historical perspective 
ACEMOGLU, Daron, JOHNSON, Simon and ROBINSON, James (2005): “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of 
Long-Run Growth”. In Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S. (Ed.): Handbook of Economic Growth, Amsterdam: North 
Holland. 
ACEMOGLU, Daron, JOHNSON, Simon and ROBINSON, James (2001): “Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation”. American Economic Review 91, pp. 1369-1341. 
ALSTON, Lee and MUELLER, Bernardo (2005): “Property Rights and the State”. In Ménard C. and Shirley M. (eds.): 
Handbook of New Institutional Economics, Ch. 22, pp. 573-590, Springer, Netherlands. 
ALSTON, Lee and MUELLER, Bernardo (2003): Property Rights, Violence and the State. Texto para Discussao nº 
293, Departamento de Economia, Universidad de Brasília. 
ÁLVAREZ, Jorge (2008): Instituciones, cambio tecnológico y distribución del ingreso. Una comparación del 
desempeño económico de Nueva Zelanda y Uruguay (1870 – 1940). Programa de Historia Económica y Social, 
Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, Uruguay, Tesis de Maestría en Historia Económica, 
diciembre, mimeo. 
ÁLVAREZ, Jorge and WILLEBALD, Henry (2009): “Land ownership systems and the conditions for the economic 
growth: settler economies during the First Globalization”. Paper presented in the XV World Economic History 
Congress, Utrecht, Netherlands, Session J4: Property Rights, Institutional Settings, and Economic Growth, August,  
 297
(http://www.wehc2009.org/programme.asp). 
AUTY, Richard and GELB, Alan (2001): “Political Economy of Resource-Abundant States”. In Auty, R. (Ed.) 
Resource Abundance and Economic Development, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 126-144.  
AVELLANEDA, Nicolás (1865): Estudio sobre las leyes de tierras públicas. Segunda Edición. Imprenta del Siglo. 
Buenos Aires. 
AYRES, Robert, CASTANEDA, Beatriz, CLEVELAND, Cutler, COSTANZA, Robert, DALY, Herman, FOLKE, 
Carl, HANNON, Bruce, HARRIS, Jonathan, KAUFMANN, Robert, LIN, Xiannuan, NORGAARD, Richard, 
RUTH, Matthias, SPRENG, Daniel, STERN, David, and VAN DEN BERGH, Jeroen (1997): “Natural Capital, 
Human Capital, and Sustainable Economic Growth”. MacArthur Foundation-Center for Energy and Environmental 
Studies at Boston University, Boston. 
BARRÁN, José y NAHUM, Benjamín (1978): Historia Rural del Uruguay Moderno. Tomo VII: “Agricultura, crédito 
y transporte bajo Batlle (1905-1914)”. Ed. EBO, Montevideo. 
BARRÁN, José y NAHUM, Benjamín (1977): Historia Rural del Uruguay Moderno. Tomo VI: “La civilización 
ganadera bajo Batlle (1905-1914)”. Ed. EBO, Montevideo. 
BARRÁN, José y NAHUM, Benjamín (1973): Historia Rural del Uruguay Moderno. Tomo III: “1895-1904”. Ed. 
EBO, Montevideo. 
BARRÁN, José y NAHUM, Benjamín (1972): Historia Rural del Uruguay Moderno. Tomo IV: “Historia social de las 
revoluciones de 1897 y 1904”. Ed. EBO, Montevideo. 
BARRÁN, José y NAHUM, Benjamín (1971): Historia Rural del Uruguay Moderno Tomo II: “1886-1894”. Ed. EBO, 
Montevideo. 
BARRÁN, José y NAHUM, Benjamín (1967): Historia Rural del Uruguay Moderno, 1851-1885; Apéndice 
Documental; Ed. EBO, Montevideo. 
BÉRTOLA, Luis, CASTELNOVO, Cecilia, RODRÍGUEZ WEBER, Javier and WILLEBALD, Henry (2010): 
“Between the Colonial Heritage and the First Globalization Boom: On Income Inequality in the Southern Cone”. In 
Revista de Historia Económica-Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History, Vol. 28, Issue 2/2010, 
Madrid, España, pp. 307-341. 
BOSCHINI, Anne, PETTERSSON, Jan, and ROINE, Jesper (2005): “Resource curse or not: A question of 
appropriability”.  Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, Nº 3, pp. 593-617, September.  
BOYCE, John and EMERY, J.C. Herbert (2006): What can exhaustible resource theory tell us about per capita income 
growth in resource intensive economies? University of Calgary, Department of Economics, mimeo. 
BRAVO-ORTEGA, Claudio and DE GREGORIO, José (2005): “The relative richness of the poor? Natural Resources, 
human capital and economic growth.” The World Bank Policy Research, Working Papers Series, No. 3484. 
BRUNNSCHWEILER, Christa (2008): “Cursing the blessings? Natural resource abundance, institutions, and economic 
growth”. World Development. Elsevier, vol. 36 (3), pp. 399-419, March. 
BRUNNSCHWEILER, Christa and BULTE, Edwin (2006): “The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of 
Paradoxes and Red Herrings”. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pp. 248-
264, May. 
BURGUIN, M (1946): The economic aspects of Argentine Federalism, 1820-1852. Ed. ACLS. New York 
CÁRCANO, Miguel Ángel (1971): Evolución Histórica del régimen de la tierra pública 1810-1916. Buenos Aires, 
Eudeba (primera edición Librería Mandesky, 1917). 
CHANG, Ha-Joon (2010): “Institutions and economic development: theory, policy and history”. Journal of Institutional 
Economics, DOI: 10.1017/S1744137410000378. 
CIDE (1965): Estudio Económico del Uruguay. Evolución y perspectivas. Tomo I, Comisión de Inversiones y 
Desarrollo Económico, Montevideo, Uruguay. 
CLAGUE, Christopher, KEEFER, Philip, KNACK, Stephen and OLSON, Mancur (1999): “Contract-Intensive Money: 
Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance”, Journal of Economic Growth, 4, pp. 185–211, 
June. 
CLARKSON, L A (1971): “Agriculture and the development of the Australian economy during the nineteenth century: 
review article”. Agricultural History Review Vol. 19, Issue 1, pp 88-96. 
COMMONWEALTH BUREAU OF CENSUS AND STATISTICS (1911): Year Book of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1910-1911. Nº 4, Melbourne.  
 298
D'AGOSTINO, Valeria (2005) “Las tierras públicas en el sudeste bonaerense: los partidos de Arenales y Ayacucho, 
1850-1880”. Mundo Agrícola  [online]. jul./dic. 2005, vol.6, no.11 [quoted February 16, 2009], p.0-0. Available  in 
<http://www.scielo.org.ar/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1515-59942005000200008&lng=es&nrm=iso>. 
DENOON, Donald (1983): Settler Capitalism: the Dynamics of Dependent Development in the Southern Hemisphery. 
Oxford: Clarendon University Press.  
DING, Ning and FIELD Barry (2004): “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth”. University of 
Massachusetts Amherst Resource Economics Working Paper No. 2004-7, July. 
DI TELLA, Guido (1989): “La economía de frontera”. En Di Tella G. y Kindleberger, C. (eds): Economía de largo 
plazo. Buenos Aires, pp. 293-316. 
DOWNIE, William (1909a): “Land Tenure and Monopoly: I”. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 17, No. 3, 
March, pp. 144-152. 
DOWNIE, William (1909b): “Land Tenure and Monopoly: I”. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 17, No. 2, 
February, pp. 82-91. 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA (2004): Land Tenure Systems and their Impacts on Food Security and 
Sustainable Development in Africa, December, http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Publications/sdd/Land_Tenure_ 
systems.pdf, retrieved January 13, 2009. 
ENGERMAN, Stanley and SOKOLOF, Kenneth (2002): “Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development 
among New World Economics”. NBER Working Paper Series 9259. National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
ENGERMAN, Stanley and SOKOLOF, Kenneth (1997): “Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of 
Growth among New World Economies”. In Harber, S. (Ed.): How Latin America Fell Behind. Standford, CA: 
Standsford U4niversity Press. 
GARCÍA-JIMENO Camilo and ROBINSON, James (2009): “The Myth of the Frontier”. NBER Working Paper Series 
14774, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., March. 
GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND (1908): The New Zealand Official Year-Book 1908. Seventeenth Year of Issue, 
Wellington.  
HALPERIN DONGUI, Tulio (1971): De la revolución de independencia a la Confederación rosista. Ed. Paidós. 
Buenos Aires 
HALPERIN DONGUI, Tulio (1963): “La expansión ganadera en la campaña de Buenos Aires (1810-1852)”. 
Desarrollo Económico, Vol. III Nº 1-2. Buenos Aires 
HAWKE, Gary (1979): “Acquisitiveness and Equality in New Zealand's Economic Development”. The Economic 
History Review, New Series, Vol. 32, No. 3, August, pp. 376-390.  
HAWKE, Gary (1985): The Making of New Zealand. An Economic History. Cambridge University Press.  
HEATON, H. (1925): “The Taxation of Unimproved Value of Land in Australia”. The Quarterly of Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 39, No. 3, May, 410-449.  
JACOB, Raúl  (1969): Consecuencias sociales del alambramiento (1872-1880). Ed. EBO. Montevideo.  
KEALL, Robert. (2000): “New Zealand”. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 59 (5), pp. 417-438. 
LA CROIX, Sumner (2002): “Land Tenure: An Introduction”. East-West Center. Working Paper, Economics Series Nº 
49, June. 
LAL, Deepak (1995): “Why growth rates differ. The political economy of social capability in 21 developing countries”. 
In Koo., B.H. and Perkins, D.H. (eds.): Social Capability and Long-Run Economic Growth. Basingstoke:Macmillan, 
pp. 288-309. 
LEFTWICH, Adrian (1995): “Bringing politics back in: towards a model of the developmental state”. Journal of 
Development Studies, 31, pp. 400-427. 
LOBATO, Zaída y SURIANO, Juan (2004): Atlas Histórico de la Argentina (Nueva Historia Argentina). Buenos Aires, 
Editorial Sudamericana. 
MARSHALL, Monty and JAGGERS, Keith (2009): Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’s Manual. Center For Global 
Policy, School of Public Policy, George Mason University, Center for Sustemic Peace, February. 
MCALOON, Jim (2002): “Gentlemanly Capitalism and Settler Capitalists: Imperialism, Dependent Development and 
Colonial Wealth in the South Island of New Zealand”. Australian Economic History Review, Vo. 42, No. 2, July, pp. 
204-223.  
 299
MCLINTOCK, A.H. (Ed.) (1966): An Encyclopaedia of New Zealand. http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/1966/land-
settlement/1 
MEHLUM, Halvor, MOENE, Karl and TORVIK, Ragnar (2006): Institutions and the Resource Curse. The Economic 
Journal, 116 (January), pp. 1-20. 
MILLOT, Julio y BERTINO, Magdalena (1996): Historia Económica del Uruguay. Tomo II (1860-1910). Ed. 
Fundación de Cultura Universitaria. Montevideo. 
MORAES, Inés (2001): Las determinantes tecnológicas e institucionales del desempeño ganadero en el largo plazo, 
1870-1970.  Tesis de Maestría en Historia Económica. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, UM, PHES, Universidad de la 
República. Montevideo, mimeo. 
MOYO, Sam (1995): The Land Question in Zimbabwe. Harare: SAPES Books. 
OTS CAPDEQUI, José María (1946): El Estado Español en las Indias. Ed. FCE. México 
PAULSON, Ross Evans (1988): “Review: The Antipodeans Connection: New Zealand Liberalism and American 
Progressivism”. Review in American History, Vol. 16, No. 2, June, pp. 272-277.  
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, Leandro and SANZ VILLARROYA, Isabel (2009): “Contract Enforcement, capital 
accumulation, and Argentina’s long-run decline”. Cliometrica, 3, pp. 1-26. 
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, Leandro and SANZ VILLARROYA, Isabel (2006): “Contract Enforcement and 
Argentina’s Long-Run Decline”. Economic History and Institutions Series Working Paper 06-06, Dpto. de Historia 
Económica e Instituciones, Universidad Carlos III, Madrid. 
PRICHARD LLOYD, Muriel (1970): An economic history of New Zealand to 1939. Collins, Auckland and London.  
RAMOS, Jorge A. (1965): Revolución y contrarrevolución en la Argentina. Tomos I y II. Ed. Plus Ultra. Buenos Aires 
RAPOPORT, Mario (2007): Historia económica, política y social de la Argentina (1880-2003). Emecé Editores. 
REEVES, W.P. (1902): State Experiments in Australian and New Zealand. Vol. 1, London (reissued 1968). 
REYNOLDS, Henry (2003): The Law of the Land. Penguin Books (3ed edition). 
ROBERTS, S.H. (1924): The History of Australian Land Settlement, 1788-1920. Melbourne.  
ROBINSON, James, TORVICK, Ragnar, and VERDIER, Thierry (2006): “Political foundations of the resources 
curse”. Journal of Development Economics, 79, pp. 447-468. 
ROSECRANCE, Richard (1964): “The Radical Culture of Australia”. In Hartz, L. (ed): The Foundations of New 
Societies. Studies in the History of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia. Harcourt, 
Brace & World, Inc., New York. 
RUFFINI, Martha (2006): “Estado y propiedad de la tierra en el territorio nacional de Río Negro: la cuestión de los 
ocupantes (1884-1892)”. En Cruz, E.y Paolini, R. (comp): La propiedad de la tierra. Pasado y presente. Estudios de 
arqueología, historia y antropología sobre la propiedad de la tierra en Argentina. Anuario del CEIC/ 3. Alción 
editora. Córdoba, pp. 147-167.  
SACHS, Jeffrey and WARNER, Andrew (1995): “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth”. NBER 
Working Paper Series 5398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass., December. 
SCORNIK, Fernando (2001): “Argentina”. In Andelson, R. (Editor): Land-Value Taxation Around the World: Studies 
in Economic Reform and Social Justice, 3rd Edition, Chapter 3. 
SHIVJI, Issa, MOYO, Sam, GUNBY, Derek and NCUBE, Welshman (1998): “National Land Policy Framework”. 
Draft discussion paper, Harare: Ministry of Lands and Agriculture, Government of Zimbabwe.. 
TRÍAS, Vivian (1974): Juan Manuel de Rosas. Ed. Siglo XXI. Buenos Aires 
VÁZQUEZ FRANCO, Guillermo (1968): Ingleses, ferrocarriles y frigoríficos. Enciclopedia Uruguaya. Ed. Arca. 
Montevideo. 
WILLEBALD, Henry and BÉRTOLA, Luis (2011): “Uneven development paths among Settler Societies, 1870-2000”. 
In Lloyd, C., Metzer, J. and Sutch, R. (Eds.): Settler Economies in World History, Ch. 4, in print.  
WILLIAMS, Michael (1975): “More and smaller is better: Australian rural settlement 1788-1914”. In Powell, J.M. and 
Williams, M. (eds.): Australian space: Australian time. Pp. 61-103. Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
WORLD BANK (2006): Where is the Wealth of Nations? Measuring Capital for the 21st Century. Washington D.C. 
